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15 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Saleem AbdulrasoolandCory Benfield 8f4bfa5bc1 scripts: update scripts for Windows support (#57)
Add support for Windows for vending BoringSSL.  This is required in
order to build SwiftCrypto for Windows.

Co-authored-by: Cory Benfield <lukasa@apple.com>
2020-12-02 15:51:18 +00:00
Cory Benfield 0effb70b52 Update BoringSSL to 9dae0ac4f0ae18ebed988d36bfb4c4e4023fc574. (#54) 2020-12-02 15:44:56 +00:00
Saleem AbdulrasoolandCory Benfield 6eee6ab1d9 CCryptoBoringSSL: add Windows generated assembly (#56)
This adds the generated assembly files for Windows.  Unfortunately, the
x64 generated assembly appears to be ELF-esque and SYSV ABI rather than
Win64.  Additionally, the ARM targets do not seem to generate valid
Windows ARM code either (quick perusal shows at least invalid SP
handling on ARMv7 NT and non-conforming prologues on AArch64).  Add x86
Windows assembly only for the time being.

Co-authored-by: Cory Benfield <lukasa@apple.com>
2020-12-02 15:43:03 +00:00
Saleem AbdulrasoolandCory Benfield 8b1daa33f6 build: allow building on Windows (#53)
This allows us to build on Windows, though not entirely.  The assembly
routines need to be generated for the Windows targets, but this is
required to get to that point.  With this set of changes, we are able to
get to the point where we can start linking the `crypto-shasum` target,
which exposes the missing symbols.

Co-authored-by: Cory Benfield <lukasa@apple.com>
2020-12-02 11:09:40 +00:00
Saleem Abdulrasool ef6f94da02 gitignore: ignore vim swapfiles (#55) 2020-12-01 21:41:40 +00:00
YOCKOW 9680b7251c Make memset_s consistent with Darwin. (#52)
Resolves [issue#51](https://github.com/apple/swift-crypto/issues/51).

In Swift 5.3, a warning is viewed on Linux because `memset_s` implemented in this module returns `Void`.
This commit let the function return the same type with Darwin.
2020-10-06 10:22:50 +01:00
Cory Benfield 3c632a678e Update BoringSSL to 67818bea6690a230e2f42e8a588e0f54949bbbf1 (#50) 2020-09-30 15:31:23 +01:00
Cory Benfield 7ba861aa8a We now use the main branch. (#49) 2020-09-24 18:03:00 +01:00
Cory Benfield afe4c9b5f6 Update BoringSSL to 54858b63c1d886f6c8d903d4a4f594f1485de189 (#47) 2020-08-03 15:57:04 +01:00
Cory Benfield d82f7d8ce8 Update to Developer Beta 3 build. (#46) 2020-07-31 19:50:26 +01:00
Tim Condon 6445f9fb06 Fix path to environment script (#44) 2020-07-03 18:01:46 +01:00
Tim Condon f8b6e4e17e Clarify the location of the line to comment out for macOS development (#42) 2020-07-03 09:59:19 +01:00
buttaface 68d56d2b3c DERTests: enable test function for Android (#41) 2020-06-27 21:01:37 +01:00
Cory Benfield 794901c991 Update Swift Crypto with API from CryptoKit @ WWDC20 (#40)
Motivation:

At WWDC 2020 Apple updated the CryptoKit APIs. This PR brings those new
APIs to Swift Crypto. This brings Swift Crypto up-to-date with the
latest CryptoKit API support, including PEM/DER key support and HKDF API
extensions.

Modifications:

- Bring forward the CryptoKit API files
- Update to have API match the WWDC seed.

Result:

Users will have access to the seed APIs.
2020-06-22 21:40:34 +01:00
Johannes Weiss 82503a48ce fix warnings in with newer Swift compilers (#37)
Motiviation:

One `let` was hiding as a `var` and a few `#file` parameters have been
forwarded to (now) `#filePath` ones.

Modification:

- make the `var` a `let`
- silence the `#file`/`#filePath` warning by adding `(#file)` because we
  can't forward them properly right now
  (https://bugs.swift.org/browse/SR-12934). That's okay because even on
  the Swift master branch, `#file` == `#filePath`.

Result:

No warnings in newer Swift compilers.
2020-06-15 13:52:24 +01:00
245 changed files with 25727 additions and 5243 deletions

