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26 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Yim Lee 296d3308b4 Fix typo in license header (#72) 2021-02-09 07:51:02 +00:00
Saleem Abdulrasool 8ff3d9dc83 build: explicitly include include in interface directories (#71)
The `include` directory is required for the interface include
directories for using `CCryptoBoringSSL` as a module from an external
package (i.e. SPM).  This allows SPM to include `CCryptoBoringSSL`
and find the module map.
2021-02-05 18:55:23 -08:00
Yim Lee 5c066af98c Update vendor-boringssl to save modulemap (#69)
* Update vendor-boringssl to save modulemap

Motivation:
The vendor-boringssl script rewrites `include`, which leads to deletion of `module.modulemap`.

Modification:
Save a copy of modulemap to tmp dir and copy it back at the end.

Result:
`module.modulemap` remains after running the script.

* Recreate modulemap each time instead of copying
2021-02-05 09:53:10 +00:00
Saleem Abdulrasoolandtomer doron 26d3f525eb build: allow using a build tree of dispatch, Foundation (#67)
When building swift-crypto from source for a toolchain build, it is
convenient to build it without building up a toolchain image.  This
additional knob allows for building swift-crypto with the build
artifacts of previous builds, allowing building up a toolchain image
while chaining multiple builds together.

Co-authored-by: tomer doron <tomer@apple.com>
2021-02-05 08:44:03 +00:00
Yim Lee 03581fe6ef Setup docker for cmake build (#70)
* Setup docker for cmake build

Motivation:
Be able to run cmake build in CI

Modifications:
- Add "cmake" service to `docker-compose.yaml`
- Update `Dockerfile` to install `cmake` and `ninja`. Remove unneeded dependencies.
- Add `docker-compose.2004.53.yaml`. `cmake` on previous Ubuntu versions are too old and it would be a pain to upgrade, so using Ubuntu 20.04 to simplify things.
- Add back modulemap to ensure cmake build is successful

Result:
Can run cmake in CI
2021-02-04 13:45:56 -08:00
Cory Benfield f9e47ba809 Update BoringSSL to bb43a45d6de7375f3310511d37f040d1055f8a10 (#66) 2021-02-04 12:31:56 +00:00
Yim Lee 42f5ffecd4 Update/Fix CMake build (#65)
Motivation:
SwiftPM's CMake build
(https://github.com/apple/swift-package-manager/pull/3202) unsuccessful
even with https://github.com/apple/swift-crypto/pull/60.

Modifications:
- Use consistent `SWIFT_CRYPTO_EXPORTS` naming. In some places `CRYPTO_EXPORTS` was used instead.
- Install `CCryptoBoringSSL` so we can import it in code (see https://github.com/apple/swift-package-manager/pull/3202)
- Always set `BUILD_SHARED_LIBS`

Result:
Successful CMake build.
2021-01-29 14:09:36 +00:00
47640ada33 Add CMake build files (#60)
Motivation:
This is to support https://github.com/apple/swift-package-manager/pull/3202, which adds swift-crypto as a dependency to SwiftPM.

Modifications:
Add CMake files.

Result:
Can build swift-crypto with cmake.

Co-authored-by: Saleem Abdulrasool <compnerd@compnerd.org>
Co-authored-by: Saleem Abdulrasool <abdulras@google.com>
2021-01-27 20:21:59 +00:00
Colin TremblayandCory Benfield 73dc51e2b2 fix a typo in documentation (#64)
Co-authored-by: Cory Benfield <lukasa@apple.com>
2021-01-26 18:15:55 +00:00
Fabian Fett f8034c8319 Use welcoming language (#63) 2021-01-26 07:54:17 +00:00
Saleem Abdulrasool 85d00fea15 Tests: add Windows into the RNG path (#61)
This adds Windows to the SystemNumberGenerator condition as well, which
is needed to get the tests to build on Windows.
2021-01-22 09:28:25 +00:00
Saleem AbdulrasoolandCory Benfield 8f4bfa5bc1 scripts: update scripts for Windows support (#57)
Add support for Windows for vending BoringSSL.  This is required in
order to build SwiftCrypto for Windows.

Co-authored-by: Cory Benfield <lukasa@apple.com>
2020-12-02 15:51:18 +00:00
Cory Benfield 0effb70b52 Update BoringSSL to 9dae0ac4f0ae18ebed988d36bfb4c4e4023fc574. (#54) 2020-12-02 15:44:56 +00:00
Saleem AbdulrasoolandCory Benfield 6eee6ab1d9 CCryptoBoringSSL: add Windows generated assembly (#56)
This adds the generated assembly files for Windows.  Unfortunately, the
x64 generated assembly appears to be ELF-esque and SYSV ABI rather than
Win64.  Additionally, the ARM targets do not seem to generate valid
Windows ARM code either (quick perusal shows at least invalid SP
handling on ARMv7 NT and non-conforming prologues on AArch64).  Add x86
Windows assembly only for the time being.

Co-authored-by: Cory Benfield <lukasa@apple.com>
2020-12-02 15:43:03 +00:00
Saleem AbdulrasoolandCory Benfield 8b1daa33f6 build: allow building on Windows (#53)
This allows us to build on Windows, though not entirely.  The assembly
routines need to be generated for the Windows targets, but this is
required to get to that point.  With this set of changes, we are able to
get to the point where we can start linking the `crypto-shasum` target,
which exposes the missing symbols.

Co-authored-by: Cory Benfield <lukasa@apple.com>
2020-12-02 11:09:40 +00:00
Saleem Abdulrasool ef6f94da02 gitignore: ignore vim swapfiles (#55) 2020-12-01 21:41:40 +00:00
YOCKOW 9680b7251c Make memset_s consistent with Darwin. (#52)
Resolves [issue#51](https://github.com/apple/swift-crypto/issues/51).

In Swift 5.3, a warning is viewed on Linux because `memset_s` implemented in this module returns `Void`.
This commit let the function return the same type with Darwin.
2020-10-06 10:22:50 +01:00
Cory Benfield 3c632a678e Update BoringSSL to 67818bea6690a230e2f42e8a588e0f54949bbbf1 (#50) 2020-09-30 15:31:23 +01:00
Cory Benfield 7ba861aa8a We now use the main branch. (#49) 2020-09-24 18:03:00 +01:00
Cory Benfield afe4c9b5f6 Update BoringSSL to 54858b63c1d886f6c8d903d4a4f594f1485de189 (#47) 2020-08-03 15:57:04 +01:00
Cory Benfield d82f7d8ce8 Update to Developer Beta 3 build. (#46) 2020-07-31 19:50:26 +01:00
Tim Condon 6445f9fb06 Fix path to environment script (#44) 2020-07-03 18:01:46 +01:00
Tim Condon f8b6e4e17e Clarify the location of the line to comment out for macOS development (#42) 2020-07-03 09:59:19 +01:00
buttaface 68d56d2b3c DERTests: enable test function for Android (#41) 2020-06-27 21:01:37 +01:00
Cory Benfield 794901c991 Update Swift Crypto with API from CryptoKit @ WWDC20 (#40)
Motivation:

At WWDC 2020 Apple updated the CryptoKit APIs. This PR brings those new
APIs to Swift Crypto. This brings Swift Crypto up-to-date with the
latest CryptoKit API support, including PEM/DER key support and HKDF API
extensions.

Modifications:

- Bring forward the CryptoKit API files
- Update to have API match the WWDC seed.

Result:

Users will have access to the seed APIs.
2020-06-22 21:40:34 +01:00
Johannes Weiss 82503a48ce fix warnings in with newer Swift compilers (#37)
Motiviation:

One `let` was hiding as a `var` and a few `#file` parameters have been
forwarded to (now) `#filePath` ones.

Modification:

- make the `var` a `let`
- silence the `#file`/`#filePath` warning by adding `(#file)` because we
  can't forward them properly right now
  (https://bugs.swift.org/browse/SR-12934). That's okay because even on
  the Swift master branch, `#file` == `#filePath`.

Result:

No warnings in newer Swift compilers.
2020-06-15 13:52:24 +01:00
289 changed files with 32192 additions and 10079 deletions