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+1 -1
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@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ _[the Swift Crypto tag/commit hash]_
### Environment
Stand in the root of the repo and run `./scripts/environments.sh` and paste the output below
Stand in the root of the repo and run `./scripts/environment.sh` and paste the output below
<details>
<pre>PLEASE_REPLACE_THIS_STIRNG_WITH_OUTPUT_OF_script_environments_THAT_IS_IN_YOUR_PASTEBOARD</pre>
+1 -1
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ _[the Swift Crypto tag/commit hash]_
### Environment
Stand in the root of the repo and run `./scripts/environments.sh` and paste the output below
Stand in the root of the repo and run `./scripts/environment.sh` and paste the output below
<details>
<pre>PLEASE_REPLACE_THIS_STIRNG_WITH_OUTPUT_OF_script_environments_THAT_IS_IN_YOUR_PASTEBOARD</pre>
+3 -1
View File
@@ -10,4 +10,6 @@ Package.resolved
.podspecs
DerivedData
.swiftpm
**/gyb.pyc
**/gyb.pyc
.*.sw[nop]
+12 -2
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
// Sources/CCryptoBoringSSL directory. The source repository is at
// https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl.
//
// BoringSSL Commit: 53a17f55247101105ae35767d5c5a6c311843a8e
// BoringSSL Commit: 9dae0ac4f0ae18ebed988d36bfb4c4e4023fc574
import PackageDescription
@@ -46,7 +46,17 @@ let package = Package(
],
dependencies: [],
targets: [
.target(name: "CCryptoBoringSSL"),
.target(
name: "CCryptoBoringSSL",
cSettings: [
/*
* This define is required on Windows, but because we need older
* versions of SPM, we cannot conditionally define this on Windows
* only. Unconditionally define it instead.
*/
.define("WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN"),
]
),
.target(name: "CCryptoBoringSSLShims", dependencies: ["CCryptoBoringSSL"]),
.target(name: "Crypto", dependencies: ["CCryptoBoringSSL", "CCryptoBoringSSLShims"], swiftSettings: swiftSettings),
.target(name: "crypto-shasum", dependencies: ["Crypto"]),
+2 -2
View File
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ If you have issues with CryptoKit, instead of Swift Crypto, please use [Feedback
#### `gyb`
Some of the files in this project are autogenerated (metaprogramming) using the Swift Utils tools called [gyb](https://github.com/apple/swift/blob/master/utils/gyb.py) (_"generate your boilerplate"_). `gyb` is included in [`./scripts/gyb`](scripts/gyb).
Some of the files in this project are autogenerated (metaprogramming) using the Swift Utils tools called [gyb](https://github.com/apple/swift/blob/main/utils/gyb.py) (_"generate your boilerplate"_). `gyb` is included in [`./scripts/gyb`](scripts/gyb).
`gyb` will generate some `Foobar.swift` Swift file from some `Foobar.swift.gyb` _template_ file. **You should not edit `Foobar.swift` directly**, since all manual edits in that generated file will be overwritten the next time `gyb` is run.
@@ -108,5 +108,5 @@ SemVer and Swift Crypto's Public API guarantees should result in a working progr
### Developing Swift Crypto on macOS
Swift Crypto normally defers to the OS implementation of CryptoKit on macOS. Naturally, this makes developing Swift Crypto on macOS tricky. To get Swift Crypto to build the open source implementation on macOS, uncomment the line that reads: `//.define("CRYPTO_IN_SWIFTPM_FORCE_BUILD_API")`, as this will force Swift Crypto to build its public API.
Swift Crypto normally defers to the OS implementation of CryptoKit on macOS. Naturally, this makes developing Swift Crypto on macOS tricky. To get Swift Crypto to build the open source implementation on macOS, in `Package.swift`, uncomment the line that reads: `//.define("CRYPTO_IN_SWIFTPM_FORCE_BUILD_API")`, as this will force Swift Crypto to build its public API.
@@ -67,10 +67,10 @@
int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(ASN1_BIT_STRING *x, unsigned char *d, int len)
{
return M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(x, d, len);
return ASN1_STRING_set(x, d, len);
}
int i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, unsigned char **pp)
int i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING(const ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, unsigned char **pp)
{
int ret, j, bits, len;
unsigned char *p, *d;
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ ASN1_BIT_STRING *c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING **a,
}
if ((a == NULL) || ((*a) == NULL)) {
if ((ret = M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
if ((ret = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
return (NULL);
} else
ret = (*a);
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ ASN1_BIT_STRING *c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING **a,
return (ret);
err:
if ((ret != NULL) && ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret)))
M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ret);
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ret);
return (NULL);
}
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, int n, int value)
return (1);
}
int ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, int n)
int ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(const ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, int n)
{
int w, v;
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ int ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, int n)
* which is not specified in 'flags', 1 otherwise.
* 'len' is the length of 'flags'.
*/
int ASN1_BIT_STRING_check(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a,
int ASN1_BIT_STRING_check(const ASN1_BIT_STRING *a,
unsigned char *flags, int flags_len)
{
int i, ok;
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ int ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a, long v)
return (1);
}
long ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a)
long ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(const ASN1_ENUMERATED *a)
{
int neg = 0, i;
@@ -147,13 +147,13 @@ long ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a)
return r;
}
ASN1_ENUMERATED *BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED(BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai)
ASN1_ENUMERATED *BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai)
{
ASN1_ENUMERATED *ret;
int len, j;
if (ai == NULL)
ret = M_ASN1_ENUMERATED_new();
ret = ASN1_ENUMERATED_new();
else
ret = ai;
if (ret == NULL) {
@@ -179,11 +179,11 @@ ASN1_ENUMERATED *BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED(BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai)
return (ret);
err:
if (ret != ai)
M_ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(ret);
ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(ret);
return (NULL);
}
BIGNUM *ASN1_ENUMERATED_to_BN(ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai, BIGNUM *bn)
BIGNUM *ASN1_ENUMERATED_to_BN(const ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai, BIGNUM *bn)
{
BIGNUM *ret;
+6 -6
View File
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
ASN1_INTEGER *ASN1_INTEGER_dup(const ASN1_INTEGER *x)
{
return M_ASN1_INTEGER_dup(x);
return ASN1_STRING_dup(x);
}
int ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(const ASN1_INTEGER *x, const ASN1_INTEGER *y)
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ int ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(const ASN1_INTEGER *x, const ASN1_INTEGER *y)
* followed by optional zeros isn't padded.
*/
int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp)
int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(const ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp)
{
int pad = 0, ret, i, neg;
unsigned char *p, *n, pb = 0;
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ ASN1_INTEGER *c2i_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER **a, const unsigned char **pp,
}
if ((a == NULL) || ((*a) == NULL)) {
if ((ret = M_ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL)
if ((ret = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL)
return (NULL);
ret->type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
} else
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ ASN1_INTEGER *c2i_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER **a, const unsigned char **pp,
err:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, i);
if ((ret != NULL) && ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret)))
M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(ret);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(ret);
return (NULL);
}
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ ASN1_INTEGER *BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_INTEGER *ai)
int len, j;
if (ai == NULL)
ret = M_ASN1_INTEGER_new();
ret = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
else
ret = ai;
if (ret == NULL) {
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ ASN1_INTEGER *BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_INTEGER *ai)
return (ret);
err:
if (ret != ai)
M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(ret);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(ret);
return (NULL);
}
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
#include "../internal.h"
int i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT *a, unsigned char **pp)
int i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(const ASN1_OBJECT *a, unsigned char **pp)
{
unsigned char *p, *allocated = NULL;
int objsize;
@@ -98,12 +98,12 @@ int i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT *a, unsigned char **pp)
return objsize;
}
int i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(char *buf, int buf_len, ASN1_OBJECT *a)
int i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a)
{
return OBJ_obj2txt(buf, buf_len, a, 0);
}
int i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(BIO *bp, ASN1_OBJECT *a)
int i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(BIO *bp, const ASN1_OBJECT *a)
{
char buf[80], *p = buf;
int i;
@@ -250,19 +250,12 @@ void ASN1_OBJECT_free(ASN1_OBJECT *a)
if (a == NULL)
return;
if (a->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS) {
#ifndef CONST_STRICT /* disable purely for compile-time strict
* const checking. Doing this on a "real"
* compile will cause memory leaks */
if (a->sn != NULL)
OPENSSL_free((void *)a->sn);
if (a->ln != NULL)
OPENSSL_free((void *)a->ln);
#endif
OPENSSL_free((void *)a->sn);
OPENSSL_free((void *)a->ln);
a->sn = a->ln = NULL;
}
if (a->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA) {
if (a->data != NULL)
OPENSSL_free((void *)a->data);
OPENSSL_free((void *)a->data);
a->data = NULL;
a->length = 0;
}
@@ -61,17 +61,17 @@
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *x)
{
return M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(x);
return ASN1_STRING_dup(x);
}
int ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a,
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *b)
{
return M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(a, b);
return ASN1_STRING_cmp(a, b);
}
int ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *x, const unsigned char *d,
int len)
{
return M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(x, d, len);
return ASN1_STRING_set(x, d, len);
}
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ ASN1_TIME *ASN1_TIME_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, time_t t,
return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
}
int ASN1_TIME_check(ASN1_TIME *t)
int ASN1_TIME_check(const ASN1_TIME *t)
{
if (t->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(t);
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ int ASN1_TIME_check(ASN1_TIME *t)
}
/* Convert an ASN1_TIME structure to GeneralizedTime */
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime(ASN1_TIME *t,
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime(const ASN1_TIME *t,
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **out)
{
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ret = NULL;
@@ -61,7 +61,10 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_obj.h>
int ASN1_TYPE_get(ASN1_TYPE *a)
#include "asn1_locl.h"
int ASN1_TYPE_get(const ASN1_TYPE *a)
{
if ((a->value.ptr != NULL) || (a->type == V_ASN1_NULL))
return (a->type);
@@ -142,8 +145,7 @@ int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b)
case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING:
case V_ASN1_OTHER:
default:
result = ASN1_STRING_cmp((ASN1_STRING *)a->value.ptr,
(ASN1_STRING *)b->value.ptr);
result = ASN1_STRING_cmp(a->value.asn1_string, b->value.asn1_string);
break;
}
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t,
if (s == NULL) {
free_s = 1;
s = M_ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
s = ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
}
if (s == NULL)
goto err;
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t,
return (s);
err:
if (free_s && s)
M_ASN1_UTCTIME_free(s);
ASN1_UTCTIME_free(s);
return NULL;
}
+15 -20
View File
@@ -251,6 +251,8 @@ void ASN1_put_object(unsigned char **pp, int constructed, int length, int tag,
int ASN1_put_eoc(unsigned char **pp)
{
/* This function is no longer used in the library, but some external code
* uses it. */
unsigned char *p = *pp;
*p++ = 0;
*p++ = 0;
@@ -311,9 +313,9 @@ int ASN1_STRING_copy(ASN1_STRING *dst, const ASN1_STRING *str)
{
if (str == NULL)
return 0;
dst->type = str->type;
if (!ASN1_STRING_set(dst, str->data, str->length))
return 0;
dst->type = str->type;
dst->flags = str->flags;
return 1;
}
@@ -395,13 +397,12 @@ ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_type_new(int type)
return (ret);
}
void ASN1_STRING_free(ASN1_STRING *a)
void ASN1_STRING_free(ASN1_STRING *str)
{
if (a == NULL)
if (str == NULL)
return;
if (a->data && !(a->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF))
OPENSSL_free(a->data);
OPENSSL_free(a);
OPENSSL_free(str->data);
OPENSSL_free(str);
}
int ASN1_STRING_cmp(const ASN1_STRING *a, const ASN1_STRING *b)
@@ -419,28 +420,22 @@ int ASN1_STRING_cmp(const ASN1_STRING *a, const ASN1_STRING *b)
return (i);
}
int ASN1_STRING_length(const ASN1_STRING *x)
int ASN1_STRING_length(const ASN1_STRING *str)
{
return M_ASN1_STRING_length(x);
return str->length;
}
void ASN1_STRING_length_set(ASN1_STRING *x, int len)
int ASN1_STRING_type(const ASN1_STRING *str)
{
M_ASN1_STRING_length_set(x, len);
return;
return str->type;
}
int ASN1_STRING_type(ASN1_STRING *x)
unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_data(ASN1_STRING *str)
{
return M_ASN1_STRING_type(x);
return str->data;
}
unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_data(ASN1_STRING *x)
const unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_get0_data(const ASN1_STRING *str)
{
return M_ASN1_STRING_data(x);
}
const unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_get0_data(const ASN1_STRING *x)
{
return x->data;
return str->data;
}
@@ -96,6 +96,36 @@ void asn1_item_combine_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
int UTF8_getc(const unsigned char *str, int len, uint32_t *val);
int UTF8_putc(unsigned char *str, int len, uint32_t value);
int ASN1_item_ex_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
void ASN1_item_ex_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
void ASN1_template_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt);
int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass, char opt,
ASN1_TLC *ctx);
int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass);
void ASN1_primitive_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
int asn1_get_choice_selector(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
int asn1_set_choice_selector(ASN1_VALUE **pval, int value, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
ASN1_VALUE **asn1_get_field_ptr(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt);
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *asn1_do_adb(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt,
int nullerr);
void asn1_refcount_set_one(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
int asn1_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
void asn1_enc_init(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
void asn1_enc_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
int asn1_enc_restore(int *len, unsigned char **out, ASN1_VALUE **pval,
const ASN1_ITEM *it);
int asn1_enc_save(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *in, int inlen,
const ASN1_ITEM *it);
#if defined(__cplusplus)
} /* extern C */
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ ASN1_STRING *ASN1_item_pack(void *obj, const ASN1_ITEM *it, ASN1_STRING **oct)
/* Extract an ASN1 object from an ASN1_STRING */
void *ASN1_item_unpack(ASN1_STRING *oct, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
void *ASN1_item_unpack(const ASN1_STRING *oct, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
const unsigned char *p;
void *ret;
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@
/* Based on a_int.c: equivalent ENUMERATED functions */
int i2a_ASN1_ENUMERATED(BIO *bp, ASN1_ENUMERATED *a)
int i2a_ASN1_ENUMERATED(BIO *bp, const ASN1_ENUMERATED *a)
{
int i, n = 0;
static const char *h = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+1 -1
View File
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_bio.h>
int i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(BIO *bp, ASN1_INTEGER *a)
int i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(BIO *bp, const ASN1_INTEGER *a)
{
int i, n = 0;
static const char *h = "0123456789ABCDEF";
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_bio.h>
int i2a_ASN1_STRING(BIO *bp, ASN1_STRING *a, int type)
int i2a_ASN1_STRING(BIO *bp, const ASN1_STRING *a, int type)
{
int i, n = 0;
static const char *h = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+14 -83
View File
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include "../internal.h"
#include "asn1_locl.h"
/*
* Constructed types with a recursive definition (such as can be found in PKCS7)
@@ -95,6 +96,8 @@ static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
ASN1_TLC *ctx, int depth);
static int asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_ITEM *it,
@@ -166,19 +169,16 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx, int depth)
{
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, *errtt = NULL;
const ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS *cf;
const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb;
const unsigned char *p = NULL, *q;
unsigned char *wp = NULL; /* BIG FAT WARNING! BREAKS CONST WHERE USED */
unsigned char imphack = 0, oclass;
unsigned char oclass;
char seq_eoc, seq_nolen, cst, isopt;
long tmplen;
int i;
int otag;
int ret = 0;
ASN1_VALUE **pchptr, *ptmpval;
ASN1_VALUE **pchptr;
int combine = aclass & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
aclass &= ~ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
if (!pval)
@@ -255,66 +255,6 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
ef = it->funcs;
return ef->asn1_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
case ASN1_ITYPE_COMPAT:
/* we must resort to old style evil hackery */
cf = it->funcs;
/* If OPTIONAL see if it is there */
if (opt) {
int exptag;
p = *in;
if (tag == -1)
exptag = it->utype;
else
exptag = tag;
/*
* Don't care about anything other than presence of expected tag
*/
ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
&p, len, exptag, aclass, 1, ctx);
if (!ret) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (ret == -1)
return -1;
}
/*
* This is the old style evil hack IMPLICIT handling: since the
* underlying code is expecting a tag and class other than the one
* present we change the buffer temporarily then change it back
* afterwards. This doesn't and never did work for tags > 30. Yes
* this is *horrible* but it is only needed for old style d2i which
* will hopefully not be around for much longer. FIXME: should copy
* the buffer then modify it so the input buffer can be const: we
* should *always* copy because the old style d2i might modify the
* buffer.
*/
if (tag != -1) {
wp = *(unsigned char **)in;
imphack = *wp;
if (p == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
*wp = (unsigned char)((*p & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
| it->utype);
}
ptmpval = cf->asn1_d2i(pval, in, len);
if (tag != -1)
*wp = imphack;
if (ptmpval)
return 1;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
@@ -370,10 +310,8 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
*in = p;
return 1;
case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
p = *in;
tmplen = len;
/* If no IMPLICIT tagging set to SEQUENCE, UNIVERSAL */
if (tag == -1) {
@@ -388,13 +326,8 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
goto err;
} else if (ret == -1)
return -1;
if (aux && (aux->flags & ASN1_AFLG_BROKEN)) {
len = tmplen - (p - *in);
seq_nolen = 1;
}
/* If indefinite we don't do a length check */
else
seq_nolen = seq_eoc;
seq_nolen = seq_eoc;
if (!cst) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED);
goto err;
@@ -649,7 +582,7 @@ static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
} else if (ret == -1)
return -1;
if (!*val)
*val = (ASN1_VALUE *)sk_new_null();
*val = (ASN1_VALUE *)sk_ASN1_VALUE_new_null();
else {
/*
* We've got a valid STACK: free up any items present
@@ -860,19 +793,19 @@ static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
/* Translate ASN1 content octets into a structure */
int asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
static int asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
ASN1_VALUE **opval = NULL;
ASN1_STRING *stmp;
ASN1_TYPE *typ = NULL;
int ret = 0;
const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf;
ASN1_INTEGER **tint;
pf = it->funcs;
if (pf && pf->prim_c2i)
return pf->prim_c2i(pval, cont, len, utype, free_cont, it);
/* Historically, |it->funcs| for primitive types contained an
* |ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS| table of callbacks. */
assert(it->funcs == NULL);
/* If ANY type clear type and set pointer to internal value */
if (it->utype == V_ASN1_ANY) {
if (!*pval) {
@@ -1055,15 +988,13 @@ static int asn1_find_end(const unsigned char **in, long len, char inf)
* constructed type and 'inf' should be set if it is indefinite length.
*/
#ifndef ASN1_MAX_STRING_NEST
/*
* This determines how many levels of recursion are permitted in ASN1 string
* types. If it is not limited stack overflows can occur. If set to zero no
* recursion is allowed at all. Although zero should be adequate examples
* exist that require a value of 1. So 5 should be more than enough.
*/
# define ASN1_MAX_STRING_NEST 5
#endif
#define ASN1_MAX_STRING_NEST 5
static int asn1_collect(BUF_MEM *buf, const unsigned char **in, long len,
char inf, int tag, int aclass, int depth)
+23 -85
View File
@@ -63,10 +63,13 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include "../internal.h"
#include "asn1_locl.h"
static int asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass);
static int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype,
const ASN1_ITEM *it);
static int asn1_set_seq_out(STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sk, unsigned char **out,
int skcontlen, const ASN1_ITEM *item,
int do_sort, int iclass);
@@ -76,16 +79,9 @@ static int asn1_item_flags_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out,
const ASN1_ITEM *it, int flags);
/*
* Top level i2d equivalents: the 'ndef' variant instructs the encoder to use
* indefinite length constructed encoding, where appropriate
* Top level i2d equivalents
*/
int ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out,
const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
return asn1_item_flags_i2d(val, out, it, ASN1_TFLG_NDEF);
}
int ASN1_item_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
return asn1_item_flags_i2d(val, out, it, 0);
@@ -128,9 +124,7 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass)
{
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt = NULL;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
int i, seqcontlen, seqlen, ndef = 1;
const ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS *cf;
int i, seqcontlen, seqlen;
const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb = 0;
@@ -174,26 +168,6 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
ef = it->funcs;
return ef->asn1_ex_i2d(pval, out, it, tag, aclass);
case ASN1_ITYPE_COMPAT:
/* old style hackery... */
cf = it->funcs;
if (out)
p = *out;
i = cf->asn1_i2d(*pval, out);
/*
* Fixup for IMPLICIT tag: note this messes up for tags > 30, but so
* did the old code. Tags > 30 are very rare anyway.
*/
if (out && (tag != -1))
*p = aclass | tag | (*p & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED);
return i;
case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
/* Use indefinite length constructed if requested */
if (aclass & ASN1_TFLG_NDEF)
ndef = 2;
OPENSSL_FALLTHROUGH;
case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
i = asn1_enc_restore(&seqcontlen, out, pval, it);
/* An error occurred */
@@ -228,11 +202,11 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
seqcontlen += tmplen;
}
seqlen = ASN1_object_size(ndef, seqcontlen, tag);
seqlen = ASN1_object_size(/*constructed=*/1, seqcontlen, tag);
if (!out || seqlen == -1)
return seqlen;
/* Output SEQUENCE header */
ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, seqcontlen, tag, aclass);
ASN1_put_object(out, /*constructed=*/1, seqcontlen, tag, aclass);
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
@@ -243,8 +217,6 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
/* FIXME: check for errors in enhanced version */
asn1_template_ex_i2d(pseqval, out, seqtt, -1, aclass);
}
if (ndef == 2)
ASN1_put_eoc(out);
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_I2D_POST, pval, it, NULL))
return 0;
return seqlen;
@@ -259,7 +231,7 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
static int asn1_template_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, int tag, int iclass)
{
int i, ret, flags, ttag, tclass, ndef;
int i, ret, flags, ttag, tclass;
size_t j;
flags = tt->flags;
/*
@@ -295,12 +267,6 @@ static int asn1_template_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
* class and iclass is any flags passed to this function.
*/
/* if template and arguments require ndef, use it */
if ((flags & ASN1_TFLG_NDEF) && (iclass & ASN1_TFLG_NDEF))
ndef = 2;
else
ndef = 1;
if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SK_MASK) {
/* SET OF, SEQUENCE OF */
STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sk = (STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *)*pval;
@@ -345,12 +311,12 @@ static int asn1_template_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
return -1;
skcontlen += tmplen;
}
sklen = ASN1_object_size(ndef, skcontlen, sktag);
sklen = ASN1_object_size(/*constructed=*/1, skcontlen, sktag);
if (sklen == -1)
return -1;
/* If EXPLICIT need length of surrounding tag */
if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG)
ret = ASN1_object_size(ndef, sklen, ttag);
ret = ASN1_object_size(/*constructed=*/1, sklen, ttag);
else
ret = sklen;
@@ -360,18 +326,12 @@ static int asn1_template_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
/* Now encode this lot... */
/* EXPLICIT tag */
if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG)
ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, sklen, ttag, tclass);
ASN1_put_object(out, /*constructed=*/1, sklen, ttag, tclass);
/* SET or SEQUENCE and IMPLICIT tag */
ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, skcontlen, sktag, skaclass);
ASN1_put_object(out, /*constructed=*/1, skcontlen, sktag, skaclass);
/* And the stuff itself */
asn1_set_seq_out(sk, out, skcontlen, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
isset, iclass);
if (ndef == 2) {
ASN1_put_eoc(out);
if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG)
ASN1_put_eoc(out);
}
return ret;
}
@@ -382,13 +342,11 @@ static int asn1_template_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
if (!i)
return 0;
/* Find length of EXPLICIT tag */
ret = ASN1_object_size(ndef, i, ttag);
ret = ASN1_object_size(/*constructed=*/1, i, ttag);
if (out && ret != -1) {
/* Output tag and item */
ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, i, ttag, tclass);
ASN1_put_object(out, /*constructed=*/1, i, ttag, tclass);
ASN1_item_ex_i2d(pval, out, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), -1, iclass);
if (ndef == 2)
ASN1_put_eoc(out);
}
return ret;
}
@@ -487,7 +445,6 @@ static int asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
int len;
int utype;
int usetag;
int ndef = 0;
utype = it->utype;
@@ -513,12 +470,6 @@ static int asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
if (len == -1)
return 0;
/* -2 return is special meaning use ndef */
if (len == -2) {
ndef = 2;
len = 0;
}
/* If not implicitly tagged get tag from underlying type */
if (tag == -1)
tag = utype;
@@ -526,23 +477,20 @@ static int asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
/* Output tag+length followed by content octets */
if (out) {
if (usetag)
ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, len, tag, aclass);
ASN1_put_object(out, /*constructed=*/0, len, tag, aclass);
asn1_ex_i2c(pval, *out, &utype, it);
if (ndef)
ASN1_put_eoc(out);
else
*out += len;
*out += len;
}
if (usetag)
return ASN1_object_size(ndef, len, tag);
return ASN1_object_size(/*constructed=*/0, len, tag);
return len;
}
/* Produce content octets from a structure */
int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cout, int *putype,
const ASN1_ITEM *it)
static int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cout, int *putype,
const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
ASN1_BOOLEAN *tbool = NULL;
ASN1_STRING *strtmp;
@@ -551,10 +499,10 @@ int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cout, int *putype,
const unsigned char *cont;
unsigned char c;
int len;
const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf;
pf = it->funcs;
if (pf && pf->prim_i2c)
return pf->prim_i2c(pval, cout, putype, it);
/* Historically, |it->funcs| for primitive types contained an
* |ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS| table of callbacks. */
assert(it->funcs == NULL);
/* Should type be omitted? */
if ((it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE)
@@ -642,16 +590,6 @@ int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cout, int *putype,
default:
/* All based on ASN1_STRING and handled the same */
strtmp = (ASN1_STRING *)*pval;
/* Special handling for NDEF */
if ((it->size == ASN1_TFLG_NDEF)
&& (strtmp->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) {
if (cout) {
strtmp->data = cout;
strtmp->length = 0;
}
/* Special return code */
return -2;
}
cont = strtmp->data;
len = strtmp->length;
@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_asn1.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_asn1t.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
@@ -77,7 +79,6 @@ void asn1_item_combine_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int combine)
{
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt = NULL, *seqtt;
const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
const ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS *cf;
const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb;
int i;
@@ -124,19 +125,12 @@ void asn1_item_combine_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int combine)
}
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_COMPAT:
cf = it->funcs;
if (cf && cf->asn1_free)
cf->asn1_free(*pval);
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN:
ef = it->funcs;
if (ef && ef->asn1_ex_free)
ef->asn1_ex_free(pval, it);
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
if (!asn1_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(pval, it))
return;
@@ -190,14 +184,9 @@ void ASN1_template_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt)
void ASN1_primitive_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
int utype;
if (it) {
const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf;
pf = it->funcs;
if (pf && pf->prim_free) {
pf->prim_free(pval, it);
return;
}
}
/* Historically, |it->funcs| for primitive types contained an
* |ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS| table of calbacks. */
assert(it == NULL || it->funcs == NULL);
/* Special case: if 'it' is NULL free contents of ASN1_TYPE */
if (!it) {
ASN1_TYPE *typ = (ASN1_TYPE *)*pval;
+10 -61
View File
@@ -70,7 +70,9 @@
static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
int combine);
static void asn1_item_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
static int ASN1_template_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt);
static void asn1_template_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt);
static int ASN1_primitive_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
static void asn1_primitive_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
ASN1_VALUE *ASN1_item_new(const ASN1_ITEM *it)
@@ -92,7 +94,6 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
int combine)
{
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt = NULL;
const ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS *cf;
const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb;
@@ -103,11 +104,6 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
else
asn1_cb = 0;
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
if (it->sname)
CRYPTO_push_info(it->sname);
#endif
switch (it->itype) {