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+1 -1
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@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ _[the Swift Crypto tag/commit hash]_
### Environment
Stand in the root of the repo and run `./scripts/environments.sh` and paste the output below
Stand in the root of the repo and run `./scripts/environment.sh` and paste the output below
<details>
<pre>PLEASE_REPLACE_THIS_STIRNG_WITH_OUTPUT_OF_script_environments_THAT_IS_IN_YOUR_PASTEBOARD</pre>
+1 -1
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@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ _[the Swift Crypto tag/commit hash]_
### Environment
Stand in the root of the repo and run `./scripts/environments.sh` and paste the output below
Stand in the root of the repo and run `./scripts/environment.sh` and paste the output below
<details>
<pre>PLEASE_REPLACE_THIS_STIRNG_WITH_OUTPUT_OF_script_environments_THAT_IS_IN_YOUR_PASTEBOARD</pre>
+5 -1
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@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
.DS_Store
/.build
/out
/Packages
/*.xcodeproj
Package.pins
@@ -10,4 +11,7 @@ Package.resolved
.podspecs
DerivedData
.swiftpm
**/gyb.pyc
**/gyb.pyc
.*.sw[nop]
+46
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@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
##===----------------------------------------------------------------------===##
##
## This source file is part of the SwiftCrypto open source project
##
## Copyright (c) 2021 Apple Inc. and the SwiftCrypto project authors
## Licensed under Apache License v2.0
##
## See LICENSE.txt for license information
## See CONTRIBUTORS.md for the list of SwiftCrypto project authors
##
## SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
##
##===----------------------------------------------------------------------===##
cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.15.1)
project(SwiftCrypto
LANGUAGES ASM C Swift)
list(APPEND CMAKE_MODULE_PATH ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/cmake/modules)
include(SwiftSupport)
if(CMAKE_VERSION VERSION_LESS 3.16 AND CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME STREQUAL Windows)
set(CMAKE_ARCHIVE_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY ${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/bin)
set(CMAKE_LIBRARY_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY ${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/bin)
else()
set(CMAKE_ARCHIVE_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY ${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/lib)
set(CMAKE_LIBRARY_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY ${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/lib)
endif()
set(CMAKE_RUNTIME_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY ${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/bin)
set(CMAKE_Swift_MODULE_DIRECTORY ${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/swift)
option(BUILD_SHARED_LIBS "Build shared libraries by default" YES)
if(BUILD_SHARED_LIBS)
set(CMAKE_POSITION_INDEPENDENT_CODE YES)
endif()
if(NOT CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME STREQUAL Darwin)
find_package(dispatch CONFIG)
find_package(Foundation CONFIG)
endif()
add_subdirectory(Sources)
add_subdirectory(cmake/modules)
+12 -2
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@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
// Sources/CCryptoBoringSSL directory. The source repository is at
// https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl.
//
// BoringSSL Commit: 53a17f55247101105ae35767d5c5a6c311843a8e
// BoringSSL Commit: bb43a45d6de7375f3310511d37f040d1055f8a10
import PackageDescription
@@ -46,7 +46,17 @@ let package = Package(
],
dependencies: [],
targets: [
.target(name: "CCryptoBoringSSL"),
.target(
name: "CCryptoBoringSSL",
cSettings: [
/*
* This define is required on Windows, but because we need older
* versions of SPM, we cannot conditionally define this on Windows
* only. Unconditionally define it instead.
*/
.define("WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN"),
]
),
.target(name: "CCryptoBoringSSLShims", dependencies: ["CCryptoBoringSSL"]),
.target(name: "Crypto", dependencies: ["CCryptoBoringSSL", "CCryptoBoringSSLShims"], swiftSettings: swiftSettings),
.target(name: "crypto-shasum", dependencies: ["Crypto"]),
+2 -2
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@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ If you have issues with CryptoKit, instead of Swift Crypto, please use [Feedback
#### `gyb`
Some of the files in this project are autogenerated (metaprogramming) using the Swift Utils tools called [gyb](https://github.com/apple/swift/blob/master/utils/gyb.py) (_"generate your boilerplate"_). `gyb` is included in [`./scripts/gyb`](scripts/gyb).
Some of the files in this project are autogenerated (metaprogramming) using the Swift Utils tools called [gyb](https://github.com/apple/swift/blob/main/utils/gyb.py) (_"generate your boilerplate"_). `gyb` is included in [`./scripts/gyb`](scripts/gyb).
`gyb` will generate some `Foobar.swift` Swift file from some `Foobar.swift.gyb` _template_ file. **You should not edit `Foobar.swift` directly**, since all manual edits in that generated file will be overwritten the next time `gyb` is run.
@@ -108,5 +108,5 @@ SemVer and Swift Crypto's Public API guarantees should result in a working progr
### Developing Swift Crypto on macOS
Swift Crypto normally defers to the OS implementation of CryptoKit on macOS. Naturally, this makes developing Swift Crypto on macOS tricky. To get Swift Crypto to build the open source implementation on macOS, uncomment the line that reads: `//.define("CRYPTO_IN_SWIFTPM_FORCE_BUILD_API")`, as this will force Swift Crypto to build its public API.
Swift Crypto normally defers to the OS implementation of CryptoKit on macOS. Naturally, this makes developing Swift Crypto on macOS tricky. To get Swift Crypto to build the open source implementation on macOS, in `Package.swift`, uncomment the line that reads: `//.define("CRYPTO_IN_SWIFTPM_FORCE_BUILD_API")`, as this will force Swift Crypto to build its public API.
+373
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@@ -0,0 +1,373 @@
##===----------------------------------------------------------------------===##
##
## This source file is part of the SwiftCrypto open source project
##
## Copyright (c) 2021 Apple Inc. and the SwiftCrypto project authors
## Licensed under Apache License v2.0
##
## See LICENSE.txt for license information
## See CONTRIBUTORS.md for the list of SwiftCrypto project authors
##
## SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
##
##===----------------------------------------------------------------------===##
add_library(CCryptoBoringSSL STATIC
"crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_bool.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_dup.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_enum.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_gentm.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_i2d_fp.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_int.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_mbstr.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_object.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_octet.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_print.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_time.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_type.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_utctm.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_utf8.c"
"crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c"
"crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c"
"crypto/asn1/asn_pack.c"
"crypto/asn1/f_enum.c"
"crypto/asn1/f_int.c"
"crypto/asn1/f_string.c"
"crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c"
"crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c"
"crypto/asn1/tasn_fre.c"
"crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c"
"crypto/asn1/tasn_typ.c"
"crypto/asn1/tasn_utl.c"
"crypto/asn1/time_support.c"
"crypto/base64/base64.c"
"crypto/bio/bio.c"
"crypto/bio/bio_mem.c"
"crypto/bio/connect.c"
"crypto/bio/fd.c"
"crypto/bio/file.c"
"crypto/bio/hexdump.c"
"crypto/bio/pair.c"
"crypto/bio/printf.c"
"crypto/bio/socket.c"
"crypto/bio/socket_helper.c"
"crypto/blake2/blake2.c"
"crypto/bn_extra/bn_asn1.c"
"crypto/bn_extra/convert.c"
"crypto/buf/buf.c"
"crypto/bytestring/asn1_compat.c"
"crypto/bytestring/ber.c"
"crypto/bytestring/cbb.c"
"crypto/bytestring/cbs.c"
"crypto/bytestring/unicode.c"
"crypto/chacha/chacha.c"
"crypto/cipher_extra/cipher_extra.c"
"crypto/cipher_extra/derive_key.c"
"crypto/cipher_extra/e_aesccm.c"
"crypto/cipher_extra/e_aesctrhmac.c"
"crypto/cipher_extra/e_aesgcmsiv.c"
"crypto/cipher_extra/e_chacha20poly1305.c"
"crypto/cipher_extra/e_null.c"
"crypto/cipher_extra/e_rc2.c"
"crypto/cipher_extra/e_rc4.c"
"crypto/cipher_extra/e_tls.c"
"crypto/cipher_extra/tls_cbc.c"
"crypto/cmac/cmac.c"
"crypto/conf/conf.c"
"crypto/cpu-aarch64-fuchsia.c"
"crypto/cpu-aarch64-linux.c"
"crypto/cpu-aarch64-win.c"
"crypto/cpu-arm-linux.c"
"crypto/cpu-arm.c"
"crypto/cpu-intel.c"
"crypto/cpu-ppc64le.c"
"crypto/crypto.c"
"crypto/curve25519/curve25519.c"
"crypto/curve25519/spake25519.c"
"crypto/dh_extra/dh_asn1.c"
"crypto/dh_extra/params.c"
"crypto/digest_extra/digest_extra.c"
"crypto/dsa/dsa.c"
"crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c"
"crypto/ec_extra/ec_asn1.c"
"crypto/ec_extra/ec_derive.c"
"crypto/ec_extra/hash_to_curve.c"
"crypto/ecdh_extra/ecdh_extra.c"
"crypto/ecdsa_extra/ecdsa_asn1.c"
"crypto/engine/engine.c"
"crypto/err/err.c"
"crypto/err/err_data.c"
"crypto/evp/digestsign.c"
"crypto/evp/evp.c"
"crypto/evp/evp_asn1.c"
"crypto/evp/evp_ctx.c"
"crypto/evp/p_dsa_asn1.c"
"crypto/evp/p_ec.c"
"crypto/evp/p_ec_asn1.c"
"crypto/evp/p_ed25519.c"
"crypto/evp/p_ed25519_asn1.c"
"crypto/evp/p_rsa.c"
"crypto/evp/p_rsa_asn1.c"
"crypto/evp/p_x25519.c"
"crypto/evp/p_x25519_asn1.c"
"crypto/evp/pbkdf.c"
"crypto/evp/print.c"
"crypto/evp/scrypt.c"
"crypto/evp/sign.c"
"crypto/ex_data.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/aes/aes.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/aes/aes_nohw.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/aes/key_wrap.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/aes/mode_wrappers.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/add.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/bn.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/bytes.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/cmp.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/ctx.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/div.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/div_extra.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/exponentiation.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/gcd.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/gcd_extra.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/generic.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/jacobi.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/montgomery.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/montgomery_inv.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/mul.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/prime.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/random.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/rsaz_exp.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/shift.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/sqrt.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/aead.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/cipher.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/e_aes.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/e_des.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/des/des.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/dh/check.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/dh/dh.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/digest/digest.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/digest/digests.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/ec.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/ec_key.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/ec_montgomery.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/felem.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/oct.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/p224-64.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/p256-x86_64.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/p256.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/scalar.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/simple.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/simple_mul.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/util.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/wnaf.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ecdh/ecdh.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ecdsa/ecdsa.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/fips_shared_support.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/hmac/hmac.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/is_fips.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/md4/md4.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/md5/md5.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/modes/cbc.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/modes/cfb.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/modes/ctr.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/modes/gcm.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/modes/gcm_nohw.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/modes/ofb.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/modes/polyval.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/rand/ctrdrbg.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/rand/fork_detect.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/rand/rand.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/rand/urandom.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/rsa/blinding.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/rsa/padding.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/rsa/rsa.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/rsa/rsa_impl.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/self_check/self_check.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/sha/sha1-altivec.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/sha/sha1.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/sha/sha256.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/sha/sha512.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/tls/kdf.c"
"crypto/hkdf/hkdf.c"
"crypto/hpke/hpke.c"
"crypto/hrss/hrss.c"
"crypto/lhash/lhash.c"
"crypto/mem.c"
"crypto/obj/obj.c"
"crypto/obj/obj_xref.c"
"crypto/pem/pem_all.c"
"crypto/pem/pem_info.c"
"crypto/pem/pem_lib.c"
"crypto/pem/pem_oth.c"
"crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c"
"crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c"
"crypto/pem/pem_x509.c"
"crypto/pem/pem_xaux.c"
"crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7.c"
"crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7_x509.c"
"crypto/pkcs8/p5_pbev2.c"
"crypto/pkcs8/pkcs8.c"
"crypto/pkcs8/pkcs8_x509.c"
"crypto/poly1305/poly1305.c"
"crypto/poly1305/poly1305_arm.c"
"crypto/poly1305/poly1305_vec.c"
"crypto/pool/pool.c"
"crypto/rand_extra/deterministic.c"
"crypto/rand_extra/forkunsafe.c"
"crypto/rand_extra/fuchsia.c"
"crypto/rand_extra/passive.c"
"crypto/rand_extra/rand_extra.c"
"crypto/rand_extra/windows.c"
"crypto/rc4/rc4.c"
"crypto/refcount_c11.c"
"crypto/refcount_lock.c"
"crypto/rsa_extra/rsa_asn1.c"
"crypto/rsa_extra/rsa_print.c"
"crypto/siphash/siphash.c"
"crypto/stack/stack.c"
"crypto/thread.c"
"crypto/thread_none.c"
"crypto/thread_pthread.c"
"crypto/thread_win.c"
"crypto/trust_token/pmbtoken.c"
"crypto/trust_token/trust_token.c"
"crypto/trust_token/voprf.c"
"crypto/x509/a_digest.c"
"crypto/x509/a_sign.c"
"crypto/x509/a_strex.c"
"crypto/x509/a_verify.c"
"crypto/x509/algorithm.c"
"crypto/x509/asn1_gen.c"
"crypto/x509/by_dir.c"
"crypto/x509/by_file.c"
"crypto/x509/i2d_pr.c"
"crypto/x509/rsa_pss.c"
"crypto/x509/t_crl.c"
"crypto/x509/t_req.c"
"crypto/x509/t_x509.c"
"crypto/x509/t_x509a.c"
"crypto/x509/x509.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_att.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_d2.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_def.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_ext.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_lu.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_obj.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_r2x.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_req.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_set.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_trs.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_txt.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_v3.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c"
"crypto/x509/x509cset.c"
"crypto/x509/x509name.c"
"crypto/x509/x509rset.c"
"crypto/x509/x509spki.c"
"crypto/x509/x_algor.c"
"crypto/x509/x_all.c"
"crypto/x509/x_attrib.c"
"crypto/x509/x_crl.c"
"crypto/x509/x_exten.c"
"crypto/x509/x_info.c"
"crypto/x509/x_name.c"
"crypto/x509/x_pkey.c"
"crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c"
"crypto/x509/x_req.c"
"crypto/x509/x_sig.c"
"crypto/x509/x_spki.c"
"crypto/x509/x_val.c"
"crypto/x509/x_x509.c"
"crypto/x509/x_x509a.c"
"crypto/x509v3/pcy_cache.c"
"crypto/x509v3/pcy_data.c"
"crypto/x509v3/pcy_lib.c"
"crypto/x509v3/pcy_map.c"
"crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c"
"crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_akey.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_akeya.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_bcons.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_bitst.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_conf.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_crld.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_enum.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_extku.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_ia5.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_info.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_int.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_lib.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_ocsp.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_pcons.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_pmaps.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_prn.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_skey.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c")
if(CMAKE_SYSTEM_PROCESSOR MATCHES "x86_64|amd64")
if(CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME STREQUAL Darwin)
target_sources(CCryptoBoringSSL PRIVATE
crypto/chacha/chacha-x86_64.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/cipher_extra/aes128gcmsiv-x86_64.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/cipher_extra/chacha20_poly1305_x86_64.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/aesni-gcm-x86_64.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/aesni-x86_64.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/ghash-ssse3-x86_64.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/ghash-x86_64.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/md5-x86_64.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/p256-x86_64-asm.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/p256_beeu-x86_64-asm.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/rdrand-x86_64.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/rsaz-avx2.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha1-x86_64.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha256-x86_64.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha512-x86_64.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/vpaes-x86_64.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/x86_64-mont.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/x86_64-mont5.mac.x86_64.S)
elseif(CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME STREQUAL Linux)
target_sources(CCryptoBoringSSL PRIVATE
crypto/chacha/chacha-x86_64.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/cipher_extra/aes128gcmsiv-x86_64.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/cipher_extra/chacha20_poly1305_x86_64.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/aesni-gcm-x86_64.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/aesni-x86_64.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/ghash-ssse3-x86_64.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/ghash-x86_64.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/md5-x86_64.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/p256-x86_64-asm.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/p256_beeu-x86_64-asm.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/rdrand-x86_64.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/rsaz-avx2.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha1-x86_64.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha256-x86_64.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha512-x86_64.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/vpaes-x86_64.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/x86_64-mont.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/x86_64-mont5.linux.x86_64.S)
endif()
endif()
target_include_directories(CCryptoBoringSSL PUBLIC
include)
target_compile_definitions(CCryptoBoringSSL PRIVATE
$<$<PLATFORM_ID:Windows>:WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN>)
set_target_properties(CCryptoBoringSSL PROPERTIES
INTERFACE_INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES "${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/include;${CMAKE_Swift_MODULE_DIRECTORY}")
set_property(GLOBAL APPEND PROPERTY SWIFT_CRYPTO_EXPORTS CCryptoBoringSSL)
@@ -67,10 +67,10 @@
int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(ASN1_BIT_STRING *x, unsigned char *d, int len)
{
return M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(x, d, len);
return ASN1_STRING_set(x, d, len);
}
int i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, unsigned char **pp)
int i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING(const ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, unsigned char **pp)
{
int ret, j, bits, len;
unsigned char *p, *d;
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ ASN1_BIT_STRING *c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING **a,
}
if ((a == NULL) || ((*a) == NULL)) {
if ((ret = M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
if ((ret = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
return (NULL);
} else
ret = (*a);
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ ASN1_BIT_STRING *c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING **a,
return (ret);
err:
if ((ret != NULL) && ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret)))
M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ret);
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ret);
return (NULL);
}
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, int n, int value)
return (1);
}
int ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, int n)
int ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(const ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, int n)
{
int w, v;
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ int ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, int n)
* which is not specified in 'flags', 1 otherwise.
* 'len' is the length of 'flags'.
*/
int ASN1_BIT_STRING_check(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a,
int ASN1_BIT_STRING_check(const ASN1_BIT_STRING *a,
unsigned char *flags, int flags_len)
{
int i, ok;
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ int ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a, long v)
return (1);
}
long ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a)
long ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(const ASN1_ENUMERATED *a)
{
int neg = 0, i;
@@ -147,13 +147,13 @@ long ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a)
return r;
}
ASN1_ENUMERATED *BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED(BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai)
ASN1_ENUMERATED *BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai)
{
ASN1_ENUMERATED *ret;
int len, j;
if (ai == NULL)
ret = M_ASN1_ENUMERATED_new();
ret = ASN1_ENUMERATED_new();
else
ret = ai;
if (ret == NULL) {
@@ -179,11 +179,11 @@ ASN1_ENUMERATED *BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED(BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai)
return (ret);
err:
if (ret != ai)
M_ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(ret);
ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(ret);
return (NULL);
}
BIGNUM *ASN1_ENUMERATED_to_BN(ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai, BIGNUM *bn)
BIGNUM *ASN1_ENUMERATED_to_BN(const ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai, BIGNUM *bn)
{
BIGNUM *ret;
+6 -6
View File
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
ASN1_INTEGER *ASN1_INTEGER_dup(const ASN1_INTEGER *x)
{
return M_ASN1_INTEGER_dup(x);
return ASN1_STRING_dup(x);
}
int ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(const ASN1_INTEGER *x, const ASN1_INTEGER *y)
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ int ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(const ASN1_INTEGER *x, const ASN1_INTEGER *y)
* followed by optional zeros isn't padded.
*/
int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp)
int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(const ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp)
{
int pad = 0, ret, i, neg;
unsigned char *p, *n, pb = 0;
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ ASN1_INTEGER *c2i_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER **a, const unsigned char **pp,
}
if ((a == NULL) || ((*a) == NULL)) {
if ((ret = M_ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL)
if ((ret = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL)
return (NULL);
ret->type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
} else
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ ASN1_INTEGER *c2i_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER **a, const unsigned char **pp,
err:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, i);
if ((ret != NULL) && ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret)))
M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(ret);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(ret);
return (NULL);
}
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ ASN1_INTEGER *BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_INTEGER *ai)
int len, j;
if (ai == NULL)
ret = M_ASN1_INTEGER_new();
ret = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
else
ret = ai;
if (ret == NULL) {
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ ASN1_INTEGER *BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_INTEGER *ai)
return (ret);
err:
if (ret != ai)
M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(ret);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(ret);
return (NULL);
}
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
#include "../internal.h"
int i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT *a, unsigned char **pp)
int i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(const ASN1_OBJECT *a, unsigned char **pp)
{
unsigned char *p, *allocated = NULL;
int objsize;
@@ -98,12 +98,12 @@ int i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT *a, unsigned char **pp)
return objsize;
}
int i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(char *buf, int buf_len, ASN1_OBJECT *a)
int i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a)
{
return OBJ_obj2txt(buf, buf_len, a, 0);
}
int i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(BIO *bp, ASN1_OBJECT *a)
int i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(BIO *bp, const ASN1_OBJECT *a)
{
char buf[80], *p = buf;
int i;
@@ -250,19 +250,12 @@ void ASN1_OBJECT_free(ASN1_OBJECT *a)
if (a == NULL)
return;
if (a->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS) {
#ifndef CONST_STRICT /* disable purely for compile-time strict
* const checking. Doing this on a "real"
* compile will cause memory leaks */
if (a->sn != NULL)
OPENSSL_free((void *)a->sn);
if (a->ln != NULL)
OPENSSL_free((void *)a->ln);
#endif
OPENSSL_free((void *)a->sn);
OPENSSL_free((void *)a->ln);
a->sn = a->ln = NULL;
}
if (a->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA) {
if (a->data != NULL)
OPENSSL_free((void *)a->data);
OPENSSL_free((void *)a->data);
a->data = NULL;
a->length = 0;
}
@@ -61,17 +61,17 @@
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *x)
{
return M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(x);
return ASN1_STRING_dup(x);
}
int ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a,
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *b)
{
return M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(a, b);
return ASN1_STRING_cmp(a, b);
}
int ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *x, const unsigned char *d,
int len)
{
return M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(x, d, len);
return ASN1_STRING_set(x, d, len);
}
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ ASN1_TIME *ASN1_TIME_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, time_t t,
return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
}
int ASN1_TIME_check(ASN1_TIME *t)
int ASN1_TIME_check(const ASN1_TIME *t)
{
if (t->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(t);
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ int ASN1_TIME_check(ASN1_TIME *t)
}
/* Convert an ASN1_TIME structure to GeneralizedTime */
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime(ASN1_TIME *t,
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime(const ASN1_TIME *t,
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **out)
{
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ret = NULL;
@@ -61,7 +61,10 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_obj.h>
int ASN1_TYPE_get(ASN1_TYPE *a)
#include "asn1_locl.h"
int ASN1_TYPE_get(const ASN1_TYPE *a)
{
if ((a->value.ptr != NULL) || (a->type == V_ASN1_NULL))
return (a->type);
@@ -142,8 +145,7 @@ int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b)
case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING:
case V_ASN1_OTHER:
default:
result = ASN1_STRING_cmp((ASN1_STRING *)a->value.ptr,
(ASN1_STRING *)b->value.ptr);
result = ASN1_STRING_cmp(a->value.asn1_string, b->value.asn1_string);
break;
}
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t,
if (s == NULL) {
free_s = 1;
s = M_ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
s = ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
}
if (s == NULL)
goto err;
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t,
return (s);
err:
if (free_s && s)
M_ASN1_UTCTIME_free(s);
ASN1_UTCTIME_free(s);
return NULL;
}
+15 -20
View File
@@ -251,6 +251,8 @@ void ASN1_put_object(unsigned char **pp, int constructed, int length, int tag,
int ASN1_put_eoc(unsigned char **pp)
{
/* This function is no longer used in the library, but some external code
* uses it. */
unsigned char *p = *pp;
*p++ = 0;
*p++ = 0;
@@ -311,9 +313,9 @@ int ASN1_STRING_copy(ASN1_STRING *dst, const ASN1_STRING *str)
{
if (str == NULL)
return 0;
dst->type = str->type;
if (!ASN1_STRING_set(dst, str->data, str->length))
return 0;
dst->type = str->type;
dst->flags = str->flags;
return 1;
}
@@ -395,13 +397,12 @@ ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_type_new(int type)
return (ret);
}
void ASN1_STRING_free(ASN1_STRING *a)
void ASN1_STRING_free(ASN1_STRING *str)
{
if (a == NULL)
if (str == NULL)
return;
if (a->data && !(a->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF))
OPENSSL_free(a->data);
OPENSSL_free(a);
OPENSSL_free(str->data);
OPENSSL_free(str);
}
int ASN1_STRING_cmp(const ASN1_STRING *a, const ASN1_STRING *b)
@@ -419,28 +420,22 @@ int ASN1_STRING_cmp(const ASN1_STRING *a, const ASN1_STRING *b)
return (i);
}
int ASN1_STRING_length(const ASN1_STRING *x)
int ASN1_STRING_length(const ASN1_STRING *str)
{
return M_ASN1_STRING_length(x);
return str->length;
}
void ASN1_STRING_length_set(ASN1_STRING *x, int len)
int ASN1_STRING_type(const ASN1_STRING *str)
{
M_ASN1_STRING_length_set(x, len);
return;
return str->type;
}
int ASN1_STRING_type(ASN1_STRING *x)
unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_data(ASN1_STRING *str)
{
return M_ASN1_STRING_type(x);
return str->data;
}
unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_data(ASN1_STRING *x)
const unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_get0_data(const ASN1_STRING *str)
{
return M_ASN1_STRING_data(x);
}
const unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_get0_data(const ASN1_STRING *x)
{
return x->data;
return str->data;
}
@@ -96,6 +96,36 @@ void asn1_item_combine_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
int UTF8_getc(const unsigned char *str, int len, uint32_t *val);
int UTF8_putc(unsigned char *str, int len, uint32_t value);
int ASN1_item_ex_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
void ASN1_item_ex_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
void ASN1_template_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt);
int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass, char opt,
ASN1_TLC *ctx);
int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass);
void ASN1_primitive_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
int asn1_get_choice_selector(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
int asn1_set_choice_selector(ASN1_VALUE **pval, int value, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
ASN1_VALUE **asn1_get_field_ptr(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt);
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *asn1_do_adb(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt,
int nullerr);
void asn1_refcount_set_one(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
int asn1_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
void asn1_enc_init(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
void asn1_enc_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
int asn1_enc_restore(int *len, unsigned char **out, ASN1_VALUE **pval,
const ASN1_ITEM *it);
int asn1_enc_save(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *in, int inlen,
const ASN1_ITEM *it);
#if defined(__cplusplus)
} /* extern C */
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ ASN1_STRING *ASN1_item_pack(void *obj, const ASN1_ITEM *it, ASN1_STRING **oct)
/* Extract an ASN1 object from an ASN1_STRING */
void *ASN1_item_unpack(ASN1_STRING *oct, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
void *ASN1_item_unpack(const ASN1_STRING *oct, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
const unsigned char *p;
void *ret;
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@
/* Based on a_int.c: equivalent ENUMERATED functions */
int i2a_ASN1_ENUMERATED(BIO *bp, ASN1_ENUMERATED *a)
int i2a_ASN1_ENUMERATED(BIO *bp, const ASN1_ENUMERATED *a)
{
int i, n = 0;
static const char *h = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+1 -1
View File
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_bio.h>
int i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(BIO *bp, ASN1_INTEGER *a)
int i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(BIO *bp, const ASN1_INTEGER *a)
{
int i, n = 0;
static const char *h = "0123456789ABCDEF";
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_bio.h>
int i2a_ASN1_STRING(BIO *bp, ASN1_STRING *a, int type)
int i2a_ASN1_STRING(BIO *bp, const ASN1_STRING *a, int type)
{
int i, n = 0;
static const char *h = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+32 -83
View File
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include "../internal.h"
#include "asn1_locl.h"
/*
* Constructed types with a recursive definition (such as can be found in PKCS7)
@@ -95,6 +96,8 @@ static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
ASN1_TLC *ctx, int depth);
static int asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_ITEM *it,
@@ -166,19 +169,16 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx, int depth)
{
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, *errtt = NULL;
const ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS *cf;
const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb;
const unsigned char *p = NULL, *q;
unsigned char *wp = NULL; /* BIG FAT WARNING! BREAKS CONST WHERE USED */
unsigned char imphack = 0, oclass;
unsigned char oclass;
char seq_eoc, seq_nolen, cst, isopt;
long tmplen;
int i;
int otag;
int ret = 0;
ASN1_VALUE **pchptr, *ptmpval;
ASN1_VALUE **pchptr;
int combine = aclass & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
aclass &= ~ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
if (!pval)
@@ -223,6 +223,15 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING:
/*
* It never makes sense for multi-strings to have implicit tagging, so
* if tag != -1, then this looks like an error in the template.
*/
if (tag != -1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE);
goto err;
}
p = *in;
/* Just read in tag and class */
ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, &otag, &oclass, NULL, NULL,
@@ -255,67 +264,16 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
ef = it->funcs;
return ef->asn1_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
case ASN1_ITYPE_COMPAT:
/* we must resort to old style evil hackery */
cf = it->funcs;
/* If OPTIONAL see if it is there */
if (opt) {
int exptag;
p = *in;
if (tag == -1)
exptag = it->utype;
else
exptag = tag;
/*
* Don't care about anything other than presence of expected tag
*/
ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
&p, len, exptag, aclass, 1, ctx);
if (!ret) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (ret == -1)
return -1;
}
/*
* This is the old style evil hack IMPLICIT handling: since the
* underlying code is expecting a tag and class other than the one
* present we change the buffer temporarily then change it back
* afterwards. This doesn't and never did work for tags > 30. Yes
* this is *horrible* but it is only needed for old style d2i which
* will hopefully not be around for much longer. FIXME: should copy
* the buffer then modify it so the input buffer can be const: we
* should *always* copy because the old style d2i might modify the
* buffer.
*/
if (tag != -1) {
wp = *(unsigned char **)in;
imphack = *wp;
if (p == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
*wp = (unsigned char)((*p & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
| it->utype);
}
ptmpval = cf->asn1_d2i(pval, in, len);
if (tag != -1)
*wp = imphack;
if (ptmpval)
return 1;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
/*
* It never makes sense for CHOICE types to have implicit tagging, so if
* tag != -1, then this looks like an error in the template.
*/
if (tag != -1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE);
goto err;
}
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
@@ -370,10 +328,8 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
*in = p;
return 1;
case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
p = *in;
tmplen = len;
/* If no IMPLICIT tagging set to SEQUENCE, UNIVERSAL */
if (tag == -1) {
@@ -388,13 +344,8 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
goto err;
} else if (ret == -1)
return -1;
if (aux && (aux->flags & ASN1_AFLG_BROKEN)) {
len = tmplen - (p - *in);
seq_nolen = 1;
}
/* If indefinite we don't do a length check */
else
seq_nolen = seq_eoc;
seq_nolen = seq_eoc;
if (!cst) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED);
goto err;
@@ -649,7 +600,7 @@ static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
} else if (ret == -1)
return -1;
if (!*val)
*val = (ASN1_VALUE *)sk_new_null();
*val = (ASN1_VALUE *)sk_ASN1_VALUE_new_null();
else {
/*
* We've got a valid STACK: free up any items present
@@ -860,19 +811,19 @@ static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
/* Translate ASN1 content octets into a structure */
int asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
static int asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
ASN1_VALUE **opval = NULL;
ASN1_STRING *stmp;
ASN1_TYPE *typ = NULL;
int ret = 0;
const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf;
ASN1_INTEGER **tint;
pf = it->funcs;
if (pf && pf->prim_c2i)
return pf->prim_c2i(pval, cont, len, utype, free_cont, it);
/* Historically, |it->funcs| for primitive types contained an
* |ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS| table of callbacks. */
assert(it->funcs == NULL);
/* If ANY type clear type and set pointer to internal value */
if (it->utype == V_ASN1_ANY) {
if (!*pval) {
@@ -1055,15 +1006,13 @@ static int asn1_find_end(const unsigned char **in, long len, char inf)
* constructed type and 'inf' should be set if it is indefinite length.
*/
#ifndef ASN1_MAX_STRING_NEST
/*
* This determines how many levels of recursion are permitted in ASN1 string
* types. If it is not limited stack overflows can occur. If set to zero no
* recursion is allowed at all. Although zero should be adequate examples
* exist that require a value of 1. So 5 should be more than enough.
*/
# define ASN1_MAX_STRING_NEST 5
#endif
#define ASN1_MAX_STRING_NEST 5
static int asn1_collect(BUF_MEM *buf, const unsigned char **in, long len,
char inf, int tag, int aclass, int depth)
+39 -85
View File
@@ -63,10 +63,13 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include "../internal.h"
#include "asn1_locl.h"
static int asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass);
static int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype,
const ASN1_ITEM *it);
static int asn1_set_seq_out(STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sk, unsigned char **out,
int skcontlen, const ASN1_ITEM *item,
int do_sort, int iclass);
@@ -76,16 +79,9 @@ static int asn1_item_flags_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out,
const ASN1_ITEM *it, int flags);
/*
* Top level i2d equivalents: the 'ndef' variant instructs the encoder to use
* indefinite length constructed encoding, where appropriate
* Top level i2d equivalents
*/
int ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out,
const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
return asn1_item_flags_i2d(val, out, it, ASN1_TFLG_NDEF);
}
int ASN1_item_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
return asn1_item_flags_i2d(val, out, it, 0);
@@ -128,9 +124,7 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass)
{
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt = NULL;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
int i, seqcontlen, seqlen, ndef = 1;
const ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS *cf;
int i, seqcontlen, seqlen;
const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb = 0;
@@ -151,9 +145,25 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING:
/*
* It never makes sense for multi-strings to have implicit tagging, so
* if tag != -1, then this looks like an error in the template.
*/
if (tag != -1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE);
return -1;
}
return asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(pval, out, it, -1, aclass);
case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
/*
* It never makes sense for CHOICE types to have implicit tagging, so if
* tag != -1, then this looks like an error in the template.
*/
if (tag != -1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE);
return -1;
}
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_I2D_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
return 0;
i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it);
@@ -174,26 +184,6 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
ef = it->funcs;
return ef->asn1_ex_i2d(pval, out, it, tag, aclass);
case ASN1_ITYPE_COMPAT:
/* old style hackery... */
cf = it->funcs;
if (out)
p = *out;
i = cf->asn1_i2d(*pval, out);
/*
* Fixup for IMPLICIT tag: note this messes up for tags > 30, but so
* did the old code. Tags > 30 are very rare anyway.
*/
if (out && (tag != -1))
*p = aclass | tag | (*p & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED);
return i;
case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
/* Use indefinite length constructed if requested */
if (aclass & ASN1_TFLG_NDEF)
ndef = 2;
OPENSSL_FALLTHROUGH;
case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
i = asn1_enc_restore(&seqcontlen, out, pval, it);
/* An error occurred */
@@ -228,11 +218,11 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
seqcontlen += tmplen;
}
seqlen = ASN1_object_size(ndef, seqcontlen, tag);
seqlen = ASN1_object_size(/*constructed=*/1, seqcontlen, tag);
if (!out || seqlen == -1)
return seqlen;
/* Output SEQUENCE header */
ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, seqcontlen, tag, aclass);
ASN1_put_object(out, /*constructed=*/1, seqcontlen, tag, aclass);
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
@@ -243,8 +233,6 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
/* FIXME: check for errors in enhanced version */
asn1_template_ex_i2d(pseqval, out, seqtt, -1, aclass);
}
if (ndef == 2)
ASN1_put_eoc(out);
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_I2D_POST, pval, it, NULL))
return 0;
return seqlen;
@@ -259,7 +247,7 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
static int asn1_template_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, int tag, int iclass)
{
int i, ret, flags, ttag, tclass, ndef;
int i, ret, flags, ttag, tclass;
size_t j;
flags = tt->flags;
/*
@@ -295,12 +283,6 @@ static int asn1_template_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
* class and iclass is any flags passed to this function.
*/
/* if template and arguments require ndef, use it */
if ((flags & ASN1_TFLG_NDEF) && (iclass & ASN1_TFLG_NDEF))
ndef = 2;
else
ndef = 1;
if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SK_MASK) {
/* SET OF, SEQUENCE OF */
STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sk = (STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *)*pval;
@@ -345,12 +327,12 @@ static int asn1_template_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
return -1;
skcontlen += tmplen;
}
sklen = ASN1_object_size(ndef, skcontlen, sktag);
sklen = ASN1_object_size(/*constructed=*/1, skcontlen, sktag);
if (sklen == -1)
return -1;
/* If EXPLICIT need length of surrounding tag */
if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG)
ret = ASN1_object_size(ndef, sklen, ttag);
ret = ASN1_object_size(/*constructed=*/1, sklen, ttag);
else
ret = sklen;
@@ -360,18 +342,12 @@ static int asn1_template_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
/* Now encode this lot... */
/* EXPLICIT tag */
if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG)
ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, sklen, ttag, tclass);
ASN1_put_object(out, /*constructed=*/1, sklen, ttag, tclass);
/* SET or SEQUENCE and IMPLICIT tag */
ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, skcontlen, sktag, skaclass);
ASN1_put_object(out, /*constructed=*/1, skcontlen, sktag, skaclass);
/* And the stuff itself */
asn1_set_seq_out(sk, out, skcontlen, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
isset, iclass);
if (ndef == 2) {
ASN1_put_eoc(out);
if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG)
ASN1_put_eoc(out);
}
return ret;
}
@@ -382,13 +358,11 @@ static int asn1_template_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
if (!i)
return 0;
/* Find length of EXPLICIT tag */
ret = ASN1_object_size(ndef, i, ttag);
ret = ASN1_object_size(/*constructed=*/1, i, ttag);
if (out && ret != -1) {
/* Output tag and item */
ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, i, ttag, tclass);
ASN1_put_object(out, /*constructed=*/1, i, ttag, tclass);
ASN1_item_ex_i2d(pval, out, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), -1, iclass);
if (ndef == 2)
ASN1_put_eoc(out);
}
return ret;
}
@@ -487,7 +461,6 @@ static int asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
int len;
int utype;
int usetag;
int ndef = 0;
utype = it->utype;
@@ -513,12 +486,6 @@ static int asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
if (len == -1)
return 0;
/* -2 return is special meaning use ndef */
if (len == -2) {
ndef = 2;
len = 0;
}
/* If not implicitly tagged get tag from underlying type */
if (tag == -1)
tag = utype;
@@ -526,23 +493,20 @@ static int asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
/* Output tag+length followed by content octets */
if (out) {
if (usetag)
ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, len, tag, aclass);
ASN1_put_object(out, /*constructed=*/0, len, tag, aclass);
asn1_ex_i2c(pval, *out, &utype, it);
if (ndef)
ASN1_put_eoc(out);
else
*out += len;
*out += len;
}
if (usetag)
return ASN1_object_size(ndef, len, tag);
return ASN1_object_size(/*constructed=*/0, len, tag);
return len;
}
/* Produce content octets from a structure */
int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cout, int *putype,
const ASN1_ITEM *it)
static int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cout, int *putype,
const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
ASN1_BOOLEAN *tbool = NULL;
ASN1_STRING *strtmp;
@@ -551,10 +515,10 @@ int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cout, int *putype,
const unsigned char *cont;
unsigned char c;
int len;
const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf;
pf = it->funcs;
if (pf && pf->prim_i2c)
return pf->prim_i2c(pval, cout, putype, it);
/* Historically, |it->funcs| for primitive types contained an
* |ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS| table of callbacks. */
assert(it->funcs == NULL);
/* Should type be omitted? */
if ((it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE)
@@ -642,16 +606,6 @@ int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cout, int *putype,
default:
/* All based on ASN1_STRING and handled the same */
strtmp = (ASN1_STRING *)*pval;
/* Special handling for NDEF */
if ((it->size == ASN1_TFLG_NDEF)
&& (strtmp->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) {
if (cout) {
strtmp->data = cout;
strtmp->length = 0;
}
/* Special return code */
return -2;
}
cont = strtmp->data;
len = strtmp->length;
@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_asn1.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_asn1t.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
@@ -77,7 +79,6 @@ void asn1_item_combine_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int combine)
{
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt = NULL, *seqtt;
const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
const ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS *cf;
const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb;
int i;
@@ -124,19 +125,12 @@ void asn1_item_combine_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int combine)
}
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_COMPAT:
cf = it->funcs;
if (cf && cf->asn1_free)
cf->asn1_free(*pval);
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN:
ef = it->funcs;
if (ef && ef->asn1_ex_free)
ef->asn1_ex_free(pval, it);
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
if (!asn1_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(pval, it))
return;
@@ -190,14 +184,9 @@ void ASN1_template_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt)
void ASN1_primitive_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
int utype;
if (it) {
const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf;
pf = it->funcs;
if (pf && pf->prim_free) {
pf->prim_free(pval, it);
return;
}
}
/* Historically, |it->funcs| for primitive types contained an
* |ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS| table of calbacks. */
assert(it == NULL || it->funcs == NULL);
/* Special case: if 'it' is NULL free contents of ASN1_TYPE */
if (!it) {
ASN1_TYPE *typ = (ASN1_TYPE *)*pval;
+10 -61
View File
@@ -70,7 +70,9 @@
static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
int combine);
static void asn1_item_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
static int ASN1_template_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt);
static void asn1_template_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt);
static int ASN1_primitive_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
static void asn1_primitive_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
ASN1_VALUE *ASN1_item_new(const ASN1_ITEM *it)
@@ -92,7 +94,6 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
int combine)
{
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt = NULL;
const ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS *cf;
const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb;
@@ -103,11 +104,6 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
else
asn1_cb = 0;
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
if (it->sname)
CRYPTO_push_info(it->sname);
#endif
switch (it->itype) {
case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN:
@@ -118,15 +114,6 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
}
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_COMPAT:
cf = it->funcs;
if (cf && cf->asn1_new) {
*pval = cf->asn1_new();
if (!*pval)
goto memerr;
}
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE:
if (it->templates) {
if (!ASN1_template_new(pval, it->templates))
@@ -146,10 +133,6 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
if (!i)
goto auxerr;
if (i == 2) {
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
if (it->sname)
CRYPTO_pop_info();
#endif
return 1;
}
}
@@ -164,17 +147,12 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
goto auxerr2;
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
if (asn1_cb) {
i = asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE, pval, it, NULL);
if (!i)
goto auxerr;
if (i == 2) {
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
if (it->sname)
CRYPTO_pop_info();
#endif
return 1;
}
}
@@ -195,30 +173,18 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
goto auxerr2;
break;
}
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
if (it->sname)
CRYPTO_pop_info();
#endif
return 1;
memerr2:
asn1_item_combine_free(pval, it, combine);
memerr:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
if (it->sname)
CRYPTO_pop_info();
#endif
return 0;
auxerr2:
asn1_item_combine_free(pval, it, combine);
auxerr:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR);
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
if (it->sname)
CRYPTO_pop_info();
#endif
return 0;
}
@@ -248,16 +214,14 @@ static void asn1_item_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
asn1_primitive_clear(pval, it);
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_COMPAT:
case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
*pval = NULL;
break;
}
}
int ASN1_template_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt)
static int ASN1_template_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt)
{
const ASN1_ITEM *it = ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item);
int ret;
@@ -271,10 +235,6 @@ int ASN1_template_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt)
*pval = NULL;
return 1;
}
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
if (tt->field_name)
CRYPTO_push_info(tt->field_name);
#endif
/* If SET OF or SEQUENCE OF, its a STACK */
if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_SK_MASK) {
STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *skval;
@@ -291,10 +251,6 @@ int ASN1_template_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt)
/* Otherwise pass it back to the item routine */
ret = asn1_item_ex_combine_new(pval, it, tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE);
done:
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
if (it->sname)
CRYPTO_pop_info();
#endif
return ret;
}
@@ -312,7 +268,7 @@ static void asn1_template_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt)
* all the old functions.
*/
int ASN1_primitive_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
static int ASN1_primitive_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
ASN1_TYPE *typ;
ASN1_STRING *str;
@@ -321,11 +277,9 @@ int ASN1_primitive_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
if (!it)
return 0;
if (it->funcs) {
const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf = it->funcs;
if (pf->prim_new)
return pf->prim_new(pval, it);
}
/* Historically, |it->funcs| for primitive types contained an
* |ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS| table of calbacks. */
assert(it->funcs == NULL);
if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING)
utype = -1;
@@ -368,14 +322,9 @@ int ASN1_primitive_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
static void asn1_primitive_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
int utype;
if (it && it->funcs) {
const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf = it->funcs;
if (pf->prim_clear)
pf->prim_clear(pval, it);
else
*pval = NULL;
return;
}
/* Historically, |it->funcs| for primitive types contained an
* |ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS| table of calbacks. */
assert(it == NULL || it->funcs == NULL);
if (!it || (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING))
utype = -1;
else
@@ -117,8 +117,6 @@ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE_ex(ASN1_FBOOLEAN, ASN1_BOOLEAN, 0)
/* Special, OCTET STRING with indefinite length constructed support */
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE_ex(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_NDEF, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ASN1_TFLG_NDEF)
ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY) =
ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY, ASN1_ANY)
ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY)
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_thread.h>
#include "../internal.h"
#include "asn1_locl.h"
/* Utility functions for manipulating fields and offsets */
@@ -91,8 +92,7 @@ int asn1_set_choice_selector(ASN1_VALUE **pval, int value,
static CRYPTO_refcount_t *asn1_get_references(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
const ASN1_ITEM *it) {
if (it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE &&
it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE) {
if (it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE) {
return NULL;
}
const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
@@ -262,6 +262,8 @@ int BIO_should_io_special(const BIO *bio) {
int BIO_get_retry_reason(const BIO *bio) { return bio->retry_reason; }
void BIO_set_retry_reason(BIO *bio, int reason) { bio->retry_reason = reason; }
void BIO_clear_flags(BIO *bio, int flags) {
bio->flags &= ~flags;
}
@@ -55,7 +55,11 @@ int bio_ip_and_port_to_socket_and_addr(int *out_sock,
ret = getaddrinfo(hostname, port_str, &hint, &result);
if (ret != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SYS, 0);
#if defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
ERR_add_error_data(1, gai_strerrorA(ret));
#else
ERR_add_error_data(1, gai_strerror(ret));
#endif
return 0;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2021, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_blake2.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_type_check.h>
#include "../internal.h"
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7693#section-2.6
static const uint64_t kIV[8] = {
UINT64_C(0x6a09e667f3bcc908), UINT64_C(0xbb67ae8584caa73b),
UINT64_C(0x3c6ef372fe94f82b), UINT64_C(0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1),
UINT64_C(0x510e527fade682d1), UINT64_C(0x9b05688c2b3e6c1f),
UINT64_C(0x1f83d9abfb41bd6b), UINT64_C(0x5be0cd19137e2179),
};
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7693#section-2.7
static const uint8_t kSigma[10 * 16] = {
// clang-format off
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,
14, 10, 4, 8, 9, 15, 13, 6, 1, 12, 0, 2, 11, 7, 5, 3,
11, 8, 12, 0, 5, 2, 15, 13, 10, 14, 3, 6, 7, 1, 9, 4,
7, 9, 3, 1, 13, 12, 11, 14, 2, 6, 5, 10, 4, 0, 15, 8,
9, 0, 5, 7, 2, 4, 10, 15, 14, 1, 11, 12, 6, 8, 3, 13,
2, 12, 6, 10, 0, 11, 8, 3, 4, 13, 7, 5, 15, 14, 1, 9,
12, 5, 1, 15, 14, 13, 4, 10, 0, 7, 6, 3, 9, 2, 8, 11,
13, 11, 7, 14, 12, 1, 3, 9, 5, 0, 15, 4, 8, 6, 2, 10,
6, 15, 14, 9, 11, 3, 0, 8, 12, 2, 13, 7, 1, 4, 10, 5,
10, 2, 8, 4, 7, 6, 1, 5, 15, 11, 9, 14, 3, 12, 13, 0,
// clang-format on
};
#define RIGHT_ROTATE(v, n) (((v) >> (n)) | ((v) << (64 - (n))))
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7693#section-3.1
static void blake2b_mix(uint64_t v[16], int a, int b, int c, int d, uint64_t x,
uint64_t y) {
v[a] = v[a] + v[b] + x;
v[d] = RIGHT_ROTATE(v[d] ^ v[a], 32);
v[c] = v[c] + v[d];
v[b] = RIGHT_ROTATE(v[b] ^ v[c], 24);
v[a] = v[a] + v[b] + y;
v[d] = RIGHT_ROTATE(v[d] ^ v[a], 16);
v[c] = v[c] + v[d];
v[b] = RIGHT_ROTATE(v[b] ^ v[c], 63);
}
static void blake2b_transform(
BLAKE2B_CTX *b2b,
const uint64_t block_words[BLAKE2B_CBLOCK / sizeof(uint64_t)],
size_t num_bytes, int is_final_block) {
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7693#section-3.2
uint64_t v[16];
OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(v) == sizeof(b2b->h) + sizeof(kIV), "");
OPENSSL_memcpy(v, b2b->h, sizeof(b2b->h));
OPENSSL_memcpy(&v[8], kIV, sizeof(kIV));
b2b->t_low += num_bytes;
if (b2b->t_low < num_bytes) {
b2b->t_high++;
}
v[12] ^= b2b->t_low;
v[13] ^= b2b->t_high;
if (is_final_block) {
v[14] = ~v[14];
}
for (int round = 0; round < 12; round++) {
const uint8_t *const s = &kSigma[16 * (round % 10)];
blake2b_mix(v, 0, 4, 8, 12, block_words[s[0]], block_words[s[1]]);
blake2b_mix(v, 1, 5, 9, 13, block_words[s[2]], block_words[s[3]]);
blake2b_mix(v, 2, 6, 10, 14, block_words[s[4]], block_words[s[5]]);
blake2b_mix(v, 3, 7, 11, 15, block_words[s[6]], block_words[s[7]]);
blake2b_mix(v, 0, 5, 10, 15, block_words[s[8]], block_words[s[9]]);
blake2b_mix(v, 1, 6, 11, 12, block_words[s[10]], block_words[s[11]]);
blake2b_mix(v, 2, 7, 8, 13, block_words[s[12]], block_words[s[13]]);
blake2b_mix(v, 3, 4, 9, 14, block_words[s[14]], block_words[s[15]]);
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(b2b->h); i++) {
b2b->h[i] ^= v[i];
b2b->h[i] ^= v[i + 8];
}
}
void BLAKE2B256_Init(BLAKE2B_CTX *b2b) {
OPENSSL_memset(b2b, 0, sizeof(BLAKE2B_CTX));
OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(kIV) == sizeof(b2b->h), "");
OPENSSL_memcpy(&b2b->h, kIV, sizeof(kIV));
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7693#section-2.5
b2b->h[0] ^= 0x01010000 | BLAKE2B256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
}
void BLAKE2B256_Update(BLAKE2B_CTX *b2b, const void *in_data, size_t len) {
const uint8_t *data = (const uint8_t *)in_data;
size_t todo = sizeof(b2b->block.bytes) - b2b->block_used;
if (todo > len) {
todo = len;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(&b2b->block.bytes[b2b->block_used], data, todo);
b2b->block_used += todo;
data += todo;
len -= todo;
if (!len) {
return;
}
// More input remains therefore we must have filled |b2b->block|.
assert(b2b->block_used == BLAKE2B_CBLOCK);
blake2b_transform(b2b, b2b->block.words, BLAKE2B_CBLOCK,
/*is_final_block=*/0);
b2b->block_used = 0;
while (len > BLAKE2B_CBLOCK) {
uint64_t block_words[BLAKE2B_CBLOCK / sizeof(uint64_t)];
OPENSSL_memcpy(block_words, data, sizeof(block_words));
blake2b_transform(b2b, block_words, BLAKE2B_CBLOCK, /*is_final_block=*/0);
data += BLAKE2B_CBLOCK;
len -= BLAKE2B_CBLOCK;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(b2b->block.bytes, data, len);
b2b->block_used = len;
}
void BLAKE2B256_Final(uint8_t out[BLAKE2B256_DIGEST_LENGTH], BLAKE2B_CTX *b2b) {
OPENSSL_memset(&b2b->block.bytes[b2b->block_used], 0,
sizeof(b2b->block.bytes) - b2b->block_used);
blake2b_transform(b2b, b2b->block.words, b2b->block_used,
/*is_final_block=*/1);
OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(BLAKE2B256_DIGEST_LENGTH <= sizeof(b2b->h), "");
memcpy(out, b2b->h, BLAKE2B256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
}
void BLAKE2B256(const uint8_t *data, size_t len,
uint8_t out[BLAKE2B256_DIGEST_LENGTH]) {
BLAKE2B_CTX ctx;
BLAKE2B256_Init(&ctx);
BLAKE2B256_Update(&ctx, data, len);
BLAKE2B256_Final(out, &ctx);
}
@@ -20,25 +20,18 @@
int BN_parse_asn1_unsigned(CBS *cbs, BIGNUM *ret) {
CBS child;
int is_negative;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &child, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
CBS_len(&child) == 0) {
!CBS_is_valid_asn1_integer(&child, &is_negative)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_BAD_ENCODING);
return 0;
}
if (CBS_data(&child)[0] & 0x80) {
if (is_negative) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NEGATIVE_NUMBER);
return 0;
}
// INTEGERs must be minimal.
if (CBS_data(&child)[0] == 0x00 &&
CBS_len(&child) > 1 &&
!(CBS_data(&child)[1] & 0x80)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_BAD_ENCODING);
return 0;
}
return BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&child), CBS_len(&child), ret) != NULL;
}
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static int is_string_type(unsigned tag) {
// depending on whether an indefinite length element or constructed string was
// found. The value of |orig_in| is not changed. It returns one on success (i.e.
// |*ber_found| was set) and zero on error.
static int cbs_find_ber(const CBS *orig_in, char *ber_found, unsigned depth) {
static int cbs_find_ber(const CBS *orig_in, int *ber_found, unsigned depth) {
CBS in;
if (depth > kMaxDepth) {
@@ -68,14 +68,11 @@ static int cbs_find_ber(const CBS *orig_in, char *ber_found, unsigned depth) {
unsigned tag;
size_t header_len;
if (!CBS_get_any_ber_asn1_element(&in, &contents, &tag, &header_len)) {
if (!CBS_get_any_ber_asn1_element(&in, &contents, &tag, &header_len,
ber_found)) {
return 0;
}
if (CBS_len(&contents) == header_len &&
header_len > 0 &&
CBS_data(&contents)[header_len-1] == 0x80) {
// Found an indefinite-length element.
*ber_found = 1;
if (*ber_found) {
return 1;
}
if (tag & CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) {
@@ -120,9 +117,11 @@ static int cbs_convert_ber(CBS *in, CBB *out, unsigned string_tag,
CBS contents;
unsigned tag, child_string_tag = string_tag;
size_t header_len;
int ber_found;
CBB *out_contents, out_contents_storage;
if (!CBS_get_any_ber_asn1_element(in, &contents, &tag, &header_len)) {
if (!CBS_get_any_ber_asn1_element(in, &contents, &tag, &header_len,
&ber_found)) {
return 0;
}
@@ -194,7 +193,7 @@ int CBS_asn1_ber_to_der(CBS *in, CBS *out, uint8_t **out_storage) {
// First, do a quick walk to find any indefinite-length elements. Most of the
// time we hope that there aren't any and thus we can quickly return.
char conversion_needed;
int conversion_needed;
if (!cbs_find_ber(in, &conversion_needed, 0)) {
return 0;
}
@@ -254,8 +254,7 @@ static int parse_asn1_tag(CBS *cbs, unsigned *out) {
//
// If the number portion is 31 (0x1f, the largest value that fits in the
// allotted bits), then the tag is more than one byte long and the
// continuation bytes contain the tag number. This parser only supports tag
// numbers less than 31 (and thus single-byte tags).
// continuation bytes contain the tag number.
unsigned tag = ((unsigned)tag_byte & 0xe0) << CBS_ASN1_TAG_SHIFT;
unsigned tag_number = tag_byte & 0x1f;
if (tag_number == 0x1f) {
@@ -263,7 +262,7 @@ static int parse_asn1_tag(CBS *cbs, unsigned *out) {
if (!parse_base128_integer(cbs, &v) ||
// Check the tag number is within our supported bounds.
v > CBS_ASN1_TAG_NUMBER_MASK ||
// Small tag numbers should have used low tag number form.
// Small tag numbers should have used low tag number form, even in BER.
v < 0x1f) {
return 0;
}
@@ -277,13 +276,17 @@ static int parse_asn1_tag(CBS *cbs, unsigned *out) {
}
static int cbs_get_any_asn1_element(CBS *cbs, CBS *out, unsigned *out_tag,
size_t *out_header_len, int ber_ok) {
size_t *out_header_len, int *out_ber_found,
int ber_ok) {
CBS header = *cbs;
CBS throwaway;
if (out == NULL) {
out = &throwaway;
}
if (ber_ok) {
*out_ber_found = 0;
}
unsigned tag;
if (!parse_asn1_tag(&header, &tag)) {
@@ -321,27 +324,38 @@ static int cbs_get_any_asn1_element(CBS *cbs, CBS *out, unsigned *out_tag,
if (out_header_len != NULL) {
*out_header_len = header_len;
}
*out_ber_found = 1;
return CBS_get_bytes(cbs, out, header_len);
}
// ITU-T X.690 clause 8.1.3.5.c specifies that the value 0xff shall not be
// used as the first byte of the length. If this parser encounters that
// value, num_bytes will be parsed as 127, which will fail the check below.
// value, num_bytes will be parsed as 127, which will fail this check.
if (num_bytes == 0 || num_bytes > 4) {
return 0;
}
if (!cbs_get_u(&header, &len64, num_bytes)) {
return 0;
}
// ITU-T X.690 section 10.1 (DER length forms) requires encoding the length
// with the minimum number of octets.
// ITU-T X.690 section 10.1 (DER length forms) requires encoding the
// length with the minimum number of octets. BER could, technically, have
// 125 superfluous zero bytes. We do not attempt to handle that and still
// require that the length fit in a |uint32_t| for BER.
if (len64 < 128) {
// Length should have used short-form encoding.
return 0;
if (ber_ok) {
*out_ber_found = 1;
} else {
return 0;
}
}
if ((len64 >> ((num_bytes-1)*8)) == 0) {
if ((len64 >> ((num_bytes - 1) * 8)) == 0) {
// Length should have been at least one byte shorter.
return 0;
if (ber_ok) {
*out_ber_found = 1;
} else {
return 0;
}
}
len = len64;
if (len + header_len + num_bytes < len) {
@@ -374,13 +388,15 @@ int CBS_get_any_asn1(CBS *cbs, CBS *out, unsigned *out_tag) {
int CBS_get_any_asn1_element(CBS *cbs, CBS *out, unsigned *out_tag,
size_t *out_header_len) {
return cbs_get_any_asn1_element(cbs, out, out_tag, out_header_len,
0 /* DER only */);
NULL, 0 /* DER only */);
}
int CBS_get_any_ber_asn1_element(CBS *cbs, CBS *out, unsigned *out_tag,
size_t *out_header_len) {
return cbs_get_any_asn1_element(cbs, out, out_tag, out_header_len,
1 /* BER allowed */);
size_t *out_header_len, int *out_ber_found) {
int ber_found_temp;
return cbs_get_any_asn1_element(
cbs, out, out_tag, out_header_len,
out_ber_found ? out_ber_found : &ber_found_temp, 1 /* BER allowed */);
}
static int cbs_get_asn1(CBS *cbs, CBS *out, unsigned tag_value,
@@ -426,29 +442,14 @@ int CBS_peek_asn1_tag(const CBS *cbs, unsigned tag_value) {
int CBS_get_asn1_uint64(CBS *cbs, uint64_t *out) {
CBS bytes;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &bytes, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER)) {
if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &bytes, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
!CBS_is_unsigned_asn1_integer(&bytes)) {
return 0;
}
*out = 0;
const uint8_t *data = CBS_data(&bytes);
size_t len = CBS_len(&bytes);
if (len == 0) {
// An INTEGER is encoded with at least one octet.
return 0;
}
if ((data[0] & 0x80) != 0) {
// Negative number.
return 0;
}
if (data[0] == 0 && len > 1 && (data[1] & 0x80) == 0) {
// Extra leading zeros.
return 0;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if ((*out >> 56) != 0) {
// Too large to represent as a uint64_t.
@@ -462,31 +463,21 @@ int CBS_get_asn1_uint64(CBS *cbs, uint64_t *out) {
}
int CBS_get_asn1_int64(CBS *cbs, int64_t *out) {
int is_negative;
CBS bytes;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &bytes, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER)) {
if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &bytes, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
!CBS_is_valid_asn1_integer(&bytes, &is_negative)) {
return 0;
}
const uint8_t *data = CBS_data(&bytes);
const size_t len = CBS_len(&bytes);
if (len == 0 || len > sizeof(int64_t)) {
// An INTEGER is encoded with at least one octet.
if (len > sizeof(int64_t)) {
return 0;
}
if (len > 1) {
if (data[0] == 0 && (data[1] & 0x80) == 0) {
return 0; // Extra leading zeros.
}
if (data[0] == 0xff && (data[1] & 0x80) != 0) {
return 0; // Extra leading 0xff.
}
}
union {
int64_t i;
uint8_t bytes[sizeof(int64_t)];
} u;
const int is_negative = (data[0] & 0x80);
memset(u.bytes, is_negative ? 0xff : 0, sizeof(u.bytes)); // Sign-extend.
for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {
u.bytes[i] = data[len - i - 1];
@@ -635,6 +626,30 @@ int CBS_asn1_bitstring_has_bit(const CBS *cbs, unsigned bit) {
(CBS_data(cbs)[byte_num] & (1 << bit_num)) != 0;
}
int CBS_is_valid_asn1_integer(const CBS *cbs, int *out_is_negative) {
CBS copy = *cbs;
uint8_t first_byte, second_byte;
if (!CBS_get_u8(&copy, &first_byte)) {
return 0; // INTEGERs may not be empty.
}
if (out_is_negative != NULL) {
*out_is_negative = (first_byte & 0x80) != 0;
}
if (!CBS_get_u8(&copy, &second_byte)) {
return 1; // One byte INTEGERs are always minimal.
}
if ((first_byte == 0x00 && (second_byte & 0x80) == 0) ||
(first_byte == 0xff && (second_byte & 0x80) != 0)) {
return 0; // The value is minimal iff the first 9 bits are not all equal.
}
return 1;
}
int CBS_is_unsigned_asn1_integer(const CBS *cbs) {
int is_negative;
return CBS_is_valid_asn1_integer(cbs, &is_negative) && !is_negative;
}
static int add_decimal(CBB *out, uint64_t v) {
char buf[DECIMAL_SIZE(uint64_t) + 1];
BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%" PRIu64, v);
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_arm_arch.h>
.private_extern _OPENSSL_armcap_P
.section __TEXT,__const
@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ Lone:
.align 5
_ChaCha20_ctr32:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
cbz x2,Labort
#if __has_feature(hwaddress_sanitizer) && __clang_major__ >= 10
adrp x5,:pg_hi21_nc:_OPENSSL_armcap_P
@@ -48,6 +50,7 @@ _ChaCha20_ctr32:
b.ne ChaCha20_neon
Lshort:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-96]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -260,6 +263,7 @@ Loop:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
Labort:
ret
@@ -316,12 +320,14 @@ Loop_tail:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.align 5
ChaCha20_neon:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-96]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -702,6 +708,7 @@ Loop_neon:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
Ltail_neon:
@@ -811,11 +818,13 @@ Ldone_neon:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.align 5
ChaCha20_512_neon:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-96]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -1979,6 +1988,7 @@ Ldone_512_neon:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
#endif // !OPENSSL_NO_ASM
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_arm_arch.h>
.hidden OPENSSL_armcap_P
.section .rodata
@@ -36,6 +37,7 @@
.type ChaCha20_ctr32,%function
.align 5
ChaCha20_ctr32:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
cbz x2,.Labort
#if __has_feature(hwaddress_sanitizer) && __clang_major__ >= 10
adrp x5,:pg_hi21_nc:OPENSSL_armcap_P
@@ -49,6 +51,7 @@ ChaCha20_ctr32:
b.ne ChaCha20_neon
.Lshort:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-96]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -261,6 +264,7 @@ ChaCha20_ctr32:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
.Labort:
ret
@@ -317,12 +321,14 @@ ChaCha20_ctr32:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size ChaCha20_ctr32,.-ChaCha20_ctr32
.type ChaCha20_neon,%function
.align 5
ChaCha20_neon:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-96]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -703,6 +709,7 @@ ChaCha20_neon:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.Ltail_neon:
@@ -812,11 +819,13 @@ ChaCha20_neon:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size ChaCha20_neon,.-ChaCha20_neon
.type ChaCha20_512_neon,%function
.align 5
ChaCha20_512_neon:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-96]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -1980,6 +1989,7 @@ ChaCha20_512_neon:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size ChaCha20_512_neon,.-ChaCha20_512_neon
#endif
@@ -0,0 +1,979 @@
#define BORINGSSL_PREFIX CCryptoBoringSSL
#if defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
# This file is generated from a similarly-named Perl script in the BoringSSL
# source tree. Do not edit by hand.
#if defined(__i386__)
#if defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h>
#endif
.text
.globl _ChaCha20_ctr32
.hidden _ChaCha20_ctr32
.def _ChaCha20_ctr32; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_ChaCha20_ctr32:
.L_ChaCha20_ctr32_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
xorl %eax,%eax
cmpl 28(%esp),%eax
je .L000no_data
call .Lpic_point
.Lpic_point:
popl %eax
leal _OPENSSL_ia32cap_P,%ebp
testl $16777216,(%ebp)
jz .L001x86
testl $512,4(%ebp)
jz .L001x86
jmp .Lssse3_shortcut
.L001x86:
movl 32(%esp),%esi
movl 36(%esp),%edi
subl $132,%esp
movl (%esi),%eax
movl 4(%esi),%ebx
movl 8(%esi),%ecx
movl 12(%esi),%edx
movl %eax,80(%esp)
movl %ebx,84(%esp)
movl %ecx,88(%esp)
movl %edx,92(%esp)
movl 16(%esi),%eax
movl 20(%esi),%ebx
movl 24(%esi),%ecx
movl 28(%esi),%edx
movl %eax,96(%esp)
movl %ebx,100(%esp)
movl %ecx,104(%esp)
movl %edx,108(%esp)
movl (%edi),%eax
movl 4(%edi),%ebx
movl 8(%edi),%ecx
movl 12(%edi),%edx
subl $1,%eax
movl %eax,112(%esp)
movl %ebx,116(%esp)
movl %ecx,120(%esp)
movl %edx,124(%esp)
jmp .L002entry
.align 16
.L003outer_loop:
movl %ebx,156(%esp)
movl %eax,152(%esp)
movl %ecx,160(%esp)
.L002entry:
movl $1634760805,%eax
movl $857760878,4(%esp)
movl $2036477234,8(%esp)
movl $1797285236,12(%esp)
movl 84(%esp),%ebx
movl 88(%esp),%ebp
movl 104(%esp),%ecx
movl 108(%esp),%esi
movl 116(%esp),%edx
movl 120(%esp),%edi
movl %ebx,20(%esp)
movl %ebp,24(%esp)
movl %ecx,40(%esp)
movl %esi,44(%esp)
movl %edx,52(%esp)
movl %edi,56(%esp)
movl 92(%esp),%ebx
movl 124(%esp),%edi
movl 112(%esp),%edx
movl 80(%esp),%ebp
movl 96(%esp),%ecx
movl 100(%esp),%esi
addl $1,%edx
movl %ebx,28(%esp)
movl %edi,60(%esp)
movl %edx,112(%esp)
movl $10,%ebx
jmp .L004loop
.align 16
.L004loop:
addl %ebp,%eax
movl %ebx,128(%esp)
movl %ebp,%ebx
xorl %eax,%edx
roll $16,%edx
addl %edx,%ecx
xorl %ecx,%ebx
movl 52(%esp),%edi
roll $12,%ebx
movl 20(%esp),%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
xorl %eax,%edx
movl %eax,(%esp)
roll $8,%edx
movl 4(%esp),%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
movl %edx,48(%esp)
xorl %ecx,%ebx
addl %ebp,%eax
roll $7,%ebx
xorl %eax,%edi
movl %ecx,32(%esp)
roll $16,%edi
movl %ebx,16(%esp)
addl %edi,%esi
movl 40(%esp),%ecx
xorl %esi,%ebp
movl 56(%esp),%edx
roll $12,%ebp
movl 24(%esp),%ebx
addl %ebp,%eax
xorl %eax,%edi
movl %eax,4(%esp)
roll $8,%edi
movl 8(%esp),%eax
addl %edi,%esi
movl %edi,52(%esp)
xorl %esi,%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
roll $7,%ebp
xorl %eax,%edx
movl %esi,36(%esp)
roll $16,%edx
movl %ebp,20(%esp)
addl %edx,%ecx
movl 44(%esp),%esi
xorl %ecx,%ebx
movl 60(%esp),%edi
roll $12,%ebx
movl 28(%esp),%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
xorl %eax,%edx
movl %eax,8(%esp)
roll $8,%edx
movl 12(%esp),%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
movl %edx,56(%esp)
xorl %ecx,%ebx
addl %ebp,%eax
roll $7,%ebx
xorl %eax,%edi
roll $16,%edi
movl %ebx,24(%esp)
addl %edi,%esi
xorl %esi,%ebp
roll $12,%ebp
movl 20(%esp),%ebx
addl %ebp,%eax
xorl %eax,%edi
movl %eax,12(%esp)
roll $8,%edi
movl (%esp),%eax
addl %edi,%esi
movl %edi,%edx
xorl %esi,%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
roll $7,%ebp
xorl %eax,%edx
roll $16,%edx
movl %ebp,28(%esp)
addl %edx,%ecx