case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN:
@@ -118,15 +114,6 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
}
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_COMPAT:
cf = it->funcs;
if (cf && cf->asn1_new) {
*pval = cf->asn1_new();
if (!*pval)
goto memerr;
}
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE:
if (it->templates) {
if (!ASN1_template_new(pval, it->templates))
@@ -146,10 +133,6 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
if (!i)
goto auxerr;
if (i == 2) {
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
if (it->sname)
CRYPTO_pop_info();
#endif
return 1;
}
}
@@ -164,17 +147,12 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
goto auxerr2;
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
if (asn1_cb) {
i = asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE, pval, it, NULL);
if (!i)
goto auxerr;
if (i == 2) {
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
if (it->sname)
CRYPTO_pop_info();
#endif
return 1;
}
}
@@ -195,30 +173,18 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
goto auxerr2;
break;
}
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
if (it->sname)
CRYPTO_pop_info();
#endif
return 1;
memerr2:
asn1_item_combine_free(pval, it, combine);
memerr:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
if (it->sname)
CRYPTO_pop_info();
#endif
return 0;
auxerr2:
asn1_item_combine_free(pval, it, combine);
auxerr:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR);
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
if (it->sname)
CRYPTO_pop_info();
#endif
return 0;
}
@@ -248,16 +214,14 @@ static void asn1_item_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
asn1_primitive_clear(pval, it);
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_COMPAT:
case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
*pval = NULL;
break;
}
}
int ASN1_template_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt)
static int ASN1_template_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt)
{
const ASN1_ITEM *it = ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item);
int ret;
@@ -271,10 +235,6 @@ int ASN1_template_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt)
*pval = NULL;
return 1;
}
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
if (tt->field_name)
CRYPTO_push_info(tt->field_name);
#endif
/* If SET OF or SEQUENCE OF, its a STACK */
if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_SK_MASK) {
STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *skval;
@@ -291,10 +251,6 @@ int ASN1_template_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt)
/* Otherwise pass it back to the item routine */
ret = asn1_item_ex_combine_new(pval, it, tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE);
done:
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
if (it->sname)
CRYPTO_pop_info();
#endif
return ret;
}
@@ -312,7 +268,7 @@ static void asn1_template_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt)
* all the old functions.
*/
int ASN1_primitive_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
static int ASN1_primitive_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
ASN1_TYPE *typ;
ASN1_STRING *str;
@@ -321,11 +277,9 @@ int ASN1_primitive_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
if (!it)
return 0;
if (it->funcs) {
const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf = it->funcs;
if (pf->prim_new)
return pf->prim_new(pval, it);
}
/* Historically, |it->funcs| for primitive types contained an
* |ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS| table of calbacks. */
assert(it->funcs == NULL);
if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING)
utype = -1;
@@ -368,14 +322,9 @@ int ASN1_primitive_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
static void asn1_primitive_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
int utype;
if (it && it->funcs) {
const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf = it->funcs;
if (pf->prim_clear)
pf->prim_clear(pval, it);
else
*pval = NULL;
return;
}
/* Historically, |it->funcs| for primitive types contained an
* |ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS| table of calbacks. */
assert(it == NULL || it->funcs == NULL);
if (!it || (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING))
utype = -1;
else
@@ -117,8 +117,6 @@ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE_ex(ASN1_FBOOLEAN, ASN1_BOOLEAN, 0)
/* Special, OCTET STRING with indefinite length constructed support */
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE_ex(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_NDEF, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ASN1_TFLG_NDEF)
ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY) =
ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY, ASN1_ANY)
ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY)
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_thread.h>
#include "../internal.h"
#include "asn1_locl.h"
/* Utility functions for manipulating fields and offsets */
@@ -91,8 +92,7 @@ int asn1_set_choice_selector(ASN1_VALUE **pval, int value,
static CRYPTO_refcount_t *asn1_get_references(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
const ASN1_ITEM *it) {
if (it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE &&
it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE) {
if (it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE) {
return NULL;
}
const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
@@ -262,6 +262,8 @@ int BIO_should_io_special(const BIO *bio) {
int BIO_get_retry_reason(const BIO *bio) { return bio->retry_reason; }
void BIO_set_retry_reason(BIO *bio, int reason) { bio->retry_reason = reason; }
void BIO_clear_flags(BIO *bio, int flags) {
bio->flags &= ~flags;
}
@@ -20,25 +20,18 @@
int BN_parse_asn1_unsigned(CBS *cbs, BIGNUM *ret) {
CBS child;
int is_negative;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &child, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
CBS_len(&child) == 0) {
!CBS_is_valid_asn1_integer(&child, &is_negative)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_BAD_ENCODING);
return 0;
}
if (CBS_data(&child)[0] & 0x80) {
if (is_negative) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NEGATIVE_NUMBER);
return 0;
}
// INTEGERs must be minimal.
if (CBS_data(&child)[0] == 0x00 &&
CBS_len(&child) > 1 &&
!(CBS_data(&child)[1] & 0x80)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_BAD_ENCODING);
return 0;
}
return BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&child), CBS_len(&child), ret) != NULL;
}
@@ -426,29 +426,14 @@ int CBS_peek_asn1_tag(const CBS *cbs, unsigned tag_value) {
int CBS_get_asn1_uint64(CBS *cbs, uint64_t *out) {
CBS bytes;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &bytes, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER)) {
if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &bytes, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
!CBS_is_unsigned_asn1_integer(&bytes)) {
return 0;
}
*out = 0;
const uint8_t *data = CBS_data(&bytes);
size_t len = CBS_len(&bytes);
if (len == 0) {
// An INTEGER is encoded with at least one octet.
return 0;
}
if ((data[0] & 0x80) != 0) {
// Negative number.
return 0;
}
if (data[0] == 0 && len > 1 && (data[1] & 0x80) == 0) {
// Extra leading zeros.
return 0;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if ((*out >> 56) != 0) {
// Too large to represent as a uint64_t.
@@ -462,31 +447,21 @@ int CBS_get_asn1_uint64(CBS *cbs, uint64_t *out) {
}
int CBS_get_asn1_int64(CBS *cbs, int64_t *out) {
int is_negative;
CBS bytes;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &bytes, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER)) {
if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &bytes, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
!CBS_is_valid_asn1_integer(&bytes, &is_negative)) {
return 0;
}
const uint8_t *data = CBS_data(&bytes);
const size_t len = CBS_len(&bytes);
if (len == 0 || len > sizeof(int64_t)) {
// An INTEGER is encoded with at least one octet.
if (len > sizeof(int64_t)) {
return 0;
}
if (len > 1) {
if (data[0] == 0 && (data[1] & 0x80) == 0) {
return 0; // Extra leading zeros.
}
if (data[0] == 0xff && (data[1] & 0x80) != 0) {
return 0; // Extra leading 0xff.
}
}
union {
int64_t i;
uint8_t bytes[sizeof(int64_t)];
} u;
const int is_negative = (data[0] & 0x80);
memset(u.bytes, is_negative ? 0xff : 0, sizeof(u.bytes)); // Sign-extend.
for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {
u.bytes[i] = data[len - i - 1];
@@ -635,6 +610,30 @@ int CBS_asn1_bitstring_has_bit(const CBS *cbs, unsigned bit) {
(CBS_data(cbs)[byte_num] & (1 << bit_num)) != 0;
}
int CBS_is_valid_asn1_integer(const CBS *cbs, int *out_is_negative) {
CBS copy = *cbs;
uint8_t first_byte, second_byte;
if (!CBS_get_u8(&copy, &first_byte)) {
return 0; // INTEGERs may not be empty.
}
if (out_is_negative != NULL) {
*out_is_negative = (first_byte & 0x80) != 0;
}
if (!CBS_get_u8(&copy, &second_byte)) {
return 1; // One byte INTEGERs are always minimal.
}
if ((first_byte == 0x00 && (second_byte & 0x80) == 0) ||
(first_byte == 0xff && (second_byte & 0x80) != 0)) {
return 0; // The value is minimal iff the first 9 bits are not all equal.
}
return 1;
}
int CBS_is_unsigned_asn1_integer(const CBS *cbs) {
int is_negative;
return CBS_is_valid_asn1_integer(cbs, &is_negative) && !is_negative;
}
static int add_decimal(CBB *out, uint64_t v) {
char buf[DECIMAL_SIZE(uint64_t) + 1];
BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%" PRIu64, v);
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ Lone:
.align 5
_ChaCha20_ctr32:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
cbz x2,Labort
#if __has_feature(hwaddress_sanitizer) && __clang_major__ >= 10
adrp x5,:pg_hi21_nc:_OPENSSL_armcap_P
@@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ _ChaCha20_ctr32:
b.ne ChaCha20_neon
Lshort:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-96]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -260,6 +262,7 @@ Loop:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
Labort:
ret
@@ -316,12 +319,14 @@ Loop_tail:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.align 5
ChaCha20_neon:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-96]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -702,6 +707,7 @@ Loop_neon:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
Ltail_neon:
@@ -811,11 +817,13 @@ Ldone_neon:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.align 5
ChaCha20_512_neon:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-96]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -1979,6 +1987,7 @@ Ldone_512_neon:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
#endif // !OPENSSL_NO_ASM
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
.type ChaCha20_ctr32,%function
.align 5
ChaCha20_ctr32:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
cbz x2,.Labort
#if __has_feature(hwaddress_sanitizer) && __clang_major__ >= 10
adrp x5,:pg_hi21_nc:OPENSSL_armcap_P
@@ -49,6 +50,7 @@ ChaCha20_ctr32:
b.ne ChaCha20_neon
.Lshort:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-96]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -261,6 +263,7 @@ ChaCha20_ctr32:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
.Labort:
ret
@@ -317,12 +320,14 @@ ChaCha20_ctr32:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size ChaCha20_ctr32,.-ChaCha20_ctr32
.type ChaCha20_neon,%function
.align 5
ChaCha20_neon:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-96]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -703,6 +708,7 @@ ChaCha20_neon:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.Ltail_neon:
@@ -812,11 +818,13 @@ ChaCha20_neon:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size ChaCha20_neon,.-ChaCha20_neon
.type ChaCha20_512_neon,%function
.align 5
ChaCha20_512_neon:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-96]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -1980,6 +1988,7 @@ ChaCha20_512_neon:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size ChaCha20_512_neon,.-ChaCha20_512_neon
#endif
@@ -0,0 +1,979 @@
#define BORINGSSL_PREFIX CCryptoBoringSSL
#if defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
# This file is generated from a similarly-named Perl script in the BoringSSL
# source tree. Do not edit by hand.
#if defined(__i386__)
#if defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h>
#endif
.text
.globl _ChaCha20_ctr32
.hidden _ChaCha20_ctr32
.def _ChaCha20_ctr32; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_ChaCha20_ctr32:
.L_ChaCha20_ctr32_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
xorl %eax,%eax
cmpl 28(%esp),%eax
je .L000no_data
call .Lpic_point
.Lpic_point:
popl %eax
leal _OPENSSL_ia32cap_P,%ebp
testl $16777216,(%ebp)
jz .L001x86
testl $512,4(%ebp)
jz .L001x86
jmp .Lssse3_shortcut
.L001x86:
movl 32(%esp),%esi
movl 36(%esp),%edi
subl $132,%esp
movl (%esi),%eax
movl 4(%esi),%ebx
movl 8(%esi),%ecx
movl 12(%esi),%edx
movl %eax,80(%esp)
movl %ebx,84(%esp)
movl %ecx,88(%esp)
movl %edx,92(%esp)
movl 16(%esi),%eax
movl 20(%esi),%ebx
movl 24(%esi),%ecx
movl 28(%esi),%edx
movl %eax,96(%esp)
movl %ebx,100(%esp)
movl %ecx,104(%esp)
movl %edx,108(%esp)
movl (%edi),%eax
movl 4(%edi),%ebx
movl 8(%edi),%ecx
movl 12(%edi),%edx
subl $1,%eax
movl %eax,112(%esp)
movl %ebx,116(%esp)
movl %ecx,120(%esp)
movl %edx,124(%esp)
jmp .L002entry
.align 16
.L003outer_loop:
movl %ebx,156(%esp)
movl %eax,152(%esp)
movl %ecx,160(%esp)
.L002entry:
movl $1634760805,%eax
movl $857760878,4(%esp)
movl $2036477234,8(%esp)
movl $1797285236,12(%esp)
movl 84(%esp),%ebx
movl 88(%esp),%ebp
movl 104(%esp),%ecx
movl 108(%esp),%esi
movl 116(%esp),%edx
movl 120(%esp),%edi
movl %ebx,20(%esp)
movl %ebp,24(%esp)
movl %ecx,40(%esp)
movl %esi,44(%esp)
movl %edx,52(%esp)
movl %edi,56(%esp)
movl 92(%esp),%ebx
movl 124(%esp),%edi
movl 112(%esp),%edx
movl 80(%esp),%ebp
movl 96(%esp),%ecx
movl 100(%esp),%esi
addl $1,%edx
movl %ebx,28(%esp)
movl %edi,60(%esp)
movl %edx,112(%esp)
movl $10,%ebx
jmp .L004loop
.align 16
.L004loop:
addl %ebp,%eax
movl %ebx,128(%esp)
movl %ebp,%ebx
xorl %eax,%edx
roll $16,%edx
addl %edx,%ecx
xorl %ecx,%ebx
movl 52(%esp),%edi
roll $12,%ebx
movl 20(%esp),%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
xorl %eax,%edx
movl %eax,(%esp)
roll $8,%edx
movl 4(%esp),%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
movl %edx,48(%esp)
xorl %ecx,%ebx
addl %ebp,%eax
roll $7,%ebx
xorl %eax,%edi
movl %ecx,32(%esp)
roll $16,%edi
movl %ebx,16(%esp)
addl %edi,%esi
movl 40(%esp),%ecx
xorl %esi,%ebp
movl 56(%esp),%edx
roll $12,%ebp
movl 24(%esp),%ebx
addl %ebp,%eax
xorl %eax,%edi
movl %eax,4(%esp)
roll $8,%edi
movl 8(%esp),%eax
addl %edi,%esi
movl %edi,52(%esp)
xorl %esi,%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
roll $7,%ebp
xorl %eax,%edx
movl %esi,36(%esp)
roll $16,%edx
movl %ebp,20(%esp)
addl %edx,%ecx
movl 44(%esp),%esi
xorl %ecx,%ebx
movl 60(%esp),%edi
roll $12,%ebx
movl 28(%esp),%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
xorl %eax,%edx
movl %eax,8(%esp)
roll $8,%edx
movl 12(%esp),%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
movl %edx,56(%esp)
xorl %ecx,%ebx
addl %ebp,%eax
roll $7,%ebx
xorl %eax,%edi
roll $16,%edi
movl %ebx,24(%esp)
addl %edi,%esi
xorl %esi,%ebp
roll $12,%ebp
movl 20(%esp),%ebx
addl %ebp,%eax
xorl %eax,%edi
movl %eax,12(%esp)
roll $8,%edi
movl (%esp),%eax
addl %edi,%esi
movl %edi,%edx
xorl %esi,%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
roll $7,%ebp
xorl %eax,%edx
roll $16,%edx
movl %ebp,28(%esp)
addl %edx,%ecx
xorl %ecx,%ebx
movl 48(%esp),%edi
roll $12,%ebx
movl 24(%esp),%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
xorl %eax,%edx
movl %eax,(%esp)
roll $8,%edx
movl 4(%esp),%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
movl %edx,60(%esp)
xorl %ecx,%ebx
addl %ebp,%eax
roll $7,%ebx
xorl %eax,%edi
movl %ecx,40(%esp)
roll $16,%edi
movl %ebx,20(%esp)
addl %edi,%esi
movl 32(%esp),%ecx
xorl %esi,%ebp
movl 52(%esp),%edx
roll $12,%ebp
movl 28(%esp),%ebx
addl %ebp,%eax
xorl %eax,%edi
movl %eax,4(%esp)
roll $8,%edi
movl 8(%esp),%eax
addl %edi,%esi
movl %edi,48(%esp)
xorl %esi,%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
roll $7,%ebp
xorl %eax,%edx
movl %esi,44(%esp)
roll $16,%edx
movl %ebp,24(%esp)
addl %edx,%ecx
movl 36(%esp),%esi
xorl %ecx,%ebx
movl 56(%esp),%edi
roll $12,%ebx
movl 16(%esp),%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
xorl %eax,%edx
movl %eax,8(%esp)
roll $8,%edx
movl 12(%esp),%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
movl %edx,52(%esp)
xorl %ecx,%ebx
addl %ebp,%eax
roll $7,%ebx
xorl %eax,%edi
roll $16,%edi
movl %ebx,28(%esp)
addl %edi,%esi
xorl %esi,%ebp
movl 48(%esp),%edx
roll $12,%ebp
movl 128(%esp),%ebx
addl %ebp,%eax
xorl %eax,%edi
movl %eax,12(%esp)
roll $8,%edi
movl (%esp),%eax
addl %edi,%esi
movl %edi,56(%esp)
xorl %esi,%ebp
roll $7,%ebp
decl %ebx
jnz .L004loop
movl 160(%esp),%ebx
addl $1634760805,%eax
addl 80(%esp),%ebp
addl 96(%esp),%ecx
addl 100(%esp),%esi
cmpl $64,%ebx
jb .L005tail
movl 156(%esp),%ebx
addl 112(%esp),%edx
addl 120(%esp),%edi
xorl (%ebx),%eax
xorl 16(%ebx),%ebp
movl %eax,(%esp)
movl 152(%esp),%eax
xorl 32(%ebx),%ecx
xorl 36(%ebx),%esi
xorl 48(%ebx),%edx
xorl 56(%ebx),%edi
movl %ebp,16(%eax)
movl %ecx,32(%eax)
movl %esi,36(%eax)
movl %edx,48(%eax)
movl %edi,56(%eax)
movl 4(%esp),%ebp
movl 8(%esp),%ecx
movl 12(%esp),%esi
movl 20(%esp),%edx
movl 24(%esp),%edi
addl $857760878,%ebp
addl $2036477234,%ecx
addl $1797285236,%esi
addl 84(%esp),%edx
addl 88(%esp),%edi
xorl 4(%ebx),%ebp
xorl 8(%ebx),%ecx
xorl 12(%ebx),%esi
xorl 20(%ebx),%edx
xorl 24(%ebx),%edi
movl %ebp,4(%eax)
movl %ecx,8(%eax)
movl %esi,12(%eax)
movl %edx,20(%eax)
movl %edi,24(%eax)
movl 28(%esp),%ebp
movl 40(%esp),%ecx
movl 44(%esp),%esi
movl 52(%esp),%edx
movl 60(%esp),%edi
addl 92(%esp),%ebp
addl 104(%esp),%ecx
addl 108(%esp),%esi
addl 116(%esp),%edx
addl 124(%esp),%edi
xorl 28(%ebx),%ebp
xorl 40(%ebx),%ecx
xorl 44(%ebx),%esi
xorl 52(%ebx),%edx
xorl 60(%ebx),%edi
leal 64(%ebx),%ebx
movl %ebp,28(%eax)
movl (%esp),%ebp
movl %ecx,40(%eax)
movl 160(%esp),%ecx
movl %esi,44(%eax)
movl %edx,52(%eax)
movl %edi,60(%eax)
movl %ebp,(%eax)
leal 64(%eax),%eax
subl $64,%ecx
jnz .L003outer_loop
jmp .L006done
.L005tail:
addl 112(%esp),%edx
addl 120(%esp),%edi
movl %eax,(%esp)
movl %ebp,16(%esp)
movl %ecx,32(%esp)
movl %esi,36(%esp)
movl %edx,48(%esp)
movl %edi,56(%esp)
movl 4(%esp),%ebp
movl 8(%esp),%ecx
movl 12(%esp),%esi
movl 20(%esp),%edx
movl 24(%esp),%edi
addl $857760878,%ebp
addl $2036477234,%ecx
addl $1797285236,%esi
addl 84(%esp),%edx
addl 88(%esp),%edi
movl %ebp,4(%esp)
movl %ecx,8(%esp)
movl %esi,12(%esp)
movl %edx,20(%esp)
movl %edi,24(%esp)
movl 28(%esp),%ebp
movl 40(%esp),%ecx
movl 44(%esp),%esi
movl 52(%esp),%edx
movl 60(%esp),%edi
addl 92(%esp),%ebp
addl 104(%esp),%ecx
addl 108(%esp),%esi
addl 116(%esp),%edx
addl 124(%esp),%edi
movl %ebp,28(%esp)
movl 156(%esp),%ebp
movl %ecx,40(%esp)
movl 152(%esp),%ecx
movl %esi,44(%esp)
xorl %esi,%esi
movl %edx,52(%esp)
movl %edi,60(%esp)
xorl %eax,%eax
xorl %edx,%edx
.L007tail_loop:
movb (%esi,%ebp,1),%al
movb (%esp,%esi,1),%dl
leal 1(%esi),%esi
xorb %dl,%al
movb %al,-1(%ecx,%esi,1)
decl %ebx
jnz .L007tail_loop
.L006done:
addl $132,%esp
.L000no_data:
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.globl _ChaCha20_ssse3
.hidden _ChaCha20_ssse3
.def _ChaCha20_ssse3; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_ChaCha20_ssse3:
.L_ChaCha20_ssse3_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
.Lssse3_shortcut:
movl 20(%esp),%edi
movl 24(%esp),%esi
movl 28(%esp),%ecx
movl 32(%esp),%edx
movl 36(%esp),%ebx
movl %esp,%ebp
subl $524,%esp
andl $-64,%esp
movl %ebp,512(%esp)
leal .Lssse3_data-.Lpic_point(%eax),%eax
movdqu (%ebx),%xmm3
cmpl $256,%ecx
jb .L0081x
movl %edx,516(%esp)
movl %ebx,520(%esp)
subl $256,%ecx
leal 384(%esp),%ebp
movdqu (%edx),%xmm7
pshufd $0,%xmm3,%xmm0
pshufd $85,%xmm3,%xmm1
pshufd $170,%xmm3,%xmm2
pshufd $255,%xmm3,%xmm3
paddd 48(%eax),%xmm0
pshufd $0,%xmm7,%xmm4
pshufd $85,%xmm7,%xmm5
psubd 64(%eax),%xmm0
pshufd $170,%xmm7,%xmm6
pshufd $255,%xmm7,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm0,64(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm1,80(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm2,96(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm3,112(%ebp)
movdqu 16(%edx),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm4,-64(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm5,-48(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm6,-32(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm7,-16(%ebp)
movdqa 32(%eax),%xmm7
leal 128(%esp),%ebx
pshufd $0,%xmm3,%xmm0
pshufd $85,%xmm3,%xmm1
pshufd $170,%xmm3,%xmm2
pshufd $255,%xmm3,%xmm3
pshufd $0,%xmm7,%xmm4
pshufd $85,%xmm7,%xmm5
pshufd $170,%xmm7,%xmm6
pshufd $255,%xmm7,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm0,(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm1,16(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm2,32(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm3,48(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm4,-128(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm5,-112(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm6,-96(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm7,-80(%ebp)
leal 128(%esi),%esi
leal 128(%edi),%edi
jmp .L009outer_loop
.align 16
.L009outer_loop:
movdqa -112(%ebp),%xmm1
movdqa -96(%ebp),%xmm2
movdqa -80(%ebp),%xmm3
movdqa -48(%ebp),%xmm5
movdqa -32(%ebp),%xmm6
movdqa -16(%ebp),%xmm7
movdqa %xmm1,-112(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm2,-96(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm3,-80(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm5,-48(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm6,-32(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm7,-16(%ebx)
movdqa 32(%ebp),%xmm2
movdqa 48(%ebp),%xmm3
movdqa 64(%ebp),%xmm4
movdqa 80(%ebp),%xmm5
movdqa 96(%ebp),%xmm6
movdqa 112(%ebp),%xmm7
paddd 64(%eax),%xmm4
movdqa %xmm2,32(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm3,48(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm4,64(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm5,80(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm6,96(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm7,112(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm4,64(%ebp)
movdqa -128(%ebp),%xmm0
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm6
movdqa -64(%ebp),%xmm3
movdqa (%ebp),%xmm4
movdqa 16(%ebp),%xmm5
movl $10,%edx
nop
.align 16
.L010loop:
paddd %xmm3,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm3,%xmm2
pxor %xmm0,%xmm6
pshufb (%eax),%xmm6
paddd %xmm6,%xmm4
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
movdqa -48(%ebx),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm1
pslld $12,%xmm2
psrld $20,%xmm1
por %xmm1,%xmm2
movdqa -112(%ebx),%xmm1
paddd %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa 80(%ebx),%xmm7
pxor %xmm0,%xmm6
movdqa %xmm0,-128(%ebx)
pshufb 16(%eax),%xmm6
paddd %xmm6,%xmm4
movdqa %xmm6,64(%ebx)
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
paddd %xmm3,%xmm1
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm0
pslld $7,%xmm2
psrld $25,%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm7
por %xmm0,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,(%ebx)
pshufb (%eax),%xmm7
movdqa %xmm2,-64(%ebx)
paddd %xmm7,%xmm5
movdqa 32(%ebx),%xmm4
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
movdqa -32(%ebx),%xmm2
movdqa %xmm3,%xmm0
pslld $12,%xmm3
psrld $20,%xmm0
por %xmm0,%xmm3
movdqa -96(%ebx),%xmm0
paddd %xmm3,%xmm1
movdqa 96(%ebx),%xmm6
pxor %xmm1,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm1,-112(%ebx)
pshufb 16(%eax),%xmm7
paddd %xmm7,%xmm5
movdqa %xmm7,80(%ebx)
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
paddd %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm3,%xmm1
pslld $7,%xmm3
psrld $25,%xmm1
pxor %xmm0,%xmm6
por %xmm1,%xmm3
movdqa %xmm5,16(%ebx)
pshufb (%eax),%xmm6
movdqa %xmm3,-48(%ebx)
paddd %xmm6,%xmm4
movdqa 48(%ebx),%xmm5
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
movdqa -16(%ebx),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm1
pslld $12,%xmm2
psrld $20,%xmm1
por %xmm1,%xmm2
movdqa -80(%ebx),%xmm1
paddd %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa 112(%ebx),%xmm7
pxor %xmm0,%xmm6
movdqa %xmm0,-96(%ebx)
pshufb 16(%eax),%xmm6
paddd %xmm6,%xmm4
movdqa %xmm6,96(%ebx)
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
paddd %xmm3,%xmm1
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm0
pslld $7,%xmm2
psrld $25,%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm7
por %xmm0,%xmm2
pshufb (%eax),%xmm7
movdqa %xmm2,-32(%ebx)
paddd %xmm7,%xmm5
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
movdqa -48(%ebx),%xmm2
movdqa %xmm3,%xmm0
pslld $12,%xmm3
psrld $20,%xmm0
por %xmm0,%xmm3
movdqa -128(%ebx),%xmm0
paddd %xmm3,%xmm1
pxor %xmm1,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm1,-80(%ebx)
pshufb 16(%eax),%xmm7
paddd %xmm7,%xmm5
movdqa %xmm7,%xmm6
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
paddd %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm3,%xmm1
pslld $7,%xmm3
psrld $25,%xmm1
pxor %xmm0,%xmm6
por %xmm1,%xmm3
pshufb (%eax),%xmm6
movdqa %xmm3,-16(%ebx)
paddd %xmm6,%xmm4
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
movdqa -32(%ebx),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm1
pslld $12,%xmm2
psrld $20,%xmm1
por %xmm1,%xmm2
movdqa -112(%ebx),%xmm1
paddd %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa 64(%ebx),%xmm7
pxor %xmm0,%xmm6
movdqa %xmm0,-128(%ebx)
pshufb 16(%eax),%xmm6
paddd %xmm6,%xmm4
movdqa %xmm6,112(%ebx)
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
paddd %xmm3,%xmm1
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm0
pslld $7,%xmm2
psrld $25,%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm7
por %xmm0,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,32(%ebx)
pshufb (%eax),%xmm7
movdqa %xmm2,-48(%ebx)
paddd %xmm7,%xmm5
movdqa (%ebx),%xmm4
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
movdqa -16(%ebx),%xmm2
movdqa %xmm3,%xmm0
pslld $12,%xmm3
psrld $20,%xmm0
por %xmm0,%xmm3
movdqa -96(%ebx),%xmm0
paddd %xmm3,%xmm1
movdqa 80(%ebx),%xmm6
pxor %xmm1,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm1,-112(%ebx)
pshufb 16(%eax),%xmm7
paddd %xmm7,%xmm5
movdqa %xmm7,64(%ebx)
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
paddd %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm3,%xmm1
pslld $7,%xmm3
psrld $25,%xmm1
pxor %xmm0,%xmm6
por %xmm1,%xmm3
movdqa %xmm5,48(%ebx)
pshufb (%eax),%xmm6
movdqa %xmm3,-32(%ebx)
paddd %xmm6,%xmm4
movdqa 16(%ebx),%xmm5
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
movdqa -64(%ebx),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm1
pslld $12,%xmm2
psrld $20,%xmm1
por %xmm1,%xmm2
movdqa -80(%ebx),%xmm1
paddd %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa 96(%ebx),%xmm7
pxor %xmm0,%xmm6
movdqa %xmm0,-96(%ebx)
pshufb 16(%eax),%xmm6
paddd %xmm6,%xmm4
movdqa %xmm6,80(%ebx)
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
paddd %xmm3,%xmm1
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm0
pslld $7,%xmm2
psrld $25,%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm7
por %xmm0,%xmm2
pshufb (%eax),%xmm7
movdqa %xmm2,-16(%ebx)
paddd %xmm7,%xmm5
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
movdqa %xmm3,%xmm0
pslld $12,%xmm3
psrld $20,%xmm0
por %xmm0,%xmm3
movdqa -128(%ebx),%xmm0
paddd %xmm3,%xmm1
movdqa 64(%ebx),%xmm6
pxor %xmm1,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm1,-80(%ebx)
pshufb 16(%eax),%xmm7
paddd %xmm7,%xmm5
movdqa %xmm7,96(%ebx)
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
movdqa %xmm3,%xmm1
pslld $7,%xmm3
psrld $25,%xmm1
por %xmm1,%xmm3
decl %edx
jnz .L010loop
movdqa %xmm3,-64(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm4,(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm5,16(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm6,64(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm7,96(%ebx)
movdqa -112(%ebx),%xmm1
movdqa -96(%ebx),%xmm2
movdqa -80(%ebx),%xmm3
paddd -128(%ebp),%xmm0
paddd -112(%ebp),%xmm1
paddd -96(%ebp),%xmm2
paddd -80(%ebp),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm6
punpckldq %xmm1,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm7
punpckldq %xmm3,%xmm2
punpckhdq %xmm1,%xmm6
punpckhdq %xmm3,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
punpcklqdq %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm3
punpcklqdq %xmm7,%xmm6
punpckhqdq %xmm2,%xmm1
punpckhqdq %xmm7,%xmm3
movdqu -128(%esi),%xmm4
movdqu -64(%esi),%xmm5
movdqu (%esi),%xmm2
movdqu 64(%esi),%xmm7
leal 16(%esi),%esi
pxor %xmm0,%xmm4
movdqa -64(%ebx),%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm5
movdqa -48(%ebx),%xmm1
pxor %xmm2,%xmm6
movdqa -32(%ebx),%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm7
movdqa -16(%ebx),%xmm3
movdqu %xmm4,-128(%edi)
movdqu %xmm5,-64(%edi)
movdqu %xmm6,(%edi)
movdqu %xmm7,64(%edi)
leal 16(%edi),%edi
paddd -64(%ebp),%xmm0
paddd -48(%ebp),%xmm1
paddd -32(%ebp),%xmm2
paddd -16(%ebp),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm6
punpckldq %xmm1,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm7
punpckldq %xmm3,%xmm2
punpckhdq %xmm1,%xmm6
punpckhdq %xmm3,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
punpcklqdq %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm3
punpcklqdq %xmm7,%xmm6
punpckhqdq %xmm2,%xmm1
punpckhqdq %xmm7,%xmm3
movdqu -128(%esi),%xmm4
movdqu -64(%esi),%xmm5
movdqu (%esi),%xmm2
movdqu 64(%esi),%xmm7
leal 16(%esi),%esi
pxor %xmm0,%xmm4
movdqa (%ebx),%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm5
movdqa 16(%ebx),%xmm1
pxor %xmm2,%xmm6
movdqa 32(%ebx),%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm7
movdqa 48(%ebx),%xmm3
movdqu %xmm4,-128(%edi)
movdqu %xmm5,-64(%edi)
movdqu %xmm6,(%edi)
movdqu %xmm7,64(%edi)
leal 16(%edi),%edi
paddd (%ebp),%xmm0
paddd 16(%ebp),%xmm1
paddd 32(%ebp),%xmm2
paddd 48(%ebp),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm6
punpckldq %xmm1,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm7
punpckldq %xmm3,%xmm2
punpckhdq %xmm1,%xmm6
punpckhdq %xmm3,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
punpcklqdq %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm3
punpcklqdq %xmm7,%xmm6
punpckhqdq %xmm2,%xmm1
punpckhqdq %xmm7,%xmm3
movdqu -128(%esi),%xmm4
movdqu -64(%esi),%xmm5
movdqu (%esi),%xmm2
movdqu 64(%esi),%xmm7
leal 16(%esi),%esi
pxor %xmm0,%xmm4
movdqa 64(%ebx),%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm5
movdqa 80(%ebx),%xmm1
pxor %xmm2,%xmm6
movdqa 96(%ebx),%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm7
movdqa 112(%ebx),%xmm3
movdqu %xmm4,-128(%edi)
movdqu %xmm5,-64(%edi)
movdqu %xmm6,(%edi)
movdqu %xmm7,64(%edi)
leal 16(%edi),%edi
paddd 64(%ebp),%xmm0
paddd 80(%ebp),%xmm1
paddd 96(%ebp),%xmm2
paddd 112(%ebp),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm6
punpckldq %xmm1,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm7
punpckldq %xmm3,%xmm2
punpckhdq %xmm1,%xmm6
punpckhdq %xmm3,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
punpcklqdq %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm3
punpcklqdq %xmm7,%xmm6
punpckhqdq %xmm2,%xmm1
punpckhqdq %xmm7,%xmm3
movdqu -128(%esi),%xmm4
movdqu -64(%esi),%xmm5
movdqu (%esi),%xmm2
movdqu 64(%esi),%xmm7
leal 208(%esi),%esi
pxor %xmm0,%xmm4
pxor %xmm1,%xmm5
pxor %xmm2,%xmm6
pxor %xmm3,%xmm7
movdqu %xmm4,-128(%edi)
movdqu %xmm5,-64(%edi)
movdqu %xmm6,(%edi)
movdqu %xmm7,64(%edi)
leal 208(%edi),%edi
subl $256,%ecx
jnc .L009outer_loop
addl $256,%ecx
jz .L011done
movl 520(%esp),%ebx
leal -128(%esi),%esi
movl 516(%esp),%edx
leal -128(%edi),%edi
movd 64(%ebp),%xmm2
movdqu (%ebx),%xmm3
paddd 96(%eax),%xmm2
pand 112(%eax),%xmm3
por %xmm2,%xmm3
.L0081x:
movdqa 32(%eax),%xmm0
movdqu (%edx),%xmm1
movdqu 16(%edx),%xmm2
movdqa (%eax),%xmm6
movdqa 16(%eax),%xmm7
movl %ebp,48(%esp)
movdqa %xmm0,(%esp)
movdqa %xmm1,16(%esp)
movdqa %xmm2,32(%esp)
movdqa %xmm3,48(%esp)
movl $10,%edx
jmp .L012loop1x
.align 16
.L013outer1x:
movdqa 80(%eax),%xmm3
movdqa (%esp),%xmm0
movdqa 16(%esp),%xmm1
movdqa 32(%esp),%xmm2
paddd 48(%esp),%xmm3
movl $10,%edx
movdqa %xmm3,48(%esp)
jmp .L012loop1x
.align 16
.L012loop1x:
paddd %xmm1,%xmm0
pxor %xmm0,%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,222
paddd %xmm3,%xmm2
pxor %xmm2,%xmm1
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm4
psrld $20,%xmm1
pslld $12,%xmm4
por %xmm4,%xmm1
paddd %xmm1,%xmm0
pxor %xmm0,%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,223
paddd %xmm3,%xmm2
pxor %xmm2,%xmm1
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm4
psrld $25,%xmm1
pslld $7,%xmm4
por %xmm4,%xmm1
pshufd $78,%xmm2,%xmm2
pshufd $57,%xmm1,%xmm1
pshufd $147,%xmm3,%xmm3
nop
paddd %xmm1,%xmm0
pxor %xmm0,%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,222
paddd %xmm3,%xmm2
pxor %xmm2,%xmm1
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm4
psrld $20,%xmm1
pslld $12,%xmm4
por %xmm4,%xmm1
paddd %xmm1,%xmm0
pxor %xmm0,%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,223
paddd %xmm3,%xmm2
pxor %xmm2,%xmm1
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm4
psrld $25,%xmm1
pslld $7,%xmm4
por %xmm4,%xmm1
pshufd $78,%xmm2,%xmm2
pshufd $147,%xmm1,%xmm1
pshufd $57,%xmm3,%xmm3
decl %edx
jnz .L012loop1x
paddd (%esp),%xmm0
paddd 16(%esp),%xmm1
paddd 32(%esp),%xmm2
paddd 48(%esp),%xmm3
cmpl $64,%ecx
jb .L014tail
movdqu (%esi),%xmm4
movdqu 16(%esi),%xmm5
pxor %xmm4,%xmm0
movdqu 32(%esi),%xmm4
pxor %xmm5,%xmm1
movdqu 48(%esi),%xmm5