xorl %ecx,%ebx
movl 48(%esp),%edi
roll $12,%ebx
movl 24(%esp),%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
xorl %eax,%edx
movl %eax,(%esp)
roll $8,%edx
movl 4(%esp),%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
movl %edx,60(%esp)
xorl %ecx,%ebx
addl %ebp,%eax
roll $7,%ebx
xorl %eax,%edi
movl %ecx,40(%esp)
roll $16,%edi
movl %ebx,20(%esp)
addl %edi,%esi
movl 32(%esp),%ecx
xorl %esi,%ebp
movl 52(%esp),%edx
roll $12,%ebp
movl 28(%esp),%ebx
addl %ebp,%eax
xorl %eax,%edi
movl %eax,4(%esp)
roll $8,%edi
movl 8(%esp),%eax
addl %edi,%esi
movl %edi,48(%esp)
xorl %esi,%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
roll $7,%ebp
xorl %eax,%edx
movl %esi,44(%esp)
roll $16,%edx
movl %ebp,24(%esp)
addl %edx,%ecx
movl 36(%esp),%esi
xorl %ecx,%ebx
movl 56(%esp),%edi
roll $12,%ebx
movl 16(%esp),%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
xorl %eax,%edx
movl %eax,8(%esp)
roll $8,%edx
movl 12(%esp),%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
movl %edx,52(%esp)
xorl %ecx,%ebx
addl %ebp,%eax
roll $7,%ebx
xorl %eax,%edi
roll $16,%edi
movl %ebx,28(%esp)
addl %edi,%esi
xorl %esi,%ebp
movl 48(%esp),%edx
roll $12,%ebp
movl 128(%esp),%ebx
addl %ebp,%eax
xorl %eax,%edi
movl %eax,12(%esp)
roll $8,%edi
movl (%esp),%eax
addl %edi,%esi
movl %edi,56(%esp)
xorl %esi,%ebp
roll $7,%ebp
decl %ebx
jnz .L004loop
movl 160(%esp),%ebx
addl $1634760805,%eax
addl 80(%esp),%ebp
addl 96(%esp),%ecx
addl 100(%esp),%esi
cmpl $64,%ebx
jb .L005tail
movl 156(%esp),%ebx
addl 112(%esp),%edx
addl 120(%esp),%edi
xorl (%ebx),%eax
xorl 16(%ebx),%ebp
movl %eax,(%esp)
movl 152(%esp),%eax
xorl 32(%ebx),%ecx
xorl 36(%ebx),%esi
xorl 48(%ebx),%edx
xorl 56(%ebx),%edi
movl %ebp,16(%eax)
movl %ecx,32(%eax)
movl %esi,36(%eax)
movl %edx,48(%eax)
movl %edi,56(%eax)
movl 4(%esp),%ebp
movl 8(%esp),%ecx
movl 12(%esp),%esi
movl 20(%esp),%edx
movl 24(%esp),%edi
addl $857760878,%ebp
addl $2036477234,%ecx
addl $1797285236,%esi
addl 84(%esp),%edx
addl 88(%esp),%edi
xorl 4(%ebx),%ebp
xorl 8(%ebx),%ecx
xorl 12(%ebx),%esi
xorl 20(%ebx),%edx
xorl 24(%ebx),%edi
movl %ebp,4(%eax)
movl %ecx,8(%eax)
movl %esi,12(%eax)
movl %edx,20(%eax)
movl %edi,24(%eax)
movl 28(%esp),%ebp
movl 40(%esp),%ecx
movl 44(%esp),%esi
movl 52(%esp),%edx
movl 60(%esp),%edi
addl 92(%esp),%ebp
addl 104(%esp),%ecx
addl 108(%esp),%esi
addl 116(%esp),%edx
addl 124(%esp),%edi
xorl 28(%ebx),%ebp
xorl 40(%ebx),%ecx
xorl 44(%ebx),%esi
xorl 52(%ebx),%edx
xorl 60(%ebx),%edi
leal 64(%ebx),%ebx
movl %ebp,28(%eax)
movl (%esp),%ebp
movl %ecx,40(%eax)
movl 160(%esp),%ecx
movl %esi,44(%eax)
movl %edx,52(%eax)
movl %edi,60(%eax)
movl %ebp,(%eax)
leal 64(%eax),%eax
subl $64,%ecx
jnz .L003outer_loop
jmp .L006done
.L005tail:
addl 112(%esp),%edx
addl 120(%esp),%edi
movl %eax,(%esp)
movl %ebp,16(%esp)
movl %ecx,32(%esp)
movl %esi,36(%esp)
movl %edx,48(%esp)
movl %edi,56(%esp)
movl 4(%esp),%ebp
movl 8(%esp),%ecx
movl 12(%esp),%esi
movl 20(%esp),%edx
movl 24(%esp),%edi
addl $857760878,%ebp
addl $2036477234,%ecx
addl $1797285236,%esi
addl 84(%esp),%edx
addl 88(%esp),%edi
movl %ebp,4(%esp)
movl %ecx,8(%esp)
movl %esi,12(%esp)
movl %edx,20(%esp)
movl %edi,24(%esp)
movl 28(%esp),%ebp
movl 40(%esp),%ecx
movl 44(%esp),%esi
movl 52(%esp),%edx
movl 60(%esp),%edi
addl 92(%esp),%ebp
addl 104(%esp),%ecx
addl 108(%esp),%esi
addl 116(%esp),%edx
addl 124(%esp),%edi
movl %ebp,28(%esp)
movl 156(%esp),%ebp
movl %ecx,40(%esp)
movl 152(%esp),%ecx
movl %esi,44(%esp)
xorl %esi,%esi
movl %edx,52(%esp)
movl %edi,60(%esp)
xorl %eax,%eax
xorl %edx,%edx
.L007tail_loop:
movb (%esi,%ebp,1),%al
movb (%esp,%esi,1),%dl
leal 1(%esi),%esi
xorb %dl,%al
movb %al,-1(%ecx,%esi,1)
decl %ebx
jnz .L007tail_loop
.L006done:
addl $132,%esp
.L000no_data:
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.globl _ChaCha20_ssse3
.hidden _ChaCha20_ssse3
.def _ChaCha20_ssse3; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_ChaCha20_ssse3:
.L_ChaCha20_ssse3_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
.Lssse3_shortcut:
movl 20(%esp),%edi
movl 24(%esp),%esi
movl 28(%esp),%ecx
movl 32(%esp),%edx
movl 36(%esp),%ebx
movl %esp,%ebp
subl $524,%esp
andl $-64,%esp
movl %ebp,512(%esp)
leal .Lssse3_data-.Lpic_point(%eax),%eax
movdqu (%ebx),%xmm3
cmpl $256,%ecx
jb .L0081x
movl %edx,516(%esp)
movl %ebx,520(%esp)
subl $256,%ecx
leal 384(%esp),%ebp
movdqu (%edx),%xmm7
pshufd $0,%xmm3,%xmm0
pshufd $85,%xmm3,%xmm1
pshufd $170,%xmm3,%xmm2
pshufd $255,%xmm3,%xmm3
paddd 48(%eax),%xmm0
pshufd $0,%xmm7,%xmm4
pshufd $85,%xmm7,%xmm5
psubd 64(%eax),%xmm0
pshufd $170,%xmm7,%xmm6
pshufd $255,%xmm7,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm0,64(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm1,80(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm2,96(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm3,112(%ebp)
movdqu 16(%edx),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm4,-64(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm5,-48(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm6,-32(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm7,-16(%ebp)
movdqa 32(%eax),%xmm7
leal 128(%esp),%ebx
pshufd $0,%xmm3,%xmm0
pshufd $85,%xmm3,%xmm1
pshufd $170,%xmm3,%xmm2
pshufd $255,%xmm3,%xmm3
pshufd $0,%xmm7,%xmm4
pshufd $85,%xmm7,%xmm5
pshufd $170,%xmm7,%xmm6
pshufd $255,%xmm7,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm0,(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm1,16(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm2,32(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm3,48(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm4,-128(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm5,-112(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm6,-96(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm7,-80(%ebp)
leal 128(%esi),%esi
leal 128(%edi),%edi
jmp .L009outer_loop
.align 16
.L009outer_loop:
movdqa -112(%ebp),%xmm1
movdqa -96(%ebp),%xmm2
movdqa -80(%ebp),%xmm3
movdqa -48(%ebp),%xmm5
movdqa -32(%ebp),%xmm6
movdqa -16(%ebp),%xmm7
movdqa %xmm1,-112(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm2,-96(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm3,-80(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm5,-48(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm6,-32(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm7,-16(%ebx)
movdqa 32(%ebp),%xmm2
movdqa 48(%ebp),%xmm3
movdqa 64(%ebp),%xmm4
movdqa 80(%ebp),%xmm5
movdqa 96(%ebp),%xmm6
movdqa 112(%ebp),%xmm7
paddd 64(%eax),%xmm4
movdqa %xmm2,32(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm3,48(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm4,64(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm5,80(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm6,96(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm7,112(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm4,64(%ebp)
movdqa -128(%ebp),%xmm0
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm6
movdqa -64(%ebp),%xmm3
movdqa (%ebp),%xmm4
movdqa 16(%ebp),%xmm5
movl $10,%edx
nop
.align 16
.L010loop:
paddd %xmm3,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm3,%xmm2
pxor %xmm0,%xmm6
pshufb (%eax),%xmm6
paddd %xmm6,%xmm4
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
movdqa -48(%ebx),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm1
pslld $12,%xmm2
psrld $20,%xmm1
por %xmm1,%xmm2
movdqa -112(%ebx),%xmm1
paddd %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa 80(%ebx),%xmm7
pxor %xmm0,%xmm6
movdqa %xmm0,-128(%ebx)
pshufb 16(%eax),%xmm6
paddd %xmm6,%xmm4
movdqa %xmm6,64(%ebx)
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
paddd %xmm3,%xmm1
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm0
pslld $7,%xmm2
psrld $25,%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm7
por %xmm0,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,(%ebx)
pshufb (%eax),%xmm7
movdqa %xmm2,-64(%ebx)
paddd %xmm7,%xmm5
movdqa 32(%ebx),%xmm4
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
movdqa -32(%ebx),%xmm2
movdqa %xmm3,%xmm0
pslld $12,%xmm3
psrld $20,%xmm0
por %xmm0,%xmm3
movdqa -96(%ebx),%xmm0
paddd %xmm3,%xmm1
movdqa 96(%ebx),%xmm6
pxor %xmm1,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm1,-112(%ebx)
pshufb 16(%eax),%xmm7
paddd %xmm7,%xmm5
movdqa %xmm7,80(%ebx)
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
paddd %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm3,%xmm1
pslld $7,%xmm3
psrld $25,%xmm1
pxor %xmm0,%xmm6
por %xmm1,%xmm3
movdqa %xmm5,16(%ebx)
pshufb (%eax),%xmm6
movdqa %xmm3,-48(%ebx)
paddd %xmm6,%xmm4
movdqa 48(%ebx),%xmm5
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
movdqa -16(%ebx),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm1
pslld $12,%xmm2
psrld $20,%xmm1
por %xmm1,%xmm2
movdqa -80(%ebx),%xmm1
paddd %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa 112(%ebx),%xmm7
pxor %xmm0,%xmm6
movdqa %xmm0,-96(%ebx)
pshufb 16(%eax),%xmm6
paddd %xmm6,%xmm4
movdqa %xmm6,96(%ebx)
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
paddd %xmm3,%xmm1
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm0
pslld $7,%xmm2
psrld $25,%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm7
por %xmm0,%xmm2
pshufb (%eax),%xmm7
movdqa %xmm2,-32(%ebx)
paddd %xmm7,%xmm5
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
movdqa -48(%ebx),%xmm2
movdqa %xmm3,%xmm0
pslld $12,%xmm3
psrld $20,%xmm0
por %xmm0,%xmm3
movdqa -128(%ebx),%xmm0
paddd %xmm3,%xmm1
pxor %xmm1,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm1,-80(%ebx)
pshufb 16(%eax),%xmm7
paddd %xmm7,%xmm5
movdqa %xmm7,%xmm6
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
paddd %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm3,%xmm1
pslld $7,%xmm3
psrld $25,%xmm1
pxor %xmm0,%xmm6
por %xmm1,%xmm3
pshufb (%eax),%xmm6
movdqa %xmm3,-16(%ebx)
paddd %xmm6,%xmm4
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
movdqa -32(%ebx),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm1
pslld $12,%xmm2
psrld $20,%xmm1
por %xmm1,%xmm2
movdqa -112(%ebx),%xmm1
paddd %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa 64(%ebx),%xmm7
pxor %xmm0,%xmm6
movdqa %xmm0,-128(%ebx)
pshufb 16(%eax),%xmm6
paddd %xmm6,%xmm4
movdqa %xmm6,112(%ebx)
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
paddd %xmm3,%xmm1
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm0
pslld $7,%xmm2
psrld $25,%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm7
por %xmm0,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,32(%ebx)
pshufb (%eax),%xmm7
movdqa %xmm2,-48(%ebx)
paddd %xmm7,%xmm5
movdqa (%ebx),%xmm4
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
movdqa -16(%ebx),%xmm2
movdqa %xmm3,%xmm0
pslld $12,%xmm3
psrld $20,%xmm0
por %xmm0,%xmm3
movdqa -96(%ebx),%xmm0
paddd %xmm3,%xmm1
movdqa 80(%ebx),%xmm6
pxor %xmm1,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm1,-112(%ebx)
pshufb 16(%eax),%xmm7
paddd %xmm7,%xmm5
movdqa %xmm7,64(%ebx)
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
paddd %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm3,%xmm1
pslld $7,%xmm3
psrld $25,%xmm1
pxor %xmm0,%xmm6
por %xmm1,%xmm3
movdqa %xmm5,48(%ebx)
pshufb (%eax),%xmm6
movdqa %xmm3,-32(%ebx)
paddd %xmm6,%xmm4
movdqa 16(%ebx),%xmm5
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
movdqa -64(%ebx),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm1
pslld $12,%xmm2
psrld $20,%xmm1
por %xmm1,%xmm2
movdqa -80(%ebx),%xmm1
paddd %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa 96(%ebx),%xmm7
pxor %xmm0,%xmm6
movdqa %xmm0,-96(%ebx)
pshufb 16(%eax),%xmm6
paddd %xmm6,%xmm4
movdqa %xmm6,80(%ebx)
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
paddd %xmm3,%xmm1
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm0
pslld $7,%xmm2
psrld $25,%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm7
por %xmm0,%xmm2
pshufb (%eax),%xmm7
movdqa %xmm2,-16(%ebx)
paddd %xmm7,%xmm5
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
movdqa %xmm3,%xmm0
pslld $12,%xmm3
psrld $20,%xmm0
por %xmm0,%xmm3
movdqa -128(%ebx),%xmm0
paddd %xmm3,%xmm1
movdqa 64(%ebx),%xmm6
pxor %xmm1,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm1,-80(%ebx)
pshufb 16(%eax),%xmm7
paddd %xmm7,%xmm5
movdqa %xmm7,96(%ebx)
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
movdqa %xmm3,%xmm1
pslld $7,%xmm3
psrld $25,%xmm1
por %xmm1,%xmm3
decl %edx
jnz .L010loop
movdqa %xmm3,-64(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm4,(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm5,16(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm6,64(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm7,96(%ebx)
movdqa -112(%ebx),%xmm1
movdqa -96(%ebx),%xmm2
movdqa -80(%ebx),%xmm3
paddd -128(%ebp),%xmm0
paddd -112(%ebp),%xmm1
paddd -96(%ebp),%xmm2
paddd -80(%ebp),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm6
punpckldq %xmm1,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm7
punpckldq %xmm3,%xmm2
punpckhdq %xmm1,%xmm6
punpckhdq %xmm3,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
punpcklqdq %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm3
punpcklqdq %xmm7,%xmm6
punpckhqdq %xmm2,%xmm1
punpckhqdq %xmm7,%xmm3
movdqu -128(%esi),%xmm4
movdqu -64(%esi),%xmm5
movdqu (%esi),%xmm2
movdqu 64(%esi),%xmm7
leal 16(%esi),%esi
pxor %xmm0,%xmm4
movdqa -64(%ebx),%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm5
movdqa -48(%ebx),%xmm1
pxor %xmm2,%xmm6
movdqa -32(%ebx),%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm7
movdqa -16(%ebx),%xmm3
movdqu %xmm4,-128(%edi)
movdqu %xmm5,-64(%edi)
movdqu %xmm6,(%edi)
movdqu %xmm7,64(%edi)
leal 16(%edi),%edi
paddd -64(%ebp),%xmm0
paddd -48(%ebp),%xmm1
paddd -32(%ebp),%xmm2
paddd -16(%ebp),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm6
punpckldq %xmm1,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm7
punpckldq %xmm3,%xmm2
punpckhdq %xmm1,%xmm6
punpckhdq %xmm3,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
punpcklqdq %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm3
punpcklqdq %xmm7,%xmm6
punpckhqdq %xmm2,%xmm1
punpckhqdq %xmm7,%xmm3
movdqu -128(%esi),%xmm4
movdqu -64(%esi),%xmm5
movdqu (%esi),%xmm2
movdqu 64(%esi),%xmm7
leal 16(%esi),%esi
pxor %xmm0,%xmm4
movdqa (%ebx),%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm5
movdqa 16(%ebx),%xmm1
pxor %xmm2,%xmm6
movdqa 32(%ebx),%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm7
movdqa 48(%ebx),%xmm3
movdqu %xmm4,-128(%edi)
movdqu %xmm5,-64(%edi)
movdqu %xmm6,(%edi)
movdqu %xmm7,64(%edi)
leal 16(%edi),%edi
paddd (%ebp),%xmm0
paddd 16(%ebp),%xmm1
paddd 32(%ebp),%xmm2
paddd 48(%ebp),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm6
punpckldq %xmm1,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm7
punpckldq %xmm3,%xmm2
punpckhdq %xmm1,%xmm6
punpckhdq %xmm3,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
punpcklqdq %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm3
punpcklqdq %xmm7,%xmm6
punpckhqdq %xmm2,%xmm1
punpckhqdq %xmm7,%xmm3
movdqu -128(%esi),%xmm4
movdqu -64(%esi),%xmm5
movdqu (%esi),%xmm2
movdqu 64(%esi),%xmm7
leal 16(%esi),%esi
pxor %xmm0,%xmm4
movdqa 64(%ebx),%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm5
movdqa 80(%ebx),%xmm1
pxor %xmm2,%xmm6
movdqa 96(%ebx),%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm7
movdqa 112(%ebx),%xmm3
movdqu %xmm4,-128(%edi)
movdqu %xmm5,-64(%edi)
movdqu %xmm6,(%edi)
movdqu %xmm7,64(%edi)
leal 16(%edi),%edi
paddd 64(%ebp),%xmm0
paddd 80(%ebp),%xmm1
paddd 96(%ebp),%xmm2
paddd 112(%ebp),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm6
punpckldq %xmm1,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm7
punpckldq %xmm3,%xmm2
punpckhdq %xmm1,%xmm6
punpckhdq %xmm3,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
punpcklqdq %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm3
punpcklqdq %xmm7,%xmm6
punpckhqdq %xmm2,%xmm1
punpckhqdq %xmm7,%xmm3
movdqu -128(%esi),%xmm4
movdqu -64(%esi),%xmm5
movdqu (%esi),%xmm2
movdqu 64(%esi),%xmm7
leal 208(%esi),%esi
pxor %xmm0,%xmm4
pxor %xmm1,%xmm5
pxor %xmm2,%xmm6
pxor %xmm3,%xmm7
movdqu %xmm4,-128(%edi)
movdqu %xmm5,-64(%edi)
movdqu %xmm6,(%edi)
movdqu %xmm7,64(%edi)
leal 208(%edi),%edi
subl $256,%ecx
jnc .L009outer_loop
addl $256,%ecx
jz .L011done
movl 520(%esp),%ebx
leal -128(%esi),%esi
movl 516(%esp),%edx
leal -128(%edi),%edi
movd 64(%ebp),%xmm2
movdqu (%ebx),%xmm3
paddd 96(%eax),%xmm2
pand 112(%eax),%xmm3
por %xmm2,%xmm3
.L0081x:
movdqa 32(%eax),%xmm0
movdqu (%edx),%xmm1
movdqu 16(%edx),%xmm2
movdqa (%eax),%xmm6
movdqa 16(%eax),%xmm7
movl %ebp,48(%esp)
movdqa %xmm0,(%esp)
movdqa %xmm1,16(%esp)
movdqa %xmm2,32(%esp)
movdqa %xmm3,48(%esp)
movl $10,%edx
jmp .L012loop1x
.align 16
.L013outer1x:
movdqa 80(%eax),%xmm3
movdqa (%esp),%xmm0
movdqa 16(%esp),%xmm1
movdqa 32(%esp),%xmm2
paddd 48(%esp),%xmm3
movl $10,%edx
movdqa %xmm3,48(%esp)
jmp .L012loop1x
.align 16
.L012loop1x:
paddd %xmm1,%xmm0
pxor %xmm0,%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,222
paddd %xmm3,%xmm2
pxor %xmm2,%xmm1
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm4
psrld $20,%xmm1
pslld $12,%xmm4
por %xmm4,%xmm1
paddd %xmm1,%xmm0
pxor %xmm0,%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,223
paddd %xmm3,%xmm2
pxor %xmm2,%xmm1
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm4
psrld $25,%xmm1
pslld $7,%xmm4
por %xmm4,%xmm1
pshufd $78,%xmm2,%xmm2
pshufd $57,%xmm1,%xmm1
pshufd $147,%xmm3,%xmm3
nop
paddd %xmm1,%xmm0
pxor %xmm0,%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,222
paddd %xmm3,%xmm2
pxor %xmm2,%xmm1
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm4
psrld $20,%xmm1
pslld $12,%xmm4
por %xmm4,%xmm1
paddd %xmm1,%xmm0
pxor %xmm0,%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,223
paddd %xmm3,%xmm2
pxor %xmm2,%xmm1
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm4
psrld $25,%xmm1
pslld $7,%xmm4
por %xmm4,%xmm1
pshufd $78,%xmm2,%xmm2
pshufd $147,%xmm1,%xmm1
pshufd $57,%xmm3,%xmm3
decl %edx
jnz .L012loop1x
paddd (%esp),%xmm0
paddd 16(%esp),%xmm1
paddd 32(%esp),%xmm2
paddd 48(%esp),%xmm3
cmpl $64,%ecx
jb .L014tail
movdqu (%esi),%xmm4
movdqu 16(%esi),%xmm5
pxor %xmm4,%xmm0
movdqu 32(%esi),%xmm4
pxor %xmm5,%xmm1
movdqu 48(%esi),%xmm5
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
leal 64(%esi),%esi
movdqu %xmm0,(%edi)
movdqu %xmm1,16(%edi)
movdqu %xmm2,32(%edi)
movdqu %xmm3,48(%edi)
leal 64(%edi),%edi
subl $64,%ecx
jnz .L013outer1x
jmp .L011done
.L014tail:
movdqa %xmm0,(%esp)
movdqa %xmm1,16(%esp)
movdqa %xmm2,32(%esp)
movdqa %xmm3,48(%esp)
xorl %eax,%eax
xorl %edx,%edx
xorl %ebp,%ebp
.L015tail_loop:
movb (%esp,%ebp,1),%al
movb (%esi,%ebp,1),%dl
leal 1(%ebp),%ebp
xorb %dl,%al
movb %al,-1(%edi,%ebp,1)
decl %ecx
jnz .L015tail_loop
.L011done:
movl 512(%esp),%esp
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.align 64
.Lssse3_data:
.byte 2,3,0,1,6,7,4,5,10,11,8,9,14,15,12,13
.byte 3,0,1,2,7,4,5,6,11,8,9,10,15,12,13,14
.long 1634760805,857760878,2036477234,1797285236
.long 0,1,2,3
.long 4,4,4,4
.long 1,0,0,0
.long 4,0,0,0
.long 0,-1,-1,-1
.align 64
.byte 67,104,97,67,104,97,50,48,32,102,111,114,32,120,56,54
.byte 44,32,67,82,89,80,84,79,71,65,77,83,32,98,121,32
.byte 60,97,112,112,114,111,64,111,112,101,110,115,115,108,46,111
.byte 114,103,62,0
#endif
#endif // defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__ELF__)
.section .note.GNU-stack,"",%progbits
#endif
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
@@ -18,18 +18,15 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_chacha.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_cipher.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_cpu.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_err.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_poly1305.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_type_check.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "../chacha/internal.h"
#include "../fipsmodule/cipher/internal.h"
#include "../internal.h"
#include "../chacha/internal.h"
#define POLY1305_TAG_LEN 16
struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx {
uint8_t key[32];
@@ -44,78 +41,6 @@ OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
"AEAD state has insufficient alignment");
#endif
// For convenience (the x86_64 calling convention allows only six parameters in
// registers), the final parameter for the assembly functions is both an input
// and output parameter.
union open_data {
struct {
alignas(16) uint8_t key[32];
uint32_t counter;
uint8_t nonce[12];
} in;
struct {
uint8_t tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN];
} out;
};
union seal_data {
struct {
alignas(16) uint8_t key[32];
uint32_t counter;
uint8_t nonce[12];
const uint8_t *extra_ciphertext;
size_t extra_ciphertext_len;
} in;
struct {
uint8_t tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN];
} out;
};
#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && \
!defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
static int asm_capable(void) {
const int sse41_capable = (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << 19)) != 0;
return sse41_capable;
}
OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(union open_data) == 48, "wrong open_data size");
OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(union seal_data) == 48 + 8 + 8,
"wrong seal_data size");
// chacha20_poly1305_open is defined in chacha20_poly1305_x86_64.pl. It decrypts
// |plaintext_len| bytes from |ciphertext| and writes them to |out_plaintext|.
// Additional input parameters are passed in |aead_data->in|. On exit, it will
// write calculated tag value to |aead_data->out.tag|, which the caller must
// check.
extern void chacha20_poly1305_open(uint8_t *out_plaintext,
const uint8_t *ciphertext,
size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
size_t ad_len, union open_data *aead_data);
// chacha20_poly1305_open is defined in chacha20_poly1305_x86_64.pl. It encrypts
// |plaintext_len| bytes from |plaintext| and writes them to |out_ciphertext|.
// Additional input parameters are passed in |aead_data->in|. The calculated tag
// value is over the computed ciphertext concatenated with |extra_ciphertext|
// and written to |aead_data->out.tag|.
extern void chacha20_poly1305_seal(uint8_t *out_ciphertext,
const uint8_t *plaintext,
size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
size_t ad_len, union seal_data *aead_data);
#else
static int asm_capable(void) { return 0; }
static void chacha20_poly1305_open(uint8_t *out_plaintext,
const uint8_t *ciphertext,
size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
size_t ad_len, union open_data *aead_data) {}
static void chacha20_poly1305_seal(uint8_t *out_ciphertext,
const uint8_t *plaintext,
size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
size_t ad_len, union seal_data *aead_data) {}
#endif
static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
size_t key_len, size_t tag_len) {
struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx =
@@ -238,8 +163,8 @@ static int chacha20_poly1305_seal_scatter(
}
}
union seal_data data;
if (asm_capable()) {
union chacha20_poly1305_seal_data data;
if (chacha20_poly1305_asm_capable()) {
OPENSSL_memcpy(data.in.key, key, 32);
data.in.counter = 0;
OPENSSL_memcpy(data.in.nonce, nonce, 12);
@@ -321,8 +246,8 @@ static int chacha20_poly1305_open_gather(
return 0;
}
union open_data data;
if (asm_capable()) {
union chacha20_poly1305_open_data data;
if (chacha20_poly1305_asm_capable()) {
OPENSSL_memcpy(data.in.key, key, 32);
data.in.counter = 0;
OPENSSL_memcpy(data.in.nonce, nonce, 12);
@@ -57,7 +57,11 @@
#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_CIPHER_EXTRA_INTERNAL_H
#define OPENSSL_HEADER_CIPHER_EXTRA_INTERNAL_H
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_base.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_cpu.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_type_check.h>
#include "../internal.h"
@@ -120,6 +124,89 @@ int EVP_tls_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t *md_out,
const uint8_t *mac_secret,
unsigned mac_secret_length);
#define POLY1305_TAG_LEN 16
// For convenience (the x86_64 calling convention allows only six parameters in
// registers), the final parameter for the assembly functions is both an input
// and output parameter.
union chacha20_poly1305_open_data {
struct {
alignas(16) uint8_t key[32];
uint32_t counter;
uint8_t nonce[12];
} in;
struct {
uint8_t tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN];
} out;
};
union chacha20_poly1305_seal_data {
struct {
alignas(16) uint8_t key[32];
uint32_t counter;
uint8_t nonce[12];
const uint8_t *extra_ciphertext;
size_t extra_ciphertext_len;
} in;
struct {
uint8_t tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN];
} out;
};
#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(union chacha20_poly1305_open_data) == 48,
"wrong chacha20_poly1305_open_data size");
OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(union chacha20_poly1305_seal_data) == 48 + 8 + 8,
"wrong chacha20_poly1305_seal_data size");
OPENSSL_INLINE int chacha20_poly1305_asm_capable(void) {
const int sse41_capable = (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << 19)) != 0;
return sse41_capable;
}
// chacha20_poly1305_open is defined in chacha20_poly1305_x86_64.pl. It decrypts
// |plaintext_len| bytes from |ciphertext| and writes them to |out_plaintext|.
// Additional input parameters are passed in |aead_data->in|. On exit, it will
// write calculated tag value to |aead_data->out.tag|, which the caller must
// check.
extern void chacha20_poly1305_open(uint8_t *out_plaintext,
const uint8_t *ciphertext,
size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
size_t ad_len,
union chacha20_poly1305_open_data *data);
// chacha20_poly1305_open is defined in chacha20_poly1305_x86_64.pl. It encrypts
// |plaintext_len| bytes from |plaintext| and writes them to |out_ciphertext|.
// Additional input parameters are passed in |aead_data->in|. The calculated tag
// value is over the computed ciphertext concatenated with |extra_ciphertext|
// and written to |aead_data->out.tag|.
extern void chacha20_poly1305_seal(uint8_t *out_ciphertext,
const uint8_t *plaintext,
size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
size_t ad_len,
union chacha20_poly1305_seal_data *data);
#else
OPENSSL_INLINE int chacha20_poly1305_asm_capable(void) { return 0; }
OPENSSL_INLINE void chacha20_poly1305_open(uint8_t *out_plaintext,
const uint8_t *ciphertext,
size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
size_t ad_len,
union chacha20_poly1305_open_data *data) {
abort();
}
OPENSSL_INLINE void chacha20_poly1305_seal(uint8_t *out_ciphertext,
const uint8_t *plaintext,
size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
size_t ad_len,
union chacha20_poly1305_seal_data *data) {
abort();
}
#endif
#if defined(__cplusplus)
} // extern C
@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ void EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac(uint8_t *out, size_t md_size, const uint8_t *in,
assert(orig_len >= in_len);
assert(in_len >= md_size);
assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
assert(md_size > 0);
// scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because
// the MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes.
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2018, Google Inc.
* Copyright (c) 2020, Arm Ltd.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_cpu.h>
#if defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64) && defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS) && \
!defined(OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP)
#include <windows.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_arm_arch.h>
#include "internal.h"
extern uint32_t OPENSSL_armcap_P;
void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) {
// We do not need to check for the presence of NEON, as Armv8-A always has it
OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV7_NEON;
if (IsProcessorFeaturePresent(PF_ARM_V8_CRYPTO_INSTRUCTIONS_AVAILABLE)) {
// These are all covered by one call in Windows
OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_AES;
OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_PMULL;
OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA1;
OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA256;
}
}
#endif
@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_dh.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_bn.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_err.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include "../fipsmodule/bn/internal.h"
@@ -91,3 +93,180 @@ BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_1536(BIGNUM *ret) {
return ret;
}
int DH_generate_parameters_ex(DH *dh, int prime_bits, int generator,
BN_GENCB *cb) {
// We generate DH parameters as follows
// find a prime q which is prime_bits/2 bits long.
// p=(2*q)+1 or (p-1)/2 = q
// For this case, g is a generator if
// g^((p-1)/q) mod p != 1 for values of q which are the factors of p-1.
// Since the factors of p-1 are q and 2, we just need to check
// g^2 mod p != 1 and g^q mod p != 1.
//
// Having said all that,
// there is another special case method for the generators 2, 3 and 5.
// for 2, p mod 24 == 11
// for 3, p mod 12 == 5 <<<<< does not work for safe primes.
// for 5, p mod 10 == 3 or 7
//
// Thanks to Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com> for the pointers about the
// special generators and for answering some of my questions.
//
// I've implemented the second simple method :-).
// Since DH should be using a safe prime (both p and q are prime),
// this generator function can take a very very long time to run.
// Actually there is no reason to insist that 'generator' be a generator.
// It's just as OK (and in some sense better) to use a generator of the
// order-q subgroup.
BIGNUM *t1, *t2;
int g, ok = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL) {
goto err;
}
// Make sure |dh| has the necessary elements
if (dh->p == NULL) {
dh->p = BN_new();
if (dh->p == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
if (dh->g == NULL) {
dh->g = BN_new();
if (dh->g == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
if (generator <= 1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR);
goto err;
}
if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_2) {
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 24)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 11)) {
goto err;
}
g = 2;
} else if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_5) {
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 10)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 3)) {
goto err;
}
// BN_set_word(t3,7); just have to miss
// out on these ones :-(
g = 5;
} else {
// in the general case, don't worry if 'generator' is a
// generator or not: since we are using safe primes,
// it will generate either an order-q or an order-2q group,
// which both is OK
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 2)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 1)) {
goto err;
}
g = generator;
}
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(dh->p, prime_bits, 1, t1, t2, cb)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(dh->g, g)) {
goto err;
}
ok = 1;
err:
if (!ok) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
}
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
return ok;
}
static int int_dh_bn_cpy(BIGNUM **dst, const BIGNUM *src) {
BIGNUM *a = NULL;
if (src) {
a = BN_dup(src);
if (!a) {
return 0;
}
}
BN_free(*dst);
*dst = a;
return 1;
}
static int int_dh_param_copy(DH *to, const DH *from, int is_x942) {
if (is_x942 == -1) {
is_x942 = !!from->q;
}
if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->p, from->p) ||
!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->g, from->g)) {
return 0;
}
if (!is_x942) {
return 1;
}
if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->q, from->q) ||
!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->j, from->j)) {
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(to->seed);
to->seed = NULL;
to->seedlen = 0;
if (from->seed) {
to->seed = OPENSSL_memdup(from->seed, from->seedlen);
if (!to->seed) {
return 0;
}
to->seedlen = from->seedlen;
}
return 1;
}
DH *DHparams_dup(const DH *dh) {
DH *ret = DH_new();
if (!ret) {
return NULL;
}
if (!int_dh_param_copy(ret, dh, -1)) {
DH_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
@@ -59,10 +59,12 @@
#include <string.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_asn1.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_blake2.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_bytestring.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_nid.h>
#include "../internal.h"
#include "../fipsmodule/digest/internal.h"
struct nid_to_digest {
@@ -238,3 +240,26 @@ const EVP_MD *EVP_get_digestbyname(const char *name) {
return NULL;
}
static void blake2b256_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { BLAKE2B256_Init(ctx->md_data); }
static void blake2b256_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t len) {
BLAKE2B256_Update(ctx->md_data, data, len);
}
static void blake2b256_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *md) {
BLAKE2B256_Final(md, ctx->md_data);
}
static const EVP_MD evp_md_blake2b256 = {
NID_undef,
BLAKE2B256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
0,
blake2b256_init,
blake2b256_update,
blake2b256_final,
BLAKE2B_CBLOCK,
sizeof(BLAKE2B_CTX),
};
const EVP_MD *EVP_blake2b256(void) { return &evp_md_blake2b256; }
+9 -43
View File
@@ -72,12 +72,11 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_sha.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_thread.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "../fipsmodule/bn/internal.h"
#include "../internal.h"
#define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
// Primality test according to FIPS PUB 186[-1], Appendix 2.1: 50 rounds of
// Miller-Rabin.
#define DSS_prime_checks 50
@@ -568,23 +567,7 @@ static int mod_mul_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
}
DSA_SIG *DSA_do_sign(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, const DSA *dsa) {
if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
return NULL;
}
// Reject invalid parameters. In particular, the algorithm will infinite loop
// if |g| is zero.
if (BN_is_zero(dsa->p) || BN_is_zero(dsa->q) || BN_is_zero(dsa->g)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS);
return NULL;
}
// We only support DSA keys that are a multiple of 8 bits. (This is a weaker
// check than the one in |DSA_do_check_signature|, which only allows 160-,
// 224-, and 256-bit keys.
if (BN_num_bits(dsa->q) % 8 != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
if (!dsa_check_parameters(dsa)) {
return NULL;
}
@@ -678,35 +661,17 @@ int DSA_do_verify(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, DSA_SIG *sig,
int DSA_do_check_signature(int *out_valid, const uint8_t *digest,
size_t digest_len, DSA_SIG *sig, const DSA *dsa) {
BN_CTX *ctx;
BIGNUM u1, u2, t1;
int ret = 0;
unsigned i;
*out_valid = 0;
if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
i = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
// FIPS 186-3 allows only different sizes for q.
if (i != 160 && i != 224 && i != 256) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
return 0;
}
if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
if (!dsa_check_parameters(dsa)) {
return 0;
}
int ret = 0;
BIGNUM u1, u2, t1;
BN_init(&u1);
BN_init(&u2);
BN_init(&t1);
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
@@ -729,11 +694,12 @@ int DSA_do_check_signature(int *out_valid, const uint8_t *digest,
}
// save M in u1
if (digest_len > (i >> 3)) {
unsigned q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
if (digest_len > (q_bits >> 3)) {
// if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the
// BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see
// fips 186-3, 4.2
digest_len = (i >> 3);
digest_len = (q_bits >> 3);
}
if (BN_bin2bn(digest, digest_len, &u1) == NULL) {
+55 -4
View File
@@ -61,9 +61,45 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_err.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "../bytestring/internal.h"
#define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
// This function is in dsa_asn1.c rather than dsa.c because it is reachable from
// |EVP_PKEY| parsers. This makes it easier for the static linker to drop most
// of the DSA implementation.
int dsa_check_parameters(const DSA *dsa) {
if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
// Reject invalid parameters. In particular, signing will infinite loop if |g|
// is zero.
if (BN_is_zero(dsa->p) || BN_is_zero(dsa->q) || BN_is_zero(dsa->g)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
// FIPS 186-4 allows only three different sizes for q.
unsigned q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
if (q_bits != 160 && q_bits != 224 && q_bits != 256) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
return 0;
}
// Bound |dsa->p| to avoid a DoS vector. Note this limit is much larger than
// the one in FIPS 186-4, which only allows L = 1024, 2048, and 3072.
if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int parse_integer(CBS *cbs, BIGNUM **out) {
assert(*out == NULL);
*out = BN_new();
@@ -124,10 +160,16 @@ DSA *DSA_parse_public_key(CBS *cbs) {
!parse_integer(&child, &ret->g) ||
CBS_len(&child) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR);
DSA_free(ret);
return NULL;
goto err;
}
if (!dsa_check_parameters(ret)) {
goto err;
}
return ret;
err:
DSA_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
int DSA_marshal_public_key(CBB *cbb, const DSA *dsa) {
@@ -156,10 +198,16 @@ DSA *DSA_parse_parameters(CBS *cbs) {
!parse_integer(&child, &ret->g) ||
CBS_len(&child) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR);
DSA_free(ret);
return NULL;
goto err;
}
if (!dsa_check_parameters(ret)) {
goto err;
}
return ret;
err:
DSA_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
int DSA_marshal_parameters(CBB *cbb, const DSA *dsa) {
@@ -203,6 +251,9 @@ DSA *DSA_parse_private_key(CBS *cbs) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!dsa_check_parameters(ret)) {
goto err;
}
return ret;
err:
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2020, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_DSA_INTERNAL_H
#define OPENSSL_HEADER_DSA_INTERNAL_H
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_dsa.h>
#if defined(__cplusplus)
extern "C" {
#endif
// dsa_check_parameters checks that |dsa|'s group is within DoS bounds. It
// returns one on success and zero on error.
int dsa_check_parameters(const DSA *dsa);
#if defined(__cplusplus)
} // extern C
#endif
#endif // OPENSSL_HEADER_DSA_INTERNAL_H
@@ -241,21 +241,6 @@ int EC_KEY_marshal_private_key(CBB *cbb, const EC_KEY *key,
return 1;
}
// is_unsigned_integer returns one if |cbs| is a valid unsigned DER INTEGER and
// zero otherwise.
static int is_unsigned_integer(const CBS *cbs) {
if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t byte = CBS_data(cbs)[0];
if ((byte & 0x80) ||
(byte == 0 && CBS_len(cbs) > 1 && (CBS_data(cbs)[1] & 0x80) == 0)) {
// Negative or not minimally-encoded.
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
// kPrimeFieldOID is the encoding of 1.2.840.10045.1.1.
static const uint8_t kPrimeField[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x01, 0x01};
@@ -276,7 +261,7 @@ static int parse_explicit_prime_curve(CBS *in, CBS *out_prime, CBS *out_a,
OPENSSL_memcmp(CBS_data(&field_type), kPrimeField, sizeof(kPrimeField)) !=
0 ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&field_id, out_prime, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
!is_unsigned_integer(out_prime) ||
!CBS_is_unsigned_asn1_integer(out_prime) ||
CBS_len(&field_id) != 0 ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&params, &curve, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&curve, out_a, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
@@ -286,7 +271,7 @@ static int parse_explicit_prime_curve(CBS *in, CBS *out_prime, CBS *out_a,