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
leal 64(%esi),%esi
movdqu %xmm0,(%edi)
movdqu %xmm1,16(%edi)
movdqu %xmm2,32(%edi)
movdqu %xmm3,48(%edi)
leal 64(%edi),%edi
subl $64,%ecx
jnz .L013outer1x
jmp .L011done
.L014tail:
movdqa %xmm0,(%esp)
movdqa %xmm1,16(%esp)
movdqa %xmm2,32(%esp)
movdqa %xmm3,48(%esp)
xorl %eax,%eax
xorl %edx,%edx
xorl %ebp,%ebp
.L015tail_loop:
movb (%esp,%ebp,1),%al
movb (%esi,%ebp,1),%dl
leal 1(%ebp),%ebp
xorb %dl,%al
movb %al,-1(%edi,%ebp,1)
decl %ecx
jnz .L015tail_loop
.L011done:
movl 512(%esp),%esp
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.align 64
.Lssse3_data:
.byte 2,3,0,1,6,7,4,5,10,11,8,9,14,15,12,13
.byte 3,0,1,2,7,4,5,6,11,8,9,10,15,12,13,14
.long 1634760805,857760878,2036477234,1797285236
.long 0,1,2,3
.long 4,4,4,4
.long 1,0,0,0
.long 4,0,0,0
.long 0,-1,-1,-1
.align 64
.byte 67,104,97,67,104,97,50,48,32,102,111,114,32,120,56,54
.byte 44,32,67,82,89,80,84,79,71,65,77,83,32,98,121,32
.byte 60,97,112,112,114,111,64,111,112,101,110,115,115,108,46,111
.byte 114,103,62,0
#endif
#endif // defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__ELF__)
.section .note.GNU-stack,"",%progbits
#endif
@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ void EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac(uint8_t *out, size_t md_size, const uint8_t *in,
assert(orig_len >= in_len);
assert(in_len >= md_size);
assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
assert(md_size > 0);
// scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because
// the MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes.
+9 -43
View File
@@ -72,12 +72,11 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_sha.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_thread.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "../fipsmodule/bn/internal.h"
#include "../internal.h"
#define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
// Primality test according to FIPS PUB 186[-1], Appendix 2.1: 50 rounds of
// Miller-Rabin.
#define DSS_prime_checks 50
@@ -568,23 +567,7 @@ static int mod_mul_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
}
DSA_SIG *DSA_do_sign(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, const DSA *dsa) {
if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
return NULL;
}
// Reject invalid parameters. In particular, the algorithm will infinite loop
// if |g| is zero.
if (BN_is_zero(dsa->p) || BN_is_zero(dsa->q) || BN_is_zero(dsa->g)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS);
return NULL;
}
// We only support DSA keys that are a multiple of 8 bits. (This is a weaker
// check than the one in |DSA_do_check_signature|, which only allows 160-,
// 224-, and 256-bit keys.
if (BN_num_bits(dsa->q) % 8 != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
if (!dsa_check_parameters(dsa)) {
return NULL;
}
@@ -678,35 +661,17 @@ int DSA_do_verify(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, DSA_SIG *sig,
int DSA_do_check_signature(int *out_valid, const uint8_t *digest,
size_t digest_len, DSA_SIG *sig, const DSA *dsa) {
BN_CTX *ctx;
BIGNUM u1, u2, t1;
int ret = 0;
unsigned i;
*out_valid = 0;
if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
i = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
// FIPS 186-3 allows only different sizes for q.
if (i != 160 && i != 224 && i != 256) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
return 0;
}
if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
if (!dsa_check_parameters(dsa)) {
return 0;
}
int ret = 0;
BIGNUM u1, u2, t1;
BN_init(&u1);
BN_init(&u2);
BN_init(&t1);
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
@@ -729,11 +694,12 @@ int DSA_do_check_signature(int *out_valid, const uint8_t *digest,
}
// save M in u1
if (digest_len > (i >> 3)) {
unsigned q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
if (digest_len > (q_bits >> 3)) {
// if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the
// BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see
// fips 186-3, 4.2
digest_len = (i >> 3);
digest_len = (q_bits >> 3);
}
if (BN_bin2bn(digest, digest_len, &u1) == NULL) {
+55 -4
View File
@@ -61,9 +61,45 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_err.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "../bytestring/internal.h"
#define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
// This function is in dsa_asn1.c rather than dsa.c because it is reachable from
// |EVP_PKEY| parsers. This makes it easier for the static linker to drop most
// of the DSA implementation.
int dsa_check_parameters(const DSA *dsa) {
if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
// Reject invalid parameters. In particular, signing will infinite loop if |g|
// is zero.
if (BN_is_zero(dsa->p) || BN_is_zero(dsa->q) || BN_is_zero(dsa->g)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
// FIPS 186-4 allows only three different sizes for q.
unsigned q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
if (q_bits != 160 && q_bits != 224 && q_bits != 256) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
return 0;
}
// Bound |dsa->p| to avoid a DoS vector. Note this limit is much larger than
// the one in FIPS 186-4, which only allows L = 1024, 2048, and 3072.
if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int parse_integer(CBS *cbs, BIGNUM **out) {
assert(*out == NULL);
*out = BN_new();
@@ -124,10 +160,16 @@ DSA *DSA_parse_public_key(CBS *cbs) {
!parse_integer(&child, &ret->g) ||
CBS_len(&child) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR);
DSA_free(ret);
return NULL;
goto err;
}
if (!dsa_check_parameters(ret)) {
goto err;
}
return ret;
err:
DSA_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
int DSA_marshal_public_key(CBB *cbb, const DSA *dsa) {
@@ -156,10 +198,16 @@ DSA *DSA_parse_parameters(CBS *cbs) {
!parse_integer(&child, &ret->g) ||
CBS_len(&child) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR);
DSA_free(ret);
return NULL;
goto err;
}
if (!dsa_check_parameters(ret)) {
goto err;
}
return ret;
err:
DSA_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
int DSA_marshal_parameters(CBB *cbb, const DSA *dsa) {
@@ -203,6 +251,9 @@ DSA *DSA_parse_private_key(CBS *cbs) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!dsa_check_parameters(ret)) {
goto err;
}
return ret;
err:
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2020, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_DSA_INTERNAL_H
#define OPENSSL_HEADER_DSA_INTERNAL_H
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_dsa.h>
#if defined(__cplusplus)
extern "C" {
#endif
// dsa_check_parameters checks that |dsa|'s group is within DoS bounds. It
// returns one on success and zero on error.
int dsa_check_parameters(const DSA *dsa);
#if defined(__cplusplus)
} // extern C
#endif
#endif // OPENSSL_HEADER_DSA_INTERNAL_H
@@ -241,21 +241,6 @@ int EC_KEY_marshal_private_key(CBB *cbb, const EC_KEY *key,
return 1;
}
// is_unsigned_integer returns one if |cbs| is a valid unsigned DER INTEGER and
// zero otherwise.
static int is_unsigned_integer(const CBS *cbs) {
if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t byte = CBS_data(cbs)[0];
if ((byte & 0x80) ||
(byte == 0 && CBS_len(cbs) > 1 && (CBS_data(cbs)[1] & 0x80) == 0)) {
// Negative or not minimally-encoded.
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
// kPrimeFieldOID is the encoding of 1.2.840.10045.1.1.
static const uint8_t kPrimeField[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x01, 0x01};
@@ -276,7 +261,7 @@ static int parse_explicit_prime_curve(CBS *in, CBS *out_prime, CBS *out_a,
OPENSSL_memcmp(CBS_data(&field_type), kPrimeField, sizeof(kPrimeField)) !=
0 ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&field_id, out_prime, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
!is_unsigned_integer(out_prime) ||
!CBS_is_unsigned_asn1_integer(out_prime) ||
CBS_len(&field_id) != 0 ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&params, &curve, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&curve, out_a, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
@@ -286,7 +271,7 @@ static int parse_explicit_prime_curve(CBS *in, CBS *out_prime, CBS *out_a,
CBS_len(&curve) != 0 ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&params, &base, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&params, out_order, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
!is_unsigned_integer(out_order) ||
!CBS_is_unsigned_asn1_integer(out_order) ||
!CBS_get_optional_asn1(&params, &cofactor, &has_cofactor,
CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
CBS_len(&params) != 0) {
@@ -50,12 +50,10 @@
// expand_message_xmd implements the operation described in section 5.3.1 of
// draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-07. It returns one on success and zero on
// allocation failure or if |out_len| was too large. If |is_draft06| is one, it
// implements the operation from draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-06 instead.
// allocation failure or if |out_len| was too large.
static int expand_message_xmd(const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
int is_draft06) {
const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len) {
int ret = 0;
const size_t block_size = EVP_MD_block_size(md);
const size_t md_size = EVP_MD_size(md);
@@ -88,9 +86,8 @@ static int expand_message_xmd(const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, kZeros, block_size) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, msg, msg_len) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, l_i_b_str_zero, sizeof(l_i_b_str_zero)) ||
(is_draft06 && !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &dst_len_u8, 1)) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, dst, dst_len) ||
(!is_draft06 && !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &dst_len_u8, 1)) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &dst_len_u8, 1) ||
!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, b_0, NULL)) {
goto err;
}
@@ -114,9 +111,8 @@ static int expand_message_xmd(const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md, NULL) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, b_i, md_size) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &i, 1) ||
(is_draft06 && !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &dst_len_u8, 1)) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, dst, dst_len) ||
(!is_draft06 && !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &dst_len_u8, 1)) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &dst_len_u8, 1) ||
!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, b_i, NULL)) {
goto err;
}
@@ -175,12 +171,11 @@ static void big_endian_to_words(BN_ULONG *out, size_t num_words,
static int hash_to_field2(const EC_GROUP *group, const EVP_MD *md,
EC_FELEM *out1, EC_FELEM *out2, const uint8_t *dst,
size_t dst_len, unsigned k, const uint8_t *msg,
size_t msg_len, int is_draft06) {
size_t msg_len) {
size_t L;
uint8_t buf[4 * EC_MAX_BYTES];
if (!num_bytes_to_derive(&L, &group->field, k) ||
!expand_message_xmd(md, buf, 2 * L, msg, msg_len, dst, dst_len,
is_draft06)) {
!expand_message_xmd(md, buf, 2 * L, msg, msg_len, dst, dst_len)) {
return 0;
}
BN_ULONG words[2 * EC_MAX_WORDS];
@@ -196,12 +191,11 @@ static int hash_to_field2(const EC_GROUP *group, const EVP_MD *md,
// group order rather than a field element. |k| is the security factor.
static int hash_to_scalar(const EC_GROUP *group, const EVP_MD *md,
EC_SCALAR *out, const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
unsigned k, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
int is_draft06) {
unsigned k, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
size_t L;
uint8_t buf[EC_MAX_BYTES * 2];
if (!num_bytes_to_derive(&L, &group->order, k) ||
!expand_message_xmd(md, buf, L, msg, msg_len, dst, dst_len, is_draft06)) {
!expand_message_xmd(md, buf, L, msg, msg_len, dst, dst_len)) {
return 0;
}
@@ -310,10 +304,9 @@ static int map_to_curve_simple_swu(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_FELEM *Z,
static int hash_to_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EVP_MD *md,
const EC_FELEM *Z, const EC_FELEM *c2, unsigned k,
EC_RAW_POINT *out, const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, int is_draft06) {
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
EC_FELEM u0, u1;
if (!hash_to_field2(group, md, &u0, &u1, dst, dst_len, k, msg, msg_len,
is_draft06)) {
if (!hash_to_field2(group, md, &u0, &u1, dst, dst_len, k, msg, msg_len)) {
return 0;
}
@@ -376,7 +369,7 @@ int ec_hash_to_curve_p384_xmd_sha512_sswu_draft07(
ec_felem_neg(group, &Z, &Z);
return hash_to_curve(group, EVP_sha512(), &Z, &c2, /*k=*/192, out, dst,
dst_len, msg, msg_len, /*is_draft06=*/0);
dst_len, msg, msg_len);
}
int ec_hash_to_scalar_p384_xmd_sha512_draft07(
@@ -388,38 +381,5 @@ int ec_hash_to_scalar_p384_xmd_sha512_draft07(
}
return hash_to_scalar(group, EVP_sha512(), out, dst, dst_len, /*k=*/192, msg,
msg_len, /*is_draft06=*/0);
}
int ec_hash_to_curve_p521_xmd_sha512_sswu_draft06(
const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *out, const uint8_t *dst,
size_t dst_len, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
// See section 8.3 of draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-06.
if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group) != NID_secp521r1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_GROUP_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
// Z = -4, c2 = 8.
EC_FELEM Z, c2;
if (!felem_from_u8(group, &Z, 4) ||
!felem_from_u8(group, &c2, 8)) {
return 0;
}
ec_felem_neg(group, &Z, &Z);
return hash_to_curve(group, EVP_sha512(), &Z, &c2, /*k=*/256, out, dst,
dst_len, msg, msg_len, /*is_draft06=*/1);
}
int ec_hash_to_scalar_p521_xmd_sha512_draft06(
const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out, const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group) != NID_secp521r1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_GROUP_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
return hash_to_scalar(group, EVP_sha512(), out, dst, dst_len, /*k=*/256, msg,
msg_len, /*is_draft06=*/1);
msg_len);
}
@@ -48,28 +48,6 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int ec_hash_to_scalar_p384_xmd_sha512_draft07(
const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out, const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len);
// ec_hash_to_curve_p521_xmd_sha512_sswu_draft06 hashes |msg| to a point on
// |group| and writes the result to |out|, implementing the
// P521_XMD:SHA-512_SSWU_RO_ suite from draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-06. It
// returns one on success and zero on error.
//
// This function implements an older version of the draft and should not be used
// in new code.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int ec_hash_to_curve_p521_xmd_sha512_sswu_draft06(
const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *out, const uint8_t *dst,
size_t dst_len, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len);
// ec_hash_to_scalar_p521_xmd_sha512_draft06 hashes |msg| to a scalar on |group|
// and writes the result to |out|, using the hash_to_field operation from the
// P521_XMD:SHA-512_SSWU_RO_ suite from draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-06, but
// generating a value modulo the group order rather than a field element.
//
// This function implements an older version of the draft and should not be used
// in new code.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int ec_hash_to_scalar_p521_xmd_sha512_draft06(
const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out, const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len);
#if defined(__cplusplus)
} // extern C
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
@@ -76,6 +76,10 @@
// TODO(davidben): Fix Node to not touch the error queue itself and remove this.
OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(EVP, NOT_XOF_OR_INVALID_LENGTH)
// The HPKE module uses the EVP error namespace, but it lives in another
// directory.
OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(EVP, EMPTY_PSK)
EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new(void) {
EVP_PKEY *ret;
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_rsa.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "../bytestring/internal.h"
#include "../internal.h"
@@ -386,3 +387,161 @@ err:
EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY **out, const uint8_t **inp, long len) {
if (len < 0) {
return NULL;
}
CBS cbs;
CBS_init(&cbs, *inp, (size_t)len);
EVP_PKEY *ret = EVP_parse_public_key(&cbs);
if (ret == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (out != NULL) {
EVP_PKEY_free(*out);
*out = ret;
}
*inp = CBS_data(&cbs);
return ret;
}
int i2d_PUBKEY(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, uint8_t **outp) {
if (pkey == NULL) {
return 0;
}
CBB cbb;
if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 128) ||
!EVP_marshal_public_key(&cbb, pkey)) {
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return -1;
}
return CBB_finish_i2d(&cbb, outp);
}
RSA *d2i_RSA_PUBKEY(RSA **out, const uint8_t **inp, long len) {
if (len < 0) {
return NULL;
}
CBS cbs;
CBS_init(&cbs, *inp, (size_t)len);
EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_parse_public_key(&cbs);
if (pkey == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (rsa == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (out != NULL) {
RSA_free(*out);
*out = rsa;
}
*inp = CBS_data(&cbs);
return rsa;
}
int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY(const RSA *rsa, uint8_t **outp) {
if (rsa == NULL) {
return 0;
}
int ret = -1;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (pkey == NULL ||
!EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, (RSA *)rsa)) {
goto err;
}
ret = i2d_PUBKEY(pkey, outp);
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return ret;
}
DSA *d2i_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA **out, const uint8_t **inp, long len) {
if (len < 0) {
return NULL;
}
CBS cbs;
CBS_init(&cbs, *inp, (size_t)len);
EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_parse_public_key(&cbs);
if (pkey == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
DSA *dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (dsa == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (out != NULL) {
DSA_free(*out);
*out = dsa;
}
*inp = CBS_data(&cbs);
return dsa;
}
int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY(const DSA *dsa, uint8_t **outp) {
if (dsa == NULL) {
return 0;
}
int ret = -1;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (pkey == NULL ||
!EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, (DSA *)dsa)) {
goto err;
}
ret = i2d_PUBKEY(pkey, outp);
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return ret;
}
EC_KEY *d2i_EC_PUBKEY(EC_KEY **out, const uint8_t **inp, long len) {
if (len < 0) {
return NULL;
}
CBS cbs;
CBS_init(&cbs, *inp, (size_t)len);
EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_parse_public_key(&cbs);
if (pkey == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (ec_key == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (out != NULL) {
EC_KEY_free(*out);
*out = ec_key;
}
*inp = CBS_data(&cbs);
return ec_key;
}
int i2d_EC_PUBKEY(const EC_KEY *ec_key, uint8_t **outp) {
if (ec_key == NULL) {
return 0;
}
int ret = -1;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (pkey == NULL ||
!EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, (EC_KEY *)ec_key)) {
goto err;
}
ret = i2d_PUBKEY(pkey, outp);
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return ret;
}
@@ -141,9 +141,13 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *out, CBS *params, CBS *key) {
goto err;
}
// Decode the key.
// Decode the key. To avoid DoS attacks when importing private keys, we bound
// |dsa->priv_key| against |dsa->q|, which itself bound by
// |DSA_parse_parameters|. (We cannot call |BN_num_bits| on |dsa->priv_key|.
// That would leak a secret bit width.)
if (!BN_parse_asn1_unsigned(key, dsa->priv_key) ||
CBS_len(key) != 0) {
CBS_len(key) != 0 ||
BN_cmp(dsa->priv_key, dsa->q) >= 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
@@ -250,6 +250,7 @@ Ldec_key_abort:
#endif
.align 5
_aes_hw_encrypt:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ldr r3,[r2,#240]
vld1.32 {q0},[r2]!
vld1.8 {q2},[r0]
@@ -282,6 +283,7 @@ Loop_enc:
#endif
.align 5
_aes_hw_decrypt:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ldr r3,[r2,#240]
vld1.32 {q0},[r2]!
vld1.8 {q2},[r0]
@@ -245,6 +245,7 @@ aes_hw_set_decrypt_key:
.type aes_hw_encrypt,%function
.align 5
aes_hw_encrypt:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ldr r3,[r2,#240]
vld1.32 {q0},[r2]!
vld1.8 {q2},[r0]
@@ -275,6 +276,7 @@ aes_hw_encrypt:
.type aes_hw_decrypt,%function
.align 5
aes_hw_decrypt:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ldr r3,[r2,#240]
vld1.32 {q0},[r2]!
vld1.8 {q2},[r0]
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ Lrcon:
.align 5
_aes_hw_set_encrypt_key:
Lenc_key:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
mov x3,#-1
@@ -202,6 +204,7 @@ Lenc_key_abort:
.align 5
_aes_hw_set_decrypt_key:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
bl Lenc_key
@@ -235,6 +238,7 @@ Loop_imc:
eor x0,x0,x0 // return value
Ldec_key_abort:
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.globl _aes_hw_encrypt
@@ -242,6 +246,7 @@ Ldec_key_abort:
.align 5
_aes_hw_encrypt:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ldr w3,[x2,#240]
ld1 {v0.4s},[x2],#16
ld1 {v2.16b},[x0]
@@ -272,6 +277,7 @@ Loop_enc:
.align 5
_aes_hw_decrypt:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ldr w3,[x2,#240]
ld1 {v0.4s},[x2],#16
ld1 {v2.16b},[x0]
@@ -302,6 +308,8 @@ Loop_dec:
.align 5
_aes_hw_cbc_encrypt:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
subs x2,x2,#16
@@ -593,6 +601,8 @@ Lcbc_abort:
.align 5
_aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
ldr w5,[x3,#240]
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@
.align 5
aes_hw_set_encrypt_key:
.Lenc_key:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
mov x3,#-1
@@ -203,6 +205,7 @@ aes_hw_set_encrypt_key:
.type aes_hw_set_decrypt_key,%function
.align 5
aes_hw_set_decrypt_key:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
bl .Lenc_key
@@ -236,6 +239,7 @@ aes_hw_set_decrypt_key:
eor x0,x0,x0 // return value
.Ldec_key_abort:
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size aes_hw_set_decrypt_key,.-aes_hw_set_decrypt_key
.globl aes_hw_encrypt
@@ -243,6 +247,7 @@ aes_hw_set_decrypt_key:
.type aes_hw_encrypt,%function
.align 5
aes_hw_encrypt:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ldr w3,[x2,#240]
ld1 {v0.4s},[x2],#16
ld1 {v2.16b},[x0]
@@ -273,6 +278,7 @@ aes_hw_encrypt:
.type aes_hw_decrypt,%function
.align 5
aes_hw_decrypt:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ldr w3,[x2,#240]
ld1 {v0.4s},[x2],#16
ld1 {v2.16b},[x0]
@@ -303,6 +309,8 @@ aes_hw_decrypt:
.type aes_hw_cbc_encrypt,%function
.align 5
aes_hw_cbc_encrypt:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
subs x2,x2,#16
@@ -594,6 +602,8 @@ aes_hw_cbc_encrypt:
.type aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,%function
.align 5
aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
ldr w5,[x3,#240]
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
#if defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h>
#endif
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_arm_arch.h>
.text
.globl _bn_mul_mont
@@ -21,6 +23,7 @@
.align 5
_bn_mul_mont:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
tst x5,#7
b.eq __bn_sqr8x_mont
tst x5,#3
@@ -218,11 +221,14 @@ Lcond_copy:
mov x0,#1
ldp x23,x24,[x29,#48]
ldr x29,[sp],#64
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.align 5
__bn_sqr8x_mont:
// Not adding AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER here because __bn_sqr8x_mont is jumped to
// only from bn_mul_mont which has already signed the return address.
cmp x1,x2
b.ne __bn_mul4x_mont
Lsqr8x_mont:
@@ -976,11 +982,16 @@ Lsqr8x_done:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldr x29,[sp],#128
// x30 is popped earlier
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.align 5
__bn_mul4x_mont:
// Not adding AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER here because __bn_mul4x_mont is jumped to
// only from bn_mul_mont or __bn_mul8x_mont which have already signed the
// return address.
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-128]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp x19,x20,[sp,#16]
@@ -1414,6 +1425,8 @@ Lmul4x_done:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldr x29,[sp],#128
// x30 is popped earlier
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.byte 77,111,110,116,103,111,109,101,114,121,32,77,117,108,116,105,112,108,105,99,97,116,105,111,110,32,102,111,114,32,65,82,77,118,56,44,32,67,82,89,80,84,79,71,65,77,83,32,98,121,32,60,97,112,112,114,111,64,111,112,101,110,115,115,108,46,111,114,103,62,0
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
#if defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h>
#endif
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_arm_arch.h>
.text
.globl bn_mul_mont
@@ -22,6 +24,7 @@
.type bn_mul_mont,%function
.align 5
bn_mul_mont:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
tst x5,#7
b.eq __bn_sqr8x_mont
tst x5,#3
@@ -219,11 +222,14 @@ bn_mul_mont:
mov x0,#1
ldp x23,x24,[x29,#48]
ldr x29,[sp],#64
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size bn_mul_mont,.-bn_mul_mont
.type __bn_sqr8x_mont,%function
.align 5
__bn_sqr8x_mont:
// Not adding AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER here because __bn_sqr8x_mont is jumped to
// only from bn_mul_mont which has already signed the return address.
cmp x1,x2
b.ne __bn_mul4x_mont
.Lsqr8x_mont:
@@ -977,11 +983,16 @@ __bn_sqr8x_mont:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldr x29,[sp],#128
// x30 is popped earlier
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size __bn_sqr8x_mont,.-__bn_sqr8x_mont
.type __bn_mul4x_mont,%function
.align 5
__bn_mul4x_mont:
// Not adding AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER here because __bn_mul4x_mont is jumped to
// only from bn_mul_mont or __bn_mul8x_mont which have already signed the
// return address.
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-128]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp x19,x20,[sp,#16]
@@ -1415,6 +1426,8 @@ __bn_mul4x_mont:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldr x29,[sp],#128
// x30 is popped earlier
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size __bn_mul4x_mont,.-__bn_mul4x_mont
.byte 77,111,110,116,103,111,109,101,114,121,32,77,117,108,116,105,112,108,105,99,97,116,105,111,110,32,102,111,114,32,65,82,77,118,56,44,32,67,82,89,80,84,79,71,65,77,83,32,98,121,32,60,97,112,112,114,111,64,111,112,101,110,115,115,108,46,111,114,103,62,0
@@ -0,0 +1,852 @@
#define BORINGSSL_PREFIX CCryptoBoringSSL
#if defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
# This file is generated from a similarly-named Perl script in the BoringSSL
# source tree. Do not edit by hand.
#if defined(__i386__)
#if defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h>
#endif
.text
.globl _bn_mul_add_words
.hidden _bn_mul_add_words
.def _bn_mul_add_words; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_bn_mul_add_words:
.L_bn_mul_add_words_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
xorl %esi,%esi
movl 20(%esp),%edi
movl 28(%esp),%ecx
movl 24(%esp),%ebx
andl $4294967288,%ecx
movl 32(%esp),%ebp
pushl %ecx
jz .L000maw_finish
.align 16
.L001maw_loop:
# Round 0
movl (%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl (%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 4
movl 4(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 4(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,4(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 8
movl 8(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 8(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,8(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 12
movl 12(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 12(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,12(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 16
movl 16(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 16(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,16(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 20
movl 20(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 20(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,20(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 24
movl 24(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 24(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,24(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 28
movl 28(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 28(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,28(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
subl $8,%ecx
leal 32(%ebx),%ebx
leal 32(%edi),%edi
jnz .L001maw_loop
.L000maw_finish:
movl 32(%esp),%ecx
andl $7,%ecx
jnz .L002maw_finish2
jmp .L003maw_end
.L002maw_finish2:
# Tail Round 0
movl (%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl (%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
decl %ecx
movl %eax,(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
jz .L003maw_end
# Tail Round 1
movl 4(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 4(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
decl %ecx
movl %eax,4(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
jz .L003maw_end
# Tail Round 2
movl 8(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 8(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
decl %ecx
movl %eax,8(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
jz .L003maw_end
# Tail Round 3
movl 12(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 12(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
decl %ecx
movl %eax,12(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
jz .L003maw_end
# Tail Round 4
movl 16(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 16(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
decl %ecx
movl %eax,16(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
jz .L003maw_end
# Tail Round 5
movl 20(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 20(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
decl %ecx
movl %eax,20(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
jz .L003maw_end
# Tail Round 6
movl 24(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 24(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,24(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
.L003maw_end:
movl %esi,%eax
popl %ecx
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.globl _bn_mul_words
.hidden _bn_mul_words
.def _bn_mul_words; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_bn_mul_words:
.L_bn_mul_words_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
xorl %esi,%esi
movl 20(%esp),%edi
movl 24(%esp),%ebx
movl 28(%esp),%ebp
movl 32(%esp),%ecx
andl $4294967288,%ebp
jz .L004mw_finish
.L005mw_loop:
# Round 0
movl (%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 4
movl 4(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,4(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 8
movl 8(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,8(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 12
movl 12(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,12(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 16
movl 16(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,16(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 20
movl 20(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,20(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 24
movl 24(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,24(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 28
movl 28(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,28(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
addl $32,%ebx
addl $32,%edi
subl $8,%ebp
jz .L004mw_finish
jmp .L005mw_loop
.L004mw_finish:
movl 28(%esp),%ebp
andl $7,%ebp
jnz .L006mw_finish2
jmp .L007mw_end
.L006mw_finish2:
# Tail Round 0
movl (%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
decl %ebp
jz .L007mw_end
# Tail Round 1
movl 4(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,4(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
decl %ebp
jz .L007mw_end
# Tail Round 2
movl 8(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,8(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
decl %ebp
jz .L007mw_end
# Tail Round 3
movl 12(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,12(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
decl %ebp
jz .L007mw_end
# Tail Round 4
movl 16(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,16(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
decl %ebp
jz .L007mw_end
# Tail Round 5
movl 20(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,20(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
decl %ebp
jz .L007mw_end
# Tail Round 6
movl 24(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,24(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
.L007mw_end:
movl %esi,%eax
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.globl _bn_sqr_words
.hidden _bn_sqr_words
.def _bn_sqr_words; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_bn_sqr_words:
.L_bn_sqr_words_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
movl 20(%esp),%esi
movl 24(%esp),%edi
movl 28(%esp),%ebx
andl $4294967288,%ebx
jz .L008sw_finish
.L009sw_loop:
# Round 0
movl (%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,(%esi)
movl %edx,4(%esi)
# Round 4
movl 4(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,8(%esi)
movl %edx,12(%esi)
# Round 8
movl 8(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,16(%esi)
movl %edx,20(%esi)
# Round 12
movl 12(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,24(%esi)
movl %edx,28(%esi)
# Round 16
movl 16(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,32(%esi)
movl %edx,36(%esi)
# Round 20
movl 20(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,40(%esi)
movl %edx,44(%esi)
# Round 24
movl 24(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,48(%esi)
movl %edx,52(%esi)
# Round 28
movl 28(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,56(%esi)
movl %edx,60(%esi)
addl $32,%edi
addl $64,%esi
subl $8,%ebx
jnz .L009sw_loop
.L008sw_finish:
movl 28(%esp),%ebx
andl $7,%ebx
jz .L010sw_end
# Tail Round 0
movl (%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,(%esi)
decl %ebx
movl %edx,4(%esi)
jz .L010sw_end
# Tail Round 1
movl 4(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,8(%esi)
decl %ebx
movl %edx,12(%esi)
jz .L010sw_end
# Tail Round 2
movl 8(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,16(%esi)
decl %ebx
movl %edx,20(%esi)
jz .L010sw_end
# Tail Round 3
movl 12(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,24(%esi)
decl %ebx
movl %edx,28(%esi)
jz .L010sw_end
# Tail Round 4
movl 16(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,32(%esi)
decl %ebx
movl %edx,36(%esi)
jz .L010sw_end
# Tail Round 5
movl 20(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,40(%esi)
decl %ebx
movl %edx,44(%esi)
jz .L010sw_end
# Tail Round 6
movl 24(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,48(%esi)
movl %edx,52(%esi)
.L010sw_end:
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.globl _bn_div_words
.hidden _bn_div_words
.def _bn_div_words; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_bn_div_words:
.L_bn_div_words_begin:
movl 4(%esp),%edx
movl 8(%esp),%eax
movl 12(%esp),%ecx
divl %ecx
ret
.globl _bn_add_words
.hidden _bn_add_words
.def _bn_add_words; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_bn_add_words:
.L_bn_add_words_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
movl 20(%esp),%ebx
movl 24(%esp),%esi
movl 28(%esp),%edi
movl 32(%esp),%ebp
xorl %eax,%eax
andl $4294967288,%ebp
jz .L011aw_finish
.L012aw_loop:
# Round 0
movl (%esi),%ecx
movl (%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,(%ebx)
# Round 1
movl 4(%esi),%ecx
movl 4(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,4(%ebx)
# Round 2
movl 8(%esi),%ecx
movl 8(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,8(%ebx)
# Round 3
movl 12(%esi),%ecx
movl 12(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,12(%ebx)
# Round 4
movl 16(%esi),%ecx
movl 16(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,16(%ebx)
# Round 5
movl 20(%esi),%ecx
movl 20(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,20(%ebx)
# Round 6
movl 24(%esi),%ecx
movl 24(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,24(%ebx)
# Round 7
movl 28(%esi),%ecx
movl 28(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,28(%ebx)
addl $32,%esi
addl $32,%edi
addl $32,%ebx
subl $8,%ebp
jnz .L012aw_loop
.L011aw_finish:
movl 32(%esp),%ebp
andl $7,%ebp
jz .L013aw_end
# Tail Round 0
movl (%esi),%ecx
movl (%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,(%ebx)
jz .L013aw_end
# Tail Round 1
movl 4(%esi),%ecx
movl 4(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,4(%ebx)
jz .L013aw_end
# Tail Round 2
movl 8(%esi),%ecx
movl 8(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,8(%ebx)
jz .L013aw_end
# Tail Round 3
movl 12(%esi),%ecx
movl 12(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,12(%ebx)
jz .L013aw_end
# Tail Round 4
movl 16(%esi),%ecx
movl 16(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,16(%ebx)
jz .L013aw_end
# Tail Round 5
movl 20(%esi),%ecx
movl 20(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,20(%ebx)
jz .L013aw_end
# Tail Round 6
movl 24(%esi),%ecx
movl 24(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,24(%ebx)
.L013aw_end:
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.globl _bn_sub_words
.hidden _bn_sub_words
.def _bn_sub_words; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_bn_sub_words:
.L_bn_sub_words_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
movl 20(%esp),%ebx
movl 24(%esp),%esi
movl 28(%esp),%edi
movl 32(%esp),%ebp
xorl %eax,%eax
andl $4294967288,%ebp
jz .L014aw_finish
.L015aw_loop:
# Round 0
movl (%esi),%ecx
movl (%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,(%ebx)
# Round 1
movl 4(%esi),%ecx
movl 4(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,4(%ebx)
# Round 2
movl 8(%esi),%ecx
movl 8(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,8(%ebx)
# Round 3
movl 12(%esi),%ecx
movl 12(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,12(%ebx)
# Round 4
movl 16(%esi),%ecx
movl 16(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,16(%ebx)
# Round 5
movl 20(%esi),%ecx
movl 20(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,20(%ebx)
# Round 6
movl 24(%esi),%ecx
movl 24(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,24(%ebx)
# Round 7
movl 28(%esi),%ecx
movl 28(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,28(%ebx)
addl $32,%esi
addl $32,%edi
addl $32,%ebx
subl $8,%ebp
jnz .L015aw_loop
.L014aw_finish:
movl 32(%esp),%ebp
andl $7,%ebp
jz .L016aw_end
# Tail Round 0
movl (%esi),%ecx
movl (%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,(%ebx)
jz .L016aw_end
# Tail Round 1
movl 4(%esi),%ecx
movl 4(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,4(%ebx)
jz .L016aw_end
# Tail Round 2
movl 8(%esi),%ecx
movl 8(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,8(%ebx)
jz .L016aw_end
# Tail Round 3
movl 12(%esi),%ecx
movl 12(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,12(%ebx)
jz .L016aw_end
# Tail Round 4
movl 16(%esi),%ecx
movl 16(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,16(%ebx)
jz .L016aw_end
# Tail Round 5
movl 20(%esi),%ecx
movl 20(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,20(%ebx)
jz .L016aw_end
# Tail Round 6
movl 24(%esi),%ecx
movl 24(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,24(%ebx)
.L016aw_end:
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
#endif
#endif // defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__ELF__)
.section .note.GNU-stack,"",%progbits
#endif
@@ -404,9 +404,19 @@ uint64_t bn_mont_n0(const BIGNUM *n);
int bn_mod_exp_base_2_consttime(BIGNUM *r, unsigned p, const BIGNUM *n,
BN_CTX *ctx);
#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && defined(_MSC_VER)
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
#define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low, high, a, b) ((low) = _umul128((a), (b), &(high)))
#elif defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)
#define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low, high, a, b) \
do { \
const BN_ULONG _a = (a); \
const BN_ULONG _b = (b); \
(low) = _a * _b; \
(high) = __umulh(_a, _b); \
} while (0)
#endif
#endif // _MSC_VER
#if !defined(BN_ULLONG) && !defined(BN_UMULT_LOHI)
#error "Either BN_ULLONG or BN_UMULT_LOHI must be defined on every platform."
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@
OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(push))
OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(disable: 4702)) // Unreachable code.
#define AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH 12
#if defined(BSAES)
static void vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks_with_bsaes(const uint8_t *in,
uint8_t *out, size_t blocks,
@@ -630,7 +632,7 @@ DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_128_gcm_generic) {
out->nid = NID_aes_128_gcm;
out->block_size = 1;
out->key_len = 16;
out->iv_len = 12;
out->iv_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) + EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING;
out->flags = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY |
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT |
@@ -698,7 +700,7 @@ DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_192_gcm_generic) {
out->nid = NID_aes_192_gcm;
out->block_size = 1;
out->key_len = 24;
out->iv_len = 12;
out->iv_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) + EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING;
out->flags = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY |
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT |
@@ -766,7 +768,7 @@ DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_256_gcm_generic) {
out->nid = NID_aes_256_gcm;
out->block_size = 1;
out->key_len = 32;
out->iv_len = 12;
out->iv_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) + EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING;
out->flags = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY |
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT |
@@ -931,21 +933,19 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
static void aead_aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {}
static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len,
size_t max_out_tag_len,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *extra_in,
size_t extra_in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *) &ctx->state;
if (extra_in_len + ctx->tag_len < ctx->tag_len) {
static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_impl(
const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx,
uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *extra_in, size_t extra_in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len,
size_t tag_len) {
if (extra_in_len + tag_len < tag_len) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
if (max_out_tag_len < extra_in_len + ctx->tag_len) {
if (max_out_tag_len < extra_in_len + tag_len) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
@@ -989,18 +989,35 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
}
}
CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, out_tag + extra_in_len, ctx->tag_len);
*out_tag_len = ctx->tag_len + extra_in_len;
CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, out_tag + extra_in_len, tag_len);
*out_tag_len = tag_len + extra_in_len;
return 1;
}
static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *) &ctx->state;
static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len,
size_t max_out_tag_len,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *extra_in,
size_t extra_in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx =
(const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
return aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_impl(
gcm_ctx, out, out_tag, out_tag_len, max_out_tag_len, nonce, nonce_len, in,
in_len, extra_in, extra_in_len, ad, ad_len, ctx->tag_len);
}
static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_impl(const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx,
uint8_t *out,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *in_tag,
size_t in_tag_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len,
size_t tag_len) {
uint8_t tag[EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN];
if (nonce_len == 0) {
@@ -1008,7 +1025,7 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
return 0;
}
if (in_tag_len != ctx->tag_len) {
if (in_tag_len != tag_len) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return 0;
}
@@ -1035,8 +1052,8 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
}
}
CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, tag, ctx->tag_len);
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in_tag, ctx->tag_len) != 0) {
CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, tag, tag_len);
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in_tag, tag_len) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return 0;
}
@@ -1044,11 +1061,22 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
return 1;
}
static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
return aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_impl(gcm_ctx, out, nonce, nonce_len, in,
in_len, in_tag, in_tag_len, ad, ad_len,
ctx->tag_len);
}
DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
out->key_len = 16;
out->nonce_len = 12;
out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1063,7 +1091,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_192_gcm) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
out->key_len = 24;
out->nonce_len = 12;
out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1078,7 +1106,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
out->key_len = 32;
out->nonce_len = 12;
out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1089,6 +1117,116 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm) {
out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather;
}
static int aead_aes_gcm_init_randnonce(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
size_t key_len,
size_t requested_tag_len) {
if (requested_tag_len != EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH) {
if (requested_tag_len < AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
requested_tag_len -= AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
}
if (!aead_aes_gcm_init(ctx, key, key_len, requested_tag_len)) {
return 0;
}
ctx->tag_len += AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
return 1;
}
static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_randnonce(
const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len,
const uint8_t *external_nonce, size_t external_nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *extra_in, size_t extra_in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
if (external_nonce_len != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
uint8_t nonce[AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH];
if (max_out_tag_len < sizeof(nonce)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
RAND_bytes(nonce, sizeof(nonce));
const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx =
(const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
if (!aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_impl(gcm_ctx, out, out_tag, out_tag_len,
max_out_tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH,
nonce, sizeof(nonce), in, in_len,
extra_in, extra_in_len, ad, ad_len,
ctx->tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH)) {
return 0;
}
assert(*out_tag_len + sizeof(nonce) <= max_out_tag_len);
memcpy(out_tag + *out_tag_len, nonce, sizeof(nonce));
*out_tag_len += sizeof(nonce);
return 1;
}
static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_randnonce(
const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
const uint8_t *external_nonce, size_t external_nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
if (external_nonce_len != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
if (in_tag_len < AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return 0;
}
const uint8_t *nonce = in_tag + in_tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx =
(const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
return aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_impl(
gcm_ctx, out, nonce, AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH, in, in_len, in_tag,
in_tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH, ad, ad_len,
ctx->tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH);
}
DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_randnonce) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
out->key_len = 16;
out->nonce_len = 0;
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
out->init = aead_aes_gcm_init_randnonce;
out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup;
out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_randnonce;
out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_randnonce;
}
DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_randnonce) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
out->key_len = 32;
out->nonce_len = 0;
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
out->init = aead_aes_gcm_init_randnonce;
out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup;
out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_randnonce;
out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_randnonce;
}
struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx {
struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx gcm_ctx;
uint64_t min_next_nonce;
@@ -1128,7 +1266,7 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_tls12_seal_scatter(
struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx *gcm_ctx =
(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx *) &ctx->state;
if (nonce_len != 12) {
if (nonce_len != AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
@@ -1155,7 +1293,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_tls12) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
out->key_len = 16;
out->nonce_len = 12;
out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1170,7 +1308,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_tls12) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
out->key_len = 32;
out->nonce_len = 12;
out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1223,7 +1361,7 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_tls13_seal_scatter(
struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx *gcm_ctx =
(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx *) &ctx->state;
if (nonce_len != 12) {
if (nonce_len != AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
@@ -1261,7 +1399,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_tls13) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
out->key_len = 16;
out->nonce_len = 12;
out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1276,7 +1414,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_tls13) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
out->key_len = 32;
out->nonce_len = 12;
out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
@@ -122,6 +122,8 @@ int EVP_DigestFinalXOF(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t len) {
uint32_t EVP_MD_meth_get_flags(const EVP_MD *md) { return EVP_MD_flags(md); }
void EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int flags) {}
int EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in) {
// |in->digest| may be NULL if this is a signing |EVP_MD_CTX| for, e.g.,
// Ed25519 which does not hash with |EVP_MD_CTX|.
@@ -703,7 +703,8 @@ void ec_GFp_mont_felem_to_bytes(const EC_GROUP *group, uint8_t *out,
int ec_GFp_mont_felem_from_bytes(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_FELEM *out,
const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
void ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(uint8_t *sign, uint8_t *digit, uint8_t in);
void ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(crypto_word_t *sign, crypto_word_t *digit,
crypto_word_t in);
const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp224_method(void);
const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp256_method(void);
@@ -866,7 +866,7 @@ static void p224_select_point(const uint64_t idx, size_t size,
}
// p224_get_bit returns the |i|th bit in |in|
static char p224_get_bit(const p224_felem_bytearray in, size_t i) {
static crypto_word_t p224_get_bit(const p224_felem_bytearray in, size_t i) {
if (i >= 224) {
return 0;
}
@@ -977,13 +977,13 @@ static void ec_GFp_nistp224_point_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
// Add every 5 doublings.
if (i % 5 == 0) {
uint64_t bits = p224_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 4) << 5;
crypto_word_t bits = p224_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 4) << 5;
bits |= p224_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 3) << 4;
bits |= p224_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 2) << 3;
bits |= p224_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 1) << 2;
bits |= p224_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i) << 1;
bits |= p224_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i - 1);
uint8_t sign, digit;
crypto_word_t sign, digit;
ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(&sign, &digit, bits);
// Select the point to add or subtract.
@@ -1022,7 +1022,7 @@ static void ec_GFp_nistp224_point_mul_base(const EC_GROUP *group,
}
// First, look 28 bits upwards.
uint64_t bits = p224_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 196) << 3;
crypto_word_t bits = p224_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 196) << 3;
bits |= p224_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 140) << 2;
bits |= p224_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 84) << 1;
bits |= p224_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 28);
@@ -1080,14 +1080,15 @@ static void ec_GFp_nistp224_point_mul_public(const EC_GROUP *group,
// Add multiples of the generator.
if (i <= 27) {
// First, look 28 bits upwards.
uint64_t bits = p224_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i + 196) << 3;
crypto_word_t bits = p224_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i + 196) << 3;
bits |= p224_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i + 140) << 2;
bits |= p224_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i + 84) << 1;
bits |= p224_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i + 28);
size_t index = (size_t)bits;
p224_point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], 1 /* mixed */,
g_p224_pre_comp[1][bits][0], g_p224_pre_comp[1][bits][1],
g_p224_pre_comp[1][bits][2]);
g_p224_pre_comp[1][index][0], g_p224_pre_comp[1][index][1],
g_p224_pre_comp[1][index][2]);
assert(!skip);
// Second, look at the current position.
@@ -1095,20 +1096,21 @@ static void ec_GFp_nistp224_point_mul_public(const EC_GROUP *group,
bits |= p224_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i + 112) << 2;
bits |= p224_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i + 56) << 1;
bits |= p224_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i);
index = (size_t)bits;
p224_point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], 1 /* mixed */,
g_p224_pre_comp[0][bits][0], g_p224_pre_comp[0][bits][1],
g_p224_pre_comp[0][bits][2]);
g_p224_pre_comp[0][index][0], g_p224_pre_comp[0][index][1],
g_p224_pre_comp[0][index][2]);
}
// Incorporate |p_scalar| every 5 doublings.
if (i % 5 == 0) {
uint64_t bits = p224_get_bit(p_scalar->bytes, i + 4) << 5;
crypto_word_t bits = p224_get_bit(p_scalar->bytes, i + 4) << 5;
bits |= p224_get_bit(p_scalar->bytes, i + 3) << 4;
bits |= p224_get_bit(p_scalar->bytes, i + 2) << 3;
bits |= p224_get_bit(p_scalar->bytes, i + 1) << 2;
bits |= p224_get_bit(p_scalar->bytes, i) << 1;
bits |= p224_get_bit(p_scalar->bytes, i - 1);
uint8_t sign, digit;
crypto_word_t sign, digit;
ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(&sign, &digit, bits);
// Select the point to add or subtract.
@@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ static const BN_ULONG ONE[P256_LIMBS] = {
// Recode window to a signed digit, see |ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits| in
// util.c for details
static unsigned booth_recode_w5(unsigned in) {
unsigned s, d;
static crypto_word_t booth_recode_w5(crypto_word_t in) {
crypto_word_t s, d;
s = ~((in >> 5) - 1);
d = (1 << 6) - in - 1;
@@ -63,8 +63,8 @@ static unsigned booth_recode_w5(unsigned in) {
return (d << 1) + (s & 1);
}
static unsigned booth_recode_w7(unsigned in) {
unsigned s, d;
static crypto_word_t booth_recode_w7(crypto_word_t in) {
crypto_word_t s, d;
s = ~((in >> 7) - 1);
d = (1 << 8) - in - 1;
@@ -196,8 +196,8 @@ static void ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, P256_POINT *r,
assert(p_scalar != NULL);
assert(group->field.width == P256_LIMBS);
static const unsigned kWindowSize = 5;
static const unsigned kMask = (1 << (5 /* kWindowSize */ + 1)) - 1;
static const size_t kWindowSize = 5;
static const crypto_word_t kMask = (1 << (5 /* kWindowSize */ + 1)) - 1;
// A |P256_POINT| is (3 * 32) = 96 bytes, and the 64-byte alignment should
// add no more than 63 bytes of overhead. Thus, |table| should require
@@ -234,17 +234,17 @@ static void ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, P256_POINT *r,
BN_ULONG tmp[P256_LIMBS];
alignas(32) P256_POINT h;
unsigned index = 255;
unsigned wvalue = p_str[(index - 1) / 8];
size_t index = 255;
crypto_word_t wvalue = p_str[(index - 1) / 8];
wvalue = (wvalue >> ((index - 1) % 8)) & kMask;
ecp_nistz256_select_w5(r, table, booth_recode_w5(wvalue) >> 1);
while (index >= 5) {
if (index != 255) {
unsigned off = (index - 1) / 8;
size_t off = (index - 1) / 8;
wvalue = p_str[off] | p_str[off + 1] << 8;
wvalue = (crypto_word_t)p_str[off] | (crypto_word_t)p_str[off + 1] << 8;
wvalue = (wvalue >> ((index - 1) % 8)) & kMask;
wvalue = booth_recode_w5(wvalue);
@@ -285,21 +285,22 @@ typedef union {
P256_POINT_AFFINE a;
} p256_point_union_t;
static unsigned calc_first_wvalue(unsigned *index, const uint8_t p_str[33]) {
static const unsigned kWindowSize = 7;
static const unsigned kMask = (1 << (7 /* kWindowSize */ + 1)) - 1;
static crypto_word_t calc_first_wvalue(size_t *index, const uint8_t p_str[33]) {
static const size_t kWindowSize = 7;
static const crypto_word_t kMask = (1 << (7 /* kWindowSize */ + 1)) - 1;
*index = kWindowSize;
unsigned wvalue = (p_str[0] << 1) & kMask;
crypto_word_t wvalue = (p_str[0] << 1) & kMask;
return booth_recode_w7(wvalue);
}
static unsigned calc_wvalue(unsigned *index, const uint8_t p_str[33]) {
static const unsigned kWindowSize = 7;
static const unsigned kMask = (1 << (7 /* kWindowSize */ + 1)) - 1;
static crypto_word_t calc_wvalue(size_t *index, const uint8_t p_str[33]) {
static const size_t kWindowSize = 7;
static const crypto_word_t kMask = (1 << (7 /* kWindowSize */ + 1)) - 1;
const unsigned off = (*index - 1) / 8;
unsigned wvalue = p_str[off] | p_str[off + 1] << 8;
const size_t off = (*index - 1) / 8;
crypto_word_t wvalue =
(crypto_word_t)p_str[off] | (crypto_word_t)p_str[off + 1] << 8;
wvalue = (wvalue >> ((*index - 1) % 8)) & kMask;
*index += kWindowSize;
@@ -327,8 +328,8 @@ static void ecp_nistz256_point_mul_base(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
p_str[32] = 0;
// First window
unsigned index = 0;
unsigned wvalue = calc_first_wvalue(&index, p_str);
size_t index = 0;
crypto_word_t wvalue = calc_first_wvalue(&index, p_str);
ecp_nistz256_select_w7(&p.a, ecp_nistz256_precomputed[0], wvalue >> 1);
ecp_nistz256_neg(p.p.Z, p.p.Y);
@@ -372,8 +373,8 @@ static void ecp_nistz256_points_mul_public(const EC_GROUP *group,
p_str[32] = 0;
// First window
unsigned index = 0;
unsigned wvalue = calc_first_wvalue(&index, p_str);
size_t index = 0;
size_t wvalue = calc_first_wvalue(&index, p_str);
// Convert |p| from affine to Jacobian coordinates. We set Z to zero if |p|
// is infinity and |ONE| otherwise. |p| was computed from the table, so it
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static fiat_p256_limb_t fiat_p256_nz(
static void fiat_p256_copy(fiat_p256_limb_t out[FIAT_P256_NLIMBS],
const fiat_p256_limb_t in1[FIAT_P256_NLIMBS]) {
for (int i = 0; i < FIAT_P256_NLIMBS; i++) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < FIAT_P256_NLIMBS; i++) {
out[i] = in1[i];
}
}
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ static void fiat_p256_select_point(const fiat_p256_limb_t idx, size_t size,
}
// fiat_p256_get_bit returns the |i|th bit in |in|
static char fiat_p256_get_bit(const uint8_t *in, int i) {
static crypto_word_t fiat_p256_get_bit(const uint8_t *in, int i) {
if (i < 0 || i >= 256) {
return 0;
}
@@ -498,20 +498,20 @@ static void ec_GFp_nistp256_point_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
// do other additions every 5 doublings
if (i % 5 == 0) {
uint64_t bits = fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 4) << 5;
crypto_word_t bits = fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 4) << 5;
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 3) << 4;
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 2) << 3;
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 1) << 2;
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i) << 1;
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i - 1);
uint8_t sign, digit;
crypto_word_t sign, digit;
ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(&sign, &digit, bits);
// select the point to add or subtract, in constant time.
fiat_p256_select_point(digit, 17, (const fiat_p256_felem(*)[3])p_pre_comp,
tmp);
fiat_p256_select_point((fiat_p256_limb_t)digit, 17,
(const fiat_p256_felem(*)[3])p_pre_comp, tmp);
fiat_p256_opp(ftmp, tmp[1]); // (X, -Y, Z) is the negative point.
fiat_p256_cmovznz(tmp[1], sign, tmp[1], ftmp);
fiat_p256_cmovznz(tmp[1], (fiat_p256_limb_t)sign, tmp[1], ftmp);
if (!skip) {
fiat_p256_point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2],
@@ -543,12 +543,13 @@ static void ec_GFp_nistp256_point_mul_base(const EC_GROUP *group,
}
// First, look 32 bits upwards.
uint64_t bits = fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 224) << 3;
crypto_word_t bits = fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 224) << 3;
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 160) << 2;
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 96) << 1;
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 32);
// Select the point to add, in constant time.
fiat_p256_select_point_affine(bits, 15, fiat_p256_g_pre_comp[1], tmp);
fiat_p256_select_point_affine((fiat_p256_limb_t)bits, 15,
fiat_p256_g_pre_comp[1], tmp);
if (!skip) {
fiat_p256_point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2],
@@ -566,7 +567,8 @@ static void ec_GFp_nistp256_point_mul_base(const EC_GROUP *group,
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i + 64) << 1;
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(scalar->bytes, i);
// Select the point to add, in constant time.
fiat_p256_select_point_affine(bits, 15, fiat_p256_g_pre_comp[0], tmp);
fiat_p256_select_point_affine((fiat_p256_limb_t)bits, 15,
fiat_p256_g_pre_comp[0], tmp);
fiat_p256_point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], 1 /* mixed */,
tmp[0], tmp[1], tmp[2]);
}
@@ -613,14 +615,15 @@ static void ec_GFp_nistp256_point_mul_public(const EC_GROUP *group,
// constant-time lookup.
if (i <= 31) {
// First, look 32 bits upwards.
uint64_t bits = fiat_p256_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i + 224) << 3;
crypto_word_t bits = fiat_p256_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i + 224) << 3;
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i + 160) << 2;
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i + 96) << 1;
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i + 32);
if (bits != 0) {
size_t index = (size_t)(bits - 1);
fiat_p256_point_add(ret[0], ret[1], ret[2], ret[0], ret[1], ret[2],
1 /* mixed */, fiat_p256_g_pre_comp[1][bits - 1][0],
fiat_p256_g_pre_comp[1][bits - 1][1],
1 /* mixed */, fiat_p256_g_pre_comp[1][index][0],
fiat_p256_g_pre_comp[1][index][1],
fiat_p256_one);
skip = 0;
}
@@ -631,9 +634,10 @@ static void ec_GFp_nistp256_point_mul_public(const EC_GROUP *group,
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i + 64) << 1;
bits |= fiat_p256_get_bit(g_scalar->bytes, i);
if (bits != 0) {
size_t index = (size_t)(bits - 1);
fiat_p256_point_add(ret[0], ret[1], ret[2], ret[0], ret[1], ret[2],
1 /* mixed */, fiat_p256_g_pre_comp[0][bits - 1][0],
fiat_p256_g_pre_comp[0][bits - 1][1],
1 /* mixed */, fiat_p256_g_pre_comp[0][index][0],
fiat_p256_g_pre_comp[0][index][1],
fiat_p256_one);
skip = 0;
}
@@ -642,7 +646,7 @@ static void ec_GFp_nistp256_point_mul_public(const EC_GROUP *group,
int digit = p_wNAF[i];
if (digit != 0) {
assert(digit & 1);
int idx = digit < 0 ? (-digit) >> 1 : digit >> 1;
size_t idx = (size_t)(digit < 0 ? (-digit) >> 1 : digit >> 1);
fiat_p256_felem *y = &p_pre_comp[idx][1], tmp;
if (digit < 0) {
fiat_p256_opp(tmp, p_pre_comp[idx][1]);
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static void ec_GFp_mont_batch_get_window(const EC_GROUP *group,
if (i > 0) {
window |= bn_is_bit_set_words(scalar->words, width, i - 1);
}
uint8_t sign, digit;
crypto_word_t sign, digit;
ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(&sign, &digit, window);
// Select the entry in constant-time.
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ static void ec_GFp_mont_batch_get_window(const EC_GROUP *group,
// Negate if necessary.
EC_FELEM neg_Y;
ec_felem_neg(group, &neg_Y, &out->Y);
BN_ULONG sign_mask = sign;
crypto_word_t sign_mask = sign;
sign_mask = 0u - sign_mask;
ec_felem_select(group, &out->Y, sign_mask, &neg_Y, &out->Y);
}
@@ -240,9 +240,9 @@
// P-384: ...01110011; w = 2, 5, 6, 7 are okay
// P-256: ...01010001; w = 5, 7 are okay
// P-224: ...00111101; w = 3, 4, 5, 6 are okay
void ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(uint8_t *sign, uint8_t *digit,
uint8_t in) {
uint8_t s, d;
void ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(crypto_word_t *sign, crypto_word_t *digit,
crypto_word_t in) {
crypto_word_t s, d;
s = ~((in >> 5) - 1); /* sets all bits to MSB(in), 'in' seen as
* 6-bit value */
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
#if defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h>
#endif
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_arm_arch.h>
.text
.globl _gcm_init_neon
@@ -21,6 +23,7 @@
.align 4