CBS_len(&curve) != 0 ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&params, &base, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&params, out_order, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
!is_unsigned_integer(out_order) ||
!CBS_is_unsigned_asn1_integer(out_order) ||
!CBS_get_optional_asn1(&params, &cofactor, &has_cofactor,
CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
CBS_len(&params) != 0) {
@@ -50,12 +50,10 @@
// expand_message_xmd implements the operation described in section 5.3.1 of
// draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-07. It returns one on success and zero on
// allocation failure or if |out_len| was too large. If |is_draft06| is one, it
// implements the operation from draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-06 instead.
// allocation failure or if |out_len| was too large.
static int expand_message_xmd(const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
int is_draft06) {
const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len) {
int ret = 0;
const size_t block_size = EVP_MD_block_size(md);
const size_t md_size = EVP_MD_size(md);
@@ -88,9 +86,8 @@ static int expand_message_xmd(const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, kZeros, block_size) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, msg, msg_len) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, l_i_b_str_zero, sizeof(l_i_b_str_zero)) ||
(is_draft06 && !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &dst_len_u8, 1)) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, dst, dst_len) ||
(!is_draft06 && !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &dst_len_u8, 1)) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &dst_len_u8, 1) ||
!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, b_0, NULL)) {
goto err;
}
@@ -114,9 +111,8 @@ static int expand_message_xmd(const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md, NULL) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, b_i, md_size) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &i, 1) ||
(is_draft06 && !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &dst_len_u8, 1)) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, dst, dst_len) ||
(!is_draft06 && !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &dst_len_u8, 1)) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &dst_len_u8, 1) ||
!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, b_i, NULL)) {
goto err;
}
@@ -175,12 +171,11 @@ static void big_endian_to_words(BN_ULONG *out, size_t num_words,
static int hash_to_field2(const EC_GROUP *group, const EVP_MD *md,
EC_FELEM *out1, EC_FELEM *out2, const uint8_t *dst,
size_t dst_len, unsigned k, const uint8_t *msg,
size_t msg_len, int is_draft06) {
size_t msg_len) {
size_t L;
uint8_t buf[4 * EC_MAX_BYTES];
if (!num_bytes_to_derive(&L, &group->field, k) ||
!expand_message_xmd(md, buf, 2 * L, msg, msg_len, dst, dst_len,
is_draft06)) {
!expand_message_xmd(md, buf, 2 * L, msg, msg_len, dst, dst_len)) {
return 0;
}
BN_ULONG words[2 * EC_MAX_WORDS];
@@ -196,12 +191,11 @@ static int hash_to_field2(const EC_GROUP *group, const EVP_MD *md,
// group order rather than a field element. |k| is the security factor.
static int hash_to_scalar(const EC_GROUP *group, const EVP_MD *md,
EC_SCALAR *out, const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
unsigned k, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
int is_draft06) {
unsigned k, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
size_t L;
uint8_t buf[EC_MAX_BYTES * 2];
if (!num_bytes_to_derive(&L, &group->order, k) ||
!expand_message_xmd(md, buf, L, msg, msg_len, dst, dst_len, is_draft06)) {
!expand_message_xmd(md, buf, L, msg, msg_len, dst, dst_len)) {
return 0;
}
@@ -310,10 +304,9 @@ static int map_to_curve_simple_swu(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_FELEM *Z,
static int hash_to_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EVP_MD *md,
const EC_FELEM *Z, const EC_FELEM *c2, unsigned k,
EC_RAW_POINT *out, const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, int is_draft06) {
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
EC_FELEM u0, u1;
if (!hash_to_field2(group, md, &u0, &u1, dst, dst_len, k, msg, msg_len,
is_draft06)) {
if (!hash_to_field2(group, md, &u0, &u1, dst, dst_len, k, msg, msg_len)) {
return 0;
}
@@ -376,7 +369,7 @@ int ec_hash_to_curve_p384_xmd_sha512_sswu_draft07(
ec_felem_neg(group, &Z, &Z);
return hash_to_curve(group, EVP_sha512(), &Z, &c2, /*k=*/192, out, dst,
dst_len, msg, msg_len, /*is_draft06=*/0);
dst_len, msg, msg_len);
}
int ec_hash_to_scalar_p384_xmd_sha512_draft07(
@@ -388,38 +381,5 @@ int ec_hash_to_scalar_p384_xmd_sha512_draft07(
}
return hash_to_scalar(group, EVP_sha512(), out, dst, dst_len, /*k=*/192, msg,
msg_len, /*is_draft06=*/0);
}
int ec_hash_to_curve_p521_xmd_sha512_sswu_draft06(
const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *out, const uint8_t *dst,
size_t dst_len, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
// See section 8.3 of draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-06.
if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group) != NID_secp521r1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_GROUP_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
// Z = -4, c2 = 8.
EC_FELEM Z, c2;
if (!felem_from_u8(group, &Z, 4) ||
!felem_from_u8(group, &c2, 8)) {
return 0;
}
ec_felem_neg(group, &Z, &Z);
return hash_to_curve(group, EVP_sha512(), &Z, &c2, /*k=*/256, out, dst,
dst_len, msg, msg_len, /*is_draft06=*/1);
}
int ec_hash_to_scalar_p521_xmd_sha512_draft06(
const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out, const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group) != NID_secp521r1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_GROUP_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
return hash_to_scalar(group, EVP_sha512(), out, dst, dst_len, /*k=*/256, msg,
msg_len, /*is_draft06=*/1);
msg_len);
}
@@ -48,28 +48,6 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int ec_hash_to_scalar_p384_xmd_sha512_draft07(
const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out, const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len);
// ec_hash_to_curve_p521_xmd_sha512_sswu_draft06 hashes |msg| to a point on
// |group| and writes the result to |out|, implementing the
// P521_XMD:SHA-512_SSWU_RO_ suite from draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-06. It
// returns one on success and zero on error.
//
// This function implements an older version of the draft and should not be used
// in new code.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int ec_hash_to_curve_p521_xmd_sha512_sswu_draft06(
const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *out, const uint8_t *dst,
size_t dst_len, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len);
// ec_hash_to_scalar_p521_xmd_sha512_draft06 hashes |msg| to a scalar on |group|
// and writes the result to |out|, using the hash_to_field operation from the
// P521_XMD:SHA-512_SSWU_RO_ suite from draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-06, but
// generating a value modulo the group order rather than a field element.
//
// This function implements an older version of the draft and should not be used
// in new code.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int ec_hash_to_scalar_p521_xmd_sha512_draft06(
const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out, const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len);
#if defined(__cplusplus)
} // extern C
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
@@ -76,6 +76,10 @@
// TODO(davidben): Fix Node to not touch the error queue itself and remove this.
OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(EVP, NOT_XOF_OR_INVALID_LENGTH)
// The HPKE module uses the EVP error namespace, but it lives in another
// directory.
OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(EVP, EMPTY_PSK)
EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new(void) {
EVP_PKEY *ret;
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_rsa.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "../bytestring/internal.h"
#include "../internal.h"
@@ -386,3 +387,161 @@ err:
EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY **out, const uint8_t **inp, long len) {
if (len < 0) {
return NULL;
}
CBS cbs;
CBS_init(&cbs, *inp, (size_t)len);
EVP_PKEY *ret = EVP_parse_public_key(&cbs);
if (ret == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (out != NULL) {
EVP_PKEY_free(*out);
*out = ret;
}
*inp = CBS_data(&cbs);
return ret;
}
int i2d_PUBKEY(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, uint8_t **outp) {
if (pkey == NULL) {
return 0;
}
CBB cbb;
if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 128) ||
!EVP_marshal_public_key(&cbb, pkey)) {
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return -1;
}
return CBB_finish_i2d(&cbb, outp);
}
RSA *d2i_RSA_PUBKEY(RSA **out, const uint8_t **inp, long len) {
if (len < 0) {
return NULL;
}
CBS cbs;
CBS_init(&cbs, *inp, (size_t)len);
EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_parse_public_key(&cbs);
if (pkey == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (rsa == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (out != NULL) {
RSA_free(*out);
*out = rsa;
}
*inp = CBS_data(&cbs);
return rsa;
}
int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY(const RSA *rsa, uint8_t **outp) {
if (rsa == NULL) {
return 0;
}
int ret = -1;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (pkey == NULL ||
!EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, (RSA *)rsa)) {
goto err;
}
ret = i2d_PUBKEY(pkey, outp);
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return ret;
}
DSA *d2i_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA **out, const uint8_t **inp, long len) {
if (len < 0) {
return NULL;
}
CBS cbs;
CBS_init(&cbs, *inp, (size_t)len);
EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_parse_public_key(&cbs);
if (pkey == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
DSA *dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (dsa == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (out != NULL) {
DSA_free(*out);
*out = dsa;
}
*inp = CBS_data(&cbs);
return dsa;
}
int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY(const DSA *dsa, uint8_t **outp) {
if (dsa == NULL) {
return 0;
}
int ret = -1;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (pkey == NULL ||
!EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, (DSA *)dsa)) {
goto err;
}
ret = i2d_PUBKEY(pkey, outp);
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return ret;
}
EC_KEY *d2i_EC_PUBKEY(EC_KEY **out, const uint8_t **inp, long len) {
if (len < 0) {
return NULL;
}
CBS cbs;
CBS_init(&cbs, *inp, (size_t)len);
EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_parse_public_key(&cbs);
if (pkey == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (ec_key == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (out != NULL) {
EC_KEY_free(*out);
*out = ec_key;
}
*inp = CBS_data(&cbs);
return ec_key;
}
int i2d_EC_PUBKEY(const EC_KEY *ec_key, uint8_t **outp) {
if (ec_key == NULL) {
return 0;
}
int ret = -1;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (pkey == NULL ||
!EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, (EC_KEY *)ec_key)) {
goto err;
}
ret = i2d_PUBKEY(pkey, outp);
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return ret;
}
@@ -141,9 +141,13 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *out, CBS *params, CBS *key) {
goto err;
}
// Decode the key.
// Decode the key. To avoid DoS attacks when importing private keys, we bound
// |dsa->priv_key| against |dsa->q|, which itself bound by
// |DSA_parse_parameters|. (We cannot call |BN_num_bits| on |dsa->priv_key|.
// That would leak a secret bit width.)
if (!BN_parse_asn1_unsigned(key, dsa->priv_key) ||
CBS_len(key) != 0) {
CBS_len(key) != 0 ||
BN_cmp(dsa->priv_key, dsa->q) >= 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
@@ -250,6 +250,7 @@ Ldec_key_abort:
#endif
.align 5
_aes_hw_encrypt:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ldr r3,[r2,#240]
vld1.32 {q0},[r2]!
vld1.8 {q2},[r0]
@@ -282,6 +283,7 @@ Loop_enc:
#endif
.align 5
_aes_hw_decrypt:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ldr r3,[r2,#240]
vld1.32 {q0},[r2]!
vld1.8 {q2},[r0]
@@ -630,20 +632,34 @@ _aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
add r7,r3,#32
mov r6,r5
movlo r12,#0
@ ARM Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72 cores running in 32-bit mode are
@ affected by silicon errata #1742098 [0] and #1655431 [1],
@ respectively, where the second instruction of an aese/aesmc
@ instruction pair may execute twice if an interrupt is taken right
@ after the first instruction consumes an input register of which a
@ single 32-bit lane has been updated the last time it was modified.
@
@ This function uses a counter in one 32-bit lane. The
@ could write to q1 and q10 directly, but that trips this bugs.
@ We write to q6 and copy to the final register as a workaround.
@
@ [0] ARM-EPM-049219 v23 Cortex-A57 MPCore Software Developers Errata Notice
@ [1] ARM-EPM-012079 v11.0 Cortex-A72 MPCore Software Developers Errata Notice
#ifndef __ARMEB__
rev r8, r8
#endif
vorr q1,q0,q0
add r10, r8, #1
vorr q10,q0,q0
add r8, r8, #2
vorr q6,q0,q0
rev r10, r10
vmov.32 d3[1],r10
vmov.32 d13[1],r10
add r8, r8, #2
vorr q1,q6,q6
bls Lctr32_tail
rev r12, r8
vmov.32 d13[1],r12
sub r2,r2,#3 @ bias
vmov.32 d21[1],r12
vorr q10,q6,q6
b Loop3x_ctr32
.align 4
@@ -670,11 +686,11 @@ Loop3x_ctr32:
.byte 0x20,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q1,q8
.byte 0x82,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q5,q1
vld1.8 {q2},[r0]!
vorr q0,q6,q6
add r9,r8,#1
.byte 0x20,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q10,q8
.byte 0xa4,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesmc q10,q10
vld1.8 {q3},[r0]!
vorr q1,q6,q6
rev r9,r9
.byte 0x22,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q4,q9
.byte 0x88,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q4,q4
.byte 0x22,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q5,q9
@@ -683,8 +699,6 @@ Loop3x_ctr32:
mov r7,r3
.byte 0x22,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q10,q9
.byte 0xa4,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesmc q9,q10
vorr q10,q6,q6
add r9,r8,#1
.byte 0x28,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q4,q12
.byte 0x88,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q4,q4
.byte 0x28,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q5,q12
@@ -699,21 +713,26 @@ Loop3x_ctr32:
.byte 0x88,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q4,q4
.byte 0x2a,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q5,q13
.byte 0x8a,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q5,q5
@ Note the logic to update q0, q1, and q1 is written to work
@ around a bug in ARM Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72 cores running in
@ 32-bit mode. See the comment above.
veor q11,q11,q7
rev r9,r9
vmov.32 d13[1], r9
.byte 0x2a,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q9,q13
.byte 0xa2,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesmc q9,q9
vmov.32 d1[1], r9
vorr q0,q6,q6
rev r10,r10
.byte 0x2c,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q4,q14
.byte 0x88,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q4,q4
vmov.32 d13[1], r10
rev r12,r8
.byte 0x2c,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q5,q14
.byte 0x8a,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q5,q5
vmov.32 d3[1], r10
rev r12,r8
vorr q1,q6,q6
vmov.32 d13[1], r12
.byte 0x2c,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q9,q14
.byte 0xa2,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesmc q9,q9
vmov.32 d21[1], r12
vorr q10,q6,q6
subs r2,r2,#3
.byte 0x2e,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q4,q15
.byte 0x2e,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q5,q15
@@ -245,6 +245,7 @@ aes_hw_set_decrypt_key:
.type aes_hw_encrypt,%function
.align 5
aes_hw_encrypt:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ldr r3,[r2,#240]
vld1.32 {q0},[r2]!
vld1.8 {q2},[r0]
@@ -275,6 +276,7 @@ aes_hw_encrypt:
.type aes_hw_decrypt,%function
.align 5
aes_hw_decrypt:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ldr r3,[r2,#240]
vld1.32 {q0},[r2]!
vld1.8 {q2},[r0]
@@ -619,20 +621,34 @@ aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
add r7,r3,#32
mov r6,r5
movlo r12,#0
@ ARM Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72 cores running in 32-bit mode are
@ affected by silicon errata #1742098 [0] and #1655431 [1],
@ respectively, where the second instruction of an aese/aesmc
@ instruction pair may execute twice if an interrupt is taken right
@ after the first instruction consumes an input register of which a
@ single 32-bit lane has been updated the last time it was modified.
@
@ This function uses a counter in one 32-bit lane. The
@ could write to q1 and q10 directly, but that trips this bugs.
@ We write to q6 and copy to the final register as a workaround.
@
@ [0] ARM-EPM-049219 v23 Cortex-A57 MPCore Software Developers Errata Notice
@ [1] ARM-EPM-012079 v11.0 Cortex-A72 MPCore Software Developers Errata Notice
#ifndef __ARMEB__
rev r8, r8
#endif
vorr q1,q0,q0
add r10, r8, #1
vorr q10,q0,q0
add r8, r8, #2
vorr q6,q0,q0
rev r10, r10
vmov.32 d3[1],r10
vmov.32 d13[1],r10
add r8, r8, #2
vorr q1,q6,q6
bls .Lctr32_tail
rev r12, r8
vmov.32 d13[1],r12
sub r2,r2,#3 @ bias
vmov.32 d21[1],r12
vorr q10,q6,q6
b .Loop3x_ctr32
.align 4
@@ -659,11 +675,11 @@ aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
.byte 0x20,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q1,q8
.byte 0x82,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q5,q1
vld1.8 {q2},[r0]!
vorr q0,q6,q6
add r9,r8,#1
.byte 0x20,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q10,q8
.byte 0xa4,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesmc q10,q10
vld1.8 {q3},[r0]!
vorr q1,q6,q6
rev r9,r9
.byte 0x22,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q4,q9
.byte 0x88,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q4,q4
.byte 0x22,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q5,q9
@@ -672,8 +688,6 @@ aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
mov r7,r3
.byte 0x22,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q10,q9
.byte 0xa4,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesmc q9,q10
vorr q10,q6,q6
add r9,r8,#1
.byte 0x28,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q4,q12
.byte 0x88,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q4,q4
.byte 0x28,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q5,q12
@@ -688,21 +702,26 @@ aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
.byte 0x88,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q4,q4
.byte 0x2a,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q5,q13
.byte 0x8a,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q5,q5
@ Note the logic to update q0, q1, and q1 is written to work
@ around a bug in ARM Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72 cores running in
@ 32-bit mode. See the comment above.
veor q11,q11,q7
rev r9,r9
vmov.32 d13[1], r9
.byte 0x2a,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q9,q13
.byte 0xa2,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesmc q9,q9
vmov.32 d1[1], r9
vorr q0,q6,q6
rev r10,r10
.byte 0x2c,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q4,q14
.byte 0x88,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q4,q4
vmov.32 d13[1], r10
rev r12,r8
.byte 0x2c,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q5,q14
.byte 0x8a,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q5,q5
vmov.32 d3[1], r10
rev r12,r8
vorr q1,q6,q6
vmov.32 d13[1], r12
.byte 0x2c,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q9,q14
.byte 0xa2,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesmc q9,q9
vmov.32 d21[1], r12
vorr q10,q6,q6
subs r2,r2,#3
.byte 0x2e,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q4,q15
.byte 0x2e,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q5,q15
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ Lrcon:
.align 5
_aes_hw_set_encrypt_key:
Lenc_key:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
mov x3,#-1
@@ -202,6 +204,7 @@ Lenc_key_abort:
.align 5
_aes_hw_set_decrypt_key:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
bl Lenc_key
@@ -235,6 +238,7 @@ Loop_imc:
eor x0,x0,x0 // return value
Ldec_key_abort:
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.globl _aes_hw_encrypt
@@ -242,6 +246,7 @@ Ldec_key_abort:
.align 5
_aes_hw_encrypt:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ldr w3,[x2,#240]
ld1 {v0.4s},[x2],#16
ld1 {v2.16b},[x0]
@@ -272,6 +277,7 @@ Loop_enc:
.align 5
_aes_hw_decrypt:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ldr w3,[x2,#240]
ld1 {v0.4s},[x2],#16
ld1 {v2.16b},[x0]
@@ -302,6 +308,8 @@ Loop_dec:
.align 5
_aes_hw_cbc_encrypt:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
subs x2,x2,#16
@@ -593,6 +601,8 @@ Lcbc_abort:
.align 5
_aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
ldr w5,[x3,#240]
@@ -612,20 +622,34 @@ _aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
add x7,x3,#32
mov w6,w5
csel x12,xzr,x12,lo
// ARM Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72 cores running in 32-bit mode are
// affected by silicon errata #1742098 [0] and #1655431 [1],
// respectively, where the second instruction of an aese/aesmc
// instruction pair may execute twice if an interrupt is taken right
// after the first instruction consumes an input register of which a
// single 32-bit lane has been updated the last time it was modified.
//
// This function uses a counter in one 32-bit lane. The vmov lines
// could write to v1.16b and v18.16b directly, but that trips this bugs.
// We write to v6.16b and copy to the final register as a workaround.
//
// [0] ARM-EPM-049219 v23 Cortex-A57 MPCore Software Developers Errata Notice
// [1] ARM-EPM-012079 v11.0 Cortex-A72 MPCore Software Developers Errata Notice
#ifndef __ARMEB__
rev w8, w8
#endif
orr v1.16b,v0.16b,v0.16b
add w10, w8, #1
orr v18.16b,v0.16b,v0.16b
add w8, w8, #2
orr v6.16b,v0.16b,v0.16b
rev w10, w10
mov v1.s[3],w10
mov v6.s[3],w10
add w8, w8, #2
orr v1.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
b.ls Lctr32_tail
rev w12, w8
mov v6.s[3],w12
sub x2,x2,#3 // bias
mov v18.s[3],w12
orr v18.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
b Loop3x_ctr32
.align 4
@@ -652,11 +676,11 @@ Loop3x_ctr32:
aese v1.16b,v16.16b
aesmc v5.16b,v1.16b
ld1 {v2.16b},[x0],#16
orr v0.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
add w9,w8,#1
aese v18.16b,v16.16b
aesmc v18.16b,v18.16b
ld1 {v3.16b},[x0],#16
orr v1.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
rev w9,w9
aese v4.16b,v17.16b
aesmc v4.16b,v4.16b
aese v5.16b,v17.16b
@@ -665,8 +689,6 @@ Loop3x_ctr32:
mov x7,x3
aese v18.16b,v17.16b
aesmc v17.16b,v18.16b
orr v18.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
add w9,w8,#1
aese v4.16b,v20.16b
aesmc v4.16b,v4.16b
aese v5.16b,v20.16b
@@ -681,21 +703,26 @@ Loop3x_ctr32:
aesmc v4.16b,v4.16b
aese v5.16b,v21.16b
aesmc v5.16b,v5.16b
// Note the logic to update v0.16b, v1.16b, and v1.16b is written to work
// around a bug in ARM Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72 cores running in
// 32-bit mode. See the comment above.
eor v19.16b,v19.16b,v7.16b
rev w9,w9
mov v6.s[3], w9
aese v17.16b,v21.16b
aesmc v17.16b,v17.16b
mov v0.s[3], w9
orr v0.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
rev w10,w10
aese v4.16b,v22.16b
aesmc v4.16b,v4.16b
mov v6.s[3], w10
rev w12,w8
aese v5.16b,v22.16b
aesmc v5.16b,v5.16b
mov v1.s[3], w10
rev w12,w8
orr v1.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
mov v6.s[3], w12
aese v17.16b,v22.16b
aesmc v17.16b,v17.16b
mov v18.s[3], w12
orr v18.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
subs x2,x2,#3
aese v4.16b,v23.16b
aese v5.16b,v23.16b
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@
.align 5
aes_hw_set_encrypt_key:
.Lenc_key:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
mov x3,#-1
@@ -203,6 +205,7 @@ aes_hw_set_encrypt_key:
.type aes_hw_set_decrypt_key,%function
.align 5
aes_hw_set_decrypt_key:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
bl .Lenc_key
@@ -236,6 +239,7 @@ aes_hw_set_decrypt_key:
eor x0,x0,x0 // return value
.Ldec_key_abort:
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size aes_hw_set_decrypt_key,.-aes_hw_set_decrypt_key
.globl aes_hw_encrypt
@@ -243,6 +247,7 @@ aes_hw_set_decrypt_key:
.type aes_hw_encrypt,%function
.align 5
aes_hw_encrypt:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ldr w3,[x2,#240]
ld1 {v0.4s},[x2],#16
ld1 {v2.16b},[x0]
@@ -273,6 +278,7 @@ aes_hw_encrypt:
.type aes_hw_decrypt,%function
.align 5
aes_hw_decrypt:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ldr w3,[x2,#240]
ld1 {v0.4s},[x2],#16
ld1 {v2.16b},[x0]
@@ -303,6 +309,8 @@ aes_hw_decrypt:
.type aes_hw_cbc_encrypt,%function
.align 5
aes_hw_cbc_encrypt:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
subs x2,x2,#16
@@ -594,6 +602,8 @@ aes_hw_cbc_encrypt:
.type aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,%function
.align 5
aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
ldr w5,[x3,#240]
@@ -613,20 +623,34 @@ aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
add x7,x3,#32
mov w6,w5
csel x12,xzr,x12,lo
// ARM Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72 cores running in 32-bit mode are
// affected by silicon errata #1742098 [0] and #1655431 [1],
// respectively, where the second instruction of an aese/aesmc
// instruction pair may execute twice if an interrupt is taken right
// after the first instruction consumes an input register of which a
// single 32-bit lane has been updated the last time it was modified.
//
// This function uses a counter in one 32-bit lane. The vmov lines
// could write to v1.16b and v18.16b directly, but that trips this bugs.
// We write to v6.16b and copy to the final register as a workaround.
//
// [0] ARM-EPM-049219 v23 Cortex-A57 MPCore Software Developers Errata Notice
// [1] ARM-EPM-012079 v11.0 Cortex-A72 MPCore Software Developers Errata Notice
#ifndef __ARMEB__
rev w8, w8
#endif
orr v1.16b,v0.16b,v0.16b
add w10, w8, #1
orr v18.16b,v0.16b,v0.16b
add w8, w8, #2
orr v6.16b,v0.16b,v0.16b
rev w10, w10
mov v1.s[3],w10
mov v6.s[3],w10
add w8, w8, #2
orr v1.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
b.ls .Lctr32_tail
rev w12, w8
mov v6.s[3],w12
sub x2,x2,#3 // bias
mov v18.s[3],w12
orr v18.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
b .Loop3x_ctr32
.align 4
@@ -653,11 +677,11 @@ aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
aese v1.16b,v16.16b
aesmc v5.16b,v1.16b
ld1 {v2.16b},[x0],#16
orr v0.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
add w9,w8,#1
aese v18.16b,v16.16b
aesmc v18.16b,v18.16b
ld1 {v3.16b},[x0],#16
orr v1.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
rev w9,w9
aese v4.16b,v17.16b
aesmc v4.16b,v4.16b
aese v5.16b,v17.16b
@@ -666,8 +690,6 @@ aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
mov x7,x3
aese v18.16b,v17.16b
aesmc v17.16b,v18.16b
orr v18.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
add w9,w8,#1
aese v4.16b,v20.16b
aesmc v4.16b,v4.16b
aese v5.16b,v20.16b
@@ -682,21 +704,26 @@ aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
aesmc v4.16b,v4.16b
aese v5.16b,v21.16b
aesmc v5.16b,v5.16b
// Note the logic to update v0.16b, v1.16b, and v1.16b is written to work
// around a bug in ARM Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72 cores running in
// 32-bit mode. See the comment above.
eor v19.16b,v19.16b,v7.16b
rev w9,w9
mov v6.s[3], w9
aese v17.16b,v21.16b
aesmc v17.16b,v17.16b
mov v0.s[3], w9
orr v0.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
rev w10,w10
aese v4.16b,v22.16b
aesmc v4.16b,v4.16b
mov v6.s[3], w10
rev w12,w8
aese v5.16b,v22.16b
aesmc v5.16b,v5.16b
mov v1.s[3], w10
rev w12,w8
orr v1.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
mov v6.s[3], w12
aese v17.16b,v22.16b
aesmc v17.16b,v17.16b
mov v18.s[3], w12
orr v18.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
subs x2,x2,#3
aese v4.16b,v23.16b
aese v5.16b,v23.16b
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
#if defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h>
#endif
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_arm_arch.h>
.text
.globl _bn_mul_mont
@@ -21,6 +23,7 @@
.align 5
_bn_mul_mont:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
tst x5,#7
b.eq __bn_sqr8x_mont
tst x5,#3
@@ -218,11 +221,14 @@ Lcond_copy:
mov x0,#1
ldp x23,x24,[x29,#48]
ldr x29,[sp],#64
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.align 5
__bn_sqr8x_mont:
// Not adding AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER here because __bn_sqr8x_mont is jumped to
// only from bn_mul_mont which has already signed the return address.
cmp x1,x2
b.ne __bn_mul4x_mont
Lsqr8x_mont:
@@ -976,11 +982,16 @@ Lsqr8x_done:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldr x29,[sp],#128
// x30 is popped earlier
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.align 5
__bn_mul4x_mont:
// Not adding AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER here because __bn_mul4x_mont is jumped to
// only from bn_mul_mont or __bn_mul8x_mont which have already signed the
// return address.
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-128]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp x19,x20,[sp,#16]
@@ -1414,6 +1425,8 @@ Lmul4x_done:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldr x29,[sp],#128
// x30 is popped earlier
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.byte 77,111,110,116,103,111,109,101,114,121,32,77,117,108,116,105,112,108,105,99,97,116,105,111,110,32,102,111,114,32,65,82,77,118,56,44,32,67,82,89,80,84,79,71,65,77,83,32,98,121,32,60,97,112,112,114,111,64,111,112,101,110,115,115,108,46,111,114,103,62,0
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
#if defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h>
#endif
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_arm_arch.h>
.text
.globl bn_mul_mont
@@ -22,6 +24,7 @@
.type bn_mul_mont,%function
.align 5
bn_mul_mont:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
tst x5,#7
b.eq __bn_sqr8x_mont
tst x5,#3
@@ -219,11 +222,14 @@ bn_mul_mont:
mov x0,#1
ldp x23,x24,[x29,#48]
ldr x29,[sp],#64
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size bn_mul_mont,.-bn_mul_mont
.type __bn_sqr8x_mont,%function
.align 5
__bn_sqr8x_mont:
// Not adding AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER here because __bn_sqr8x_mont is jumped to
// only from bn_mul_mont which has already signed the return address.
cmp x1,x2
b.ne __bn_mul4x_mont
.Lsqr8x_mont:
@@ -977,11 +983,16 @@ __bn_sqr8x_mont:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldr x29,[sp],#128
// x30 is popped earlier
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size __bn_sqr8x_mont,.-__bn_sqr8x_mont
.type __bn_mul4x_mont,%function
.align 5
__bn_mul4x_mont:
// Not adding AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER here because __bn_mul4x_mont is jumped to
// only from bn_mul_mont or __bn_mul8x_mont which have already signed the
// return address.
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-128]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp x19,x20,[sp,#16]
@@ -1415,6 +1426,8 @@ __bn_mul4x_mont:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldr x29,[sp],#128
// x30 is popped earlier
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size __bn_mul4x_mont,.-__bn_mul4x_mont
.byte 77,111,110,116,103,111,109,101,114,121,32,77,117,108,116,105,112,108,105,99,97,116,105,111,110,32,102,111,114,32,65,82,77,118,56,44,32,67,82,89,80,84,79,71,65,77,83,32,98,121,32,60,97,112,112,114,111,64,111,112,101,110,115,115,108,46,111,114,103,62,0
@@ -0,0 +1,852 @@
#define BORINGSSL_PREFIX CCryptoBoringSSL
#if defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
# This file is generated from a similarly-named Perl script in the BoringSSL
# source tree. Do not edit by hand.
#if defined(__i386__)
#if defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h>
#endif
.text
.globl _bn_mul_add_words
.hidden _bn_mul_add_words
.def _bn_mul_add_words; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_bn_mul_add_words:
.L_bn_mul_add_words_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
xorl %esi,%esi
movl 20(%esp),%edi
movl 28(%esp),%ecx
movl 24(%esp),%ebx
andl $4294967288,%ecx
movl 32(%esp),%ebp
pushl %ecx
jz .L000maw_finish
.align 16
.L001maw_loop:
# Round 0
movl (%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl (%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 4
movl 4(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 4(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,4(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 8
movl 8(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 8(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,8(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 12
movl 12(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 12(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,12(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 16
movl 16(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 16(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,16(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 20
movl 20(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 20(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,20(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 24
movl 24(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 24(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,24(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 28
movl 28(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 28(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,28(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
subl $8,%ecx
leal 32(%ebx),%ebx
leal 32(%edi),%edi
jnz .L001maw_loop
.L000maw_finish:
movl 32(%esp),%ecx
andl $7,%ecx
jnz .L002maw_finish2
jmp .L003maw_end
.L002maw_finish2:
# Tail Round 0
movl (%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl (%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
decl %ecx
movl %eax,(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
jz .L003maw_end
# Tail Round 1
movl 4(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 4(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
decl %ecx
movl %eax,4(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
jz .L003maw_end
# Tail Round 2
movl 8(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 8(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
decl %ecx
movl %eax,8(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
jz .L003maw_end
# Tail Round 3
movl 12(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 12(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
decl %ecx
movl %eax,12(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
jz .L003maw_end
# Tail Round 4
movl 16(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 16(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
decl %ecx
movl %eax,16(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
jz .L003maw_end
# Tail Round 5
movl 20(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 20(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
decl %ecx
movl %eax,20(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
jz .L003maw_end
# Tail Round 6
movl 24(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 24(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,24(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
.L003maw_end:
movl %esi,%eax
popl %ecx
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.globl _bn_mul_words
.hidden _bn_mul_words
.def _bn_mul_words; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_bn_mul_words:
.L_bn_mul_words_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
xorl %esi,%esi
movl 20(%esp),%edi
movl 24(%esp),%ebx
movl 28(%esp),%ebp
movl 32(%esp),%ecx
andl $4294967288,%ebp
jz .L004mw_finish
.L005mw_loop:
# Round 0
movl (%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 4
movl 4(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,4(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 8
movl 8(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,8(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 12
movl 12(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,12(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 16
movl 16(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,16(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 20
movl 20(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,20(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 24
movl 24(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,24(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 28
movl 28(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,28(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
addl $32,%ebx
addl $32,%edi
subl $8,%ebp
jz .L004mw_finish
jmp .L005mw_loop
.L004mw_finish:
movl 28(%esp),%ebp
andl $7,%ebp
jnz .L006mw_finish2
jmp .L007mw_end
.L006mw_finish2:
# Tail Round 0
movl (%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
decl %ebp
jz .L007mw_end
# Tail Round 1
movl 4(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,4(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
decl %ebp
jz .L007mw_end
# Tail Round 2
movl 8(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,8(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
decl %ebp
jz .L007mw_end
# Tail Round 3
movl 12(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,12(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
decl %ebp
jz .L007mw_end
# Tail Round 4
movl 16(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,16(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
decl %ebp
jz .L007mw_end
# Tail Round 5
movl 20(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,20(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
decl %ebp
jz .L007mw_end
# Tail Round 6
movl 24(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,24(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
.L007mw_end:
movl %esi,%eax
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.globl _bn_sqr_words
.hidden _bn_sqr_words
.def _bn_sqr_words; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_bn_sqr_words:
.L_bn_sqr_words_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
movl 20(%esp),%esi
movl 24(%esp),%edi
movl 28(%esp),%ebx
andl $4294967288,%ebx
jz .L008sw_finish
.L009sw_loop:
# Round 0
movl (%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,(%esi)
movl %edx,4(%esi)
# Round 4
movl 4(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,8(%esi)
movl %edx,12(%esi)
# Round 8
movl 8(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,16(%esi)
movl %edx,20(%esi)
# Round 12
movl 12(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,24(%esi)
movl %edx,28(%esi)
# Round 16
movl 16(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,32(%esi)
movl %edx,36(%esi)
# Round 20
movl 20(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,40(%esi)
movl %edx,44(%esi)
# Round 24
movl 24(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,48(%esi)
movl %edx,52(%esi)
# Round 28
movl 28(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,56(%esi)
movl %edx,60(%esi)
addl $32,%edi
addl $64,%esi
subl $8,%ebx
jnz .L009sw_loop
.L008sw_finish:
movl 28(%esp),%ebx
andl $7,%ebx
jz .L010sw_end
# Tail Round 0
movl (%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,(%esi)
decl %ebx
movl %edx,4(%esi)
jz .L010sw_end
# Tail Round 1
movl 4(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,8(%esi)
decl %ebx
movl %edx,12(%esi)
jz .L010sw_end
# Tail Round 2
movl 8(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,16(%esi)