_gcm_init_neon:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
// This function is adapted from gcm_init_v8. xC2 is t3.
ld1 {v17.2d}, [x1] // load H
movi v19.16b, #0xe1
@@ -46,6 +49,7 @@ _gcm_init_neon:
.align 4
_gcm_gmult_neon:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ld1 {v3.16b}, [x0] // load Xi
ld1 {v5.1d}, [x1], #8 // load twisted H
ld1 {v6.1d}, [x1]
@@ -65,6 +69,7 @@ _gcm_gmult_neon:
.align 4
_gcm_ghash_neon:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ld1 {v0.16b}, [x0] // load Xi
ld1 {v5.1d}, [x1], #8 // load twisted H
ld1 {v6.1d}, [x1]
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
#if defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h>
#endif
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_arm_arch.h>
.text
.globl gcm_init_neon
@@ -22,6 +24,7 @@
.type gcm_init_neon,%function
.align 4
gcm_init_neon:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
// This function is adapted from gcm_init_v8. xC2 is t3.
ld1 {v17.2d}, [x1] // load H
movi v19.16b, #0xe1
@@ -47,6 +50,7 @@ gcm_init_neon:
.type gcm_gmult_neon,%function
.align 4
gcm_gmult_neon:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ld1 {v3.16b}, [x0] // load Xi
ld1 {v5.1d}, [x1], #8 // load twisted H
ld1 {v6.1d}, [x1]
@@ -66,6 +70,7 @@ gcm_gmult_neon:
.type gcm_ghash_neon,%function
.align 4
gcm_ghash_neon:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ld1 {v0.16b}, [x0] // load Xi
ld1 {v5.1d}, [x1], #8 // load twisted H
ld1 {v6.1d}, [x1]
@@ -0,0 +1,298 @@
#define BORINGSSL_PREFIX CCryptoBoringSSL
#if defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
# This file is generated from a similarly-named Perl script in the BoringSSL
# source tree. Do not edit by hand.
#if defined(__i386__)
#if defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h>
#endif
.text
.globl _gcm_gmult_ssse3
.hidden _gcm_gmult_ssse3
.def _gcm_gmult_ssse3; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_gcm_gmult_ssse3:
.L_gcm_gmult_ssse3_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
movl 20(%esp),%edi
movl 24(%esp),%esi
movdqu (%edi),%xmm0
call .L000pic_point
.L000pic_point:
popl %eax
movdqa .Lreverse_bytes-.L000pic_point(%eax),%xmm7
movdqa .Llow4_mask-.L000pic_point(%eax),%xmm2
.byte 102,15,56,0,199
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm1
pandn %xmm0,%xmm1
psrld $4,%xmm1
pand %xmm2,%xmm0
pxor %xmm2,%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm3
movl $5,%eax
.L001loop_row_1:
movdqa (%esi),%xmm4
leal 16(%esi),%esi
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm6
.byte 102,15,58,15,243,1
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm3
psrldq $1,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
.byte 102,15,56,0,224
.byte 102,15,56,0,233
pxor %xmm5,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
psllq $60,%xmm5
movdqa %xmm5,%xmm6
pslldq $8,%xmm6
pxor %xmm6,%xmm3
psrldq $8,%xmm5
pxor %xmm5,%xmm2
psrlq $4,%xmm4
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
subl $1,%eax
jnz .L001loop_row_1
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $1,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $1,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $5,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm3
movl $5,%eax
.L002loop_row_2:
movdqa (%esi),%xmm4
leal 16(%esi),%esi
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm6
.byte 102,15,58,15,243,1
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm3
psrldq $1,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
.byte 102,15,56,0,224
.byte 102,15,56,0,233
pxor %xmm5,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
psllq $60,%xmm5
movdqa %xmm5,%xmm6
pslldq $8,%xmm6
pxor %xmm6,%xmm3
psrldq $8,%xmm5
pxor %xmm5,%xmm2
psrlq $4,%xmm4
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
subl $1,%eax
jnz .L002loop_row_2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $1,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $1,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $5,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm3
movl $6,%eax
.L003loop_row_3:
movdqa (%esi),%xmm4
leal 16(%esi),%esi
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm6
.byte 102,15,58,15,243,1
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm3
psrldq $1,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
.byte 102,15,56,0,224
.byte 102,15,56,0,233
pxor %xmm5,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
psllq $60,%xmm5
movdqa %xmm5,%xmm6
pslldq $8,%xmm6
pxor %xmm6,%xmm3
psrldq $8,%xmm5
pxor %xmm5,%xmm2
psrlq $4,%xmm4
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
subl $1,%eax
jnz .L003loop_row_3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $1,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $1,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $5,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,215
movdqu %xmm2,(%edi)
pxor %xmm0,%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm1
pxor %xmm2,%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm3
pxor %xmm4,%xmm4
pxor %xmm5,%xmm5
pxor %xmm6,%xmm6
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.globl _gcm_ghash_ssse3
.hidden _gcm_ghash_ssse3
.def _gcm_ghash_ssse3; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_gcm_ghash_ssse3:
.L_gcm_ghash_ssse3_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
movl 20(%esp),%edi
movl 24(%esp),%esi
movl 28(%esp),%edx
movl 32(%esp),%ecx
movdqu (%edi),%xmm0
call .L004pic_point
.L004pic_point:
popl %ebx
movdqa .Lreverse_bytes-.L004pic_point(%ebx),%xmm7
andl $-16,%ecx
.byte 102,15,56,0,199
pxor %xmm3,%xmm3
.L005loop_ghash:
movdqa .Llow4_mask-.L004pic_point(%ebx),%xmm2
movdqu (%edx),%xmm1
.byte 102,15,56,0,207
pxor %xmm1,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm1
pandn %xmm0,%xmm1
psrld $4,%xmm1
pand %xmm2,%xmm0
pxor %xmm2,%xmm2
movl $5,%eax
.L006loop_row_4:
movdqa (%esi),%xmm4
leal 16(%esi),%esi
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm6
.byte 102,15,58,15,243,1
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm3
psrldq $1,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
.byte 102,15,56,0,224
.byte 102,15,56,0,233
pxor %xmm5,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
psllq $60,%xmm5
movdqa %xmm5,%xmm6
pslldq $8,%xmm6
pxor %xmm6,%xmm3
psrldq $8,%xmm5
pxor %xmm5,%xmm2
psrlq $4,%xmm4
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
subl $1,%eax
jnz .L006loop_row_4
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $1,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $1,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $5,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm3
movl $5,%eax
.L007loop_row_5:
movdqa (%esi),%xmm4
leal 16(%esi),%esi
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm6
.byte 102,15,58,15,243,1
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm3
psrldq $1,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
.byte 102,15,56,0,224
.byte 102,15,56,0,233
pxor %xmm5,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
psllq $60,%xmm5
movdqa %xmm5,%xmm6
pslldq $8,%xmm6
pxor %xmm6,%xmm3
psrldq $8,%xmm5
pxor %xmm5,%xmm2
psrlq $4,%xmm4
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
subl $1,%eax
jnz .L007loop_row_5
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $1,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $1,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $5,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm3
movl $6,%eax
.L008loop_row_6:
movdqa (%esi),%xmm4
leal 16(%esi),%esi
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm6
.byte 102,15,58,15,243,1
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm3
psrldq $1,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
.byte 102,15,56,0,224
.byte 102,15,56,0,233
pxor %xmm5,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
psllq $60,%xmm5
movdqa %xmm5,%xmm6
pslldq $8,%xmm6
pxor %xmm6,%xmm3
psrldq $8,%xmm5
pxor %xmm5,%xmm2
psrlq $4,%xmm4
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
subl $1,%eax
jnz .L008loop_row_6
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $1,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $1,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
psrlq $5,%xmm3
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm3
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm0
leal -256(%esi),%esi
leal 16(%edx),%edx
subl $16,%ecx
jnz .L005loop_ghash
.byte 102,15,56,0,199
movdqu %xmm0,(%edi)
pxor %xmm0,%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm1
pxor %xmm2,%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm3
pxor %xmm4,%xmm4
pxor %xmm5,%xmm5
pxor %xmm6,%xmm6
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.align 16
.Lreverse_bytes:
.byte 15,14,13,12,11,10,9,8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1,0
.align 16
.Llow4_mask:
.long 252645135,252645135,252645135,252645135
#endif
#endif // defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__ELF__)
.section .note.GNU-stack,"",%progbits
#endif
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
#define BORINGSSL_PREFIX CCryptoBoringSSL
#if defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
# This file is generated from a similarly-named Perl script in the BoringSSL
# source tree. Do not edit by hand.
#if defined(__i386__)
#if defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h>
#endif
.text
.byte 71,72,65,83,72,32,102,111,114,32,120,56,54,44,32,67
.byte 82,89,80,84,79,71,65,77,83,32,98,121,32,60,97,112
.byte 112,114,111,64,111,112,101,110,115,115,108,46,111,114,103,62
.byte 0
#endif
#endif // defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__ELF__)
.section .note.GNU-stack,"",%progbits
#endif
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#endif
.align 4
_gcm_init_v8:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
vld1.64 {q9},[r1] @ load input H
vmov.i8 q11,#0xe1
vshl.i64 q11,q11,#57 @ 0xc2.0
@@ -80,6 +81,7 @@ _gcm_init_v8:
#endif
.align 4
_gcm_gmult_v8:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
vld1.64 {q9},[r0] @ load Xi
vmov.i8 q11,#0xe1
vld1.64 {q12,q13},[r1] @ load twisted H, ...
@@ -124,6 +126,7 @@ _gcm_gmult_v8:
#endif
.align 4
_gcm_ghash_v8:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
vstmdb sp!,{d8,d9,d10,d11,d12,d13,d14,d15} @ 32-bit ABI says so
vld1.64 {q0},[r0] @ load [rotated] Xi
@ "[rotated]" means that
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
.type gcm_init_v8,%function
.align 4
gcm_init_v8:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
vld1.64 {q9},[r1] @ load input H
vmov.i8 q11,#0xe1
vshl.i64 q11,q11,#57 @ 0xc2.0
@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@ gcm_init_v8:
.type gcm_gmult_v8,%function
.align 4
gcm_gmult_v8:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
vld1.64 {q9},[r0] @ load Xi
vmov.i8 q11,#0xe1
vld1.64 {q12,q13},[r1] @ load twisted H, ...
@@ -119,6 +121,7 @@ gcm_gmult_v8:
.type gcm_ghash_v8,%function
.align 4
gcm_ghash_v8:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
vstmdb sp!,{d8,d9,d10,d11,d12,d13,d14,d15} @ 32-bit ABI says so
vld1.64 {q0},[r0] @ load [rotated] Xi
@ "[rotated]" means that
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
.align 4
_gcm_init_v8:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ld1 {v17.2d},[x1] //load input H
movi v19.16b,#0xe1
shl v19.2d,v19.2d,#57 //0xc2.0
@@ -74,6 +75,7 @@ _gcm_init_v8:
.align 4
_gcm_gmult_v8:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ld1 {v17.2d},[x0] //load Xi
movi v19.16b,#0xe1
ld1 {v20.2d,v21.2d},[x1] //load twisted H, ...
@@ -116,6 +118,7 @@ _gcm_gmult_v8:
.align 4
_gcm_ghash_v8:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ld1 {v0.2d},[x0] //load [rotated] Xi
//"[rotated]" means that
//loaded value would have
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
.type gcm_init_v8,%function
.align 4
gcm_init_v8:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ld1 {v17.2d},[x1] //load input H
movi v19.16b,#0xe1
shl v19.2d,v19.2d,#57 //0xc2.0
@@ -75,6 +76,7 @@ gcm_init_v8:
.type gcm_gmult_v8,%function
.align 4
gcm_gmult_v8:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ld1 {v17.2d},[x0] //load Xi
movi v19.16b,#0xe1
ld1 {v20.2d,v21.2d},[x1] //load twisted H, ...
@@ -117,6 +119,7 @@ gcm_gmult_v8:
.type gcm_ghash_v8,%function
.align 4
gcm_ghash_v8:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ld1 {v0.2d},[x0] //load [rotated] Xi
//"[rotated]" means that
//loaded value would have
@@ -0,0 +1,693 @@
#define BORINGSSL_PREFIX CCryptoBoringSSL
#if defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
# This file is generated from a similarly-named Perl script in the BoringSSL
# source tree. Do not edit by hand.
#if defined(__i386__)
#if defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h>
#endif
.text
.globl _md5_block_asm_data_order
.hidden _md5_block_asm_data_order
.def _md5_block_asm_data_order; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_md5_block_asm_data_order:
.L_md5_block_asm_data_order_begin:
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
movl 12(%esp),%edi
movl 16(%esp),%esi
movl 20(%esp),%ecx
pushl %ebp
shll $6,%ecx
pushl %ebx
addl %esi,%ecx
subl $64,%ecx
movl (%edi),%eax
pushl %ecx
movl 4(%edi),%ebx
movl 8(%edi),%ecx
movl 12(%edi),%edx
.L000start:
# R0 section
movl %ecx,%edi
movl (%esi),%ebp
# R0 0
xorl %edx,%edi
andl %ebx,%edi
leal 3614090360(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
xorl %edx,%edi
addl %edi,%eax
movl %ebx,%edi
roll $7,%eax
movl 4(%esi),%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
# R0 1
xorl %ecx,%edi
andl %eax,%edi
leal 3905402710(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
xorl %ecx,%edi
addl %edi,%edx
movl %eax,%edi
roll $12,%edx
movl 8(%esi),%ebp
addl %eax,%edx
# R0 2
xorl %ebx,%edi
andl %edx,%edi
leal 606105819(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
xorl %ebx,%edi
addl %edi,%ecx
movl %edx,%edi
roll $17,%ecx
movl 12(%esi),%ebp
addl %edx,%ecx
# R0 3
xorl %eax,%edi
andl %ecx,%edi
leal 3250441966(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
xorl %eax,%edi
addl %edi,%ebx
movl %ecx,%edi
roll $22,%ebx
movl 16(%esi),%ebp
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R0 4
xorl %edx,%edi
andl %ebx,%edi
leal 4118548399(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
xorl %edx,%edi
addl %edi,%eax
movl %ebx,%edi
roll $7,%eax
movl 20(%esi),%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
# R0 5
xorl %ecx,%edi
andl %eax,%edi
leal 1200080426(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
xorl %ecx,%edi
addl %edi,%edx
movl %eax,%edi
roll $12,%edx
movl 24(%esi),%ebp
addl %eax,%edx
# R0 6
xorl %ebx,%edi
andl %edx,%edi
leal 2821735955(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
xorl %ebx,%edi
addl %edi,%ecx
movl %edx,%edi
roll $17,%ecx
movl 28(%esi),%ebp
addl %edx,%ecx
# R0 7
xorl %eax,%edi
andl %ecx,%edi
leal 4249261313(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
xorl %eax,%edi
addl %edi,%ebx
movl %ecx,%edi
roll $22,%ebx
movl 32(%esi),%ebp
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R0 8
xorl %edx,%edi
andl %ebx,%edi
leal 1770035416(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
xorl %edx,%edi
addl %edi,%eax
movl %ebx,%edi
roll $7,%eax
movl 36(%esi),%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
# R0 9
xorl %ecx,%edi
andl %eax,%edi
leal 2336552879(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
xorl %ecx,%edi
addl %edi,%edx
movl %eax,%edi
roll $12,%edx
movl 40(%esi),%ebp
addl %eax,%edx
# R0 10
xorl %ebx,%edi
andl %edx,%edi
leal 4294925233(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
xorl %ebx,%edi
addl %edi,%ecx
movl %edx,%edi
roll $17,%ecx
movl 44(%esi),%ebp
addl %edx,%ecx
# R0 11
xorl %eax,%edi
andl %ecx,%edi
leal 2304563134(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
xorl %eax,%edi
addl %edi,%ebx
movl %ecx,%edi
roll $22,%ebx
movl 48(%esi),%ebp
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R0 12
xorl %edx,%edi
andl %ebx,%edi
leal 1804603682(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
xorl %edx,%edi
addl %edi,%eax
movl %ebx,%edi
roll $7,%eax
movl 52(%esi),%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
# R0 13
xorl %ecx,%edi
andl %eax,%edi
leal 4254626195(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
xorl %ecx,%edi
addl %edi,%edx
movl %eax,%edi
roll $12,%edx
movl 56(%esi),%ebp
addl %eax,%edx
# R0 14
xorl %ebx,%edi
andl %edx,%edi
leal 2792965006(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
xorl %ebx,%edi
addl %edi,%ecx
movl %edx,%edi
roll $17,%ecx
movl 60(%esi),%ebp
addl %edx,%ecx
# R0 15
xorl %eax,%edi
andl %ecx,%edi
leal 1236535329(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
xorl %eax,%edi
addl %edi,%ebx
movl %ecx,%edi
roll $22,%ebx
movl 4(%esi),%ebp
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R1 section
# R1 16
leal 4129170786(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
xorl %ebx,%edi
andl %edx,%edi
movl 24(%esi),%ebp
xorl %ecx,%edi
addl %edi,%eax
movl %ebx,%edi
roll $5,%eax
addl %ebx,%eax
# R1 17
leal 3225465664(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
xorl %eax,%edi
andl %ecx,%edi
movl 44(%esi),%ebp
xorl %ebx,%edi
addl %edi,%edx
movl %eax,%edi
roll $9,%edx
addl %eax,%edx
# R1 18
leal 643717713(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
xorl %edx,%edi
andl %ebx,%edi
movl (%esi),%ebp
xorl %eax,%edi
addl %edi,%ecx
movl %edx,%edi
roll $14,%ecx
addl %edx,%ecx
# R1 19
leal 3921069994(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
xorl %ecx,%edi
andl %eax,%edi
movl 20(%esi),%ebp
xorl %edx,%edi
addl %edi,%ebx
movl %ecx,%edi
roll $20,%ebx
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R1 20
leal 3593408605(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
xorl %ebx,%edi
andl %edx,%edi
movl 40(%esi),%ebp
xorl %ecx,%edi
addl %edi,%eax
movl %ebx,%edi
roll $5,%eax
addl %ebx,%eax
# R1 21
leal 38016083(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
xorl %eax,%edi
andl %ecx,%edi
movl 60(%esi),%ebp
xorl %ebx,%edi
addl %edi,%edx
movl %eax,%edi
roll $9,%edx
addl %eax,%edx
# R1 22
leal 3634488961(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
xorl %edx,%edi
andl %ebx,%edi
movl 16(%esi),%ebp
xorl %eax,%edi
addl %edi,%ecx
movl %edx,%edi
roll $14,%ecx
addl %edx,%ecx
# R1 23
leal 3889429448(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
xorl %ecx,%edi
andl %eax,%edi
movl 36(%esi),%ebp
xorl %edx,%edi
addl %edi,%ebx
movl %ecx,%edi
roll $20,%ebx
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R1 24
leal 568446438(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
xorl %ebx,%edi
andl %edx,%edi
movl 56(%esi),%ebp
xorl %ecx,%edi
addl %edi,%eax
movl %ebx,%edi
roll $5,%eax
addl %ebx,%eax
# R1 25
leal 3275163606(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
xorl %eax,%edi
andl %ecx,%edi
movl 12(%esi),%ebp
xorl %ebx,%edi
addl %edi,%edx
movl %eax,%edi
roll $9,%edx
addl %eax,%edx
# R1 26
leal 4107603335(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
xorl %edx,%edi
andl %ebx,%edi
movl 32(%esi),%ebp
xorl %eax,%edi
addl %edi,%ecx
movl %edx,%edi
roll $14,%ecx
addl %edx,%ecx
# R1 27
leal 1163531501(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
xorl %ecx,%edi
andl %eax,%edi
movl 52(%esi),%ebp
xorl %edx,%edi
addl %edi,%ebx
movl %ecx,%edi
roll $20,%ebx
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R1 28
leal 2850285829(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
xorl %ebx,%edi
andl %edx,%edi
movl 8(%esi),%ebp
xorl %ecx,%edi
addl %edi,%eax
movl %ebx,%edi
roll $5,%eax
addl %ebx,%eax
# R1 29
leal 4243563512(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
xorl %eax,%edi
andl %ecx,%edi
movl 28(%esi),%ebp
xorl %ebx,%edi
addl %edi,%edx
movl %eax,%edi
roll $9,%edx
addl %eax,%edx
# R1 30
leal 1735328473(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
xorl %edx,%edi
andl %ebx,%edi
movl 48(%esi),%ebp
xorl %eax,%edi
addl %edi,%ecx
movl %edx,%edi
roll $14,%ecx
addl %edx,%ecx
# R1 31
leal 2368359562(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
xorl %ecx,%edi
andl %eax,%edi
movl 20(%esi),%ebp
xorl %edx,%edi
addl %edi,%ebx
movl %ecx,%edi
roll $20,%ebx
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R2 section
# R2 32
xorl %edx,%edi
xorl %ebx,%edi
leal 4294588738(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
addl %edi,%eax
roll $4,%eax
movl 32(%esi),%ebp
movl %ebx,%edi
# R2 33
leal 2272392833(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
addl %ebx,%eax
xorl %ecx,%edi
xorl %eax,%edi
movl 44(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%edx
movl %eax,%edi
roll $11,%edx
addl %eax,%edx
# R2 34
xorl %ebx,%edi
xorl %edx,%edi
leal 1839030562(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
addl %edi,%ecx
roll $16,%ecx
movl 56(%esi),%ebp
movl %edx,%edi
# R2 35
leal 4259657740(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
addl %edx,%ecx
xorl %eax,%edi
xorl %ecx,%edi
movl 4(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%ebx
movl %ecx,%edi
roll $23,%ebx
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R2 36
xorl %edx,%edi
xorl %ebx,%edi
leal 2763975236(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
addl %edi,%eax
roll $4,%eax
movl 16(%esi),%ebp
movl %ebx,%edi
# R2 37
leal 1272893353(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
addl %ebx,%eax
xorl %ecx,%edi
xorl %eax,%edi
movl 28(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%edx
movl %eax,%edi
roll $11,%edx
addl %eax,%edx
# R2 38
xorl %ebx,%edi
xorl %edx,%edi
leal 4139469664(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
addl %edi,%ecx
roll $16,%ecx
movl 40(%esi),%ebp
movl %edx,%edi
# R2 39
leal 3200236656(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
addl %edx,%ecx
xorl %eax,%edi
xorl %ecx,%edi
movl 52(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%ebx
movl %ecx,%edi
roll $23,%ebx
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R2 40
xorl %edx,%edi
xorl %ebx,%edi
leal 681279174(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
addl %edi,%eax
roll $4,%eax
movl (%esi),%ebp
movl %ebx,%edi
# R2 41
leal 3936430074(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
addl %ebx,%eax
xorl %ecx,%edi
xorl %eax,%edi
movl 12(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%edx
movl %eax,%edi
roll $11,%edx
addl %eax,%edx
# R2 42
xorl %ebx,%edi
xorl %edx,%edi
leal 3572445317(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
addl %edi,%ecx
roll $16,%ecx
movl 24(%esi),%ebp
movl %edx,%edi
# R2 43
leal 76029189(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
addl %edx,%ecx
xorl %eax,%edi
xorl %ecx,%edi
movl 36(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%ebx
movl %ecx,%edi
roll $23,%ebx
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R2 44
xorl %edx,%edi
xorl %ebx,%edi
leal 3654602809(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
addl %edi,%eax
roll $4,%eax
movl 48(%esi),%ebp
movl %ebx,%edi
# R2 45
leal 3873151461(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
addl %ebx,%eax
xorl %ecx,%edi
xorl %eax,%edi
movl 60(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%edx
movl %eax,%edi
roll $11,%edx
addl %eax,%edx
# R2 46
xorl %ebx,%edi
xorl %edx,%edi
leal 530742520(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
addl %edi,%ecx
roll $16,%ecx
movl 8(%esi),%ebp
movl %edx,%edi
# R2 47
leal 3299628645(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
addl %edx,%ecx
xorl %eax,%edi
xorl %ecx,%edi
movl (%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%ebx
movl $-1,%edi
roll $23,%ebx
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R3 section
# R3 48
xorl %edx,%edi
orl %ebx,%edi
leal 4096336452(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
xorl %ecx,%edi
movl 28(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%eax
movl $-1,%edi
roll $6,%eax
xorl %ecx,%edi
addl %ebx,%eax
# R3 49
orl %eax,%edi
leal 1126891415(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
xorl %ebx,%edi
movl 56(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%edx
movl $-1,%edi
roll $10,%edx
xorl %ebx,%edi
addl %eax,%edx
# R3 50
orl %edx,%edi
leal 2878612391(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
xorl %eax,%edi
movl 20(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%ecx
movl $-1,%edi
roll $15,%ecx
xorl %eax,%edi
addl %edx,%ecx
# R3 51
orl %ecx,%edi
leal 4237533241(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
xorl %edx,%edi
movl 48(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%ebx
movl $-1,%edi
roll $21,%ebx
xorl %edx,%edi
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R3 52
orl %ebx,%edi
leal 1700485571(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
xorl %ecx,%edi
movl 12(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%eax
movl $-1,%edi
roll $6,%eax
xorl %ecx,%edi
addl %ebx,%eax
# R3 53
orl %eax,%edi
leal 2399980690(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
xorl %ebx,%edi
movl 40(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%edx
movl $-1,%edi
roll $10,%edx
xorl %ebx,%edi
addl %eax,%edx
# R3 54
orl %edx,%edi
leal 4293915773(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
xorl %eax,%edi
movl 4(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%ecx
movl $-1,%edi
roll $15,%ecx
xorl %eax,%edi
addl %edx,%ecx
# R3 55
orl %ecx,%edi
leal 2240044497(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
xorl %edx,%edi
movl 32(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%ebx
movl $-1,%edi
roll $21,%ebx
xorl %edx,%edi
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R3 56
orl %ebx,%edi
leal 1873313359(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
xorl %ecx,%edi
movl 60(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%eax
movl $-1,%edi
roll $6,%eax
xorl %ecx,%edi
addl %ebx,%eax
# R3 57
orl %eax,%edi
leal 4264355552(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
xorl %ebx,%edi
movl 24(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%edx
movl $-1,%edi
roll $10,%edx
xorl %ebx,%edi
addl %eax,%edx
# R3 58
orl %edx,%edi
leal 2734768916(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
xorl %eax,%edi
movl 52(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%ecx
movl $-1,%edi
roll $15,%ecx
xorl %eax,%edi
addl %edx,%ecx
# R3 59
orl %ecx,%edi
leal 1309151649(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
xorl %edx,%edi
movl 16(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%ebx
movl $-1,%edi
roll $21,%ebx
xorl %edx,%edi
addl %ecx,%ebx
# R3 60
orl %ebx,%edi
leal 4149444226(%eax,%ebp,1),%eax
xorl %ecx,%edi
movl 44(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%eax
movl $-1,%edi
roll $6,%eax
xorl %ecx,%edi
addl %ebx,%eax
# R3 61
orl %eax,%edi
leal 3174756917(%edx,%ebp,1),%edx
xorl %ebx,%edi
movl 8(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%edx
movl $-1,%edi
roll $10,%edx
xorl %ebx,%edi
addl %eax,%edx
# R3 62
orl %edx,%edi
leal 718787259(%ecx,%ebp,1),%ecx
xorl %eax,%edi
movl 36(%esi),%ebp
addl %edi,%ecx
movl $-1,%edi
roll $15,%ecx
xorl %eax,%edi
addl %edx,%ecx
# R3 63
orl %ecx,%edi
leal 3951481745(%ebx,%ebp,1),%ebx
xorl %edx,%edi
movl 24(%esp),%ebp
addl %edi,%ebx
addl $64,%esi
roll $21,%ebx
movl (%ebp),%edi
addl %ecx,%ebx
addl %edi,%eax
movl 4(%ebp),%edi
addl %edi,%ebx
movl 8(%ebp),%edi
addl %edi,%ecx
movl 12(%ebp),%edi
addl %edi,%edx
movl %eax,(%ebp)
movl %ebx,4(%ebp)
movl (%esp),%edi
movl %ecx,8(%ebp)
movl %edx,12(%ebp)
cmpl %esi,%edi
jae .L000start
popl %eax
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
popl %edi
popl %esi
ret
#endif
#endif // defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__ELF__)
.section .note.GNU-stack,"",%progbits
#endif
@@ -108,6 +108,10 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
int RSA_padding_add_none(uint8_t *to, size_t to_len, const uint8_t *from,
size_t from_len);
// rsa_check_public_key checks that |rsa|'s public modulus and exponent are
// within DoS bounds.
int rsa_check_public_key(const RSA *rsa);
// RSA_private_transform calls either the method-specific |private_transform|
// function (if given) or the generic one. See the comment for
// |private_transform| in |rsa_meth_st|.
@@ -661,6 +661,9 @@ static int check_mod_inverse(int *out_ok, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *ainv,
return 1;
}
// Note |bn_mul_consttime| and |bn_div_consttime| do not scale linearly, but
// checking |ainv| is in range bounds the running time, assuming |m|'s bounds
// were checked by the caller.
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
BIGNUM *tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
int ret = tmp != NULL &&
@@ -674,22 +677,35 @@ static int check_mod_inverse(int *out_ok, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *ainv,
}
int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key) {
// TODO(davidben): RSA key initialization is spread across
// |rsa_check_public_key|, |RSA_check_key|, |freeze_private_key|, and
// |BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked| as a result of API issues. See
// https://crbug.com/boringssl/316. As a result, we inconsistently check RSA
// invariants. We should fix this and integrate that logic.
if (RSA_is_opaque(key)) {
// Opaque keys can't be checked.
return 1;
}
if (!rsa_check_public_key(key)) {
return 0;
}
if ((key->p != NULL) != (key->q != NULL)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_ONLY_ONE_OF_P_Q_GIVEN);
return 0;
}
if (!key->n || !key->e) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
// |key->d| must be bounded by |key->n|. This ensures bounds on |RSA_bits|
// translate to bounds on the running time of private key operations.
if (key->d != NULL &&
(BN_is_negative(key->d) || BN_cmp(key->d, key->n) >= 0)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_D_OUT_OF_RANGE);
return 0;
}
if (!key->d || !key->p) {
if (key->d == NULL || key->p == NULL) {
// For a public key, or without p and q, there's nothing that can be
// checked.
return 1;
@@ -709,24 +725,28 @@ int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key) {
BN_init(&qm1);
BN_init(&dmp1);
BN_init(&dmq1);
// Check that p * q == n. Before we multiply, we check that p and q are in
// bounds, to avoid a DoS vector in |bn_mul_consttime| below. Note that
// n was bound by |rsa_check_public_key|.
if (BN_is_negative(key->p) || BN_cmp(key->p, key->n) >= 0 ||
BN_is_negative(key->q) || BN_cmp(key->q, key->n) >= 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_N_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q);
goto out;
}
if (!bn_mul_consttime(&tmp, key->p, key->q, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
goto out;
}
if (BN_cmp(&tmp, key->n) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_N_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q);
goto out;
}
if (BN_is_negative(key->d) || BN_cmp(key->d, key->n) >= 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_D_OUT_OF_RANGE);
goto out;
}
// d must be an inverse of e mod the Carmichael totient, lcm(p-1, q-1), but it
// may be unreduced because other implementations use the Euler totient. We
// simply check that d * e is one mod p-1 and mod q-1.
// simply check that d * e is one mod p-1 and mod q-1. Note d and e were bound
// by earlier checks in this function.
if (!bn_usub_consttime(&pm1, key->p, BN_value_one()) ||
!bn_usub_consttime(&qm1, key->q, BN_value_one()) ||
!bn_mul_consttime(&de, key->d, key->e, ctx) ||
@@ -73,7 +73,12 @@
#include "../rand/fork_detect.h"
static int check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes(const RSA *rsa) {
int rsa_check_public_key(const RSA *rsa) {
if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
return 0;
}
unsigned rsa_bits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
if (rsa_bits > 16 * 1024) {
@@ -253,8 +258,7 @@ size_t rsa_default_size(const RSA *rsa) {
int RSA_encrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
if (!rsa_check_public_key(rsa)) {
return 0;
}
@@ -269,10 +273,6 @@ int RSA_encrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
return 0;
}
if (!check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes(rsa)) {
return 0;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
@@ -592,8 +592,7 @@ static int mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
int RSA_verify_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
if (!rsa_check_public_key(rsa)) {
return 0;
}
@@ -610,10 +609,6 @@ int RSA_verify_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
return 0;
}
if (!check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes(rsa)) {
return 0;
}
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
return 0;
@@ -938,20 +933,57 @@ static int ensure_bignum(BIGNUM **out) {
return *out != NULL;
}
// kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwo is the BIGNUM representation of ⌊2¹⁵³⁵×√2⌋. This is
// chosen to give enough precision for 3072-bit RSA, the largest key size FIPS
// kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwo is the BIGNUM representation of ⌊2²⁰⁴⁷×√2⌋. This is
// chosen to give enough precision for 4096-bit RSA, the largest key size FIPS
// specifies. Key sizes beyond this will round up.
//
// To verify this number, check that n² < 2³⁰⁷¹ < (n+1)², where n is value
// To calculate, use the following Haskell code:
//
// import Text.Printf (printf)
// import Data.List (intercalate)
//
// pow2 = 4095
// target = 2^pow2
//
// f x = x*x - (toRational target)
//
// fprime x = 2*x
//
// newtonIteration x = x - (f x) / (fprime x)
//
// converge x =
// let n = floor x in
// if n*n - target < 0 && (n+1)*(n+1) - target > 0
// then n
// else converge (newtonIteration x)
//
// divrem bits x = (x `div` (2^bits), x `rem` (2^bits))
//
// bnWords :: Integer -> [Integer]
// bnWords x =
// if x == 0
// then []
// else let (high, low) = divrem 64 x in low : bnWords high
//