decl %ebx
movl %edx,20(%esi)
jz .L010sw_end
# Tail Round 3
movl 12(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,24(%esi)
decl %ebx
movl %edx,28(%esi)
jz .L010sw_end
# Tail Round 4
movl 16(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,32(%esi)
decl %ebx
movl %edx,36(%esi)
jz .L010sw_end
# Tail Round 5
movl 20(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,40(%esi)
decl %ebx
movl %edx,44(%esi)
jz .L010sw_end
# Tail Round 6
movl 24(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,48(%esi)
movl %edx,52(%esi)
.L010sw_end:
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.globl _bn_div_words
.hidden _bn_div_words
.def _bn_div_words; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_bn_div_words:
.L_bn_div_words_begin:
movl 4(%esp),%edx
movl 8(%esp),%eax
movl 12(%esp),%ecx
divl %ecx
ret
.globl _bn_add_words
.hidden _bn_add_words
.def _bn_add_words; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_bn_add_words:
.L_bn_add_words_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
movl 20(%esp),%ebx
movl 24(%esp),%esi
movl 28(%esp),%edi
movl 32(%esp),%ebp
xorl %eax,%eax
andl $4294967288,%ebp
jz .L011aw_finish
.L012aw_loop:
# Round 0
movl (%esi),%ecx
movl (%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,(%ebx)
# Round 1
movl 4(%esi),%ecx
movl 4(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,4(%ebx)
# Round 2
movl 8(%esi),%ecx
movl 8(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,8(%ebx)
# Round 3
movl 12(%esi),%ecx
movl 12(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,12(%ebx)
# Round 4
movl 16(%esi),%ecx
movl 16(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,16(%ebx)
# Round 5
movl 20(%esi),%ecx
movl 20(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,20(%ebx)
# Round 6
movl 24(%esi),%ecx
movl 24(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,24(%ebx)
# Round 7
movl 28(%esi),%ecx
movl 28(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,28(%ebx)
addl $32,%esi
addl $32,%edi
addl $32,%ebx
subl $8,%ebp
jnz .L012aw_loop
.L011aw_finish:
movl 32(%esp),%ebp
andl $7,%ebp
jz .L013aw_end
# Tail Round 0
movl (%esi),%ecx
movl (%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,(%ebx)
jz .L013aw_end
# Tail Round 1
movl 4(%esi),%ecx
movl 4(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,4(%ebx)
jz .L013aw_end
# Tail Round 2
movl 8(%esi),%ecx
movl 8(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,8(%ebx)
jz .L013aw_end
# Tail Round 3
movl 12(%esi),%ecx
movl 12(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,12(%ebx)
jz .L013aw_end
# Tail Round 4
movl 16(%esi),%ecx
movl 16(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,16(%ebx)
jz .L013aw_end
# Tail Round 5
movl 20(%esi),%ecx
movl 20(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,20(%ebx)
jz .L013aw_end
# Tail Round 6
movl 24(%esi),%ecx
movl 24(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,24(%ebx)
.L013aw_end:
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.globl _bn_sub_words
.hidden _bn_sub_words
.def _bn_sub_words; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_bn_sub_words:
.L_bn_sub_words_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
movl 20(%esp),%ebx
movl 24(%esp),%esi
movl 28(%esp),%edi
movl 32(%esp),%ebp
xorl %eax,%eax
andl $4294967288,%ebp
jz .L014aw_finish
.L015aw_loop:
# Round 0
movl (%esi),%ecx
movl (%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,(%ebx)
# Round 1
movl 4(%esi),%ecx
movl 4(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,4(%ebx)
# Round 2
movl 8(%esi),%ecx
movl 8(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,8(%ebx)
# Round 3
movl 12(%esi),%ecx
movl 12(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,12(%ebx)
# Round 4
movl 16(%esi),%ecx
movl 16(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,16(%ebx)
# Round 5
movl 20(%esi),%ecx
movl 20(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,20(%ebx)
# Round 6
movl 24(%esi),%ecx
movl 24(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,24(%ebx)
# Round 7
movl 28(%esi),%ecx
movl 28(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,28(%ebx)
addl $32,%esi
addl $32,%edi
addl $32,%ebx
subl $8,%ebp
jnz .L015aw_loop
.L014aw_finish:
movl 32(%esp),%ebp
andl $7,%ebp
jz .L016aw_end
# Tail Round 0
movl (%esi),%ecx
movl (%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,(%ebx)
jz .L016aw_end
# Tail Round 1
movl 4(%esi),%ecx
movl 4(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,4(%ebx)
jz .L016aw_end
# Tail Round 2
movl 8(%esi),%ecx
movl 8(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,8(%ebx)
jz .L016aw_end
# Tail Round 3
movl 12(%esi),%ecx
movl 12(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,12(%ebx)
jz .L016aw_end
# Tail Round 4
movl 16(%esi),%ecx
movl 16(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,16(%ebx)
jz .L016aw_end
# Tail Round 5
movl 20(%esi),%ecx
movl 20(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,20(%ebx)
jz .L016aw_end
# Tail Round 6
movl 24(%esi),%ecx
movl 24(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,24(%ebx)
.L016aw_end:
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
#endif
#endif // defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__ELF__)
.section .note.GNU-stack,"",%progbits
#endif
@@ -101,26 +101,7 @@ void BN_free(BIGNUM *bn) {
}
void BN_clear_free(BIGNUM *bn) {
char should_free;
if (bn == NULL) {
return;
}
if (bn->d != NULL) {
if ((bn->flags & BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA) == 0) {
OPENSSL_free(bn->d);
} else {
OPENSSL_cleanse(bn->d, bn->dmax * sizeof(bn->d[0]));
}
}
should_free = (bn->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED) != 0;
if (should_free) {
OPENSSL_free(bn);
} else {
OPENSSL_cleanse(bn, sizeof(BIGNUM));
}
BN_free(bn);
}
BIGNUM *BN_dup(const BIGNUM *src) {
@@ -302,6 +283,18 @@ int bn_set_words(BIGNUM *bn, const BN_ULONG *words, size_t num) {
return 1;
}
void bn_set_static_words(BIGNUM *bn, const BN_ULONG *words, size_t num) {
if ((bn->flags & BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA) == 0) {
OPENSSL_free(bn->d);
}
bn->d = (BN_ULONG *)words;
bn->width = num;
bn->dmax = num;
bn->neg = 0;
bn->flags |= BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA;
}
int bn_fits_in_words(const BIGNUM *bn, size_t num) {
// All words beyond |num| must be zero.
BN_ULONG mask = 0;
@@ -64,10 +64,10 @@
#include "internal.h"
#if !defined(BN_CAN_DIVIDE_ULLONG) && !defined(BN_CAN_USE_INLINE_ASM)
// bn_div_words divides a double-width |h|,|l| by |d| and returns the result,
// which must fit in a |BN_ULONG|.
static BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d) {
OPENSSL_UNUSED static BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l,
BN_ULONG d) {
BN_ULONG dh, dl, q, ret = 0, th, tl, t;
int i, count = 2;
@@ -135,7 +135,6 @@ static BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d) {
ret |= q;
return ret;
}
#endif // !defined(BN_CAN_DIVIDE_ULLONG) && !defined(BN_CAN_USE_INLINE_ASM)
static inline void bn_div_rem_words(BN_ULONG *quotient_out, BN_ULONG *rem_out,
BN_ULONG n0, BN_ULONG n1, BN_ULONG d0) {
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@
#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_BN_INTERNAL_H
#define OPENSSL_HEADER_BN_INTERNAL_H
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_base.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_bn.h>
#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && defined(_MSC_VER)
OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(push, 3))
@@ -241,6 +241,14 @@ void bn_select_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG mask, const BN_ULONG *a,
// least significant word first.
int bn_set_words(BIGNUM *bn, const BN_ULONG *words, size_t num);
// bn_set_static_words acts like |bn_set_words|, but doesn't copy the data. A
// flag is set on |bn| so that |BN_free| won't attempt to free the data.
//
// The |STATIC_BIGNUM| macro is probably a better solution for this outside of
// the FIPS module. Inside of the FIPS module that macro generates rel.ro data,
// which doesn't work with FIPS requirements.
void bn_set_static_words(BIGNUM *bn, const BN_ULONG *words, size_t num);
// bn_fits_in_words returns one if |bn| may be represented in |num| words, plus
// a sign bit, and zero otherwise.
int bn_fits_in_words(const BIGNUM *bn, size_t num);
@@ -404,9 +412,19 @@ uint64_t bn_mont_n0(const BIGNUM *n);
int bn_mod_exp_base_2_consttime(BIGNUM *r, unsigned p, const BIGNUM *n,
BN_CTX *ctx);
#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && defined(_MSC_VER)
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
#define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low, high, a, b) ((low) = _umul128((a), (b), &(high)))
#elif defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)
#define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low, high, a, b) \
do { \
const BN_ULONG _a = (a); \
const BN_ULONG _b = (b); \
(low) = _a * _b; \
(high) = __umulh(_a, _b); \
} while (0)
#endif
#endif // _MSC_VER
#if !defined(BN_ULLONG) && !defined(BN_UMULT_LOHI)
#error "Either BN_ULLONG or BN_UMULT_LOHI must be defined on every platform."
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@
OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(push))
OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(disable: 4702)) // Unreachable code.
#define AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH 12
#if defined(BSAES)
static void vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks_with_bsaes(const uint8_t *in,
uint8_t *out, size_t blocks,
@@ -630,7 +632,7 @@ DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_128_gcm_generic) {
out->nid = NID_aes_128_gcm;
out->block_size = 1;
out->key_len = 16;
out->iv_len = 12;
out->iv_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) + EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING;
out->flags = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY |
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT |
@@ -698,7 +700,7 @@ DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_192_gcm_generic) {
out->nid = NID_aes_192_gcm;
out->block_size = 1;
out->key_len = 24;
out->iv_len = 12;
out->iv_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) + EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING;
out->flags = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY |
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT |
@@ -766,7 +768,7 @@ DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_256_gcm_generic) {
out->nid = NID_aes_256_gcm;
out->block_size = 1;
out->key_len = 32;
out->iv_len = 12;
out->iv_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) + EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING;
out->flags = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY |
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT |
@@ -931,21 +933,19 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
static void aead_aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {}
static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len,
size_t max_out_tag_len,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *extra_in,
size_t extra_in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *) &ctx->state;
if (extra_in_len + ctx->tag_len < ctx->tag_len) {
static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_impl(
const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx,
uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *extra_in, size_t extra_in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len,
size_t tag_len) {
if (extra_in_len + tag_len < tag_len) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
if (max_out_tag_len < extra_in_len + ctx->tag_len) {
if (max_out_tag_len < extra_in_len + tag_len) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
@@ -989,18 +989,35 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
}
}
CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, out_tag + extra_in_len, ctx->tag_len);
*out_tag_len = ctx->tag_len + extra_in_len;
CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, out_tag + extra_in_len, tag_len);
*out_tag_len = tag_len + extra_in_len;
return 1;
}
static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *) &ctx->state;
static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len,
size_t max_out_tag_len,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *extra_in,
size_t extra_in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx =
(const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
return aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_impl(
gcm_ctx, out, out_tag, out_tag_len, max_out_tag_len, nonce, nonce_len, in,
in_len, extra_in, extra_in_len, ad, ad_len, ctx->tag_len);
}
static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_impl(const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx,
uint8_t *out,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *in_tag,
size_t in_tag_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len,
size_t tag_len) {
uint8_t tag[EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN];
if (nonce_len == 0) {
@@ -1008,7 +1025,7 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
return 0;
}
if (in_tag_len != ctx->tag_len) {
if (in_tag_len != tag_len) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return 0;
}
@@ -1035,8 +1052,8 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
}
}
CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, tag, ctx->tag_len);
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in_tag, ctx->tag_len) != 0) {
CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, tag, tag_len);
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in_tag, tag_len) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return 0;
}
@@ -1044,11 +1061,22 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
return 1;
}
static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
return aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_impl(gcm_ctx, out, nonce, nonce_len, in,
in_len, in_tag, in_tag_len, ad, ad_len,
ctx->tag_len);
}
DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
out->key_len = 16;
out->nonce_len = 12;
out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1063,7 +1091,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_192_gcm) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
out->key_len = 24;
out->nonce_len = 12;
out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1078,7 +1106,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
out->key_len = 32;
out->nonce_len = 12;
out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1089,6 +1117,116 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm) {
out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather;
}
static int aead_aes_gcm_init_randnonce(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
size_t key_len,
size_t requested_tag_len) {
if (requested_tag_len != EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH) {
if (requested_tag_len < AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
requested_tag_len -= AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
}
if (!aead_aes_gcm_init(ctx, key, key_len, requested_tag_len)) {
return 0;
}
ctx->tag_len += AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
return 1;
}
static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_randnonce(
const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len,
const uint8_t *external_nonce, size_t external_nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *extra_in, size_t extra_in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
if (external_nonce_len != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
uint8_t nonce[AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH];
if (max_out_tag_len < sizeof(nonce)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
RAND_bytes(nonce, sizeof(nonce));
const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx =
(const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
if (!aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_impl(gcm_ctx, out, out_tag, out_tag_len,
max_out_tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH,
nonce, sizeof(nonce), in, in_len,
extra_in, extra_in_len, ad, ad_len,
ctx->tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH)) {
return 0;
}
assert(*out_tag_len + sizeof(nonce) <= max_out_tag_len);
memcpy(out_tag + *out_tag_len, nonce, sizeof(nonce));
*out_tag_len += sizeof(nonce);
return 1;
}
static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_randnonce(
const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
const uint8_t *external_nonce, size_t external_nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
if (external_nonce_len != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
if (in_tag_len < AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return 0;
}
const uint8_t *nonce = in_tag + in_tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx =
(const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
return aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_impl(
gcm_ctx, out, nonce, AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH, in, in_len, in_tag,
in_tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH, ad, ad_len,
ctx->tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH);
}
DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_randnonce) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
out->key_len = 16;
out->nonce_len = 0;
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
out->init = aead_aes_gcm_init_randnonce;
out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup;
out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_randnonce;
out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_randnonce;
}
DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_randnonce) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
out->key_len = 32;
out->nonce_len = 0;
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
out->init = aead_aes_gcm_init_randnonce;
out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup;
out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_randnonce;
out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_randnonce;
}
struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx {
struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx gcm_ctx;
uint64_t min_next_nonce;
@@ -1128,7 +1266,7 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_tls12_seal_scatter(
struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx *gcm_ctx =
(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx *) &ctx->state;
if (nonce_len != 12) {
if (nonce_len != AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
@@ -1155,7 +1293,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_tls12) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
out->key_len = 16;
out->nonce_len = 12;
out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1170,7 +1308,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_tls12) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
out->key_len = 32;
out->nonce_len = 12;
out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1223,7 +1361,7 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_tls13_seal_scatter(
struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx *gcm_ctx =
(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx *) &ctx->state;
if (nonce_len != 12) {
if (nonce_len != AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
@@ -1261,7 +1399,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_tls13) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
out->key_len = 16;
out->nonce_len = 12;
out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1276,7 +1414,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_tls13) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
out->key_len = 32;
out->nonce_len = 12;
out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
@@ -60,17 +60,15 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_bn.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_err.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_ex_data.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_digest.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_thread.h>
#include "../internal.h"
#include "../../internal.h"
#define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT;
DH *DH_new(void) {
DH *dh = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DH));
if (dh == NULL) {
@@ -83,7 +81,6 @@ DH *DH_new(void) {
CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&dh->method_mont_p_lock);
dh->references = 1;
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&dh->ex_data);
return dh;
}
@@ -97,8 +94,6 @@ void DH_free(DH *dh) {
return;
}
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, dh, &dh->ex_data);
BN_MONT_CTX_free(dh->method_mont_p);
BN_clear_free(dh->p);
BN_clear_free(dh->g);
@@ -189,120 +184,6 @@ int DH_set_length(DH *dh, unsigned priv_length) {
return 1;
}
int DH_generate_parameters_ex(DH *dh, int prime_bits, int generator, BN_GENCB *cb) {
// We generate DH parameters as follows
// find a prime q which is prime_bits/2 bits long.
// p=(2*q)+1 or (p-1)/2 = q
// For this case, g is a generator if
// g^((p-1)/q) mod p != 1 for values of q which are the factors of p-1.
// Since the factors of p-1 are q and 2, we just need to check
// g^2 mod p != 1 and g^q mod p != 1.
//
// Having said all that,
// there is another special case method for the generators 2, 3 and 5.
// for 2, p mod 24 == 11
// for 3, p mod 12 == 5 <<<<< does not work for safe primes.
// for 5, p mod 10 == 3 or 7
//
// Thanks to Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com> for the pointers about the
// special generators and for answering some of my questions.
//
// I've implemented the second simple method :-).
// Since DH should be using a safe prime (both p and q are prime),
// this generator function can take a very very long time to run.
// Actually there is no reason to insist that 'generator' be a generator.
// It's just as OK (and in some sense better) to use a generator of the
// order-q subgroup.
BIGNUM *t1, *t2;
int g, ok = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL) {
goto err;
}
// Make sure |dh| has the necessary elements
if (dh->p == NULL) {
dh->p = BN_new();
if (dh->p == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
if (dh->g == NULL) {
dh->g = BN_new();
if (dh->g == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
if (generator <= 1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR);
goto err;
}
if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_2) {
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 24)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 11)) {
goto err;
}
g = 2;
} else if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_5) {
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 10)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 3)) {
goto err;
}
// BN_set_word(t3,7); just have to miss
// out on these ones :-(
g = 5;
} else {
// in the general case, don't worry if 'generator' is a
// generator or not: since we are using safe primes,
// it will generate either an order-q or an order-2q group,
// which both is OK
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 2)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 1)) {
goto err;
}
g = generator;
}
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(dh->p, prime_bits, 1, t1, t2, cb)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(dh->g, g)) {
goto err;
}
ok = 1;
err:
if (!ok) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
}
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
return ok;
}
int DH_generate_key(DH *dh) {
int ok = 0;
int generate_new_key = 0;
@@ -390,56 +271,127 @@ err:
return ok;
}
int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *out, const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) {
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *shared_key;
int ret = -1;
int check_result;
static int dh_compute_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *out_shared_key,
const BIGNUM *peers_key, BN_CTX *ctx) {
if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
goto err;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
shared_key = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (shared_key == NULL) {
goto err;
return 0;
}
if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE);
goto err;
return 0;
}
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, &dh->method_mont_p_lock,
int check_result;
if (!DH_check_pub_key(dh, peers_key, &check_result) || check_result) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY);
return 0;
}
int ret = 0;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
BIGNUM *p_minus_1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (!p_minus_1 ||
!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, &dh->method_mont_p_lock,
dh->p, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
if (!DH_check_pub_key(dh, peers_key, &check_result) || check_result) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY);
goto err;
}
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(shared_key, peers_key, dh->priv_key, dh->p,
ctx, dh->method_mont_p)) {
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(out_shared_key, peers_key, dh->priv_key, dh->p,
ctx, dh->method_mont_p) ||
!BN_copy(p_minus_1, dh->p) ||
!BN_sub_word(p_minus_1, 1)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret = BN_bn2bin(shared_key, out);
err:
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
// This performs the check required by SP 800-56Ar3 section 5.7.1.1 step two.
if (BN_cmp_word(out_shared_key, 1) <= 0 ||
BN_cmp(out_shared_key, p_minus_1) == 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY);
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return ret;
}
int DH_compute_key_padded(unsigned char *out, const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) {
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
return -1;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
int dh_size = DH_size(dh);
int ret = -1;
BIGNUM *shared_key = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (shared_key &&
dh_compute_key(dh, shared_key, peers_key, ctx) &&
BN_bn2bin_padded(out, dh_size, shared_key)) {
ret = dh_size;
}
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *out, const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) {
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
return -1;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
int ret = -1;
BIGNUM *shared_key = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (shared_key && dh_compute_key(dh, shared_key, peers_key, ctx)) {
ret = BN_bn2bin(shared_key, out);
}
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
int DH_compute_key_hashed(DH *dh, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
size_t max_out_len, const BIGNUM *peers_key,
const EVP_MD *digest) {
*out_len = (size_t)-1;
const size_t digest_len = EVP_MD_size(digest);
if (digest_len > max_out_len) {
return 0;
}
int ret = 0;
const size_t dh_len = DH_size(dh);
uint8_t *shared_bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(dh_len);
unsigned out_len_unsigned;
if (!shared_bytes ||
// SP 800-56A is ambiguous about whether the output should be padded prior
// to revision three. But revision three, section C.1, awkwardly specifies
// padding to the length of p.
//
// Also, padded output avoids side-channels, so is always strongly
// advisable.
DH_compute_key_padded(shared_bytes, peers_key, dh) != (int)dh_len ||
!EVP_Digest(shared_bytes, dh_len, out, &out_len_unsigned, digest, NULL) ||
out_len_unsigned != digest_len) {
goto err;
}
*out_len = digest_len;
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(shared_bytes);
return ret;
}
@@ -451,83 +403,3 @@ int DH_up_ref(DH *dh) {
CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&dh->references);
return 1;
}
static int int_dh_bn_cpy(BIGNUM **dst, const BIGNUM *src) {
BIGNUM *a = NULL;
if (src) {
a = BN_dup(src);
if (!a) {
return 0;
}
}
BN_free(*dst);
*dst = a;
return 1;
}
static int int_dh_param_copy(DH *to, const DH *from, int is_x942) {
if (is_x942 == -1) {
is_x942 = !!from->q;
}
if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->p, from->p) ||
!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->g, from->g)) {
return 0;
}
if (!is_x942) {
return 1;
}
if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->q, from->q) ||
!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->j, from->j)) {
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(to->seed);
to->seed = NULL;
to->seedlen = 0;
if (from->seed) {
to->seed = OPENSSL_memdup(from->seed, from->seedlen);
if (!to->seed) {
return 0;
}
to->seedlen = from->seedlen;
}
return 1;
}
DH *DHparams_dup(const DH *dh) {
DH *ret = DH_new();
if (!ret) {
return NULL;
}
if (!int_dh_param_copy(ret, dh, -1)) {
DH_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
int DH_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
int index;
if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
free_func)) {
return -1;
}
return index;
}
int DH_set_ex_data(DH *d, int idx, void *arg) {
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx, arg);
}
void *DH_get_ex_data(DH *d, int idx) {
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx);
}
@@ -122,6 +122,8 @@ int EVP_DigestFinalXOF(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t len) {
uint32_t EVP_MD_meth_get_flags(const EVP_MD *md) { return EVP_MD_flags(md); }
void EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int flags) {}
int EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in) {
// |in->digest| may be NULL if this is a signing |EVP_MD_CTX| for, e.g.,
// Ed25519 which does not hash with |EVP_MD_CTX|.
@@ -797,6 +797,12 @@ int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
return 1;
}
int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group,
const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y,
BN_CTX *ctx) {
return EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx);
}
void ec_affine_to_jacobian(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *out,
const EC_AFFINE *p) {
out->X = p->X;
@@ -879,6 +885,12 @@ int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
return 1;
}
int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y,
BN_CTX *ctx) {
return EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx);
}
int EC_POINT_add(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx) {
if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group, r->group, NULL) != 0 ||
@@ -440,7 +440,15 @@ int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *key) {
}
int EC_KEY_generate_key_fips(EC_KEY *eckey) {
return EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey) && EC_KEY_check_fips(eckey);
if (EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey) && EC_KEY_check_fips(eckey)) {
return 1;
}
EC_POINT_free(eckey->pub_key);
ec_wrapped_scalar_free(eckey->priv_key);
eckey->pub_key = NULL;
eckey->priv_key = NULL;
return 0;
}
int EC_KEY_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
@@ -703,7 +703,8 @@ void ec_GFp_mont_felem_to_bytes(const EC_GROUP *group, uint8_t *out,
int ec_GFp_mont_felem_from_bytes(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_FELEM *out,
const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
void ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(uint8_t *sign, uint8_t *digit, uint8_t in);
void ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(crypto_word_t *sign, crypto_word_t *digit,
crypto_word_t in);
const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp224_method(void);
const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp256_method(void);
@@ -866,7 +866,7 @@ static void p224_select_point(const uint64_t idx, size_t size,
}
// p224_get_bit returns the |i|th bit in |in|
static char p224_get_bit(const p224_felem_bytearray in, size_t i) {
static crypto_word_t p224_get_bit(const p224_felem_bytearray in, size_t i) {
if (i >= 224) {
return 0;
}
@@ -977,13 +977,13 @@ static void ec_GFp_nistp224_point_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
// Add every 5 doublings.
if (i % 5 == 0) {
uint64_t bits = p224_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 4) << 5;
crypto_word_t bits = p224_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 4) << 5;
bits |= p224_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 3) << 4;
bits |= p224_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 2) << 3;
bits |= p224_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 1) << 2;
bits |= p224_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i) << 1;
bits |= p224_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i - 1);
uint8_t sign, digit;
crypto_word_t sign, digit;
ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(&sign, &digit, bits);
// Select the point to add or subtract.
@@ -1022,7 +1022,7 @@ static void ec_GFp_nistp224_point_mul_base(const EC_GROUP *group,
}
// First, look 28 bits upwards.
uint64_t bits = p224_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 196) << 3;
crypto_word_t bits = p224_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 196) << 3;
bits |= p224_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 140) << 2;
bits |= p224_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 84) << 1;
bits |= p224_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 28);
@@ -1080,14 +1080,15 @@ static void ec_GFp_nistp224_point_mul_public(const EC_GROUP *group,
// Add multiples of the generator.
if (i <= 27) {
// First, look 28 bits upwards.
uint64_t bits = p224_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i + 196) << 3;
crypto_word_t bits = p224_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i + 196) << 3;
bits |= p224_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i + 140) << 2;
bits |= p224_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i + 84) << 1;
bits |= p224_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i + 28);
size_t index = (size_t)bits;
p224_point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], 1 /* mixed */,
g_p224_pre_comp[1][bits][0], g_p224_pre_comp[1][bits][1],
g_p224_pre_comp[1][bits][2]);
g_p224_pre_comp[1][index][0], g_p224_pre_comp[1][index][1],
g_p224_pre_comp[1][index][2]);
assert(!skip);
// Second, look at the current position.
@@ -1095,20 +1096,21 @@ static void ec_GFp_nistp224_point_mul_public(const EC_GROUP *group,
bits |= p224_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i + 112) << 2;
bits |= p224_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i + 56) << 1;
bits |= p224_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i);
index = (size_t)bits;
p224_point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], 1 /* mixed */,
g_p224_pre_comp[0][bits][0], g_p224_pre_comp[0][bits][1],
g_p224_pre_comp[0][bits][2]);
g_p224_pre_comp[0][index][0], g_p224_pre_comp[0][index][1],
g_p224_pre_comp[0][index][2]);
}
// Incorporate |p_scalar| every 5 doublings.
if (i % 5 == 0) {
uint64_t bits = p224_get_bit(p_scalar->bytes, i + 4) << 5;
crypto_word_t bits = p224_get_bit(p_scalar->bytes, i + 4) << 5;
bits |= p224_get_bit(p_scalar->bytes, i + 3) << 4;
bits |= p224_get_bit(p_scalar->bytes, i + 2) << 3;
bits |= p224_get_bit(p_scalar->bytes, i + 1) << 2;
bits |= p224_get_bit(p_scalar->bytes, i) << 1;
bits |= p224_get_bit(p_scalar->bytes, i - 1);
uint8_t sign, digit;
crypto_word_t sign, digit;
ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(&sign, &digit, bits);
// Select the point to add or subtract.
@@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ static const BN_ULONG ONE[P256_LIMBS] = {
// Recode window to a signed digit, see |ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits| in
// util.c for details
static unsigned booth_recode_w5(unsigned in) {
unsigned s, d;
static crypto_word_t booth_recode_w5(crypto_word_t in) {
crypto_word_t s, d;
s = ~((in >> 5) - 1);
d = (1 << 6) - in - 1;
@@ -63,8 +63,8 @@ static unsigned booth_recode_w5(unsigned in) {
return (d << 1) + (s & 1);
}
static unsigned booth_recode_w7(unsigned in) {
unsigned s, d;
static crypto_word_t booth_recode_w7(crypto_word_t in) {
crypto_word_t s, d;
s = ~((in >> 7) - 1);
d = (1 << 8) - in - 1;
@@ -196,8 +196,8 @@ static void ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, P256_POINT *r,
assert(p_scalar != NULL);
assert(group->field.width == P256_LIMBS);
static const unsigned kWindowSize = 5;
static const unsigned kMask = (1 << (5 /* kWindowSize */ + 1)) - 1;
static const size_t kWindowSize = 5;
static const crypto_word_t kMask = (1 << (5 /* kWindowSize */ + 1)) - 1;
// A |P256_POINT| is (3 * 32) = 96 bytes, and the 64-byte alignment should
// add no more than 63 bytes of overhead. Thus, |table| should require
@@ -234,17 +234,17 @@ static void ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, P256_POINT *r,
BN_ULONG tmp[P256_LIMBS];
alignas(32) P256_POINT h;
unsigned index = 255;
unsigned wvalue = p_str[(index - 1) / 8];
size_t index = 255;
crypto_word_t wvalue = p_str[(index - 1) / 8];
wvalue = (wvalue >> ((index - 1) % 8)) & kMask;
ecp_nistz256_select_w5(r, table, booth_recode_w5(wvalue) >> 1);
while (index >= 5) {
if (index != 255) {
unsigned off = (index - 1) / 8;
size_t off = (index - 1) / 8;
wvalue = p_str[off] | p_str[off + 1] << 8;
wvalue = (crypto_word_t)p_str[off] | (crypto_word_t)p_str[off + 1] << 8;
wvalue = (wvalue >> ((index - 1) % 8)) & kMask;
wvalue = booth_recode_w5(wvalue);
@@ -285,21 +285,22 @@ typedef union {
P256_POINT_AFFINE a;
} p256_point_union_t;
static unsigned calc_first_wvalue(unsigned *index, const uint8_t p_str[33]) {
static const unsigned kWindowSize = 7;
static const unsigned kMask = (1 << (7 /* kWindowSize */ + 1)) - 1;
static crypto_word_t calc_first_wvalue(size_t *index, const uint8_t p_str[33]) {
static const size_t kWindowSize = 7;
static const crypto_word_t kMask = (1 << (7 /* kWindowSize */ + 1)) - 1;
*index = kWindowSize;
unsigned wvalue = (p_str[0] << 1) & kMask;
crypto_word_t wvalue = (p_str[0] << 1) & kMask;
return booth_recode_w7(wvalue);
}
static unsigned calc_wvalue(unsigned *index, const uint8_t p_str[33]) {
static const unsigned kWindowSize = 7;
static const unsigned kMask = (1 << (7 /* kWindowSize */ + 1)) - 1;
static crypto_word_t calc_wvalue(size_t *index, const uint8_t p_str[33]) {
static const size_t kWindowSize = 7;
static const crypto_word_t kMask = (1 << (7 /* kWindowSize */ + 1)) - 1;
const unsigned off = (*index - 1) / 8;
unsigned wvalue = p_str[off] | p_str[off + 1] << 8;
const size_t off = (*index - 1) / 8;
crypto_word_t wvalue =
(crypto_word_t)p_str[off] | (crypto_word_t)p_str[off + 1] << 8;
wvalue = (wvalue >> ((*index - 1) % 8)) & kMask;
*index += kWindowSize;
@@ -327,8 +328,8 @@ static void ecp_nistz256_point_mul_base(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
p_str[32] = 0;
// First window
unsigned index = 0;
unsigned wvalue = calc_first_wvalue(&index, p_str);
size_t index = 0;
crypto_word_t wvalue = calc_first_wvalue(&index, p_str);
ecp_nistz256_select_w7(&p.a, ecp_nistz256_precomputed[0], wvalue >> 1);
ecp_nistz256_neg(p.p.Z, p.p.Y);
@@ -372,8 +373,8 @@ static void ecp_nistz256_points_mul_public(const EC_GROUP *group,
p_str[32] = 0;
// First window
unsigned index = 0;
unsigned wvalue = calc_first_wvalue(&index, p_str);
size_t index = 0;
size_t wvalue = calc_first_wvalue(&index, p_str);
// Convert |p| from affine to Jacobian coordinates. We set Z to zero if |p|
// is infinity and |ONE| otherwise. |p| was computed from the table, so it
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static fiat_p256_limb_t fiat_p256_nz(
static void fiat_p256_copy(fiat_p256_limb_t out[FIAT_P256_NLIMBS],
const fiat_p256_limb_t in1[FIAT_P256_NLIMBS]) {
for (int i = 0; i < FIAT_P256_NLIMBS; i++) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < FIAT_P256_NLIMBS; i++) {
out[i] = in1[i];
}
}
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ static void fiat_p256_select_point(const fiat_p256_limb_t idx, size_t size,
}
// fiat_p256_get_bit returns the |i|th bit in |in|
static char fiat_p256_get_bit(const uint8_t *in, int i) {
static crypto_word_t fiat_p256_get_bit(const uint8_t *in, int i) {
if (i < 0 || i >= 256) {
return 0;
}
@@ -498,20 +498,20 @@ static void ec_GFp_nistp256_point_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
// do other additions every 5 doublings
if (i % 5 == 0) {
uint64_t bits = fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 4) << 5;
crypto_word_t bits = fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 4) << 5;
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 3) << 4;
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 2) << 3;
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 1) << 2;
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i) << 1;
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i - 1);
uint8_t sign, digit;
crypto_word_t sign, digit;
ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(&sign, &digit, bits);
// select the point to add or subtract, in constant time.
fiat_p256_select_point(digit, 17, (const fiat_p256_felem(*)[3])p_pre_comp,
tmp);
fiat_p256_select_point((fiat_p256_limb_t)digit, 17,
(const fiat_p256_felem(*)[3])p_pre_comp, tmp);
fiat_p256_opp(ftmp, tmp[1]); // (X, -Y, Z) is the negative point.
fiat_p256_cmovznz(tmp[1], sign, tmp[1], ftmp);
fiat_p256_cmovznz(tmp[1], (fiat_p256_limb_t)sign, tmp[1], ftmp);
if (!skip) {
fiat_p256_point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2],
@@ -543,12 +543,13 @@ static void ec_GFp_nistp256_point_mul_base(const EC_GROUP *group,
}
// First, look 32 bits upwards.
uint64_t bits = fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 224) << 3;
crypto_word_t bits = fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 224) << 3;
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 160) << 2;
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 96) << 1;
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 32);
// Select the point to add, in constant time.
fiat_p256_select_point_affine(bits, 15, fiat_p256_g_pre_comp[1], tmp);
fiat_p256_select_point_affine((fiat_p256_limb_t)bits, 15,
fiat_p256_g_pre_comp[1], tmp);
if (!skip) {
fiat_p256_point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2],
@@ -566,7 +567,8 @@ static void ec_GFp_nistp256_point_mul_base(const EC_GROUP *group,
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 64) << 1;
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i);
// Select the point to add, in constant time.
fiat_p256_select_point_affine(bits, 15, fiat_p256_g_pre_comp[0], tmp);
fiat_p256_select_point_affine((fiat_p256_limb_t)bits, 15,
fiat_p256_g_pre_comp[0], tmp);
fiat_p256_point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], 1 /* mixed */,
tmp[0], tmp[1], tmp[2]);
}
@@ -613,14 +615,15 @@ static void ec_GFp_nistp256_point_mul_public(const EC_GROUP *group,
// constant-time lookup.
if (i <= 31) {
// First, look 32 bits upwards.
uint64_t bits = fiat_p256_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i + 224) << 3;
crypto_word_t bits = fiat_p256_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i + 224) << 3;
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i + 160) << 2;
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i + 96) << 1;
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i + 32);
if (bits != 0) {
size_t index = (size_t)(bits - 1);
fiat_p256_point_add(ret[0], ret[1], ret[2], ret[0], ret[1], ret[2],
1 /* mixed */, fiat_p256_g_pre_comp[1][bits - 1][0],
fiat_p256_g_pre_comp[1][bits - 1][1],
1 /* mixed */, fiat_p256_g_pre_comp[1][index][0],
fiat_p256_g_pre_comp[1][index][1],
fiat_p256_one);
skip = 0;
}
@@ -631,9 +634,10 @@ static void ec_GFp_nistp256_point_mul_public(const EC_GROUP *group,
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i + 64) << 1;
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i);
if (bits != 0) {
size_t index = (size_t)(bits - 1);
fiat_p256_point_add(ret[0], ret[1], ret[2], ret[0], ret[1], ret[2],
1 /* mixed */, fiat_p256_g_pre_comp[0][bits - 1][0],
fiat_p256_g_pre_comp[0][bits - 1][1],
1 /* mixed */, fiat_p256_g_pre_comp[0][index][0],
fiat_p256_g_pre_comp[0][index][1],
fiat_p256_one);
skip = 0;
}
@@ -642,7 +646,7 @@ static void ec_GFp_nistp256_point_mul_public(const EC_GROUP *group,
int digit = p_wNAF[i];
if (digit != 0) {
assert(digit & 1);
int idx = digit < 0 ? (-digit) >> 1 : digit >> 1;
size_t idx = (size_t)(digit < 0 ? (-digit) >> 1 : digit >> 1);
fiat_p256_felem *y = &p_pre_comp[idx][1], tmp;
if (digit < 0) {
fiat_p256_opp(tmp, p_pre_comp[idx][1]);
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static void ec_GFp_mont_batch_get_window(const EC_GROUP *group,
if (i > 0) {
window |= bn_is_bit_set_words(scalar->words, width, i - 1);
}
uint8_t sign, digit;
crypto_word_t sign, digit;
ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(&sign, &digit, window);
// Select the entry in constant-time.
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ static void ec_GFp_mont_batch_get_window(const EC_GROUP *group,
// Negate if necessary.
EC_FELEM neg_Y;
ec_felem_neg(group, &neg_Y, &out->Y);
BN_ULONG sign_mask = sign;
crypto_word_t sign_mask = sign;
sign_mask = 0u - sign_mask;
ec_felem_select(group, &out->Y, sign_mask, &neg_Y, &out->Y);
}
@@ -240,9 +240,9 @@
// P-384: ...01110011; w = 2, 5, 6, 7 are okay
// P-256: ...01010001; w = 5, 7 are okay
// P-224: ...00111101; w = 3, 4, 5, 6 are okay
void ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(uint8_t *sign, uint8_t *digit,
uint8_t in) {
uint8_t s, d;
void ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(crypto_word_t *sign, crypto_word_t *digit,
crypto_word_t in) {
crypto_word_t s, d;
s = ~((in >> 5) - 1); /* sets all bits to MSB(in), 'in' seen as
* 6-bit value */
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
#if defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h>
#endif
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_arm_arch.h>
.text
.globl _gcm_init_neon
@@ -21,6 +23,7 @@
.align 4
_gcm_init_neon:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
// This function is adapted from gcm_init_v8. xC2 is t3.
ld1 {v17.2d}, [x1] // load H
movi v19.16b, #0xe1
@@ -46,6 +49,7 @@ _gcm_init_neon:
.align 4
_gcm_gmult_neon:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ld1 {v3.16b}, [x0] // load Xi
ld1 {v5.1d}, [x1], #8 // load twisted H
ld1 {v6.1d}, [x1]
@@ -65,6 +69,7 @@ _gcm_gmult_neon:
.align 4
_gcm_ghash_neon:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ld1 {v0.16b}, [x0] // load Xi
ld1 {v5.1d}, [x1], #8 // load twisted H
ld1 {v6.1d}, [x1]
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
#if defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h>
#endif
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_arm_arch.h>
.text
.globl gcm_init_neon
@@ -22,6 +24,7 @@
.type gcm_init_neon,%function
.align 4
gcm_init_neon:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
// This function is adapted from gcm_init_v8. xC2 is t3.
ld1 {v17.2d}, [x1] // load H
movi v19.16b, #0xe1
@@ -47,6 +50,7 @@ gcm_init_neon:
.type gcm_gmult_neon,%function
.align 4
gcm_gmult_neon:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ld1 {v3.16b}, [x0] // load Xi
ld1 {v5.1d}, [x1], #8 // load twisted H
ld1 {v6.1d}, [x1]
@@ -66,6 +70,7 @@ gcm_gmult_neon:
.type gcm_ghash_neon,%function
.align 4
gcm_ghash_neon:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ld1 {v0.16b}, [x0] // load Xi
ld1 {v5.1d}, [x1], #8 // load twisted H
ld1 {v6.1d}, [x1]
@@ -0,0 +1,298 @@
#define BORINGSSL_PREFIX CCryptoBoringSSL
#if defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
# This file is generated from a similarly-named Perl script in the BoringSSL
# source tree. Do not edit by hand.
#if defined(__i386__)
#if defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h>
#endif
.text
.globl _gcm_gmult_ssse3
.hidden _gcm_gmult_ssse3
.def _gcm_gmult_ssse3; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_gcm_gmult_ssse3:
.L_gcm_gmult_ssse3_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
movl 20(%esp),%edi
movl 24(%esp),%esi
movdqu (%edi),%xmm0
call .L000pic_point
.L000pic_point:
popl %eax
movdqa .Lreverse_bytes-.L000pic_point(%eax),%xmm7
movdqa .Llow4_mask-.L000pic_point(%eax),%xmm2
.byte 102,15,56,0,199
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm1
pandn %xmm0,%xmm1
psrld $4,%xmm1
pand %xmm2,%xmm0
pxor %xmm2,%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm3
movl $5,%eax
.L001loop_row_1:
movdqa (%esi),%xmm4
leal 16(%esi),%esi
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm6
.byte 102,15,58,15,243,1
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm3
psrldq $1,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
.byte 102,15,56,0,224
.byte 102,15,56,0,233
pxor %xmm5,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
psllq $60,%xmm5
movdqa %xmm5,%xmm6
pslldq $8,%xmm6
pxor %xmm6,%xmm3
psrldq $8,%xmm5
pxor %xmm5,%xmm2
psrlq $4,%xmm4
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
subl $1,%eax
jnz .L001loop_row_1
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $1,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $1,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $5,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm3
movl $5,%eax
.L002loop_row_2:
movdqa (%esi),%xmm4
leal 16(%esi),%esi
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm6
.byte 102,15,58,15,243,1
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm3
psrldq $1,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
.byte 102,15,56,0,224
.byte 102,15,56,0,233
pxor %xmm5,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
psllq $60,%xmm5
movdqa %xmm5,%xmm6
pslldq $8,%xmm6
pxor %xmm6,%xmm3
psrldq $8,%xmm5
pxor %xmm5,%xmm2
psrlq $4,%xmm4
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
subl $1,%eax
jnz .L002loop_row_2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $1,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $1,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $5,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm3
movl $6,%eax
.L003loop_row_3:
movdqa (%esi),%xmm4
leal 16(%esi),%esi
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm6
.byte 102,15,58,15,243,1
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm3
psrldq $1,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
.byte 102,15,56,0,224
.byte 102,15,56,0,233
pxor %xmm5,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
psllq $60,%xmm5
movdqa %xmm5,%xmm6
pslldq $8,%xmm6
pxor %xmm6,%xmm3
psrldq $8,%xmm5
pxor %xmm5,%xmm2
psrlq $4,%xmm4
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
subl $1,%eax
jnz .L003loop_row_3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $1,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $1,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $5,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,215
movdqu %xmm2,(%edi)
pxor %xmm0,%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm1
pxor %xmm2,%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm3
pxor %xmm4,%xmm4
pxor %xmm5,%xmm5
pxor %xmm6,%xmm6
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.globl _gcm_ghash_ssse3
.hidden _gcm_ghash_ssse3
.def _gcm_ghash_ssse3; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_gcm_ghash_ssse3:
.L_gcm_ghash_ssse3_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
movl 20(%esp),%edi
movl 24(%esp),%esi
movl 28(%esp),%edx
movl 32(%esp),%ecx
movdqu (%edi),%xmm0
call .L004pic_point
.L004pic_point:
popl %ebx
movdqa .Lreverse_bytes-.L004pic_point(%ebx),%xmm7
andl $-16,%ecx
.byte 102,15,56,0,199
pxor %xmm3,%xmm3
.L005loop_ghash:
movdqa .Llow4_mask-.L004pic_point(%ebx),%xmm2
movdqu (%edx),%xmm1
.byte 102,15,56,0,207
pxor %xmm1,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm1
pandn %xmm0,%xmm1
psrld $4,%xmm1
pand %xmm2,%xmm0
pxor %xmm2,%xmm2
movl $5,%eax
.L006loop_row_4:
movdqa (%esi),%xmm4
leal 16(%esi),%esi
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm6
.byte 102,15,58,15,243,1
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm3
psrldq $1,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
.byte 102,15,56,0,224
.byte 102,15,56,0,233
pxor %xmm5,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
psllq $60,%xmm5
movdqa %xmm5,%xmm6
pslldq $8,%xmm6
pxor %xmm6,%xmm3
psrldq $8,%xmm5
pxor %xmm5,%xmm2
psrlq $4,%xmm4
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
subl $1,%eax
jnz .L006loop_row_4
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $1,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $1,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $5,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm3
movl $5,%eax
.L007loop_row_5:
movdqa (%esi),%xmm4
leal 16(%esi),%esi
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm6
.byte 102,15,58,15,243,1
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm3
psrldq $1,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
.byte 102,15,56,0,224
.byte 102,15,56,0,233
pxor %xmm5,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
psllq $60,%xmm5
movdqa %xmm5,%xmm6
pslldq $8,%xmm6
pxor %xmm6,%xmm3
psrldq $8,%xmm5
pxor %xmm5,%xmm2
psrlq $4,%xmm4
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
subl $1,%eax
jnz .L007loop_row_5
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $1,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $1,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $5,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm3
movl $6,%eax
.L008loop_row_6:
movdqa (%esi),%xmm4
leal 16(%esi),%esi
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm6
.byte 102,15,58,15,243,1
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm3
psrldq $1,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
.byte 102,15,56,0,224
.byte 102,15,56,0,233
pxor %xmm5,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
psllq $60,%xmm5
movdqa %xmm5,%xmm6
pslldq $8,%xmm6
pxor %xmm6,%xmm3
psrldq $8,%xmm5
pxor %xmm5,%xmm2
psrlq $4,%xmm4
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
subl $1,%eax
jnz .L008loop_row_6
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $1,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $1,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $5,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm3
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm0
leal -256(%esi),%esi
leal 16(%edx),%edx
subl $16,%ecx
jnz .L005loop_ghash
.byte 102,15,56,0,199
movdqu %xmm0,(%edi)
pxor %xmm0,%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm1
pxor %xmm2,%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm3
pxor %xmm4,%xmm4
pxor %xmm5,%xmm5
pxor %xmm6,%xmm6
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.align 16
.Lreverse_bytes:
.byte 15,14,13,12,11,10,9,8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1,0
.align 16
.Llow4_mask:
.long 252645135,252645135,252645135,252645135
#endif
#endif // defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__ELF__)
.section .note.GNU-stack,"",%progbits
#endif
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
#define BORINGSSL_PREFIX CCryptoBoringSSL
#if defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
# This file is generated from a similarly-named Perl script in the BoringSSL
# source tree. Do not edit by hand.
#if defined(__i386__)
#if defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h>
#endif
.text
.byte 71,72,65,83,72,32,102,111,114,32,120,56,54,44,32,67
.byte 82,89,80,84,79,71,65,77,83,32,98,121,32,60,97,112
.byte 112,114,111,64,111,112,101,110,115,115,108,46,111,114,103,62
.byte 0
#endif
#endif // defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__ELF__)
.section .note.GNU-stack,"",%progbits
#endif
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#endif
.align 4
_gcm_init_v8:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
vld1.64 {q9},[r1] @ load input H
vmov.i8 q11,#0xe1
vshl.i64 q11,q11,#57 @ 0xc2.0
@@ -80,6 +81,7 @@ _gcm_init_v8:
#endif
.align 4
_gcm_gmult_v8:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
vld1.64 {q9},[r0] @ load Xi
vmov.i8 q11,#0xe1
vld1.64 {q12,q13},[r1] @ load twisted H, ...
@@ -124,6 +126,7 @@ _gcm_gmult_v8:
#endif
.align 4
_gcm_ghash_v8:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
vstmdb sp!,{d8,d9,d10,d11,d12,d13,d14,d15} @ 32-bit ABI says so
vld1.64 {q0},[r0] @ load [rotated] Xi
@ "[rotated]" means that
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
.type gcm_init_v8,%function
.align 4
gcm_init_v8:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
vld1.64 {q9},[r1] @ load input H
vmov.i8 q11,#0xe1
vshl.i64 q11,q11,#57 @ 0xc2.0
@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@ gcm_init_v8:
.type gcm_gmult_v8,%function
.align 4
gcm_gmult_v8:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
vld1.64 {q9},[r0] @ load Xi
vmov.i8 q11,#0xe1
vld1.64 {q12,q13},[r1] @ load twisted H, ...
@@ -119,6 +121,7 @@ gcm_gmult_v8:
.type gcm_ghash_v8,%function
.align 4
gcm_ghash_v8:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
vstmdb sp!,{d8,d9,d10,d11,d12,d13,d14,d15} @ 32-bit ABI says so
vld1.64 {q0},[r0] @ load [rotated] Xi
@ "[rotated]" means that
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
.align 4
_gcm_init_v8:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ld1 {v17.2d},[x1] //load input H
movi v19.16b,#0xe1
shl v19.2d,v19.2d,#57 //0xc2.0
@@ -74,6 +75,7 @@ _gcm_init_v8:
.align 4
_gcm_gmult_v8:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ld1 {v17.2d},[x0] //load Xi
movi v19.16b,#0xe1
ld1 {v20.2d,v21.2d},[x1] //load twisted H, ...
@@ -116,6 +118,7 @@ _gcm_gmult_v8:
.align 4
_gcm_ghash_v8:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ld1 {v0.2d},[x0] //load [rotated] Xi
//"[rotated]" means that
//loaded value would have
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
.type gcm_init_v8,%function
.align 4
gcm_init_v8:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ld1 {v17.2d},[x1] //load input H
movi v19.16b,#0xe1
shl v19.2d,v19.2d,#57 //0xc2.0
@@ -75,6 +76,7 @@ gcm_init_v8:
.type gcm_gmult_v8,%function
.align 4
gcm_gmult_v8:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ld1 {v17.2d},[x0] //load Xi
movi v19.16b,#0xe1
ld1 {v20.2d,v21.2d},[x1] //load twisted H, ...
@@ -117,6 +119,7 @@ gcm_gmult_v8:
.type gcm_ghash_v8,%function
.align 4
gcm_ghash_v8:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ld1 {v0.2d},[x0] //load [rotated] Xi
//"[rotated]" means that
//loaded value would have
@@ -0,0 +1,693 @@
#define BORINGSSL_PREFIX CCryptoBoringSSL
#if defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
# This file is generated from a similarly-named Perl script in the BoringSSL
# source tree. Do not edit by hand.
#if defined(__i386__)
#if defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h>
#endif
.text
.globl _md5_block_asm_data_order
.hidden _md5_block_asm_data_order
.def _md5_block_asm_data_order; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_md5_block_asm_data_order:
.L_md5_block_asm_data_order_begin:
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
movl 12(%esp),%edi
movl 16(%esp),%esi
movl 20(%esp),%ecx
pushl %ebp
shll $6,%ecx
pushl %ebx
addl %esi,%ecx
subl $64,%ecx
movl (%edi),%eax
pushl %ecx
movl 4(%edi),%ebx
movl 8(%edi),%ecx
movl 12(%edi),%edx
.L000start:
# R0 section
movl %ecx,%edi
movl (%esi),%ebp
# R0 0
xorl %edx,%edi
andl %ebx,%edi
leal 3614090360(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
xorl %edx,%edi
addl %edi,%eax
movl %ebx,%edi
roll $7,%eax
movl 4(%esi),%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
# R0 1
xorl %ecx,%edi
andl %eax,%edi
leal 3905402710(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
xorl %ecx,%edi
addl %edi,%edx
movl %eax,%edi
roll $12,%edx
movl 8(%esi),%ebp
addl %eax,%edx
# R0 2
xorl %ebx,%edi
andl %edx,%edi
leal 606105819(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
xorl %ebx,%edi
addl %edi,%ecx
movl %edx,%edi
roll $17,%ecx
movl 12(%esi),%ebp
addl %edx,%ecx
# R0 3
xorl %eax,%edi
andl %ecx,%edi
leal 3250441966(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
xorl %eax,%edi
addl %edi,%ebx
movl %ecx,%edi
roll $22,%ebx
movl 16(%esi),%ebp
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R0 4
xorl %edx,%edi
andl %ebx,%edi
leal 4118548399(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
xorl %edx,%edi
addl %edi,%eax
movl %ebx,%edi
roll $7,%eax
movl 20(%esi),%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
# R0 5
xorl %ecx,%edi
andl %eax,%edi
leal 1200080426(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
xorl %ecx,%edi
addl %edi,%edx
movl %eax,%edi
roll $12,%edx
movl 24(%esi),%ebp
addl %eax,%edx
# R0 6
xorl %ebx,%edi
andl %edx,%edi
leal 2821735955(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
xorl %ebx,%edi
addl %edi,%ecx
movl %edx,%edi
roll $17,%ecx
movl 28(%esi),%ebp
addl %edx,%ecx
# R0 7
xorl %eax,%edi
andl %ecx,%edi
leal 4249261313(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
xorl %eax,%edi
addl %edi,%ebx
movl %ecx,%edi
roll $22,%ebx
movl 32(%esi),%ebp
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R0 8
xorl %edx,%edi
andl %ebx,%edi
leal 1770035416(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
xorl %edx,%edi
addl %edi,%eax
movl %ebx,%edi
roll $7,%eax
movl 36(%esi),%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
# R0 9
xorl %ecx,%edi
andl %eax,%edi
leal 2336552879(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
xorl %ecx,%edi
addl %edi,%edx
movl %eax,%edi
roll $12,%edx
movl 40(%esi),%ebp
addl %eax,%edx
# R0 10
xorl %ebx,%edi
andl %edx,%edi
leal 4294925233(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
xorl %ebx,%edi
addl %edi,%ecx
movl %edx,%edi
roll $17,%ecx
movl 44(%esi),%ebp
addl %edx,%ecx
# R0 11
xorl %eax,%edi
andl %ecx,%edi
leal 2304563134(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
xorl %eax,%edi
addl %edi,%ebx
movl %ecx,%edi
roll $22,%ebx
movl 48(%esi),%ebp
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R0 12
xorl %edx,%edi
andl %ebx,%edi
leal 1804603682(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
xorl %edx,%edi
addl %edi,%eax
movl %ebx,%edi
roll $7,%eax
movl 52(%esi),%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
# R0 13
xorl %ecx,%edi
andl %eax,%edi
leal 4254626195(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
xorl %ecx,%edi
addl %edi,%edx
movl %eax,%edi
roll $12,%edx
movl 56(%esi),%ebp
addl %eax,%edx
# R0 14
xorl %ebx,%edi
andl %edx,%edi
leal 2792965006(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
xorl %ebx,%edi
addl %edi,%ecx
movl %edx,%edi
roll $17,%ecx
movl 60(%esi),%ebp
addl %edx,%ecx
# R0 15
xorl %eax,%edi
andl %ecx,%edi
leal 1236535329(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
xorl %eax,%edi
addl %edi,%ebx
movl %ecx,%edi
roll $22,%ebx
movl 4(%esi),%ebp
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R1 section
# R1 16
leal 4129170786(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
xorl %ebx,%edi
andl %edx,%edi
movl 24(%esi),%ebp
xorl %ecx,%edi
addl %edi,%eax
movl %ebx,%edi
roll $5,%eax
addl %ebx,%eax
# R1 17
leal 3225465664(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
xorl %eax,%edi
andl %ecx,%edi
movl 44(%esi),%ebp
xorl %ebx,%edi
addl %edi,%edx
movl %eax,%edi
roll $9,%edx
addl %eax,%edx
# R1 18
leal 643717713(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
xorl %edx,%edi
andl %ebx,%edi
movl (%esi),%ebp
xorl %eax,%edi
addl %edi,%ecx
movl %edx,%edi
roll $14,%ecx
addl %edx,%ecx
# R1 19
leal 3921069994(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
xorl %ecx,%edi
andl %eax,%edi
movl 20(%esi),%ebp
xorl %edx,%edi
addl %edi,%ebx
movl %ecx,%edi
roll $20,%ebx
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R1 20
leal 3593408605(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
xorl %ebx,%edi
andl %edx,%edi
movl 40(%esi),%ebp
xorl %ecx,%edi
addl %edi,%eax
movl %ebx,%edi
roll $5,%eax
addl %ebx,%eax
# R1 21
leal 38016083(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
xorl %eax,%edi
andl %ecx,%edi
movl 60(%esi),%ebp
xorl %ebx,%edi
addl %edi,%edx
movl %eax,%edi
roll $9,%edx
addl %eax,%edx
# R1 22
leal 3634488961(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
xorl %edx,%edi
andl %ebx,%edi
movl 16(%esi),%ebp
xorl %eax,%edi
addl %edi,%ecx
movl %edx,%edi
roll $14,%ecx
addl %edx,%ecx
# R1 23
leal 3889429448(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
xorl %ecx,%edi
andl %eax,%edi
movl 36(%esi),%ebp
xorl %edx,%edi
addl %edi,%ebx
movl %ecx,%edi
roll $20,%ebx
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R1 24
leal 568446438(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
xorl %ebx,%edi
andl %edx,%edi
movl 56(%esi),%ebp
xorl %ecx,%edi
addl %edi,%eax
movl %ebx,%edi
roll $5,%eax
addl %ebx,%eax
# R1 25
leal 3275163606(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
xorl %eax,%edi
andl %ecx,%edi
movl 12(%esi),%ebp
xorl %ebx,%edi
addl %edi,%edx
movl %eax,%edi
roll $9,%edx
addl %eax,%edx
# R1 26
leal 4107603335(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
xorl %edx,%edi
andl %ebx,%edi
movl 32(%esi),%ebp
xorl %eax,%edi
addl %edi,%ecx
movl %edx,%edi
roll $14,%ecx
addl %edx,%ecx
# R1 27
leal 1163531501(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
xorl %ecx,%edi
andl %eax,%edi
movl 52(%esi),%ebp
xorl %edx,%edi
addl %edi,%ebx
movl %ecx,%edi
roll $20,%ebx
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R1 28
leal 2850285829(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
xorl %ebx,%edi
andl %edx,%edi
movl 8(%esi),%ebp
xorl %ecx,%edi
addl %edi,%eax
movl %ebx,%edi
roll $5,%eax
addl %ebx,%eax
# R1 29
leal 4243563512(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
xorl %eax,%edi
andl %ecx,%edi
movl 28(%esi),%ebp
xorl %ebx,%edi
addl %edi,%edx
movl %eax,%edi
roll $9,%edx
addl %eax,%edx
# R1 30
leal 1735328473(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
xorl %edx,%edi
andl %ebx,%edi
movl 48(%esi),%ebp
xorl %eax,%edi
addl %edi,%ecx
movl %edx,%edi
roll $14,%ecx
addl %edx,%ecx
# R1 31
leal 2368359562(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
xorl %ecx,%edi
andl %eax,%edi
movl 20(%esi),%ebp
xorl %edx,%edi
addl %edi,%ebx
movl %ecx,%edi
roll $20,%ebx
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R2 section
# R2 32
xorl %edx,%edi
xorl %ebx,%edi
leal 4294588738(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
addl %edi,%eax
roll $4,%eax
movl 32(%esi),%ebp
movl %ebx,%edi
# R2 33
leal 2272392833(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
addl %ebx,%eax
xorl %ecx,%edi
xorl %eax,%edi
movl 44(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%edx
movl %eax,%edi
roll $11,%edx
addl %eax,%edx
# R2 34
xorl %ebx,%edi
xorl %edx,%edi
leal 1839030562(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
addl %edi,%ecx
roll $16,%ecx
movl 56(%esi),%ebp
movl %edx,%edi
# R2 35
leal 4259657740(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
addl %edx,%ecx
xorl %eax,%edi
xorl %ecx,%edi
movl 4(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%ebx
movl %ecx,%edi
roll $23,%ebx
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R2 36
xorl %edx,%edi
xorl %ebx,%edi
leal 2763975236(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
addl %edi,%eax
roll $4,%eax
movl 16(%esi),%ebp
movl %ebx,%edi
# R2 37
leal 1272893353(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
addl %ebx,%eax
xorl %ecx,%edi
xorl %eax,%edi
movl 28(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%edx
movl %eax,%edi
roll $11,%edx
addl %eax,%edx
# R2 38
xorl %ebx,%edi
xorl %edx,%edi
leal 4139469664(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
addl %edi,%ecx
roll $16,%ecx
movl 40(%esi),%ebp
movl %edx,%edi
# R2 39
leal 3200236656(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
addl %edx,%ecx
xorl %eax,%edi
xorl %ecx,%edi
movl 52(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%ebx
movl %ecx,%edi
roll $23,%ebx
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R2 40
xorl %edx,%edi
xorl %ebx,%edi
leal 681279174(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
addl %edi,%eax
roll $4,%eax
movl (%esi),%ebp
movl %ebx,%edi
# R2 41
leal 3936430074(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
addl %ebx,%eax
xorl %ecx,%edi
xorl %eax,%edi
movl 12(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%edx
movl %eax,%edi
roll $11,%edx
addl %eax,%edx
# R2 42
xorl %ebx,%edi
xorl %edx,%edi
leal 3572445317(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
addl %edi,%ecx
roll $16,%ecx
movl 24(%esi),%ebp
movl %edx,%edi
# R2 43
leal 76029189(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
addl %edx,%ecx
xorl %eax,%edi
xorl %ecx,%edi
movl 36(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%ebx
movl %ecx,%edi
roll $23,%ebx
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R2 44
xorl %edx,%edi
xorl %ebx,%edi
leal 3654602809(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
addl %edi,%eax
roll $4,%eax
movl 48(%esi),%ebp
movl %ebx,%edi
# R2 45
leal 3873151461(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
addl %ebx,%eax
xorl %ecx,%edi
xorl %eax,%edi
movl 60(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%edx
movl %eax,%edi
roll $11,%edx
addl %eax,%edx
# R2 46
xorl %ebx,%edi
xorl %edx,%edi
leal 530742520(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
addl %edi,%ecx
roll $16,%ecx
movl 8(%esi),%ebp
movl %edx,%edi
# R2 47
leal 3299628645(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
addl %edx,%ecx
xorl %eax,%edi
xorl %ecx,%edi
movl (%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%ebx
movl $-1,%edi
roll $23,%ebx
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R3 section
# R3 48
xorl %edx,%edi
orl %ebx,%edi
leal 4096336452(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
xorl %ecx,%edi
movl 28(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%eax
movl $-1,%edi
roll $6,%eax
xorl %ecx,%edi
addl %ebx,%eax
# R3 49
orl %eax,%edi
leal 1126891415(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
xorl %ebx,%edi
movl 56(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%edx
movl $-1,%edi
roll $10,%edx
xorl %ebx,%edi
addl %eax,%edx
# R3 50
orl %edx,%edi
leal 2878612391(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
xorl %eax,%edi
movl 20(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%ecx
movl $-1,%edi
roll $15,%ecx
xorl %eax,%edi
addl %edx,%ecx
# R3 51
orl %ecx,%edi
leal 4237533241(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
xorl %edx,%edi
movl 48(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%ebx
movl $-1,%edi
roll $21,%ebx
xorl %edx,%edi
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R3 52
orl %ebx,%edi
leal 1700485571(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
xorl %ecx,%edi
movl 12(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%eax
movl $-1,%edi
roll $6,%eax
xorl %ecx,%edi
addl %ebx,%eax
# R3 53
orl %eax,%edi
leal 2399980690(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
xorl %ebx,%edi
movl 40(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%edx
movl $-1,%edi
roll $10,%edx
xorl %ebx,%edi
addl %eax,%edx
# R3 54
orl %edx,%edi
leal 4293915773(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
xorl %eax,%edi
movl 4(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%ecx
movl $-1,%edi
roll $15,%ecx
xorl %eax,%edi
addl %edx,%ecx
# R3 55
orl %ecx,%edi
leal 2240044497(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
xorl %edx,%edi
movl 32(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%ebx
movl $-1,%edi
roll $21,%ebx
xorl %edx,%edi
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R3 56
orl %ebx,%edi
leal 1873313359(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
xorl %ecx,%edi
movl 60(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%eax
movl $-1,%edi
roll $6,%eax
xorl %ecx,%edi
addl %ebx,%eax
# R3 57
orl %eax,%edi
leal 4264355552(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
xorl %ebx,%edi
movl 24(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%edx
movl $-1,%edi
roll $10,%edx
xorl %ebx,%edi
addl %eax,%edx
# R3 58
orl %edx,%edi
leal 2734768916(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
xorl %eax,%edi
movl 52(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%ecx
movl $-1,%edi
roll $15,%ecx
xorl %eax,%edi
addl %edx,%ecx
# R3 59
orl %ecx,%edi
leal 1309151649(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
xorl %edx,%edi
movl 16(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%ebx
movl $-1,%edi
roll $21,%ebx
xorl %edx,%edi
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R3 60
orl %ebx,%edi
leal 4149444226(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
xorl %ecx,%edi
movl 44(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%eax
movl $-1,%edi
roll $6,%eax
xorl %ecx,%edi
addl %ebx,%eax
# R3 61
orl %eax,%edi
leal 3174756917(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
xorl %ebx,%edi
movl 8(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%edx
movl $-1,%edi
roll $10,%edx
xorl %ebx,%edi
addl %eax,%edx
# R3 62
orl %edx,%edi
leal 718787259(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
xorl %eax,%edi
movl 36(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%ecx
movl $-1,%edi
roll $15,%ecx
xorl %eax,%edi
addl %edx,%ecx
# R3 63
orl %ecx,%edi
leal 3951481745(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
xorl %edx,%edi
movl 24(%esp),%ebp
addl %edi,%ebx
addl $64,%esi
roll $21,%ebx
movl (%ebp),%edi
addl %ecx,%ebx
addl %edi,%eax
movl 4(%ebp),%edi
addl %edi,%ebx
movl 8(%ebp),%edi
addl %edi,%ecx
movl 12(%ebp),%edi
addl %edi,%edx
movl %eax,(%ebp)
movl %ebx,4(%ebp)
movl (%esp),%edi
movl %ecx,8(%ebp)
movl %edx,12(%ebp)
cmpl %esi,%edi
jae .L000start
popl %eax
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
popl %edi
popl %esi
ret
#endif
#endif // defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__ELF__)
.section .note.GNU-stack,"",%progbits
#endif
@@ -36,6 +36,34 @@ extern "C" {
void RAND_bytes_with_additional_data(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
const uint8_t user_additional_data[32]);
#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
// We overread from /dev/urandom or RDRAND by a factor of 10 and XOR to whiten.
#define BORINGSSL_FIPS_OVERREAD 10
// CRYPTO_get_seed_entropy writes |out_entropy_len| bytes of entropy, suitable
// for seeding a DRBG, to |out_entropy|. It sets |*out_used_cpu| to one if the
// entropy came directly from the CPU and zero if it came from the OS. It
// actively obtains entropy from the CPU/OS and so should not be called from
// within the FIPS module if |BORINGSSL_FIPS_PASSIVE_ENTROPY| is defined.
void CRYPTO_get_seed_entropy(uint8_t *out_entropy, size_t out_entropy_len,
int *out_used_cpu);
#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_PASSIVE_ENTROPY)
// RAND_load_entropy supplies |entropy_len| bytes of entropy to the module. The
// |from_cpu| parameter is true iff the entropy was obtained directly from the
// CPU.
void RAND_load_entropy(const uint8_t *entropy, size_t entropy_len,
int from_cpu);
// RAND_need_entropy is implemented outside of the FIPS module and is called
// when the module has stopped because it has run out of entropy.
void RAND_need_entropy(size_t bytes_needed);
#endif // BORINGSSL_FIPS_PASSIVE_ENTROPY
#endif // BORINGSSL_FIPS
// CRYPTO_sysrand fills |len| bytes at |buf| with entropy from the operating
// system.
void CRYPTO_sysrand(uint8_t *buf, size_t len);
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_chacha.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_cpu.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_type_check.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "fork_detect.h"
@@ -63,11 +64,11 @@ struct rand_thread_state {
// (re)seeded. This is bound by |kReseedInterval|.
unsigned calls;
// last_block_valid is non-zero iff |last_block| contains data from
// |CRYPTO_sysrand_for_seed|.
// |get_seed_entropy|.
int last_block_valid;
#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
// last_block contains the previous block from |CRYPTO_sysrand_for_seed|.
// last_block contains the previous block from |get_seed_entropy|.
uint8_t last_block[CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE];
// next and prev form a NULL-terminated, double-linked list of all states in
// a process.
@@ -146,12 +147,6 @@ static int rdrand(uint8_t *buf, const size_t len) {
OPENSSL_memcpy(buf + len_multiple8, rand_buf, remainder);
}
#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_BREAK_CRNG)
// This breaks the "continuous random number generator test" defined in FIPS
// 140-2, section 4.9.2, and implemented in rand_get_seed().
OPENSSL_memset(buf, 0, len);
#endif
return 1;
}
@@ -165,25 +160,110 @@ static int rdrand(uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
void CRYPTO_get_seed_entropy(uint8_t *out_entropy, size_t out_entropy_len,
int *out_used_cpu) {
*out_used_cpu = 0;
if (have_rdrand() && rdrand(out_entropy, out_entropy_len)) {
*out_used_cpu = 1;
} else {
CRYPTO_sysrand_for_seed(out_entropy, out_entropy_len);
}
#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_BREAK_CRNG)
// This breaks the "continuous random number generator test" defined in FIPS
// 140-2, section 4.9.2, and implemented in |rand_get_seed|.
OPENSSL_memset(out_entropy, 0, out_entropy_len);
#endif
}
#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_PASSIVE_ENTROPY)
// In passive entropy mode, entropy is supplied from outside of the module via
// |RAND_load_entropy| and is stored in global instance of the following
// structure.
struct entropy_buffer {
// bytes contains entropy suitable for seeding a DRBG.
uint8_t bytes[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN * BORINGSSL_FIPS_OVERREAD];
// bytes_valid indicates the number of bytes of |bytes| that contain valid
// data.
size_t bytes_valid;
// from_cpu is true if any of the contents of |bytes| were obtained directly
// from the CPU.
int from_cpu;
};
DEFINE_BSS_GET(struct entropy_buffer, entropy_buffer);
DEFINE_STATIC_MUTEX(entropy_buffer_lock);
void RAND_load_entropy(const uint8_t *entropy, size_t entropy_len,
int from_cpu) {
struct entropy_buffer *const buffer = entropy_buffer_bss_get();
CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
const size_t space = sizeof(buffer->bytes) - buffer->bytes_valid;
if (entropy_len > space) {
entropy_len = space;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(&buffer->bytes[buffer->bytes_valid], entropy, entropy_len);
buffer->bytes_valid += entropy_len;
buffer->from_cpu |= from_cpu && (entropy_len != 0);
CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
}
// get_seed_entropy fills |out_entropy_len| bytes of |out_entropy| from the
// global |entropy_buffer|.
static void get_seed_entropy(uint8_t *out_entropy, size_t out_entropy_len,
int *out_used_cpu) {
struct entropy_buffer *const buffer = entropy_buffer_bss_get();
if (out_entropy_len > sizeof(buffer->bytes)) {
abort();
}
CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
while (buffer->bytes_valid < out_entropy_len) {
CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
RAND_need_entropy(out_entropy_len - buffer->bytes_valid);
CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
}
*out_used_cpu = buffer->from_cpu;
OPENSSL_memcpy(out_entropy, buffer->bytes, out_entropy_len);
OPENSSL_memmove(buffer->bytes, &buffer->bytes[out_entropy_len],
buffer->bytes_valid - out_entropy_len);
buffer->bytes_valid -= out_entropy_len;
if (buffer->bytes_valid == 0) {
buffer->from_cpu = 0;
}
CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
}
#else
// In the active case, |get_seed_entropy| simply calls |CRYPTO_get_seed_entropy|
// in order to obtain entropy from the CPU or OS.
static void get_seed_entropy(uint8_t *out_entropy, size_t out_entropy_len,
int *out_used_cpu) {
CRYPTO_get_seed_entropy(out_entropy, out_entropy_len, out_used_cpu);
}
#endif // !BORINGSSL_FIPS_PASSIVE_ENTROPY
// rand_get_seed fills |seed| with entropy and sets |*out_used_cpu| to one if
// that entropy came directly from the CPU and zero otherwise.
static void rand_get_seed(struct rand_thread_state *state,
uint8_t seed[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN]) {
uint8_t seed[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN],
int *out_used_cpu) {
if (!state->last_block_valid) {
if (!have_rdrand() ||
!rdrand(state->last_block, sizeof(state->last_block))) {
CRYPTO_sysrand_for_seed(state->last_block, sizeof(state->last_block));
}
int unused;
get_seed_entropy(state->last_block, sizeof(state->last_block), &unused);
state->last_block_valid = 1;
}
// We overread from /dev/urandom or RDRAND by a factor of 10 and XOR to
// whiten.
#define FIPS_OVERREAD 10
uint8_t entropy[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN * FIPS_OVERREAD];
int used_rdrand = have_rdrand() && rdrand(entropy, sizeof(entropy));
if (!used_rdrand) {
CRYPTO_sysrand_for_seed(entropy, sizeof(entropy));
}
uint8_t entropy[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN * BORINGSSL_FIPS_OVERREAD];
get_seed_entropy(entropy, sizeof(entropy), out_used_cpu);
// See FIPS 140-2, section 4.9.2. This is the “continuous random number
// generator test” which causes the program to randomly abort. Hopefully the
@@ -193,6 +273,7 @@ static void rand_get_seed(struct rand_thread_state *state,
BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort();
}
OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(entropy) % CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE == 0, "");
for (size_t i = CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE; i < sizeof(entropy);
i += CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE) {
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(entropy + i - CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE, entropy + i,
@@ -207,31 +288,24 @@ static void rand_get_seed(struct rand_thread_state *state,
OPENSSL_memcpy(seed, entropy, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN);
for (size_t i = 1; i < FIPS_OVERREAD; i++) {
for (size_t i = 1; i < BORINGSSL_FIPS_OVERREAD; i++) {
for (size_t j = 0; j < CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN; j++) {
seed[j] ^= entropy[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN * i + j];
}
}
#if defined(OPENSSL_URANDOM)
// If we used RDRAND, also opportunistically read from the system. This avoids
// solely relying on the hardware once the entropy pool has been initialized.
if (used_rdrand) {
CRYPTO_sysrand_if_available(entropy, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN);
for (size_t i = 0; i < CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN; i++) {
seed[i] ^= entropy[i];
}
}
#endif
}
#else
// rand_get_seed fills |seed| with entropy and sets |*out_used_cpu| to one if
// that entropy came directly from the CPU and zero otherwise.
static void rand_get_seed(struct rand_thread_state *state,
uint8_t seed[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN]) {
uint8_t seed[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN],
int *out_used_cpu) {
// If not in FIPS mode, we don't overread from the system entropy source and
// we don't depend only on the hardware RDRAND.
CRYPTO_sysrand(seed, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN);
*out_used_cpu = 0;
}
#endif
@@ -290,8 +364,23 @@ void RAND_bytes_with_additional_data(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
state->last_block_valid = 0;
uint8_t seed[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN];
rand_get_seed(state, seed);
if (!CTR_DRBG_init(&state->drbg, seed, NULL, 0)) {
int used_cpu;
rand_get_seed(state, seed, &used_cpu);
uint8_t personalization[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN];
size_t personalization_len = 0;
#if defined(OPENSSL_URANDOM)
// If we used RDRAND, also opportunistically read from the system. This
// avoids solely relying on the hardware once the entropy pool has been
// initialized.
if (used_cpu &&
CRYPTO_sysrand_if_available(personalization, sizeof(personalization))) {
personalization_len = sizeof(personalization);
}
#endif
if (!CTR_DRBG_init(&state->drbg, seed, personalization,
personalization_len)) {
abort();
}
state->calls = 0;
@@ -315,7 +404,8 @@ void RAND_bytes_with_additional_data(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
if (state->calls >= kReseedInterval ||
state->fork_generation != fork_generation) {
uint8_t seed[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN];
rand_get_seed(state, seed);
int used_cpu;
rand_get_seed(state, seed, &used_cpu);
#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
// Take a read lock around accesses to |state->drbg|. This is needed to
// avoid returning bad entropy if we race with
@@ -366,14 +366,7 @@ void CRYPTO_sysrand_for_seed(uint8_t *out, size_t requested) {
perror("entropy fill failed");
abort();
}
#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_BREAK_CRNG)
// This breaks the "continuous random number generator test" defined in FIPS
// 140-2, section 4.9.2, and implemented in rand_get_seed().
OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, requested);
#endif
}
#endif // BORINGSSL_FIPS
int CRYPTO_sysrand_if_available(uint8_t *out, size_t requested) {
@@ -108,6 +108,10 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
int RSA_padding_add_none(uint8_t *to, size_t to_len, const uint8_t *from,
size_t from_len);
// rsa_check_public_key checks that |rsa|'s public modulus and exponent are
// within DoS bounds.
int rsa_check_public_key(const RSA *rsa);
// RSA_private_transform calls either the method-specific |private_transform|
// function (if given) or the generic one. See the comment for
// |private_transform| in |rsa_meth_st|.
@@ -661,6 +661,9 @@ static int check_mod_inverse(int *out_ok, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *ainv,
return 1;
}
// Note |bn_mul_consttime| and |bn_div_consttime| do not scale linearly, but
// checking |ainv| is in range bounds the running time, assuming |m|'s bounds
// were checked by the caller.
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
BIGNUM *tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
int ret = tmp != NULL &&
@@ -674,22 +677,35 @@ static int check_mod_inverse(int *out_ok, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *ainv,
}
int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key) {
// TODO(davidben): RSA key initialization is spread across
// |rsa_check_public_key|, |RSA_check_key|, |freeze_private_key|, and
// |BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked| as a result of API issues. See
// https://crbug.com/boringssl/316. As a result, we inconsistently check RSA
// invariants. We should fix this and integrate that logic.
if (RSA_is_opaque(key)) {
// Opaque keys can't be checked.
return 1;
}
if (!rsa_check_public_key(key)) {
return 0;
}
if ((key->p != NULL) != (key->q != NULL)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_ONLY_ONE_OF_P_Q_GIVEN);
return 0;
}
if (!key->n || !key->e) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
// |key->d| must be bounded by |key->n|. This ensures bounds on |RSA_bits|
// translate to bounds on the running time of private key operations.
if (key->d != NULL &&
(BN_is_negative(key->d) || BN_cmp(key->d, key->n) >= 0)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_D_OUT_OF_RANGE);
return 0;
}
if (!key->d || !key->p) {
if (key->d == NULL || key->p == NULL) {
// For a public key, or without p and q, there's nothing that can be
// checked.
return 1;
@@ -709,24 +725,28 @@ int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key) {
BN_init(&qm1);
BN_init(&dmp1);
BN_init(&dmq1);
// Check that p * q == n. Before we multiply, we check that p and q are in
// bounds, to avoid a DoS vector in |bn_mul_consttime| below. Note that
// n was bound by |rsa_check_public_key|.
if (BN_is_negative(key->p) || BN_cmp(key->p, key->n) >= 0 ||
BN_is_negative(key->q) || BN_cmp(key->q, key->n) >= 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_N_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q);
goto out;
}
if (!bn_mul_consttime(&tmp, key->p, key->q, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
goto out;
}
if (BN_cmp(&tmp, key->n) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_N_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q);
goto out;
}
if (BN_is_negative(key->d) || BN_cmp(key->d, key->n) >= 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_D_OUT_OF_RANGE);
goto out;
}
// d must be an inverse of e mod the Carmichael totient, lcm(p-1, q-1), but it
// may be unreduced because other implementations use the Euler totient. We
// simply check that d * e is one mod p-1 and mod q-1.
// simply check that d * e is one mod p-1 and mod q-1. Note d and e were bound
// by earlier checks in this function.
if (!bn_usub_consttime(&pm1, key->p, BN_value_one()) ||
!bn_usub_consttime(&qm1, key->q, BN_value_one()) ||
!bn_mul_consttime(&de, key->d, key->e, ctx) ||
@@ -73,7 +73,12 @@
#include "../rand/fork_detect.h"
static int check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes(const RSA *rsa) {
int rsa_check_public_key(const RSA *rsa) {
if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
return 0;
}
unsigned rsa_bits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
if (rsa_bits > 16 * 1024) {
@@ -253,8 +258,7 @@ size_t rsa_default_size(const RSA *rsa) {
int RSA_encrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
if (!rsa_check_public_key(rsa)) {
return 0;
}
@@ -269,10 +273,6 @@ int RSA_encrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
return 0;
}
if (!check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes(rsa)) {
return 0;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
@@ -592,8 +592,7 @@ static int mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
int RSA_verify_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
if (!rsa_check_public_key(rsa)) {
return 0;
}
@@ -610,10 +609,6 @@ int RSA_verify_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
return 0;
}
if (!check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes(rsa)) {
return 0;
}
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
return 0;
@@ -938,20 +933,57 @@ static int ensure_bignum(BIGNUM **out) {
return *out != NULL;
}
// kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwo is the BIGNUM representation of ⌊2¹⁵³⁵×√2⌋. This is
// chosen to give enough precision for 3072-bit RSA, the largest key size FIPS
// kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwo is the BIGNUM representation of ⌊2²⁰⁴⁷×√2⌋. This is
// chosen to give enough precision for 4096-bit RSA, the largest key size FIPS
// specifies. Key sizes beyond this will round up.
//
// To verify this number, check that n² < 2³⁰⁷¹ < (n+1)², where n is value
// To calculate, use the following Haskell code:
//
// import Text.Printf (printf)
// import Data.List (intercalate)
//
// pow2 = 4095
// target = 2^pow2
//
// f x = x*x - (toRational target)
//
// fprime x = 2*x
//
// newtonIteration x = x - (f x) / (fprime x)
//
// converge x =
// let n = floor x in
// if n*n - target < 0 && (n+1)*(n+1) - target > 0
// then n
// else converge (newtonIteration x)
//
// divrem bits x = (x `div` (2^bits), x `rem` (2^bits))
//
// bnWords :: Integer -> [Integer]
// bnWords x =
// if x == 0
// then []
// else let (high, low) = divrem 64 x in low : bnWords high
//
// showWord x = let (high, low) = divrem 32 x in printf "TOBN(0x%08x, 0x%08x)" high low
//
// output :: String
// output = intercalate ", " $ map showWord $ bnWords $ converge (2 ^ (pow2 `div` 2))
//
// To verify this number, check that n² < 2⁴⁰⁹⁵ < (n+1)², where n is value
// represented here. Note the components are listed in little-endian order. Here
// is some sample Python code to check:
//
// >>> TOBN = lambda a, b: a << 32 | b
// >>> l = [ <paste the contents of kSqrtTwo> ]
// >>> n = sum(a * 2**(64*i) for i, a in enumerate(l))
// >>> n**2 < 2**3071 < (n+1)**2
// >>> n**2 < 2**4095 < (n+1)**2
// True
const BN_ULONG kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwo[] = {
TOBN(0x4d7c60a5, 0xe633e3e1), TOBN(0x5fcf8f7b, 0xca3ea33b),
TOBN(0xc246785e, 0x92957023), TOBN(0xf9acce41, 0x797f2805),
TOBN(0xfdfe170f, 0xd3b1f780), TOBN(0xd24f4a76, 0x3facb882),
TOBN(0x18838a2e, 0xaff5f3b2), TOBN(0xc1fcbdde, 0xa2f7dc33),
TOBN(0xdea06241, 0xf7aa81c2), TOBN(0xf6a1be3f, 0xca221307),
TOBN(0x332a5e9f, 0x7bda1ebf), TOBN(0x0104dc01, 0xfe32352f),
TOBN(0xb8cf341b, 0x6f8236c7), TOBN(0x4264dabc, 0xd528b651),
@@ -1121,8 +1153,8 @@ static int rsa_generate_key_impl(RSA *rsa, int bits, const BIGNUM *e_value,
// Reject excessively large public exponents. Windows CryptoAPI and Go don't
// support values larger than 32 bits, so match their limits for generating
// keys. (|check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes| uses a slightly more conservative
// value, but we don't need to support generating such keys.)
// keys. (|rsa_check_public_key| uses a slightly more conservative value, but
// we don't need to support generating such keys.)
// https://github.com/golang/go/issues/3161
// https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa387685(VS.85).aspx
if (BN_num_bits(e_value) > 32) {
@@ -1172,13 +1204,13 @@ static int rsa_generate_key_impl(RSA *rsa, int bits, const BIGNUM *e_value,
int sqrt2_bits = kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwoLen * BN_BITS2;
assert(sqrt2_bits == (int)BN_num_bits(sqrt2));
if (sqrt2_bits > prime_bits) {
// For key sizes up to 3072 (prime_bits = 1536), this is exactly
// For key sizes up to 4096 (prime_bits = 2048), this is exactly
// ⌊2^(prime_bits-1)×√2⌋.
if (!BN_rshift(sqrt2, sqrt2, sqrt2_bits - prime_bits)) {
goto bn_err;
}
} else if (prime_bits > sqrt2_bits) {
// For key sizes beyond 3072, this is approximate. We err towards retrying
// For key sizes beyond 4096, this is approximate. We err towards retrying
// to ensure our key is the right size and round up.
if (!BN_add_word(sqrt2, 1) ||
!BN_lshift(sqrt2, sqrt2, prime_bits - sqrt2_bits)) {
@@ -1284,58 +1316,80 @@ static void replace_bn_mont_ctx(BN_MONT_CTX **out, BN_MONT_CTX **in) {
*in = NULL;
}
int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, const BIGNUM *e_value,
BN_GENCB *cb) {
static int RSA_generate_key_ex_maybe_fips(RSA *rsa, int bits,
const BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb,
int check_fips) {
RSA *tmp = NULL;
uint32_t err;
int ret = 0;
// |rsa_generate_key_impl|'s 2^-20 failure probability is too high at scale,
// so we run the FIPS algorithm four times, bringing it down to 2^-80. We
// should just adjust the retry limit, but FIPS 186-4 prescribes that value
// and thus results in unnecessary complexity.
for (int i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
int failures = 0;
do {
ERR_clear_error();
// Generate into scratch space, to avoid leaving partial work on failure.
RSA *tmp = RSA_new();
tmp = RSA_new();
if (tmp == NULL) {
return 0;
goto out;
}
if (rsa_generate_key_impl(tmp, bits, e_value, cb)) {
replace_bignum(&rsa->n, &tmp->n);
replace_bignum(&rsa->e, &tmp->e);
replace_bignum(&rsa->d, &tmp->d);
replace_bignum(&rsa->p, &tmp->p);
replace_bignum(&rsa->q, &tmp->q);
replace_bignum(&rsa->dmp1, &tmp->dmp1);
replace_bignum(&rsa->dmq1, &tmp->dmq1);
replace_bignum(&rsa->iqmp, &tmp->iqmp);
replace_bn_mont_ctx(&rsa->mont_n, &tmp->mont_n);
replace_bn_mont_ctx(&rsa->mont_p, &tmp->mont_p);
replace_bn_mont_ctx(&rsa->mont_q, &tmp->mont_q);
replace_bignum(&rsa->d_fixed, &tmp->d_fixed);
replace_bignum(&rsa->dmp1_fixed, &tmp->dmp1_fixed);
replace_bignum(&rsa->dmq1_fixed, &tmp->dmq1_fixed);
replace_bignum(&rsa->inv_small_mod_large_mont,
&tmp->inv_small_mod_large_mont);
rsa->private_key_frozen = tmp->private_key_frozen;
RSA_free(tmp);
return 1;
break;
}
uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error();
err = ERR_peek_error();
RSA_free(tmp);
tmp = NULL;
failures++;
// Only retry on |RSA_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS|. This is so a caller-induced
// failure in |BN_GENCB_call| is still fatal.
if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) != ERR_LIB_RSA ||
ERR_GET_REASON(err) != RSA_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS) {
return 0;
}
} while (failures < 4 && ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_RSA &&
ERR_GET_REASON(err) == RSA_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS);
if (tmp == NULL || (check_fips && !RSA_check_fips(tmp))) {
goto out;
}
return 0;
replace_bignum(&rsa->n, &tmp->n);
replace_bignum(&rsa->e, &tmp->e);
replace_bignum(&rsa->d, &tmp->d);
replace_bignum(&rsa->p, &tmp->p);
replace_bignum(&rsa->q, &tmp->q);
replace_bignum(&rsa->dmp1, &tmp->dmp1);
replace_bignum(&rsa->dmq1, &tmp->dmq1);
replace_bignum(&rsa->iqmp, &tmp->iqmp);
replace_bn_mont_ctx(&rsa->mont_n, &tmp->mont_n);
replace_bn_mont_ctx(&rsa->mont_p, &tmp->mont_p);
replace_bn_mont_ctx(&rsa->mont_q, &tmp->mont_q);
replace_bignum(&rsa->d_fixed, &tmp->d_fixed);
replace_bignum(&rsa->dmp1_fixed, &tmp->dmp1_fixed);
replace_bignum(&rsa->dmq1_fixed, &tmp->dmq1_fixed);
replace_bignum(&rsa->inv_small_mod_large_mont,
&tmp->inv_small_mod_large_mont);
rsa->private_key_frozen = tmp->private_key_frozen;
ret = 1;
out:
RSA_free(tmp);
return ret;
}
int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, const BIGNUM *e_value,
BN_GENCB *cb) {
return RSA_generate_key_ex_maybe_fips(rsa, bits, e_value, cb,
/*check_fips=*/0);
}
int RSA_generate_key_fips(RSA *rsa, int bits, BN_GENCB *cb) {
// FIPS 186-4 allows 2048-bit and 3072-bit RSA keys (1024-bit and 1536-bit
// primes, respectively) with the prime generation method we use.
if (bits != 2048 && bits != 3072) {
// Subsequently, IG A.14 stated that larger modulus sizes can be used and ACVP
// testing supports 4096 bits.
if (bits != 2048 && bits != 3072 && bits != 4096) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_RSA_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
@@ -1343,8 +1397,7 @@ int RSA_generate_key_fips(RSA *rsa, int bits, BN_GENCB *cb) {
BIGNUM *e = BN_new();
int ret = e != NULL &&
BN_set_word(e, RSA_F4) &&
RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e, cb) &&
RSA_check_fips(rsa);
RSA_generate_key_ex_maybe_fips(rsa, bits, e, cb, /*check_fips=*/1);
BN_free(e);
return ret;
}
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_aes.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_bn.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_des.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_dh.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_digest.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_ec.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_ecdsa.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_ec_key.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_nid.h>
@@ -30,6 +33,7 @@
#include "../../internal.h"
#include "../ec/internal.h"
#include "../rand/internal.h"
#include "../tls/internal.h"
// MSVC wants to put a NUL byte at the end of non-char arrays and so cannot
@@ -243,6 +247,77 @@ static EC_KEY *self_test_ecdsa_key(void) {
return ec_key;
}
static DH *self_test_dh(void) {
// This is the prime from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7919#appendix-A.1,
// which is specifically approved for FIPS in appendix D of SP 800-56Ar3.
static const BN_ULONG kFFDHE2048Data[] = {
TOBN(0xffffffff, 0xffffffff), TOBN(0x886b4238, 0x61285c97),
TOBN(0xc6f34a26, 0xc1b2effa), TOBN(0xc58ef183, 0x7d1683b2),
TOBN(0x3bb5fcbc, 0x2ec22005), TOBN(0xc3fe3b1b, 0x4c6fad73),
TOBN(0x8e4f1232, 0xeef28183), TOBN(0x9172fe9c, 0xe98583ff),
TOBN(0xc03404cd, 0x28342f61), TOBN(0x9e02fce1, 0xcdf7e2ec),
TOBN(0x0b07a7c8, 0xee0a6d70), TOBN(0xae56ede7, 0x6372bb19),
TOBN(0x1d4f42a3, 0xde394df4), TOBN(0xb96adab7, 0x60d7f468),
TOBN(0xd108a94b, 0xb2c8e3fb), TOBN(0xbc0ab182, 0xb324fb61),
TOBN(0x30acca4f, 0x483a797a), TOBN(0x1df158a1, 0x36ade735),
TOBN(0xe2a689da, 0xf3efe872), TOBN(0x984f0c70, 0xe0e68b77),
TOBN(0xb557135e, 0x7f57c935), TOBN(0x85636555, 0x3ded1af3),
TOBN(0x2433f51f, 0x5f066ed0), TOBN(0xd3df1ed5, 0xd5fd6561),
TOBN(0xf681b202, 0xaec4617a), TOBN(0x7d2fe363, 0x630c75d8),
TOBN(0xcc939dce, 0x249b3ef9), TOBN(0xa9e13641, 0x146433fb),
TOBN(0xd8b9c583, 0xce2d3695), TOBN(0xafdc5620, 0x273d3cf1),
TOBN(0xadf85458, 0xa2bb4a9a), TOBN(0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
};
// kFFDHE2048PrivateKeyData is a 225-bit value. (225 because that's the
// minimum private key size in
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7919#appendix-A.1.)
static const BN_ULONG kFFDHE2048PrivateKeyData[] = {
TOBN(0x187be36b, 0xd38a4fa1),
TOBN(0x0a152f39, 0x6458f3b8),
TOBN(0x0570187e, 0xc422eeb7),
TOBN(0x00000001, 0x91173f2a),
};
BIGNUM *const ffdhe2048_p = BN_new();
BIGNUM *const ffdhe2048_q = BN_new();
BIGNUM *const ffdhe2048_g = BN_new();
BIGNUM *ffdhe2048_priv = BN_new();
DH *const dh = DH_new();
if (!ffdhe2048_p || !ffdhe2048_q || !ffdhe2048_g || !ffdhe2048_priv || !dh) {
goto err;
}
bn_set_static_words(ffdhe2048_p, kFFDHE2048Data,
OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kFFDHE2048Data));
bn_set_static_words(ffdhe2048_priv, kFFDHE2048PrivateKeyData,
OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kFFDHE2048PrivateKeyData));
if (!BN_copy(ffdhe2048_q, ffdhe2048_p) ||
!BN_sub_word(ffdhe2048_q, 1) ||
BN_div_word(ffdhe2048_q, 2) != 0 ||
!BN_set_word(ffdhe2048_g, 2) ||
!DH_set0_key(dh, NULL, ffdhe2048_priv)) {
goto err;
}
ffdhe2048_priv = NULL;
if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, ffdhe2048_p, ffdhe2048_q, ffdhe2048_g)) {
goto err;
}
return dh;
err:
BN_free(ffdhe2048_p);
BN_free(ffdhe2048_q);
BN_free(ffdhe2048_g);
BN_free(ffdhe2048_priv);
DH_free(dh);
return NULL;
}
#if defined(OPENSSL_ANDROID)
static const size_t kModuleDigestSize = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
#else
@@ -430,11 +505,119 @@ int boringssl_fips_self_test(
0xba, 0x4d, 0xd9, 0x86, 0x77, 0xda, 0x7d, 0x8f, 0xef, 0xc4, 0x1a,
0xf0, 0xcc, 0x81, 0xe5, 0xea, 0x3f, 0xc2, 0x41, 0x7f, 0xd8,
};
// kP256Point is SHA256("Primitive Z Computation KAT")×G within P-256.
const uint8_t kP256Point[65] = {
0x04, 0x4e, 0xc1, 0x94, 0x8c, 0x5c, 0xf4, 0x37, 0x35, 0x0d, 0xa3,
0xf9, 0x55, 0xf9, 0x8b, 0x26, 0x23, 0x5c, 0x43, 0xe0, 0x83, 0x51,
0x2b, 0x0d, 0x4b, 0x56, 0x24, 0xc3, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xa8, 0xe2, 0xe9,
0x95, 0xf2, 0xc4, 0xb9, 0xb7, 0x48, 0x7d, 0x2a, 0xae, 0xc5, 0xc0,
0x0a, 0xcc, 0x1b, 0xd0, 0xec, 0xb8, 0xdc, 0xbe, 0x0c, 0xbe, 0x52,
0x79, 0x93, 0x7c, 0x0b, 0x92, 0x2b, 0x7f, 0x17, 0xa5, 0x80,
};
// kP256Scalar is SHA256("Primitive Z Computation KAT scalar").
const uint8_t kP256Scalar[32] = {
0xe7, 0x60, 0x44, 0x91, 0x26, 0x9a, 0xfb, 0x5b, 0x10, 0x2d, 0x6e,
0xa5, 0x2c, 0xb5, 0x9f, 0xeb, 0x70, 0xae, 0xde, 0x6c, 0xe3, 0xbf,
0xb3, 0xe0, 0x10, 0x54, 0x85, 0xab, 0xd8, 0x61, 0xd7, 0x7b,
};
// kP256PointResult is |kP256Scalar|×|kP256Point|.
const uint8_t kP256PointResult[65] = {
0x04, 0xf1, 0x63, 0x00, 0x88, 0xc5, 0xd5, 0xe9, 0x05, 0x52, 0xac,
0xb6, 0xec, 0x68, 0x76, 0xb8, 0x73, 0x7f, 0x0f, 0x72, 0x34, 0xe6,
0xbb, 0x30, 0x32, 0x22, 0x37, 0xb6, 0x2a, 0x80, 0xe8, 0x9e, 0x6e,
0x6f, 0x36, 0x02, 0xe7, 0x21, 0xd2, 0x31, 0xdb, 0x94, 0x63, 0xb7,
0xd8, 0x19, 0x0e, 0xc2, 0xc0, 0xa7, 0x2f, 0x15, 0x49, 0x1a, 0xa2,
0x7c, 0x41, 0x8f, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0x40, 0xaf, 0x2e, 0x4a,
#if !defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_BREAK_Z_COMPUTATION)
0x0c,
#else
0x00,
#endif
};
const uint8_t kTLSOutput[32] = {
0x67, 0x85, 0xde, 0x60, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x83, 0xe9, 0xa2, 0x2a, 0xb3,
0xf0, 0x27, 0x0c, 0xba, 0xf7, 0xfa, 0x82, 0x3d, 0x14, 0x77, 0x1d,
0x86, 0x29, 0x79, 0x39, 0x77, 0x8a, 0xd5, 0x0e, 0x9d,
#if !defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_BREAK_TLS_KDF)
0x32,
#else
0x00,
#endif
};
const uint8_t kTLSSecret[32] = {
0xbf, 0xe4, 0xb7, 0xe0, 0x26, 0x55, 0x5f, 0x6a, 0xdf, 0x5d, 0x27,
0xd6, 0x89, 0x99, 0x2a, 0xd6, 0xf7, 0x65, 0x66, 0x07, 0x4b, 0x55,
0x5f, 0x64, 0x55, 0xcd, 0xd5, 0x77, 0xa4, 0xc7, 0x09, 0x61,
};
const char kTLSLabel[] = "FIPS self test";
const uint8_t kTLSSeed1[16] = {
0x8f, 0x0d, 0xe8, 0xb6, 0x90, 0x8f, 0xb1, 0xd2,
0x6d, 0x51, 0xf4, 0x79, 0x18, 0x63, 0x51, 0x65,
};
const uint8_t kTLSSeed2[16] = {
0x7d, 0x24, 0x1a, 0x9d, 0x3c, 0x59, 0xbf, 0x3c,
0x31, 0x1e, 0x2b, 0x21, 0x41, 0x8d, 0x32, 0x81,
};
// kFFDHE2048PublicValueData is an arbitrary public value, mod
// kFFDHE2048Data. (The private key happens to be 4096.)
static const BN_ULONG kFFDHE2048PublicValueData[] = {
TOBN(0x187be36b, 0xd38a4fa1), TOBN(0x0a152f39, 0x6458f3b8),
TOBN(0x0570187e, 0xc422eeb7), TOBN(0x18af7482, 0x91173f2a),
TOBN(0xe9fdac6a, 0xcff4eaaa), TOBN(0xf6afebb7, 0x6e589d6c),
TOBN(0xf92f8e9a, 0xb7e33fb0), TOBN(0x70acf2aa, 0x4cf36ddd),
TOBN(0x561ab426, 0xd07137fd), TOBN(0x5f57d037, 0x430ee91e),
TOBN(0xe3e768c8, 0x60d10b8a), TOBN(0xb14884d8, 0xa18af8ce),
TOBN(0xf8a98014, 0xa12b74e4), TOBN(0x748d407c, 0x3437b7a8),
TOBN(0x627588c4, 0x9875d5a7), TOBN(0xdd24a127, 0x53c8f09d),
TOBN(0x85a997d5, 0x0cd51aec), TOBN(0x44f0c619, 0xce348458),
TOBN(0x9b894b24, 0x5f6b69a1), TOBN(0xae1302f2, 0xf6d4777e),
TOBN(0xe6678eeb, 0x375db18e), TOBN(0x2674e1d6, 0x4fbcbdc8),
TOBN(0xb297a823, 0x6fa93d28), TOBN(0x6a12fb70, 0x7c8c0510),
TOBN(0x5c6d1aeb, 0xdb06f65b), TOBN(0xe8c2954e, 0x4c1804ca),
TOBN(0x06bdeac1, 0xf5500fa7), TOBN(0x6a315604, 0x189cd76b),
TOBN(0xbae7b0b3, 0x6e362dc0), TOBN(0xa57c73bd, 0xdc70fb82),
TOBN(0xfaff50d2, 0x9d573457), TOBN(0x352bd399, 0xbe84058e),
};
const uint8_t kDHOutput[2048 / 8] = {
0x2a, 0xe6, 0xd3, 0xa6, 0x13, 0x58, 0x8e, 0xce, 0x53, 0xaa, 0xf6, 0x5d,
0x9a, 0xae, 0x02, 0x12, 0xf5, 0x80, 0x3d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x76, 0xac, 0x57,
0x37, 0x9e, 0xab, 0x38, 0x62, 0x25, 0x05, 0x1d, 0xf3, 0xa9, 0x39, 0x60,
0xf6, 0xae, 0x90, 0xed, 0x1e, 0xad, 0x6e, 0xe9, 0xe3, 0xba, 0x27, 0xf6,
0xdb, 0x54, 0xdf, 0xe2, 0xbd, 0xbb, 0x7f, 0xf1, 0x81, 0xac, 0x1a, 0xfa,
0xdb, 0x87, 0x07, 0x98, 0x76, 0x90, 0x21, 0xf2, 0xae, 0xda, 0x0d, 0x84,
0x97, 0x64, 0x0b, 0xbf, 0xb8, 0x8d, 0x10, 0x46, 0xe2, 0xd5, 0xca, 0x1b,
0xbb, 0xe5, 0x37, 0xb2, 0x3b, 0x35, 0xd3, 0x1b, 0x65, 0xea, 0xae, 0xf2,
0x03, 0xe2, 0xb6, 0xde, 0x22, 0xb7, 0x86, 0x49, 0x79, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0x16,
0xf7, 0xdc, 0x9c, 0x59, 0xf5, 0xb7, 0x70, 0xc0, 0x53, 0x42, 0x6f, 0xb1,
0xd2, 0x4e, 0x00, 0x25, 0x4b, 0x2d, 0x5a, 0x9b, 0xd0, 0xe9, 0x27, 0x43,
0xcc, 0x00, 0x66, 0xea, 0x94, 0x7a, 0x0b, 0xb9, 0x89, 0x0c, 0x5e, 0x94,
0xb8, 0x3a, 0x78, 0x9c, 0x4d, 0x84, 0xe6, 0x32, 0x2c, 0x38, 0x7c, 0xf7,
0x43, 0x9c, 0xd8, 0xb8, 0x1c, 0xce, 0x24, 0x91, 0x20, 0x67, 0x7a, 0x54,
0x1f, 0x7e, 0x86, 0x7f, 0xa1, 0xc1, 0x03, 0x4e, 0x2c, 0x26, 0x71, 0xb2,
0x06, 0x30, 0xb3, 0x6c, 0x15, 0xcc, 0xac, 0x25, 0xe5, 0x37, 0x3f, 0x24,
0x8f, 0x2a, 0x89, 0x5e, 0x3d, 0x43, 0x94, 0xc9, 0x36, 0xae, 0x40, 0x00,
0x6a, 0x0d, 0xb0, 0x6e, 0x8b, 0x2e, 0x70, 0x57, 0xe1, 0x88, 0x53, 0xd6,
0x06, 0x80, 0x2a, 0x4e, 0x5a, 0xf0, 0x1e, 0xaa, 0xcb, 0xab, 0x06, 0x0e,
0x27, 0x0f, 0xd9, 0x88, 0xd9, 0x01, 0xe3, 0x07, 0xeb, 0xdf, 0xc3, 0x12,
0xe3, 0x40, 0x88, 0x7b, 0x5f, 0x59, 0x78, 0x6e, 0x26, 0x20, 0xc3, 0xdf,
0xc8, 0xe4, 0x5e,
#if !defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_BREAK_FFC_DH)
0xb8,
#else
0x00,
#endif
};
EVP_AEAD_CTX aead_ctx;
EVP_AEAD_CTX_zero(&aead_ctx);
RSA *rsa_key = NULL;
EC_KEY *ec_key = NULL;
EC_GROUP *ec_group = NULL;
EC_POINT *ec_point_in = NULL;
EC_POINT *ec_point_out = NULL;
BIGNUM *ec_scalar = NULL;
ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
int ret = 0;
@@ -577,7 +760,7 @@ int boringssl_fips_self_test(
goto err;
}
// ECDSA Sign/Verify PWCT
// ECDSA Sign/Verify KAT
// The 'k' value for ECDSA is fixed to avoid an entropy draw.
ec_key->fixed_k = BN_new();
@@ -598,7 +781,60 @@ int boringssl_fips_self_test(
!BN_bn2bin(sig->s, ecdsa_s_bytes) ||
!check_test(kECDSASigR, ecdsa_r_bytes, sizeof(kECDSASigR), "ECDSA R") ||
!check_test(kECDSASigS, ecdsa_s_bytes, sizeof(kECDSASigS), "ECDSA S")) {
fprintf(stderr, "ECDSA KAT failed.\n");
fprintf(stderr, "ECDSA signature KAT failed.\n");
goto err;
}
if (!ECDSA_do_verify(kPlaintextSHA256, sizeof(kPlaintextSHA256), sig,
ec_key)) {
fprintf(stderr, "ECDSA verification KAT failed.\n");
goto err;
}
// Primitive Z Computation KAT (IG 9.6).
ec_group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
if (ec_group == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create P-256 group.\n");
goto err;
}
ec_point_in = EC_POINT_new(ec_group);
ec_point_out = EC_POINT_new(ec_group);
ec_scalar = BN_new();
uint8_t z_comp_result[65];
if (ec_point_in == NULL || ec_point_out == NULL || ec_scalar == NULL ||
!EC_POINT_oct2point(ec_group, ec_point_in, kP256Point, sizeof(kP256Point),
NULL) ||
!BN_bin2bn(kP256Scalar, sizeof(kP256Scalar), ec_scalar) ||
!EC_POINT_mul(ec_group, ec_point_out, NULL, ec_point_in, ec_scalar,
NULL) ||
!EC_POINT_point2oct(ec_group, ec_point_out, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
z_comp_result, sizeof(z_comp_result), NULL) ||
!check_test(kP256PointResult, z_comp_result, sizeof(z_comp_result),
"Z Computation Result")) {
fprintf(stderr, "Z Computation KAT failed.\n");
goto err;
}
// FFC Diffie-Hellman KAT
BIGNUM *const ffdhe2048_value = BN_new();
DH *const dh = self_test_dh();
int dh_ok = 0;
if (ffdhe2048_value && dh) {
bn_set_static_words(ffdhe2048_value, kFFDHE2048PublicValueData,
OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kFFDHE2048PublicValueData));
uint8_t dh_out[sizeof(kDHOutput)];
dh_ok =
sizeof(dh_out) == DH_size(dh) &&
DH_compute_key_padded(dh_out, ffdhe2048_value, dh) == sizeof(dh_out) &&
check_test(kDHOutput, dh_out, sizeof(dh_out), "FFC DH");
}
BN_free(ffdhe2048_value);
DH_free(dh);
if (!dh_ok) {
fprintf(stderr, "FFDH failed.\n");
goto err;
}
@@ -626,6 +862,17 @@ int boringssl_fips_self_test(
goto err;
}
// TLS KDF KAT
uint8_t tls_output[sizeof(kTLSOutput)];
if (!CRYPTO_tls1_prf(EVP_sha256(), tls_output, sizeof(tls_output), kTLSSecret,
sizeof(kTLSSecret), kTLSLabel, sizeof(kTLSLabel),
kTLSSeed1, sizeof(kTLSSeed1), kTLSSeed2,
sizeof(kTLSSeed2)) ||
!check_test(kTLSOutput, tls_output, sizeof(kTLSOutput), "TLS KDF KAT")) {
fprintf(stderr, "TLS KDF failed.\n");
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_SELF_TEST_FLAG_FILE)
@@ -642,6 +889,10 @@ err:
EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&aead_ctx);
RSA_free(rsa_key);
EC_KEY_free(ec_key);
EC_POINT_free(ec_point_in);
EC_POINT_free(ec_point_out);
EC_GROUP_free(ec_group);
BN_free(ec_scalar);
ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
return ret;
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
@@ -19,11 +19,14 @@
.text
.private_extern _OPENSSL_armcap_P
.globl _sha1_block_data_order
.private_extern _sha1_block_data_order
.align 6
_sha1_block_data_order:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
#if __has_feature(hwaddress_sanitizer) && __clang_major__ >= 10
adrp x16,:pg_hi21_nc:_OPENSSL_armcap_P
#else
@@ -1091,6 +1094,8 @@ Loop:
.align 6
sha1_block_armv8:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
Lv8_entry:
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -1229,8 +1234,6 @@ Lconst:
.byte 83,72,65,49,32,98,108,111,99,107,32,116,114,97,110,115,102,111,114,109,32,102,111,114,32,65,82,77,118,56,44,32,67,82,89,80,84,79,71,65,77,83,32,98,121,32,60,97,112,112,114,111,64,111,112,101,110,115,115,108,46,111,114,103,62,0
.align 2
.align 2
.comm _OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4
.private_extern _OPENSSL_armcap_P
#endif // !OPENSSL_NO_ASM
#endif // defined(__aarch64__) && defined(__APPLE__)
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__ELF__)
@@ -20,11 +20,14 @@
.text
.hidden OPENSSL_armcap_P
.globl sha1_block_data_order
.hidden sha1_block_data_order
.type sha1_block_data_order,%function
.align 6
sha1_block_data_order:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
#if __has_feature(hwaddress_sanitizer) && __clang_major__ >= 10
adrp x16,:pg_hi21_nc:OPENSSL_armcap_P
#else
@@ -1092,6 +1095,8 @@ sha1_block_data_order:
.type sha1_block_armv8,%function
.align 6
sha1_block_armv8:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
.Lv8_entry:
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -1230,8 +1235,6 @@ sha1_block_armv8:
.byte 83,72,65,49,32,98,108,111,99,107,32,116,114,97,110,115,102,111,114,109,32,102,111,114,32,65,82,77,118,56,44,32,67,82,89,80,84,79,71,65,77,83,32,98,121,32,60,97,112,112,114,111,64,111,112,101,110,115,115,108,46,111,114,103,62,0
.align 2
.align 2
.comm OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4
.hidden OPENSSL_armcap_P
#endif
#endif // !OPENSSL_NO_ASM
.section .note.GNU-stack,"",%progbits
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ sha1_block_data_order:
movl 8(%r10),%r10d
testl $512,%r8d
jz .Lialu
testl $536870912,%r10d
jnz _shaext_shortcut
andl $296,%r10d
cmpl $296,%r10d
je _avx2_shortcut
@@ -1271,6 +1273,175 @@ sha1_block_data_order:
.byte 0xf3,0xc3
.cfi_endproc
.size sha1_block_data_order,.-sha1_block_data_order
.type sha1_block_data_order_shaext,@function
.align 32
sha1_block_data_order_shaext:
_shaext_shortcut:
.cfi_startproc
movdqu (%rdi),%xmm0
movd 16(%rdi),%xmm1
movdqa K_XX_XX+160(%rip),%xmm3
movdqu (%rsi),%xmm4
pshufd $27,%xmm0,%xmm0
movdqu 16(%rsi),%xmm5
pshufd $27,%xmm1,%xmm1
movdqu 32(%rsi),%xmm6
.byte 102,15,56,0,227
movdqu 48(%rsi),%xmm7
.byte 102,15,56,0,235
.byte 102,15,56,0,243
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm9
.byte 102,15,56,0,251
jmp .Loop_shaext
.align 16
.Loop_shaext:
decq %rdx
leaq 64(%rsi),%r8
paddd %xmm4,%xmm1
cmovneq %r8,%rsi
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm8
.byte 15,56,201,229
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,0
.byte 15,56,200,213
pxor %xmm6,%xmm4
.byte 15,56,201,238
.byte 15,56,202,231
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,0
.byte 15,56,200,206
pxor %xmm7,%xmm5
.byte 15,56,202,236
.byte 15,56,201,247
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,0
.byte 15,56,200,215
pxor %xmm4,%xmm6
.byte 15,56,201,252
.byte 15,56,202,245
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,0
.byte 15,56,200,204
pxor %xmm5,%xmm7
.byte 15,56,202,254
.byte 15,56,201,229
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,0
.byte 15,56,200,213
pxor %xmm6,%xmm4
.byte 15,56,201,238
.byte 15,56,202,231
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,1
.byte 15,56,200,206
pxor %xmm7,%xmm5
.byte 15,56,202,236
.byte 15,56,201,247
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,1
.byte 15,56,200,215
pxor %xmm4,%xmm6
.byte 15,56,201,252
.byte 15,56,202,245
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,1
.byte 15,56,200,204
pxor %xmm5,%xmm7
.byte 15,56,202,254
.byte 15,56,201,229
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,1
.byte 15,56,200,213
pxor %xmm6,%xmm4
.byte 15,56,201,238
.byte 15,56,202,231
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,1
.byte 15,56,200,206
pxor %xmm7,%xmm5
.byte 15,56,202,236
.byte 15,56,201,247
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,2
.byte 15,56,200,215
pxor %xmm4,%xmm6
.byte 15,56,201,252
.byte 15,56,202,245
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,2
.byte 15,56,200,204
pxor %xmm5,%xmm7
.byte 15,56,202,254
.byte 15,56,201,229
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,2
.byte 15,56,200,213
pxor %xmm6,%xmm4
.byte 15,56,201,238
.byte 15,56,202,231
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,2
.byte 15,56,200,206
pxor %xmm7,%xmm5
.byte 15,56,202,236
.byte 15,56,201,247
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,2
.byte 15,56,200,215
pxor %xmm4,%xmm6
.byte 15,56,201,252
.byte 15,56,202,245
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,3
.byte 15,56,200,204
pxor %xmm5,%xmm7
.byte 15,56,202,254
movdqu (%rsi),%xmm4
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,3
.byte 15,56,200,213
movdqu 16(%rsi),%xmm5
.byte 102,15,56,0,227
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,3
.byte 15,56,200,206
movdqu 32(%rsi),%xmm6
.byte 102,15,56,0,235
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,3
.byte 15,56,200,215
movdqu 48(%rsi),%xmm7
.byte 102,15,56,0,243
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,3
.byte 65,15,56,200,201
.byte 102,15,56,0,251
paddd %xmm8,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm9
jnz .Loop_shaext
pshufd $27,%xmm0,%xmm0
pshufd $27,%xmm1,%xmm1
movdqu %xmm0,(%rdi)
movd %xmm1,16(%rdi)
.byte 0xf3,0xc3
.cfi_endproc
.size sha1_block_data_order_shaext,.-sha1_block_data_order_shaext
.type sha1_block_data_order_ssse3,@function
.align 16
sha1_block_data_order_ssse3:
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ _sha1_block_data_order:
movl 8(%r10),%r10d
testl $512,%r8d
jz L$ialu
testl $536870912,%r10d
jnz _shaext_shortcut
andl $296,%r10d
cmpl $296,%r10d
je _avx2_shortcut
@@ -1271,6 +1273,175 @@ L$epilogue:
.p2align 5
sha1_block_data_order_shaext:
_shaext_shortcut:
movdqu (%rdi),%xmm0
movd 16(%rdi),%xmm1
movdqa K_XX_XX+160(%rip),%xmm3
movdqu (%rsi),%xmm4
pshufd $27,%xmm0,%xmm0
movdqu 16(%rsi),%xmm5
pshufd $27,%xmm1,%xmm1
movdqu 32(%rsi),%xmm6
.byte 102,15,56,0,227
movdqu 48(%rsi),%xmm7
.byte 102,15,56,0,235
.byte 102,15,56,0,243
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm9
.byte 102,15,56,0,251
jmp L$oop_shaext
.p2align 4
L$oop_shaext:
decq %rdx
leaq 64(%rsi),%r8
paddd %xmm4,%xmm1
cmovneq %r8,%rsi
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm8
.byte 15,56,201,229
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,0
.byte 15,56,200,213
pxor %xmm6,%xmm4
.byte 15,56,201,238
.byte 15,56,202,231
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,0
.byte 15,56,200,206
pxor %xmm7,%xmm5
.byte 15,56,202,236
.byte 15,56,201,247
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,0
.byte 15,56,200,215
pxor %xmm4,%xmm6
.byte 15,56,201,252
.byte 15,56,202,245
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,0
.byte 15,56,200,204
pxor %xmm5,%xmm7
.byte 15,56,202,254
.byte 15,56,201,229
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,0
.byte 15,56,200,213
pxor %xmm6,%xmm4
.byte 15,56,201,238
.byte 15,56,202,231
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,1
.byte 15,56,200,206
pxor %xmm7,%xmm5
.byte 15,56,202,236
.byte 15,56,201,247
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,1
.byte 15,56,200,215
pxor %xmm4,%xmm6
.byte 15,56,201,252
.byte 15,56,202,245
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,1
.byte 15,56,200,204
pxor %xmm5,%xmm7
.byte 15,56,202,254
.byte 15,56,201,229
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,1
.byte 15,56,200,213
pxor %xmm6,%xmm4
.byte 15,56,201,238
.byte 15,56,202,231
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,1
.byte 15,56,200,206
pxor %xmm7,%xmm5
.byte 15,56,202,236
.byte 15,56,201,247
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,2
.byte 15,56,200,215
pxor %xmm4,%xmm6
.byte 15,56,201,252
.byte 15,56,202,245
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,2
.byte 15,56,200,204
pxor %xmm5,%xmm7
.byte 15,56,202,254
.byte 15,56,201,229
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,2
.byte 15,56,200,213
pxor %xmm6,%xmm4
.byte 15,56,201,238
.byte 15,56,202,231
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,2
.byte 15,56,200,206
pxor %xmm7,%xmm5
.byte 15,56,202,236
.byte 15,56,201,247
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,2
.byte 15,56,200,215
pxor %xmm4,%xmm6
.byte 15,56,201,252
.byte 15,56,202,245
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,3
.byte 15,56,200,204
pxor %xmm5,%xmm7
.byte 15,56,202,254
movdqu (%rsi),%xmm4
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,3
.byte 15,56,200,213
movdqu 16(%rsi),%xmm5
.byte 102,15,56,0,227
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,3
.byte 15,56,200,206
movdqu 32(%rsi),%xmm6
.byte 102,15,56,0,235
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,3
.byte 15,56,200,215
movdqu 48(%rsi),%xmm7
.byte 102,15,56,0,243
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,3
.byte 65,15,56,200,201
.byte 102,15,56,0,251
paddd %xmm8,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm9
jnz L$oop_shaext
pshufd $27,%xmm0,%xmm0
pshufd $27,%xmm1,%xmm1
movdqu %xmm0,(%rdi)
movd %xmm1,16(%rdi)
.byte 0xf3,0xc3
.p2align 4
sha1_block_data_order_ssse3:
_ssse3_shortcut:
Loaded 100 of 289 files, more files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff. Show more