// showWord x = let (high, low) = divrem 32 x in printf "TOBN(0x%08x, 0x%08x)" high low
//
// output :: String
// output = intercalate ", " $ map showWord $ bnWords $ converge (2 ^ (pow2 `div` 2))
//
// To verify this number, check that n² < 2⁴⁰⁹⁵ < (n+1)², where n is value
// represented here. Note the components are listed in little-endian order. Here
// is some sample Python code to check:
//
// >>> TOBN = lambda a, b: a << 32 | b
// >>> l = [ <paste the contents of kSqrtTwo> ]
// >>> n = sum(a * 2**(64*i) for i, a in enumerate(l))
// >>> n**2 < 2**3071 < (n+1)**2
// >>> n**2 < 2**4095 < (n+1)**2
// True
const BN_ULONG kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwo[] = {
TOBN(0x4d7c60a5, 0xe633e3e1), TOBN(0x5fcf8f7b, 0xca3ea33b),
TOBN(0xc246785e, 0x92957023), TOBN(0xf9acce41, 0x797f2805),
TOBN(0xfdfe170f, 0xd3b1f780), TOBN(0xd24f4a76, 0x3facb882),
TOBN(0x18838a2e, 0xaff5f3b2), TOBN(0xc1fcbdde, 0xa2f7dc33),
TOBN(0xdea06241, 0xf7aa81c2), TOBN(0xf6a1be3f, 0xca221307),
TOBN(0x332a5e9f, 0x7bda1ebf), TOBN(0x0104dc01, 0xfe32352f),
TOBN(0xb8cf341b, 0x6f8236c7), TOBN(0x4264dabc, 0xd528b651),
@@ -1121,8 +1153,8 @@ static int rsa_generate_key_impl(RSA *rsa, int bits, const BIGNUM *e_value,
// Reject excessively large public exponents. Windows CryptoAPI and Go don't
// support values larger than 32 bits, so match their limits for generating
// keys. (|check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes| uses a slightly more conservative
// value, but we don't need to support generating such keys.)
// keys. (|rsa_check_public_key| uses a slightly more conservative value, but
// we don't need to support generating such keys.)
// https://github.com/golang/go/issues/3161
// https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa387685(VS.85).aspx
if (BN_num_bits(e_value) > 32) {
@@ -1172,13 +1204,13 @@ static int rsa_generate_key_impl(RSA *rsa, int bits, const BIGNUM *e_value,
int sqrt2_bits = kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwoLen * BN_BITS2;
assert(sqrt2_bits == (int)BN_num_bits(sqrt2));
if (sqrt2_bits > prime_bits) {
// For key sizes up to 3072 (prime_bits = 1536), this is exactly
// For key sizes up to 4096 (prime_bits = 2048), this is exactly
// ⌊2^(prime_bits-1)×√2⌋.
if (!BN_rshift(sqrt2, sqrt2, sqrt2_bits - prime_bits)) {
goto bn_err;
}
} else if (prime_bits > sqrt2_bits) {
// For key sizes beyond 3072, this is approximate. We err towards retrying
// For key sizes beyond 4096, this is approximate. We err towards retrying
// to ensure our key is the right size and round up.
if (!BN_add_word(sqrt2, 1) ||
!BN_lshift(sqrt2, sqrt2, prime_bits - sqrt2_bits)) {
@@ -1335,7 +1367,9 @@ int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, const BIGNUM *e_value,
int RSA_generate_key_fips(RSA *rsa, int bits, BN_GENCB *cb) {
// FIPS 186-4 allows 2048-bit and 3072-bit RSA keys (1024-bit and 1536-bit
// primes, respectively) with the prime generation method we use.
if (bits != 2048 && bits != 3072) {
// Subsequently, IG A.14 stated that larger modulus sizes can be used and ACVP
// testing supports 4096 bits.
if (bits != 2048 && bits != 3072 && bits != 4096) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_RSA_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_aes.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_bn.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_des.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_digest.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_ec.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_ecdsa.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_ec_key.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_nid.h>
@@ -30,6 +32,7 @@
#include "../../internal.h"
#include "../ec/internal.h"
#include "../rand/internal.h"
#include "../tls/internal.h"
// MSVC wants to put a NUL byte at the end of non-char arrays and so cannot
@@ -430,11 +433,68 @@ int boringssl_fips_self_test(
0xba, 0x4d, 0xd9, 0x86, 0x77, 0xda, 0x7d, 0x8f, 0xef, 0xc4, 0x1a,
0xf0, 0xcc, 0x81, 0xe5, 0xea, 0x3f, 0xc2, 0x41, 0x7f, 0xd8,
};
// kP256Point is SHA256("Primitive Z Computation KAT")×G within P-256.
const uint8_t kP256Point[65] = {
0x04, 0x4e, 0xc1, 0x94, 0x8c, 0x5c, 0xf4, 0x37, 0x35, 0x0d, 0xa3,
0xf9, 0x55, 0xf9, 0x8b, 0x26, 0x23, 0x5c, 0x43, 0xe0, 0x83, 0x51,
0x2b, 0x0d, 0x4b, 0x56, 0x24, 0xc3, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xa8, 0xe2, 0xe9,
0x95, 0xf2, 0xc4, 0xb9, 0xb7, 0x48, 0x7d, 0x2a, 0xae, 0xc5, 0xc0,
0x0a, 0xcc, 0x1b, 0xd0, 0xec, 0xb8, 0xdc, 0xbe, 0x0c, 0xbe, 0x52,
0x79, 0x93, 0x7c, 0x0b, 0x92, 0x2b, 0x7f, 0x17, 0xa5, 0x80,
};
// kP256Scalar is SHA256("Primitive Z Computation KAT scalar").
const uint8_t kP256Scalar[32] = {
0xe7, 0x60, 0x44, 0x91, 0x26, 0x9a, 0xfb, 0x5b, 0x10, 0x2d, 0x6e,
0xa5, 0x2c, 0xb5, 0x9f, 0xeb, 0x70, 0xae, 0xde, 0x6c, 0xe3, 0xbf,
0xb3, 0xe0, 0x10, 0x54, 0x85, 0xab, 0xd8, 0x61, 0xd7, 0x7b,
};
// kP256PointResult is |kP256Scalar|×|kP256Point|.
const uint8_t kP256PointResult[65] = {
0x04, 0xf1, 0x63, 0x00, 0x88, 0xc5, 0xd5, 0xe9, 0x05, 0x52, 0xac,
0xb6, 0xec, 0x68, 0x76, 0xb8, 0x73, 0x7f, 0x0f, 0x72, 0x34, 0xe6,
0xbb, 0x30, 0x32, 0x22, 0x37, 0xb6, 0x2a, 0x80, 0xe8, 0x9e, 0x6e,
0x6f, 0x36, 0x02, 0xe7, 0x21, 0xd2, 0x31, 0xdb, 0x94, 0x63, 0xb7,
0xd8, 0x19, 0x0e, 0xc2, 0xc0, 0xa7, 0x2f, 0x15, 0x49, 0x1a, 0xa2,
0x7c, 0x41, 0x8f, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0x40, 0xaf, 0x2e, 0x4a,
#if !defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_BREAK_Z_COMPUTATION)
0x0c,
#else
0x00,
#endif
};
const uint8_t kTLSOutput[32] = {
0x67, 0x85, 0xde, 0x60, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x83, 0xe9, 0xa2, 0x2a, 0xb3,
0xf0, 0x27, 0x0c, 0xba, 0xf7, 0xfa, 0x82, 0x3d, 0x14, 0x77, 0x1d,
0x86, 0x29, 0x79, 0x39, 0x77, 0x8a, 0xd5, 0x0e, 0x9d,
#if !defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_BREAK_TLS_KDF)
0x32,
#else
0x00,
#endif
};
const uint8_t kTLSSecret[32] = {
0xbf, 0xe4, 0xb7, 0xe0, 0x26, 0x55, 0x5f, 0x6a, 0xdf, 0x5d, 0x27,
0xd6, 0x89, 0x99, 0x2a, 0xd6, 0xf7, 0x65, 0x66, 0x07, 0x4b, 0x55,
0x5f, 0x64, 0x55, 0xcd, 0xd5, 0x77, 0xa4, 0xc7, 0x09, 0x61,
};
const char kTLSLabel[] = "FIPS self test";
const uint8_t kTLSSeed1[16] = {
0x8f, 0x0d, 0xe8, 0xb6, 0x90, 0x8f, 0xb1, 0xd2,
0x6d, 0x51, 0xf4, 0x79, 0x18, 0x63, 0x51, 0x65,
};
const uint8_t kTLSSeed2[16] = {
0x7d, 0x24, 0x1a, 0x9d, 0x3c, 0x59, 0xbf, 0x3c,
0x31, 0x1e, 0x2b, 0x21, 0x41, 0x8d, 0x32, 0x81,
};
EVP_AEAD_CTX aead_ctx;
EVP_AEAD_CTX_zero(&aead_ctx);
RSA *rsa_key = NULL;
EC_KEY *ec_key = NULL;
EC_GROUP *ec_group = NULL;
EC_POINT *ec_point_in = NULL;
EC_POINT *ec_point_out = NULL;
BIGNUM *ec_scalar = NULL;
ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
int ret = 0;
@@ -577,7 +637,7 @@ int boringssl_fips_self_test(
goto err;
}
// ECDSA Sign/Verify PWCT
// ECDSA Sign/Verify KAT
// The 'k' value for ECDSA is fixed to avoid an entropy draw.
ec_key->fixed_k = BN_new();
@@ -598,7 +658,37 @@ int boringssl_fips_self_test(
!BN_bn2bin(sig->s, ecdsa_s_bytes) ||
!check_test(kECDSASigR, ecdsa_r_bytes, sizeof(kECDSASigR), "ECDSA R") ||
!check_test(kECDSASigS, ecdsa_s_bytes, sizeof(kECDSASigS), "ECDSA S")) {
fprintf(stderr, "ECDSA KAT failed.\n");
fprintf(stderr, "ECDSA signature KAT failed.\n");
goto err;
}
if (!ECDSA_do_verify(kPlaintextSHA256, sizeof(kPlaintextSHA256), sig,
ec_key)) {
fprintf(stderr, "ECDSA verification KAT failed.\n");
goto err;
}
// Primitive Z Computation KAT (IG 9.6).
ec_group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
if (ec_group == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create P-256 group.\n");
goto err;
}
ec_point_in = EC_POINT_new(ec_group);
ec_point_out = EC_POINT_new(ec_group);
ec_scalar = BN_new();
uint8_t z_comp_result[65];
if (ec_point_in == NULL || ec_point_out == NULL || ec_scalar == NULL ||
!EC_POINT_oct2point(ec_group, ec_point_in, kP256Point, sizeof(kP256Point),
NULL) ||
!BN_bin2bn(kP256Scalar, sizeof(kP256Scalar), ec_scalar) ||
!EC_POINT_mul(ec_group, ec_point_out, NULL, ec_point_in, ec_scalar,
NULL) ||
!EC_POINT_point2oct(ec_group, ec_point_out, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
z_comp_result, sizeof(z_comp_result), NULL) ||
!check_test(kP256PointResult, z_comp_result, sizeof(z_comp_result),
"Z Computation Result")) {
fprintf(stderr, "Z Computation KAT failed.\n");
goto err;
}
@@ -626,6 +716,17 @@ int boringssl_fips_self_test(
goto err;
}
// TLS KDF KAT
uint8_t tls_output[sizeof(kTLSOutput)];
if (!CRYPTO_tls1_prf(EVP_sha256(), tls_output, sizeof(tls_output), kTLSSecret,
sizeof(kTLSSecret), kTLSLabel, sizeof(kTLSLabel),
kTLSSeed1, sizeof(kTLSSeed1), kTLSSeed2,
sizeof(kTLSSeed2)) ||
!check_test(kTLSOutput, tls_output, sizeof(kTLSOutput), "TLS KDF KAT")) {
fprintf(stderr, "TLS KDF failed.\n");
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_SELF_TEST_FLAG_FILE)
@@ -642,6 +743,10 @@ err:
EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&aead_ctx);
RSA_free(rsa_key);
EC_KEY_free(ec_key);
EC_POINT_free(ec_point_in);
EC_POINT_free(ec_point_out);
EC_GROUP_free(ec_group);
BN_free(ec_scalar);
ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
return ret;
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
.align 6
_sha1_block_data_order:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
#if __has_feature(hwaddress_sanitizer) && __clang_major__ >= 10
adrp x16,:pg_hi21_nc:_OPENSSL_armcap_P
#else
@@ -1091,6 +1093,8 @@ Loop:
.align 6
sha1_block_armv8:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
Lv8_entry:
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@
.type sha1_block_data_order,%function
.align 6
sha1_block_data_order:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
#if __has_feature(hwaddress_sanitizer) && __clang_major__ >= 10
adrp x16,:pg_hi21_nc:OPENSSL_armcap_P
#else
@@ -1092,6 +1094,8 @@ sha1_block_data_order:
.type sha1_block_armv8,%function
.align 6
sha1_block_armv8:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
.Lv8_entry:
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ sha1_block_data_order:
movl 8(%r10),%r10d
testl $512,%r8d
jz .Lialu
testl $536870912,%r10d
jnz _shaext_shortcut
andl $296,%r10d
cmpl $296,%r10d
je _avx2_shortcut
@@ -1271,6 +1273,175 @@ sha1_block_data_order:
.byte 0xf3,0xc3
.cfi_endproc
.size sha1_block_data_order,.-sha1_block_data_order
.type sha1_block_data_order_shaext,@function
.align 32
sha1_block_data_order_shaext:
_shaext_shortcut:
.cfi_startproc
movdqu (%rdi),%xmm0
movd 16(%rdi),%xmm1
movdqa K_XX_XX+160(%rip),%xmm3
movdqu (%rsi),%xmm4
pshufd $27,%xmm0,%xmm0
movdqu 16(%rsi),%xmm5
pshufd $27,%xmm1,%xmm1
movdqu 32(%rsi),%xmm6
.byte 102,15,56,0,227
movdqu 48(%rsi),%xmm7
.byte 102,15,56,0,235
.byte 102,15,56,0,243
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm9
.byte 102,15,56,0,251
jmp .Loop_shaext
.align 16
.Loop_shaext:
decq %rdx
leaq 64(%rsi),%r8
paddd %xmm4,%xmm1
cmovneq %r8,%rsi
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm8
.byte 15,56,201,229
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,0
.byte 15,56,200,213
pxor %xmm6,%xmm4
.byte 15,56,201,238
.byte 15,56,202,231
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,0
.byte 15,56,200,206
pxor %xmm7,%xmm5
.byte 15,56,202,236
.byte 15,56,201,247
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,0
.byte 15,56,200,215
pxor %xmm4,%xmm6
.byte 15,56,201,252
.byte 15,56,202,245
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,0
.byte 15,56,200,204
pxor %xmm5,%xmm7
.byte 15,56,202,254
.byte 15,56,201,229
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,0
.byte 15,56,200,213
pxor %xmm6,%xmm4
.byte 15,56,201,238
.byte 15,56,202,231
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,1
.byte 15,56,200,206
pxor %xmm7,%xmm5
.byte 15,56,202,236
.byte 15,56,201,247
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,1
.byte 15,56,200,215
pxor %xmm4,%xmm6
.byte 15,56,201,252
.byte 15,56,202,245
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,1
.byte 15,56,200,204
pxor %xmm5,%xmm7
.byte 15,56,202,254
.byte 15,56,201,229
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,1
.byte 15,56,200,213
pxor %xmm6,%xmm4
.byte 15,56,201,238
.byte 15,56,202,231
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,1
.byte 15,56,200,206
pxor %xmm7,%xmm5
.byte 15,56,202,236
.byte 15,56,201,247
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,2
.byte 15,56,200,215
pxor %xmm4,%xmm6
.byte 15,56,201,252
.byte 15,56,202,245
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,2
.byte 15,56,200,204
pxor %xmm5,%xmm7
.byte 15,56,202,254
.byte 15,56,201,229
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,2
.byte 15,56,200,213
pxor %xmm6,%xmm4
.byte 15,56,201,238
.byte 15,56,202,231
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,2
.byte 15,56,200,206
pxor %xmm7,%xmm5
.byte 15,56,202,236
.byte 15,56,201,247
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,2
.byte 15,56,200,215
pxor %xmm4,%xmm6
.byte 15,56,201,252
.byte 15,56,202,245
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,3
.byte 15,56,200,204
pxor %xmm5,%xmm7
.byte 15,56,202,254
movdqu (%rsi),%xmm4
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,3
.byte 15,56,200,213
movdqu 16(%rsi),%xmm5
.byte 102,15,56,0,227
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,3
.byte 15,56,200,206
movdqu 32(%rsi),%xmm6
.byte 102,15,56,0,235
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,3
.byte 15,56,200,215
movdqu 48(%rsi),%xmm7
.byte 102,15,56,0,243
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,3
.byte 65,15,56,200,201
.byte 102,15,56,0,251
paddd %xmm8,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm9
jnz .Loop_shaext
pshufd $27,%xmm0,%xmm0
pshufd $27,%xmm1,%xmm1
movdqu %xmm0,(%rdi)
movd %xmm1,16(%rdi)
.byte 0xf3,0xc3
.cfi_endproc
.size sha1_block_data_order_shaext,.-sha1_block_data_order_shaext
.type sha1_block_data_order_ssse3,@function
.align 16
sha1_block_data_order_ssse3:
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ _sha1_block_data_order:
movl 8(%r10),%r10d
testl $512,%r8d
jz L$ialu
testl $536870912,%r10d
jnz _shaext_shortcut
andl $296,%r10d
cmpl $296,%r10d
je _avx2_shortcut
@@ -1271,6 +1273,175 @@ L$epilogue:
.p2align 5
sha1_block_data_order_shaext:
_shaext_shortcut:
movdqu (%rdi),%xmm0
movd 16(%rdi),%xmm1
movdqa K_XX_XX+160(%rip),%xmm3
movdqu (%rsi),%xmm4
pshufd $27,%xmm0,%xmm0
movdqu 16(%rsi),%xmm5
pshufd $27,%xmm1,%xmm1
movdqu 32(%rsi),%xmm6
.byte 102,15,56,0,227
movdqu 48(%rsi),%xmm7
.byte 102,15,56,0,235
.byte 102,15,56,0,243
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm9
.byte 102,15,56,0,251
jmp L$oop_shaext
.p2align 4
L$oop_shaext:
decq %rdx
leaq 64(%rsi),%r8
paddd %xmm4,%xmm1
cmovneq %r8,%rsi
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm8
.byte 15,56,201,229
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,0
.byte 15,56,200,213
pxor %xmm6,%xmm4
.byte 15,56,201,238
.byte 15,56,202,231
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,0
.byte 15,56,200,206
pxor %xmm7,%xmm5
.byte 15,56,202,236
.byte 15,56,201,247
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,0
.byte 15,56,200,215
pxor %xmm4,%xmm6
.byte 15,56,201,252
.byte 15,56,202,245
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,0
.byte 15,56,200,204
pxor %xmm5,%xmm7
.byte 15,56,202,254
.byte 15,56,201,229
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,0
.byte 15,56,200,213
pxor %xmm6,%xmm4
.byte 15,56,201,238
.byte 15,56,202,231
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,1
.byte 15,56,200,206
pxor %xmm7,%xmm5
.byte 15,56,202,236
.byte 15,56,201,247
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,1
.byte 15,56,200,215
pxor %xmm4,%xmm6
.byte 15,56,201,252
.byte 15,56,202,245
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,1
.byte 15,56,200,204
pxor %xmm5,%xmm7
.byte 15,56,202,254
.byte 15,56,201,229
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,1
.byte 15,56,200,213
pxor %xmm6,%xmm4
.byte 15,56,201,238
.byte 15,56,202,231
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,1
.byte 15,56,200,206
pxor %xmm7,%xmm5
.byte 15,56,202,236
.byte 15,56,201,247
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,2
.byte 15,56,200,215
pxor %xmm4,%xmm6
.byte 15,56,201,252
.byte 15,56,202,245
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,2
.byte 15,56,200,204
pxor %xmm5,%xmm7
.byte 15,56,202,254
.byte 15,56,201,229
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,2
.byte 15,56,200,213
pxor %xmm6,%xmm4
.byte 15,56,201,238
.byte 15,56,202,231
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,2
.byte 15,56,200,206
pxor %xmm7,%xmm5
.byte 15,56,202,236
.byte 15,56,201,247
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,2
.byte 15,56,200,215
pxor %xmm4,%xmm6
.byte 15,56,201,252
.byte 15,56,202,245
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,3
.byte 15,56,200,204
pxor %xmm5,%xmm7
.byte 15,56,202,254
movdqu (%rsi),%xmm4
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,3
.byte 15,56,200,213
movdqu 16(%rsi),%xmm5
.byte 102,15,56,0,227
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,3
.byte 15,56,200,206
movdqu 32(%rsi),%xmm6
.byte 102,15,56,0,235
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 15,58,204,193,3
.byte 15,56,200,215
movdqu 48(%rsi),%xmm7
.byte 102,15,56,0,243
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
.byte 15,58,204,194,3
.byte 65,15,56,200,201
.byte 102,15,56,0,251
paddd %xmm8,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm9
jnz L$oop_shaext
pshufd $27,%xmm0,%xmm0
pshufd $27,%xmm1,%xmm1
movdqu %xmm0,(%rdi)
movd %xmm1,16(%rdi)
.byte 0xf3,0xc3
.p2align 4
sha1_block_data_order_ssse3:
_ssse3_shortcut:
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
.align 6
_sha256_block_data_order:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
#ifndef __KERNEL__
#if __has_feature(hwaddress_sanitizer) && __clang_major__ >= 10
adrp x16,:pg_hi21_nc:_OPENSSL_armcap_P
@@ -75,6 +76,7 @@ _sha256_block_data_order:
tst w16,#ARMV8_SHA256
b.ne Lv8_entry
#endif
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-128]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -1035,6 +1037,7 @@ Loop_16_xx:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#128
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
@@ -1069,6 +1072,7 @@ LK256:
.align 6
sha256_block_armv8:
Lv8_entry:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
.type sha256_block_data_order,%function
.align 6
sha256_block_data_order:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
#ifndef __KERNEL__
#if __has_feature(hwaddress_sanitizer) && __clang_major__ >= 10
adrp x16,:pg_hi21_nc:OPENSSL_armcap_P
@@ -76,6 +77,7 @@ sha256_block_data_order:
tst w16,#ARMV8_SHA256
b.ne .Lv8_entry
#endif
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-128]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -1036,6 +1038,7 @@ sha256_block_data_order:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#128
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size sha256_block_data_order,.-sha256_block_data_order
@@ -1070,6 +1073,7 @@ sha256_block_data_order:
.align 6
sha256_block_armv8:
.Lv8_entry:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -0,0 +1,579 @@
#define BORINGSSL_PREFIX CCryptoBoringSSL
#if defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
# This file is generated from a similarly-named Perl script in the BoringSSL
# source tree. Do not edit by hand.
#if defined(__i386__)
#if defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h>
#endif
.text
.globl _sha512_block_data_order
.hidden _sha512_block_data_order
.def _sha512_block_data_order; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_sha512_block_data_order:
.L_sha512_block_data_order_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
movl 20(%esp),%esi
movl 24(%esp),%edi
movl 28(%esp),%eax
movl %esp,%ebx
call .L000pic_point
.L000pic_point:
popl %ebp
leal .L001K512-.L000pic_point(%ebp),%ebp
subl $16,%esp
andl $-64,%esp
shll $7,%eax
addl %edi,%eax
movl %esi,(%esp)
movl %edi,4(%esp)
movl %eax,8(%esp)
movl %ebx,12(%esp)
.align 16
.L002loop_x86:
movl (%edi),%eax
movl 4(%edi),%ebx
movl 8(%edi),%ecx
movl 12(%edi),%edx
bswap %eax
bswap %ebx
bswap %ecx
bswap %edx
pushl %eax
pushl %ebx
pushl %ecx
pushl %edx
movl 16(%edi),%eax
movl 20(%edi),%ebx
movl 24(%edi),%ecx
movl 28(%edi),%edx
bswap %eax
bswap %ebx
bswap %ecx
bswap %edx
pushl %eax
pushl %ebx
pushl %ecx
pushl %edx
movl 32(%edi),%eax
movl 36(%edi),%ebx
movl 40(%edi),%ecx
movl 44(%edi),%edx
bswap %eax
bswap %ebx
bswap %ecx
bswap %edx
pushl %eax
pushl %ebx
pushl %ecx
pushl %edx
movl 48(%edi),%eax
movl 52(%edi),%ebx
movl 56(%edi),%ecx
movl 60(%edi),%edx
bswap %eax
bswap %ebx
bswap %ecx
bswap %edx
pushl %eax
pushl %ebx
pushl %ecx
pushl %edx
movl 64(%edi),%eax
movl 68(%edi),%ebx
movl 72(%edi),%ecx
movl 76(%edi),%edx
bswap %eax
bswap %ebx
bswap %ecx
bswap %edx
pushl %eax
pushl %ebx
pushl %ecx
pushl %edx
movl 80(%edi),%eax
movl 84(%edi),%ebx
movl 88(%edi),%ecx
movl 92(%edi),%edx
bswap %eax
bswap %ebx
bswap %ecx
bswap %edx
pushl %eax
pushl %ebx
pushl %ecx
pushl %edx
movl 96(%edi),%eax
movl 100(%edi),%ebx
movl 104(%edi),%ecx
movl 108(%edi),%edx
bswap %eax
bswap %ebx
bswap %ecx
bswap %edx
pushl %eax
pushl %ebx
pushl %ecx
pushl %edx
movl 112(%edi),%eax
movl 116(%edi),%ebx
movl 120(%edi),%ecx
movl 124(%edi),%edx
bswap %eax
bswap %ebx
bswap %ecx
bswap %edx
pushl %eax
pushl %ebx
pushl %ecx
pushl %edx
addl $128,%edi
subl $72,%esp
movl %edi,204(%esp)
leal 8(%esp),%edi
movl $16,%ecx
.long 2784229001
.align 16
.L00300_15_x86:
movl 40(%esp),%ecx
movl 44(%esp),%edx
movl %ecx,%esi
shrl $9,%ecx
movl %edx,%edi
shrl $9,%edx
movl %ecx,%ebx
shll $14,%esi
movl %edx,%eax
shll $14,%edi
xorl %esi,%ebx
shrl $5,%ecx
xorl %edi,%eax
shrl $5,%edx
xorl %ecx,%eax
shll $4,%esi
xorl %edx,%ebx
shll $4,%edi
xorl %esi,%ebx
shrl $4,%ecx
xorl %edi,%eax
shrl $4,%edx
xorl %ecx,%eax
shll $5,%esi
xorl %edx,%ebx
shll $5,%edi
xorl %esi,%eax
xorl %edi,%ebx
movl 48(%esp),%ecx
movl 52(%esp),%edx
movl 56(%esp),%esi
movl 60(%esp),%edi
addl 64(%esp),%eax
adcl 68(%esp),%ebx
xorl %esi,%ecx
xorl %edi,%edx
andl 40(%esp),%ecx
andl 44(%esp),%edx
addl 192(%esp),%eax
adcl 196(%esp),%ebx
xorl %esi,%ecx
xorl %edi,%edx
movl (%ebp),%esi
movl 4(%ebp),%edi
addl %ecx,%eax
adcl %edx,%ebx
movl 32(%esp),%ecx
movl 36(%esp),%edx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl %edi,%ebx
movl %eax,(%esp)
movl %ebx,4(%esp)
addl %ecx,%eax
adcl %edx,%ebx
movl 8(%esp),%ecx
movl 12(%esp),%edx
movl %eax,32(%esp)
movl %ebx,36(%esp)
movl %ecx,%esi
shrl $2,%ecx
movl %edx,%edi
shrl $2,%edx
movl %ecx,%ebx
shll $4,%esi
movl %edx,%eax
shll $4,%edi
xorl %esi,%ebx
shrl $5,%ecx
xorl %edi,%eax
shrl $5,%edx
xorl %ecx,%ebx
shll $21,%esi
xorl %edx,%eax
shll $21,%edi
xorl %esi,%eax
shrl $21,%ecx
xorl %edi,%ebx
shrl $21,%edx
xorl %ecx,%eax
shll $5,%esi
xorl %edx,%ebx
shll $5,%edi
xorl %esi,%eax
xorl %edi,%ebx
movl 8(%esp),%ecx
movl 12(%esp),%edx
movl 16(%esp),%esi
movl 20(%esp),%edi
addl (%esp),%eax
adcl 4(%esp),%ebx
orl %esi,%ecx
orl %edi,%edx
andl 24(%esp),%ecx
andl 28(%esp),%edx
andl 8(%esp),%esi
andl 12(%esp),%edi
orl %esi,%ecx
orl %edi,%edx
addl %ecx,%eax
adcl %edx,%ebx
movl %eax,(%esp)
movl %ebx,4(%esp)
movb (%ebp),%dl
subl $8,%esp
leal 8(%ebp),%ebp
cmpb $148,%dl
jne .L00300_15_x86
.align 16
.L00416_79_x86:
movl 312(%esp),%ecx
movl 316(%esp),%edx
movl %ecx,%esi
shrl $1,%ecx
movl %edx,%edi
shrl $1,%edx
movl %ecx,%eax
shll $24,%esi
movl %edx,%ebx
shll $24,%edi
xorl %esi,%ebx
shrl $6,%ecx
xorl %edi,%eax
shrl $6,%edx
xorl %ecx,%eax
shll $7,%esi
xorl %edx,%ebx
shll $1,%edi
xorl %esi,%ebx
shrl $1,%ecx
xorl %edi,%eax
shrl $1,%edx
xorl %ecx,%eax
shll $6,%edi
xorl %edx,%ebx
xorl %edi,%eax
movl %eax,(%esp)
movl %ebx,4(%esp)
movl 208(%esp),%ecx
movl 212(%esp),%edx
movl %ecx,%esi
shrl $6,%ecx
movl %edx,%edi
shrl $6,%edx
movl %ecx,%eax
shll $3,%esi
movl %edx,%ebx
shll $3,%edi
xorl %esi,%eax
shrl $13,%ecx
xorl %edi,%ebx
shrl $13,%edx
xorl %ecx,%eax
shll $10,%esi
xorl %edx,%ebx
shll $10,%edi
xorl %esi,%ebx
shrl $10,%ecx
xorl %edi,%eax
shrl $10,%edx
xorl %ecx,%ebx
shll $13,%edi
xorl %edx,%eax
xorl %edi,%eax
movl 320(%esp),%ecx
movl 324(%esp),%edx
addl (%esp),%eax
adcl 4(%esp),%ebx
movl 248(%esp),%esi
movl 252(%esp),%edi
addl %ecx,%eax
adcl %edx,%ebx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl %edi,%ebx
movl %eax,192(%esp)
movl %ebx,196(%esp)
movl 40(%esp),%ecx
movl 44(%esp),%edx
movl %ecx,%esi
shrl $9,%ecx
movl %edx,%edi
shrl $9,%edx
movl %ecx,%ebx
shll $14,%esi
movl %edx,%eax
shll $14,%edi
xorl %esi,%ebx
shrl $5,%ecx
xorl %edi,%eax
shrl $5,%edx
xorl %ecx,%eax
shll $4,%esi
xorl %edx,%ebx
shll $4,%edi
xorl %esi,%ebx
shrl $4,%ecx
xorl %edi,%eax
shrl $4,%edx
xorl %ecx,%eax
shll $5,%esi
xorl %edx,%ebx
shll $5,%edi
xorl %esi,%eax
xorl %edi,%ebx
movl 48(%esp),%ecx
movl 52(%esp),%edx
movl 56(%esp),%esi
movl 60(%esp),%edi
addl 64(%esp),%eax
adcl 68(%esp),%ebx
xorl %esi,%ecx
xorl %edi,%edx
andl 40(%esp),%ecx
andl 44(%esp),%edx
addl 192(%esp),%eax
adcl 196(%esp),%ebx
xorl %esi,%ecx
xorl %edi,%edx
movl (%ebp),%esi
movl 4(%ebp),%edi
addl %ecx,%eax
adcl %edx,%ebx
movl 32(%esp),%ecx
movl 36(%esp),%edx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl %edi,%ebx
movl %eax,(%esp)
movl %ebx,4(%esp)
addl %ecx,%eax
adcl %edx,%ebx
movl 8(%esp),%ecx
movl 12(%esp),%edx
movl %eax,32(%esp)
movl %ebx,36(%esp)
movl %ecx,%esi
shrl $2,%ecx
movl %edx,%edi
shrl $2,%edx
movl %ecx,%ebx
shll $4,%esi
movl %edx,%eax
shll $4,%edi
xorl %esi,%ebx
shrl $5,%ecx
xorl %edi,%eax
shrl $5,%edx
xorl %ecx,%ebx
shll $21,%esi
xorl %edx,%eax
shll $21,%edi
xorl %esi,%eax
shrl $21,%ecx
xorl %edi,%ebx
shrl $21,%edx
xorl %ecx,%eax
shll $5,%esi
xorl %edx,%ebx
shll $5,%edi
xorl %esi,%eax
xorl %edi,%ebx
movl 8(%esp),%ecx
movl 12(%esp),%edx
movl 16(%esp),%esi
movl 20(%esp),%edi
addl (%esp),%eax
adcl 4(%esp),%ebx
orl %esi,%ecx
orl %edi,%edx
andl 24(%esp),%ecx
andl 28(%esp),%edx
andl 8(%esp),%esi
andl 12(%esp),%edi
orl %esi,%ecx
orl %edi,%edx
addl %ecx,%eax
adcl %edx,%ebx
movl %eax,(%esp)
movl %ebx,4(%esp)
movb (%ebp),%dl
subl $8,%esp
leal 8(%ebp),%ebp
cmpb $23,%dl
jne .L00416_79_x86
movl 840(%esp),%esi
movl 844(%esp),%edi
movl (%esi),%eax
movl 4(%esi),%ebx
movl 8(%esi),%ecx
movl 12(%esi),%edx
addl 8(%esp),%eax
adcl 12(%esp),%ebx
movl %eax,(%esi)
movl %ebx,4(%esi)
addl 16(%esp),%ecx
adcl 20(%esp),%edx
movl %ecx,8(%esi)
movl %edx,12(%esi)
movl 16(%esi),%eax
movl 20(%esi),%ebx
movl 24(%esi),%ecx
movl 28(%esi),%edx
addl 24(%esp),%eax
adcl 28(%esp),%ebx
movl %eax,16(%esi)
movl %ebx,20(%esi)
addl 32(%esp),%ecx
adcl 36(%esp),%edx
movl %ecx,24(%esi)
movl %edx,28(%esi)
movl 32(%esi),%eax
movl 36(%esi),%ebx
movl 40(%esi),%ecx
movl 44(%esi),%edx
addl 40(%esp),%eax
adcl 44(%esp),%ebx
movl %eax,32(%esi)
movl %ebx,36(%esi)
addl 48(%esp),%ecx
adcl 52(%esp),%edx
movl %ecx,40(%esi)
movl %edx,44(%esi)
movl 48(%esi),%eax
movl 52(%esi),%ebx
movl 56(%esi),%ecx
movl 60(%esi),%edx
addl 56(%esp),%eax
adcl 60(%esp),%ebx
movl %eax,48(%esi)
movl %ebx,52(%esi)
addl 64(%esp),%ecx
adcl 68(%esp),%edx
movl %ecx,56(%esi)
movl %edx,60(%esi)
addl $840,%esp
subl $640,%ebp
cmpl 8(%esp),%edi
jb .L002loop_x86
movl 12(%esp),%esp
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.align 64
.L001K512:
.long 3609767458,1116352408
.long 602891725,1899447441
.long 3964484399,3049323471
.long 2173295548,3921009573
.long 4081628472,961987163
.long 3053834265,1508970993
.long 2937671579,2453635748
.long 3664609560,2870763221
.long 2734883394,3624381080
.long 1164996542,310598401
.long 1323610764,607225278
.long 3590304994,1426881987
.long 4068182383,1925078388
.long 991336113,2162078206
.long 633803317,2614888103
.long 3479774868,3248222580
.long 2666613458,3835390401
.long 944711139,4022224774
.long 2341262773,264347078
.long 2007800933,604807628
.long 1495990901,770255983
.long 1856431235,1249150122
.long 3175218132,1555081692
.long 2198950837,1996064986
.long 3999719339,2554220882
.long 766784016,2821834349
.long 2566594879,2952996808
.long 3203337956,3210313671
.long 1034457026,3336571891
.long 2466948901,3584528711
.long 3758326383,113926993
.long 168717936,338241895
.long 1188179964,666307205
.long 1546045734,773529912
.long 1522805485,1294757372
.long 2643833823,1396182291
.long 2343527390,1695183700
.long 1014477480,1986661051
.long 1206759142,2177026350
.long 344077627,2456956037
.long 1290863460,2730485921
.long 3158454273,2820302411
.long 3505952657,3259730800
.long 106217008,3345764771
.long 3606008344,3516065817
.long 1432725776,3600352804
.long 1467031594,4094571909
.long 851169720,275423344
.long 3100823752,430227734
.long 1363258195,506948616
.long 3750685593,659060556
.long 3785050280,883997877
.long 3318307427,958139571
.long 3812723403,1322822218
.long 2003034995,1537002063
.long 3602036899,1747873779
.long 1575990012,1955562222
.long 1125592928,2024104815
.long 2716904306,2227730452
.long 442776044,2361852424
.long 593698344,2428436474
.long 3733110249,2756734187
.long 2999351573,3204031479
.long 3815920427,3329325298
.long 3928383900,3391569614
.long 566280711,3515267271
.long 3454069534,3940187606
.long 4000239992,4118630271
.long 1914138554,116418474
.long 2731055270,174292421
.long 3203993006,289380356
.long 320620315,460393269
.long 587496836,685471733
.long 1086792851,852142971
.long 365543100,1017036298
.long 2618297676,1126000580
.long 3409855158,1288033470
.long 4234509866,1501505948
.long 987167468,1607167915
.long 1246189591,1816402316
.long 67438087,66051
.long 202182159,134810123
.byte 83,72,65,53,49,50,32,98,108,111,99,107,32,116,114,97
.byte 110,115,102,111,114,109,32,102,111,114,32,120,56,54,44,32
.byte 67,82,89,80,84,79,71,65,77,83,32,98,121,32,60,97
.byte 112,112,114,111,64,111,112,101,110,115,115,108,46,111,114,103
.byte 62,0
#endif
#endif // defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__ELF__)
.section .note.GNU-stack,"",%progbits
#endif
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
.align 6
_sha512_block_data_order:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-128]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -1025,6 +1026,7 @@ Loop_16_xx:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#128
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
.type sha512_block_data_order,%function
.align 6
sha512_block_data_order:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-128]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -1026,6 +1027,7 @@ sha512_block_data_order:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#128
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size sha512_block_data_order,.-sha512_block_data_order
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
#if defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h>
#endif
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_arm_arch.h>
.section __TEXT,__const
@@ -216,6 +218,7 @@ Lenc_entry:
.align 4
_vpaes_encrypt:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -225,6 +228,7 @@ _vpaes_encrypt:
st1 {v0.16b}, [x1]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
@@ -453,6 +457,7 @@ Ldec_entry:
.align 4
_vpaes_decrypt:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -462,6 +467,7 @@ _vpaes_decrypt:
st1 {v0.16b}, [x1]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
@@ -631,6 +637,7 @@ _vpaes_key_preheat:
.align 4
_vpaes_schedule_core:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29, x30, [sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -800,6 +807,7 @@ Lschedule_mangle_last_dec:
eor v6.16b, v6.16b, v6.16b // vpxor %xmm6, %xmm6, %xmm6
eor v7.16b, v7.16b, v7.16b // vpxor %xmm7, %xmm7, %xmm7
ldp x29, x30, [sp],#16
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
@@ -1013,6 +1021,7 @@ Lschedule_mangle_both:
.align 4
_vpaes_set_encrypt_key:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp d8,d9,[sp,#-16]! // ABI spec says so
@@ -1028,6 +1037,7 @@ _vpaes_set_encrypt_key:
ldp d8,d9,[sp],#16
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
@@ -1036,6 +1046,7 @@ _vpaes_set_encrypt_key:
.align 4
_vpaes_set_decrypt_key:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp d8,d9,[sp,#-16]! // ABI spec says so
@@ -1055,6 +1066,7 @@ _vpaes_set_decrypt_key:
ldp d8,d9,[sp],#16
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.globl _vpaes_cbc_encrypt
@@ -1062,6 +1074,7 @@ _vpaes_set_decrypt_key:
.align 4
_vpaes_cbc_encrypt:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
cbz x2, Lcbc_abort
cmp w5, #0 // check direction
b.eq vpaes_cbc_decrypt
@@ -1088,6 +1101,7 @@ Lcbc_enc_loop:
st1 {v0.16b}, [x4] // write ivec
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
Lcbc_abort:
ret
@@ -1095,6 +1109,8 @@ Lcbc_abort:
.align 4
vpaes_cbc_decrypt:
// Not adding AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER here because vpaes_cbc_decrypt is jumped to
// only from vpaes_cbc_encrypt which has already signed the return address.
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp d8,d9,[sp,#-16]! // ABI spec says so
@@ -1136,6 +1152,7 @@ Lcbc_dec_done:
ldp d10,d11,[sp],#16
ldp d8,d9,[sp],#16
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.globl _vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
@@ -1143,6 +1160,7 @@ Lcbc_dec_done:
.align 4
_vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp d8,d9,[sp,#-16]! // ABI spec says so
@@ -1210,6 +1228,7 @@ Lctr32_done:
ldp d10,d11,[sp],#16
ldp d8,d9,[sp],#16
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
#endif // !OPENSSL_NO_ASM
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
#if defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h>
#endif
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_arm_arch.h>
.section .rodata
.type _vpaes_consts,%object
@@ -217,6 +219,7 @@ _vpaes_encrypt_core:
.type vpaes_encrypt,%function
.align 4
vpaes_encrypt:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -226,6 +229,7 @@ vpaes_encrypt:
st1 {v0.16b}, [x1]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size vpaes_encrypt,.-vpaes_encrypt
@@ -454,6 +458,7 @@ _vpaes_decrypt_core:
.type vpaes_decrypt,%function
.align 4
vpaes_decrypt:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -463,6 +468,7 @@ vpaes_decrypt:
st1 {v0.16b}, [x1]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size vpaes_decrypt,.-vpaes_decrypt
@@ -632,6 +638,7 @@ _vpaes_key_preheat:
.type _vpaes_schedule_core,%function
.align 4
_vpaes_schedule_core:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29, x30, [sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -801,6 +808,7 @@ _vpaes_schedule_core:
eor v6.16b, v6.16b, v6.16b // vpxor %xmm6, %xmm6, %xmm6
eor v7.16b, v7.16b, v7.16b // vpxor %xmm7, %xmm7, %xmm7
ldp x29, x30, [sp],#16
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size _vpaes_schedule_core,.-_vpaes_schedule_core
@@ -1014,6 +1022,7 @@ _vpaes_schedule_mangle:
.type vpaes_set_encrypt_key,%function
.align 4
vpaes_set_encrypt_key:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp d8,d9,[sp,#-16]! // ABI spec says so
@@ -1029,6 +1038,7 @@ vpaes_set_encrypt_key:
ldp d8,d9,[sp],#16
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size vpaes_set_encrypt_key,.-vpaes_set_encrypt_key
@@ -1037,6 +1047,7 @@ vpaes_set_encrypt_key:
.type vpaes_set_decrypt_key,%function
.align 4
vpaes_set_decrypt_key:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp d8,d9,[sp,#-16]! // ABI spec says so
@@ -1056,6 +1067,7 @@ vpaes_set_decrypt_key:
ldp d8,d9,[sp],#16
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size vpaes_set_decrypt_key,.-vpaes_set_decrypt_key
.globl vpaes_cbc_encrypt
@@ -1063,6 +1075,7 @@ vpaes_set_decrypt_key:
.type vpaes_cbc_encrypt,%function
.align 4
vpaes_cbc_encrypt:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
cbz x2, .Lcbc_abort
cmp w5, #0 // check direction
b.eq vpaes_cbc_decrypt
@@ -1089,6 +1102,7 @@ vpaes_cbc_encrypt:
st1 {v0.16b}, [x4] // write ivec
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
.Lcbc_abort:
ret
.size vpaes_cbc_encrypt,.-vpaes_cbc_encrypt
@@ -1096,6 +1110,8 @@ vpaes_cbc_encrypt:
.type vpaes_cbc_decrypt,%function
.align 4
vpaes_cbc_decrypt:
// Not adding AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER here because vpaes_cbc_decrypt is jumped to
// only from vpaes_cbc_encrypt which has already signed the return address.
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp d8,d9,[sp,#-16]! // ABI spec says so
@@ -1137,6 +1153,7 @@ vpaes_cbc_decrypt:
ldp d10,d11,[sp],#16
ldp d8,d9,[sp],#16
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size vpaes_cbc_decrypt,.-vpaes_cbc_decrypt
.globl vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
@@ -1144,6 +1161,7 @@ vpaes_cbc_decrypt:
.type vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,%function
.align 4
vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp d8,d9,[sp,#-16]! // ABI spec says so
@@ -1211,6 +1229,7 @@ vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
ldp d10,d11,[sp],#16
ldp d8,d9,[sp],#16
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,.-vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
#endif
@@ -0,0 +1,701 @@
#define BORINGSSL_PREFIX CCryptoBoringSSL
#if defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
# This file is generated from a similarly-named Perl script in the BoringSSL
# source tree. Do not edit by hand.
#if defined(__i386__)
#if defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h>
#endif
.text
#ifdef BORINGSSL_DISPATCH_TEST
#endif
.align 64
.L_vpaes_consts:
.long 218628480,235210255,168496130,67568393
.long 252381056,17041926,33884169,51187212
.long 252645135,252645135,252645135,252645135
.long 1512730624,3266504856,1377990664,3401244816
.long 830229760,1275146365,2969422977,3447763452
.long 3411033600,2979783055,338359620,2782886510
.long 4209124096,907596821,221174255,1006095553
.long 191964160,3799684038,3164090317,1589111125
.long 182528256,1777043520,2877432650,3265356744
.long 1874708224,3503451415,3305285752,363511674
.long 1606117888,3487855781,1093350906,2384367825
.long 197121,67569157,134941193,202313229
.long 67569157,134941193,202313229,197121
.long 134941193,202313229,197121,67569157
.long 202313229,197121,67569157,134941193
.long 33619971,100992007,168364043,235736079
.long 235736079,33619971,100992007,168364043
.long 168364043,235736079,33619971,100992007
.long 100992007,168364043,235736079,33619971
.long 50462976,117835012,185207048,252579084
.long 252314880,51251460,117574920,184942860
.long 184682752,252054788,50987272,118359308
.long 118099200,185467140,251790600,50727180
.long 2946363062,528716217,1300004225,1881839624
.long 1532713819,1532713819,1532713819,1532713819
.long 3602276352,4288629033,3737020424,4153884961
.long 1354558464,32357713,2958822624,3775749553
.long 1201988352,132424512,1572796698,503232858
.long 2213177600,1597421020,4103937655,675398315
.long 2749646592,4273543773,1511898873,121693092
.long 3040248576,1103263732,2871565598,1608280554
.long 2236667136,2588920351,482954393,64377734
.long 3069987328,291237287,2117370568,3650299247
.long 533321216,3573750986,2572112006,1401264716
.long 1339849704,2721158661,548607111,3445553514
.long 2128193280,3054596040,2183486460,1257083700
.long 655635200,1165381986,3923443150,2344132524
.long 190078720,256924420,290342170,357187870
.long 1610966272,2263057382,4103205268,309794674
.long 2592527872,2233205587,1335446729,3402964816
.long 3973531904,3225098121,3002836325,1918774430
.long 3870401024,2102906079,2284471353,4117666579
.long 617007872,1021508343,366931923,691083277
.long 2528395776,3491914898,2968704004,1613121270
.long 3445188352,3247741094,844474987,4093578302
.long 651481088,1190302358,1689581232,574775300
.long 4289380608,206939853,2555985458,2489840491
.long 2130264064,327674451,3566485037,3349835193
.long 2470714624,316102159,3636825756,3393945945
.byte 86,101,99,116,111,114,32,80,101,114,109,117,116,97,116,105
.byte 111,110,32,65,69,83,32,102,111,114,32,120,56,54,47,83
.byte 83,83,69,51,44,32,77,105,107,101,32,72,97,109,98,117
.byte 114,103,32,40,83,116,97,110,102,111,114,100,32,85,110,105
.byte 118,101,114,115,105,116,121,41,0
.align 64
.hidden __vpaes_preheat
.def __vpaes_preheat; .scl 3; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
__vpaes_preheat:
addl (%esp),%ebp
movdqa -48(%ebp),%xmm7
movdqa -16(%ebp),%xmm6
ret
.hidden __vpaes_encrypt_core
.def __vpaes_encrypt_core; .scl 3; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
__vpaes_encrypt_core:
movl $16,%ecx
movl 240(%edx),%eax
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm1
movdqa (%ebp),%xmm2
pandn %xmm0,%xmm1
pand %xmm6,%xmm0
movdqu (%edx),%xmm5
.byte 102,15,56,0,208
movdqa 16(%ebp),%xmm0
pxor %xmm5,%xmm2
psrld $4,%xmm1
addl $16,%edx
.byte 102,15,56,0,193
leal 192(%ebp),%ebx
pxor %xmm2,%xmm0
jmp .L000enc_entry
.align 16
.L001enc_loop:
movdqa 32(%ebp),%xmm4
movdqa 48(%ebp),%xmm0
.byte 102,15,56,0,226
.byte 102,15,56,0,195
pxor %xmm5,%xmm4
movdqa 64(%ebp),%xmm5
pxor %xmm4,%xmm0
movdqa -64(%ebx,%ecx,1),%xmm1
.byte 102,15,56,0,234
movdqa 80(%ebp),%xmm2
movdqa (%ebx,%ecx,1),%xmm4
.byte 102,15,56,0,211
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm3
pxor %xmm5,%xmm2
.byte 102,15,56,0,193
addl $16,%edx
pxor %xmm2,%xmm0
.byte 102,15,56,0,220
addl $16,%ecx
pxor %xmm0,%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,193
andl $48,%ecx
subl $1,%eax
pxor %xmm3,%xmm0
.L000enc_entry:
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm1
movdqa -32(%ebp),%xmm5
pandn %xmm0,%xmm1
psrld $4,%xmm1
pand %xmm6,%xmm0
.byte 102,15,56,0,232
movdqa %xmm7,%xmm3
pxor %xmm1,%xmm0
.byte 102,15,56,0,217
movdqa %xmm7,%xmm4
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,224
movdqa %xmm7,%xmm2
pxor %xmm5,%xmm4
.byte 102,15,56,0,211
movdqa %xmm7,%xmm3
pxor %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 102,15,56,0,220
movdqu (%edx),%xmm5
pxor %xmm1,%xmm3
jnz .L001enc_loop
movdqa 96(%ebp),%xmm4
movdqa 112(%ebp),%xmm0
.byte 102,15,56,0,226
pxor %xmm5,%xmm4
.byte 102,15,56,0,195
movdqa 64(%ebx,%ecx,1),%xmm1
pxor %xmm4,%xmm0
.byte 102,15,56,0,193
ret
.hidden __vpaes_decrypt_core
.def __vpaes_decrypt_core; .scl 3; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
__vpaes_decrypt_core:
leal 608(%ebp),%ebx
movl 240(%edx),%eax
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm1
movdqa -64(%ebx),%xmm2
pandn %xmm0,%xmm1
movl %eax,%ecx
psrld $4,%xmm1
movdqu (%edx),%xmm5
shll $4,%ecx
pand %xmm6,%xmm0
.byte 102,15,56,0,208
movdqa -48(%ebx),%xmm0
xorl $48,%ecx
.byte 102,15,56,0,193
andl $48,%ecx
pxor %xmm5,%xmm2
movdqa 176(%ebp),%xmm5
pxor %xmm2,%xmm0
addl $16,%edx
leal -352(%ebx,%ecx,1),%ecx
jmp .L002dec_entry
.align 16
.L003dec_loop:
movdqa -32(%ebx),%xmm4
movdqa -16(%ebx),%xmm1
.byte 102,15,56,0,226
.byte 102,15,56,0,203
pxor %xmm4,%xmm0
movdqa (%ebx),%xmm4
pxor %xmm1,%xmm0
movdqa 16(%ebx),%xmm1
.byte 102,15,56,0,226
.byte 102,15,56,0,197
.byte 102,15,56,0,203
pxor %xmm4,%xmm0
movdqa 32(%ebx),%xmm4
pxor %xmm1,%xmm0
movdqa 48(%ebx),%xmm1
.byte 102,15,56,0,226
.byte 102,15,56,0,197
.byte 102,15,56,0,203
pxor %xmm4,%xmm0
movdqa 64(%ebx),%xmm4
pxor %xmm1,%xmm0
movdqa 80(%ebx),%xmm1
.byte 102,15,56,0,226
.byte 102,15,56,0,197
.byte 102,15,56,0,203
pxor %xmm4,%xmm0
addl $16,%edx
.byte 102,15,58,15,237,12
pxor %xmm1,%xmm0
subl $1,%eax
.L002dec_entry:
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm1
movdqa -32(%ebp),%xmm2
pandn %xmm0,%xmm1
pand %xmm6,%xmm0
psrld $4,%xmm1
.byte 102,15,56,0,208
movdqa %xmm7,%xmm3
pxor %xmm1,%xmm0
.byte 102,15,56,0,217
movdqa %xmm7,%xmm4
pxor %xmm2,%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,224
pxor %xmm2,%xmm4
movdqa %xmm7,%xmm2
.byte 102,15,56,0,211
movdqa %xmm7,%xmm3
pxor %xmm0,%xmm2
.byte 102,15,56,0,220
movdqu (%edx),%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm3
jnz .L003dec_loop
movdqa 96(%ebx),%xmm4
.byte 102,15,56,0,226
pxor %xmm0,%xmm4
movdqa 112(%ebx),%xmm0
movdqa (%ecx),%xmm2
.byte 102,15,56,0,195
pxor %xmm4,%xmm0
.byte 102,15,56,0,194
ret
.hidden __vpaes_schedule_core
.def __vpaes_schedule_core; .scl 3; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
__vpaes_schedule_core:
addl (%esp),%ebp
movdqu (%esi),%xmm0
movdqa 320(%ebp),%xmm2
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm3
leal (%ebp),%ebx
movdqa %xmm2,4(%esp)
call __vpaes_schedule_transform
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm7
testl %edi,%edi
jnz .L004schedule_am_decrypting
movdqu %xmm0,(%edx)
jmp .L005schedule_go
.L004schedule_am_decrypting:
movdqa 256(%ebp,%ecx,1),%xmm1
.byte 102,15,56,0,217
movdqu %xmm3,(%edx)
xorl $48,%ecx
.L005schedule_go:
cmpl $192,%eax
ja .L006schedule_256
je .L007schedule_192
.L008schedule_128:
movl $10,%eax
.L009loop_schedule_128:
call __vpaes_schedule_round
decl %eax
jz .L010schedule_mangle_last
call __vpaes_schedule_mangle
jmp .L009loop_schedule_128
.align 16
.L007schedule_192:
movdqu 8(%esi),%xmm0
call __vpaes_schedule_transform
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm6
pxor %xmm4,%xmm4
movhlps %xmm4,%xmm6
movl $4,%eax
.L011loop_schedule_192:
call __vpaes_schedule_round
.byte 102,15,58,15,198,8
call __vpaes_schedule_mangle
call __vpaes_schedule_192_smear
call __vpaes_schedule_mangle
call __vpaes_schedule_round
decl %eax
jz .L010schedule_mangle_last
call __vpaes_schedule_mangle
call __vpaes_schedule_192_smear
jmp .L011loop_schedule_192
.align 16
.L006schedule_256:
movdqu 16(%esi),%xmm0
call __vpaes_schedule_transform
movl $7,%eax
.L012loop_schedule_256:
call __vpaes_schedule_mangle
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm6
call __vpaes_schedule_round
decl %eax
jz .L010schedule_mangle_last
call __vpaes_schedule_mangle
pshufd $255,%xmm0,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm7,20(%esp)
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm7
call .L_vpaes_schedule_low_round
movdqa 20(%esp),%xmm7
jmp .L012loop_schedule_256
.align 16
.L010schedule_mangle_last:
leal 384(%ebp),%ebx
testl %edi,%edi
jnz .L013schedule_mangle_last_dec
movdqa 256(%ebp,%ecx,1),%xmm1
.byte 102,15,56,0,193
leal 352(%ebp),%ebx
addl $32,%edx
.L013schedule_mangle_last_dec:
addl $-16,%edx
pxor 336(%ebp),%xmm0
call __vpaes_schedule_transform
movdqu %xmm0,(%edx)
pxor %xmm0,%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm1
pxor %xmm2,%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm3
pxor %xmm4,%xmm4
pxor %xmm5,%xmm5
pxor %xmm6,%xmm6
pxor %xmm7,%xmm7
ret
.hidden __vpaes_schedule_192_smear
.def __vpaes_schedule_192_smear; .scl 3; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
__vpaes_schedule_192_smear:
pshufd $128,%xmm6,%xmm1
pshufd $254,%xmm7,%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm6
pxor %xmm1,%xmm1
pxor %xmm0,%xmm6
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm0
movhlps %xmm1,%xmm6
ret
.hidden __vpaes_schedule_round
.def __vpaes_schedule_round; .scl 3; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
__vpaes_schedule_round:
movdqa 8(%esp),%xmm2
pxor %xmm1,%xmm1
.byte 102,15,58,15,202,15
.byte 102,15,58,15,210,15
pxor %xmm1,%xmm7
pshufd $255,%xmm0,%xmm0
.byte 102,15,58,15,192,1
movdqa %xmm2,8(%esp)
.L_vpaes_schedule_low_round:
movdqa %xmm7,%xmm1
pslldq $4,%xmm7
pxor %xmm1,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm7,%xmm1
pslldq $8,%xmm7
pxor %xmm1,%xmm7
pxor 336(%ebp),%xmm7
movdqa -16(%ebp),%xmm4
movdqa -48(%ebp),%xmm5
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm1
pandn %xmm0,%xmm1
psrld $4,%xmm1
pand %xmm4,%xmm0
movdqa -32(%ebp),%xmm2
.byte 102,15,56,0,208
pxor %xmm1,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm5,%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,217
pxor %xmm2,%xmm3
movdqa %xmm5,%xmm4
.byte 102,15,56,0,224
pxor %xmm2,%xmm4
movdqa %xmm5,%xmm2
.byte 102,15,56,0,211
pxor %xmm0,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm5,%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,220
pxor %xmm1,%xmm3
movdqa 32(%ebp),%xmm4
.byte 102,15,56,0,226
movdqa 48(%ebp),%xmm0
.byte 102,15,56,0,195
pxor %xmm4,%xmm0
pxor %xmm7,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm7
ret
.hidden __vpaes_schedule_transform
.def __vpaes_schedule_transform; .scl 3; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
__vpaes_schedule_transform:
movdqa -16(%ebp),%xmm2
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm1
pandn %xmm0,%xmm1
psrld $4,%xmm1
pand %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa (%ebx),%xmm2
.byte 102,15,56,0,208
movdqa 16(%ebx),%xmm0
.byte 102,15,56,0,193
pxor %xmm2,%xmm0
ret
.hidden __vpaes_schedule_mangle
.def __vpaes_schedule_mangle; .scl 3; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
__vpaes_schedule_mangle:
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm4
movdqa 128(%ebp),%xmm5
testl %edi,%edi
jnz .L014schedule_mangle_dec
addl $16,%edx
pxor 336(%ebp),%xmm4
.byte 102,15,56,0,229
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,229
pxor %xmm4,%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,229
pxor %xmm4,%xmm3
jmp .L015schedule_mangle_both
.align 16
.L014schedule_mangle_dec:
movdqa -16(%ebp),%xmm2
leal 416(%ebp),%esi
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm1
pandn %xmm4,%xmm1
psrld $4,%xmm1
pand %xmm2,%xmm4
movdqa (%esi),%xmm2
.byte 102,15,56,0,212
movdqa 16(%esi),%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,217
pxor %xmm2,%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,221
movdqa 32(%esi),%xmm2
.byte 102,15,56,0,212
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
movdqa 48(%esi),%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,217
pxor %xmm2,%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,221
movdqa 64(%esi),%xmm2
.byte 102,15,56,0,212
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
movdqa 80(%esi),%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,217
pxor %xmm2,%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,221
movdqa 96(%esi),%xmm2
.byte 102,15,56,0,212
pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
movdqa 112(%esi),%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,217
pxor %xmm2,%xmm3
addl $-16,%edx
.L015schedule_mangle_both:
movdqa 256(%ebp,%ecx,1),%xmm1
.byte 102,15,56,0,217
addl $-16,%ecx
andl $48,%ecx
movdqu %xmm3,(%edx)
ret
.globl _vpaes_set_encrypt_key
.hidden _vpaes_set_encrypt_key
.def _vpaes_set_encrypt_key; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_vpaes_set_encrypt_key:
.L_vpaes_set_encrypt_key_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
#ifdef BORINGSSL_DISPATCH_TEST
pushl %ebx
pushl %edx
call .L016pic
.L016pic:
popl %ebx
leal _BORINGSSL_function_hit+5-.L016pic(%ebx),%ebx
movl $1,%edx
movb %dl,(%ebx)
popl %edx
popl %ebx
#endif
movl 20(%esp),%esi
leal -56(%esp),%ebx
movl 24(%esp),%eax
andl $-16,%ebx
movl 28(%esp),%edx
xchgl %esp,%ebx
movl %ebx,48(%esp)
movl %eax,%ebx
shrl $5,%ebx
addl $5,%ebx
movl %ebx,240(%edx)
movl $48,%ecx
movl $0,%edi
leal .L_vpaes_consts+0x30-.L017pic_point,%ebp
call __vpaes_schedule_core
.L017pic_point:
movl 48(%esp),%esp
xorl %eax,%eax
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.globl _vpaes_set_decrypt_key
.hidden _vpaes_set_decrypt_key
.def _vpaes_set_decrypt_key; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_vpaes_set_decrypt_key:
.L_vpaes_set_decrypt_key_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
movl 20(%esp),%esi
leal -56(%esp),%ebx
movl 24(%esp),%eax
andl $-16,%ebx
movl 28(%esp),%edx
xchgl %esp,%ebx
movl %ebx,48(%esp)
movl %eax,%ebx
shrl $5,%ebx
addl $5,%ebx
movl %ebx,240(%edx)
shll $4,%ebx
leal 16(%edx,%ebx,1),%edx
movl $1,%edi
movl %eax,%ecx
shrl $1,%ecx
andl $32,%ecx
xorl $32,%ecx
leal .L_vpaes_consts+0x30-.L018pic_point,%ebp
call __vpaes_schedule_core
.L018pic_point:
movl 48(%esp),%esp
xorl %eax,%eax
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.globl _vpaes_encrypt
.hidden _vpaes_encrypt
.def _vpaes_encrypt; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_vpaes_encrypt:
.L_vpaes_encrypt_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
#ifdef BORINGSSL_DISPATCH_TEST
pushl %ebx
pushl %edx
call .L019pic
.L019pic:
popl %ebx
leal _BORINGSSL_function_hit+4-.L019pic(%ebx),%ebx
movl $1,%edx
movb %dl,(%ebx)
popl %edx
popl %ebx
#endif
leal .L_vpaes_consts+0x30-.L020pic_point,%ebp
call __vpaes_preheat
.L020pic_point:
movl 20(%esp),%esi
leal -56(%esp),%ebx
movl 24(%esp),%edi
andl $-16,%ebx
movl 28(%esp),%edx
xchgl %esp,%ebx
movl %ebx,48(%esp)
movdqu (%esi),%xmm0
call __vpaes_encrypt_core
movdqu %xmm0,(%edi)
movl 48(%esp),%esp
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.globl _vpaes_decrypt
.hidden _vpaes_decrypt
.def _vpaes_decrypt; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_vpaes_decrypt:
.L_vpaes_decrypt_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
leal .L_vpaes_consts+0x30-.L021pic_point,%ebp
call __vpaes_preheat
.L021pic_point:
movl 20(%esp),%esi
leal -56(%esp),%ebx
movl 24(%esp),%edi
andl $-16,%ebx
movl 28(%esp),%edx
xchgl %esp,%ebx
movl %ebx,48(%esp)
movdqu (%esi),%xmm0
call __vpaes_decrypt_core
movdqu %xmm0,(%edi)
movl 48(%esp),%esp
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.globl _vpaes_cbc_encrypt
.hidden _vpaes_cbc_encrypt
.def _vpaes_cbc_encrypt; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_vpaes_cbc_encrypt:
.L_vpaes_cbc_encrypt_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
movl 20(%esp),%esi
movl 24(%esp),%edi
movl 28(%esp),%eax
movl 32(%esp),%edx
subl $16,%eax
jc .L022cbc_abort
leal -56(%esp),%ebx
movl 36(%esp),%ebp
andl $-16,%ebx
movl 40(%esp),%ecx
xchgl %esp,%ebx
movdqu (%ebp),%xmm1
subl %esi,%edi
movl %ebx,48(%esp)
movl %edi,(%esp)
movl %edx,4(%esp)
movl %ebp,8(%esp)
movl %eax,%edi
leal .L_vpaes_consts+0x30-.L023pic_point,%ebp
call __vpaes_preheat
.L023pic_point:
cmpl $0,%ecx
je .L024cbc_dec_loop
jmp .L025cbc_enc_loop
.align 16
.L025cbc_enc_loop:
movdqu (%esi),%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm0
call __vpaes_encrypt_core
movl (%esp),%ebx
movl 4(%esp),%edx
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
movdqu %xmm0,(%ebx,%esi,1)
leal 16(%esi),%esi
subl $16,%edi
jnc .L025cbc_enc_loop
jmp .L026cbc_done
.align 16
.L024cbc_dec_loop:
movdqu (%esi),%xmm0
movdqa %xmm1,16(%esp)
movdqa %xmm0,32(%esp)
call __vpaes_decrypt_core
movl (%esp),%ebx
movl 4(%esp),%edx
pxor 16(%esp),%xmm0
movdqa 32(%esp),%xmm1
movdqu %xmm0,(%ebx,%esi,1)
leal 16(%esi),%esi
subl $16,%edi
jnc .L024cbc_dec_loop
.L026cbc_done:
movl 8(%esp),%ebx
movl 48(%esp),%esp
movdqu %xmm1,(%ebx)
.L022cbc_abort:
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
#endif
#endif // defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__ELF__)
.section .note.GNU-stack,"",%progbits
#endif
@@ -0,0 +1,369 @@
#define BORINGSSL_PREFIX CCryptoBoringSSL
#if defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
# This file is generated from a similarly-named Perl script in the BoringSSL
# source tree. Do not edit by hand.
#if defined(__i386__)
#if defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h>
#endif
.text
.globl _bn_mul_mont
.hidden _bn_mul_mont
.def _bn_mul_mont; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_bn_mul_mont:
.L_bn_mul_mont_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
xorl %eax,%eax
movl 40(%esp),%edi
cmpl $4,%edi
jl .L000just_leave
leal 20(%esp),%esi
leal 24(%esp),%edx
addl $2,%edi
negl %edi
leal -32(%esp,%edi,4),%ebp
negl %edi
movl %ebp,%eax
subl %edx,%eax
andl $2047,%eax
subl %eax,%ebp
xorl %ebp,%edx
andl $2048,%edx
xorl $2048,%edx
subl %edx,%ebp
andl $-64,%ebp
movl %esp,%eax
subl %ebp,%eax
andl $-4096,%eax
movl %esp,%edx
leal (%ebp,%eax,1),%esp
movl (%esp),%eax
cmpl %ebp,%esp
ja .L001page_walk
jmp .L002page_walk_done
.align 16
.L001page_walk:
leal -4096(%esp),%esp
movl (%esp),%eax
cmpl %ebp,%esp
ja .L001page_walk
.L002page_walk_done:
movl (%esi),%eax
movl 4(%esi),%ebx
movl 8(%esi),%ecx
movl 12(%esi),%ebp
movl 16(%esi),%esi
movl (%esi),%esi
movl %eax,4(%esp)
movl %ebx,8(%esp)
movl %ecx,12(%esp)
movl %ebp,16(%esp)
movl %esi,20(%esp)
leal -3(%edi),%ebx
movl %edx,24(%esp)
movl 8(%esp),%esi
leal 1(%ebx),%ebp
movl 12(%esp),%edi
xorl %ecx,%ecx
movl %esi,%edx
andl $1,%ebp
subl %edi,%edx
leal 4(%edi,%ebx,4),%eax
orl %edx,%ebp
movl (%edi),%edi
jz .L003bn_sqr_mont
movl %eax,28(%esp)
movl (%esi),%eax
xorl %edx,%edx
.align 16
.L004mull:
movl %edx,%ebp
mull %edi
addl %eax,%ebp
leal 1(%ecx),%ecx
adcl $0,%edx
movl (%esi,%ecx,4),%eax
cmpl %ebx,%ecx
movl %ebp,28(%esp,%ecx,4)
jl .L004mull
movl %edx,%ebp
mull %edi
movl 20(%esp),%edi
addl %ebp,%eax
movl 16(%esp),%esi
adcl $0,%edx
imull 32(%esp),%edi
movl %eax,32(%esp,%ebx,4)
xorl %ecx,%ecx
movl %edx,36(%esp,%ebx,4)
movl %ecx,40(%esp,%ebx,4)
movl (%esi),%eax
mull %edi
addl 32(%esp),%eax
movl 4(%esi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
incl %ecx
jmp .L0052ndmadd
.align 16
.L0061stmadd:
movl %edx,%ebp
mull %edi
addl 32(%esp,%ecx,4),%ebp
leal 1(%ecx),%ecx
adcl $0,%edx
addl %eax,%ebp
movl (%esi,%ecx,4),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
cmpl %ebx,%ecx
movl %ebp,28(%esp,%ecx,4)
jl .L0061stmadd
movl %edx,%ebp
mull %edi
addl 32(%esp,%ebx,4),%eax
movl 20(%esp),%edi
adcl $0,%edx
movl 16(%esp),%esi
addl %eax,%ebp
adcl $0,%edx
imull 32(%esp),%edi
xorl %ecx,%ecx
addl 36(%esp,%ebx,4),%edx
movl %ebp,32(%esp,%ebx,4)
adcl $0,%ecx
movl (%esi),%eax
movl %edx,36(%esp,%ebx,4)
movl %ecx,40(%esp,%ebx,4)
mull %edi
addl 32(%esp),%eax
movl 4(%esi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl $1,%ecx
.align 16
.L0052ndmadd:
movl %edx,%ebp
mull %edi
addl 32(%esp,%ecx,4),%ebp
leal 1(%ecx),%ecx
adcl $0,%edx
addl %eax,%ebp
movl (%esi,%ecx,4),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
cmpl %ebx,%ecx
movl %ebp,24(%esp,%ecx,4)
jl .L0052ndmadd
movl %edx,%ebp
mull %edi
addl 32(%esp,%ebx,4),%ebp
adcl $0,%edx
addl %eax,%ebp
adcl $0,%edx
movl %ebp,28(%esp,%ebx,4)
xorl %eax,%eax
movl 12(%esp),%ecx
addl 36(%esp,%ebx,4),%edx
adcl 40(%esp,%ebx,4),%eax
leal 4(%ecx),%ecx
movl %edx,32(%esp,%ebx,4)
cmpl 28(%esp),%ecx
movl %eax,36(%esp,%ebx,4)
je .L007common_tail
movl (%ecx),%edi
movl 8(%esp),%esi
movl %ecx,12(%esp)
xorl %ecx,%ecx
xorl %edx,%edx
movl (%esi),%eax
jmp .L0061stmadd
.align 16
.L003bn_sqr_mont:
movl %ebx,(%esp)
movl %ecx,12(%esp)
movl %edi,%eax
mull %edi
movl %eax,32(%esp)
movl %edx,%ebx
shrl $1,%edx
andl $1,%ebx
incl %ecx
.align 16
.L008sqr:
movl (%esi,%ecx,4),%eax
movl %edx,%ebp
mull %edi
addl %ebp,%eax
leal 1(%ecx),%ecx
adcl $0,%edx
leal (%ebx,%eax,2),%ebp
shrl $31,%eax
cmpl (%esp),%ecx
movl %eax,%ebx
movl %ebp,28(%esp,%ecx,4)
jl .L008sqr
movl (%esi,%ecx,4),%eax
movl %edx,%ebp
mull %edi
addl %ebp,%eax
movl 20(%esp),%edi
adcl $0,%edx
movl 16(%esp),%esi
leal (%ebx,%eax,2),%ebp
imull 32(%esp),%edi
shrl $31,%eax
movl %ebp,32(%esp,%ecx,4)
leal (%eax,%edx,2),%ebp
movl (%esi),%eax
shrl $31,%edx
movl %ebp,36(%esp,%ecx,4)
movl %edx,40(%esp,%ecx,4)
mull %edi
addl 32(%esp),%eax
movl %ecx,%ebx
adcl $0,%edx
movl 4(%esi),%eax
movl $1,%ecx
.align 16
.L0093rdmadd:
movl %edx,%ebp
mull %edi
addl 32(%esp,%ecx,4),%ebp
adcl $0,%edx
addl %eax,%ebp
movl 4(%esi,%ecx,4),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %ebp,28(%esp,%ecx,4)
movl %edx,%ebp
mull %edi
addl 36(%esp,%ecx,4),%ebp
leal 2(%ecx),%ecx
adcl $0,%edx
addl %eax,%ebp
movl (%esi,%ecx,4),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
cmpl %ebx,%ecx
movl %ebp,24(%esp,%ecx,4)
jl .L0093rdmadd
movl %edx,%ebp
mull %edi
addl 32(%esp,%ebx,4),%ebp
adcl $0,%edx
addl %eax,%ebp
adcl $0,%edx
movl %ebp,28(%esp,%ebx,4)
movl 12(%esp),%ecx
xorl %eax,%eax
movl 8(%esp),%esi
addl 36(%esp,%ebx,4),%edx
adcl 40(%esp,%ebx,4),%eax
movl %edx,32(%esp,%ebx,4)
cmpl %ebx,%ecx
movl %eax,36(%esp,%ebx,4)
je .L007common_tail
movl 4(%esi,%ecx,4),%edi
leal 1(%ecx),%ecx
movl %edi,%eax
movl %ecx,12(%esp)
mull %edi
addl 32(%esp,%ecx,4),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,32(%esp,%ecx,4)
xorl %ebp,%ebp
cmpl %ebx,%ecx
leal 1(%ecx),%ecx
je .L010sqrlast
movl %edx,%ebx
shrl $1,%edx
andl $1,%ebx
.align 16
.L011sqradd:
movl (%esi,%ecx,4),%eax
movl %edx,%ebp
mull %edi
addl %ebp,%eax
leal (%eax,%eax,1),%ebp
adcl $0,%edx
shrl $31,%eax
addl 32(%esp,%ecx,4),%ebp
leal 1(%ecx),%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
addl %ebx,%ebp
adcl $0,%eax
cmpl (%esp),%ecx
movl %ebp,28(%esp,%ecx,4)
movl %eax,%ebx
jle .L011sqradd
movl %edx,%ebp
addl %edx,%edx
shrl $31,%ebp
addl %ebx,%edx
adcl $0,%ebp
.L010sqrlast:
movl 20(%esp),%edi
movl 16(%esp),%esi
imull 32(%esp),%edi
addl 32(%esp,%ecx,4),%edx
movl (%esi),%eax
adcl $0,%ebp
movl %edx,32(%esp,%ecx,4)
movl %ebp,36(%esp,%ecx,4)
mull %edi
addl 32(%esp),%eax
leal -1(%ecx),%ebx
adcl $0,%edx
movl $1,%ecx
movl 4(%esi),%eax
jmp .L0093rdmadd
.align 16
.L007common_tail:
movl 16(%esp),%ebp
movl 4(%esp),%edi
leal 32(%esp),%esi
movl (%esi),%eax
movl %ebx,%ecx
xorl %edx,%edx
.align 16
.L012sub:
sbbl (%ebp,%edx,4),%eax
movl %eax,(%edi,%edx,4)
decl %ecx
movl 4(%esi,%edx,4),%eax
leal 1(%edx),%edx
jge .L012sub
sbbl $0,%eax
movl $-1,%edx
xorl %eax,%edx
jmp .L013copy
.align 16
.L013copy:
movl 32(%esp,%ebx,4),%esi
movl (%edi,%ebx,4),%ebp
movl %ecx,32(%esp,%ebx,4)
andl %eax,%esi
andl %edx,%ebp
orl %esi,%ebp
movl %ebp,(%edi,%ebx,4)
decl %ebx
jge .L013copy
movl 24(%esp),%esp
movl $1,%eax
.L000just_leave:
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.byte 77,111,110,116,103,111,109,101,114,121,32,77,117,108,116,105
.byte 112,108,105,99,97,116,105,111,110,32,102,111,114,32,120,56
.byte 54,44,32,67,82,89,80,84,79,71,65,77,83,32,98,121
.byte 32,60,97,112,112,114,111,64,111,112,101,110,115,115,108,46
.byte 111,114,103,62,0
#endif
#endif // defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__ELF__)
.section .note.GNU-stack,"",%progbits
#endif
+543
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,543 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2020, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#include <assert.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_aead.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_bytestring.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_digest.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_err.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_evp.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_hkdf.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_sha.h>
#include "../internal.h"
#include "internal.h"
// This file implements draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-05.
#define KEM_CONTEXT_LEN (2 * X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN)
// HPKE KEM scheme IDs.
#define HPKE_DHKEM_X25519_HKDF_SHA256 0x0020
// This is strlen("HPKE") + 3 * sizeof(uint16_t).
#define HPKE_SUITE_ID_LEN 10
#define HPKE_MODE_BASE 0
#define HPKE_MODE_PSK 1
static const char kHpkeRfcId[] = "HPKE-05 ";
static int add_label_string(CBB *cbb, const char *label) {
return CBB_add_bytes(cbb, (const uint8_t *)label, strlen(label));
}
// The suite_id for the KEM is defined as concat("KEM", I2OSP(kem_id, 2)). Note
// that the suite_id used outside of the KEM also includes the kdf_id and
// aead_id.
static const uint8_t kX25519SuiteID[] = {
'K', 'E', 'M', HPKE_DHKEM_X25519_HKDF_SHA256 >> 8,
HPKE_DHKEM_X25519_HKDF_SHA256 & 0x00ff};
// The suite_id for non-KEM pieces of HPKE is defined as concat("HPKE",
// I2OSP(kem_id, 2), I2OSP(kdf_id, 2), I2OSP(aead_id, 2)).
static int hpke_build_suite_id(uint8_t out[HPKE_SUITE_ID_LEN], uint16_t kdf_id,
uint16_t aead_id) {
CBB cbb;
int ret = CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, out, HPKE_SUITE_ID_LEN) &&
add_label_string(&cbb, "HPKE") &&
CBB_add_u16(&cbb, HPKE_DHKEM_X25519_HKDF_SHA256) &&
CBB_add_u16(&cbb, kdf_id) &&
CBB_add_u16(&cbb, aead_id);
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return ret;
}
static int hpke_labeled_extract(const EVP_MD *hkdf_md, uint8_t *out_key,
size_t *out_len, const uint8_t *salt,
size_t salt_len, const uint8_t *suite_id,
size_t suite_id_len, const char *label,
const uint8_t *ikm, size_t ikm_len) {
// labeledIKM = concat("RFCXXXX ", suite_id, label, IKM)
CBB labeled_ikm;
int ok = CBB_init(&labeled_ikm, 0) &&
add_label_string(&labeled_ikm, kHpkeRfcId) &&
CBB_add_bytes(&labeled_ikm, suite_id, suite_id_len) &&
add_label_string(&labeled_ikm, label) &&
CBB_add_bytes(&labeled_ikm, ikm, ikm_len) &&
HKDF_extract(out_key, out_len, hkdf_md, CBB_data(&labeled_ikm),
CBB_len(&labeled_ikm), salt, salt_len);
CBB_cleanup(&labeled_ikm);
return ok;
}
static int hpke_labeled_expand(const EVP_MD *hkdf_md, uint8_t *out_key,
size_t out_len, const uint8_t *prk,
size_t prk_len, const uint8_t *suite_id,
size_t suite_id_len, const char *label,
const uint8_t *info, size_t info_len) {
// labeledInfo = concat(I2OSP(L, 2), "RFCXXXX ", suite_id, label, info)
CBB labeled_info;
int ok = CBB_init(&labeled_info, 0) &&
CBB_add_u16(&labeled_info, out_len) &&
add_label_string(&labeled_info, kHpkeRfcId) &&
CBB_add_bytes(&labeled_info, suite_id, suite_id_len) &&
add_label_string(&labeled_info, label) &&
CBB_add_bytes(&labeled_info, info, info_len) &&
HKDF_expand(out_key, out_len, hkdf_md, prk, prk_len,
CBB_data(&labeled_info), CBB_len(&labeled_info));
CBB_cleanup(&labeled_info);
return ok;
}
static int hpke_extract_and_expand(const EVP_MD *hkdf_md, uint8_t *out_key,
size_t out_len,
const uint8_t dh[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
const uint8_t kem_context[KEM_CONTEXT_LEN]) {
uint8_t prk[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t prk_len;
static const char kEaePrkLabel[] = "eae_prk";
if (!hpke_labeled_extract(hkdf_md, prk, &prk_len, NULL, 0, kX25519SuiteID,
sizeof(kX25519SuiteID), kEaePrkLabel, dh,
X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN)) {
return 0;
}
static const char kPRKExpandLabel[] = "shared_secret";
if (!hpke_labeled_expand(hkdf_md, out_key, out_len, prk, prk_len,
kX25519SuiteID, sizeof(kX25519SuiteID),
kPRKExpandLabel, kem_context, KEM_CONTEXT_LEN)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static const EVP_AEAD *hpke_get_aead(uint16_t aead_id) {
switch (aead_id) {
case EVP_HPKE_AEAD_AES_GCM_128:
return EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm();
case EVP_HPKE_AEAD_AES_GCM_256:
return EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm();
case EVP_HPKE_AEAD_CHACHA20POLY1305:
return EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305();
}
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
static const EVP_MD *hpke_get_kdf(uint16_t kdf_id) {
switch (kdf_id) {
case EVP_HPKE_HKDF_SHA256:
return EVP_sha256();
case EVP_HPKE_HKDF_SHA384:
return EVP_sha384();
case EVP_HPKE_HKDF_SHA512:
return EVP_sha512();
}
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
static int hpke_key_schedule(EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t mode,
const uint8_t *shared_secret,
size_t shared_secret_len, const uint8_t *info,
size_t info_len, const uint8_t *psk,
size_t psk_len, const uint8_t *psk_id,
size_t psk_id_len) {
// Verify the PSK inputs.
switch (mode) {
case HPKE_MODE_BASE:
// This is an internal error, unreachable from the caller.
assert(psk_len == 0 && psk_id_len == 0);
break;
case HPKE_MODE_PSK:
if (psk_len == 0 || psk_id_len == 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_EMPTY_PSK);
return 0;
}
break;
default:
return 0;
}
// Attempt to get an EVP_AEAD*.
const EVP_AEAD *aead = hpke_get_aead(hpke->aead_id);
if (aead == NULL) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t suite_id[HPKE_SUITE_ID_LEN];
if (!hpke_build_suite_id(suite_id, hpke->kdf_id, hpke->aead_id)) {
return 0;
}
// psk_id_hash = LabeledExtract("", "psk_id_hash", psk_id)
static const char kPskIdHashLabel[] = "psk_id_hash";
uint8_t psk_id_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t psk_id_hash_len;
if (!hpke_labeled_extract(hpke->hkdf_md, psk_id_hash, &psk_id_hash_len, NULL,
0, suite_id, sizeof(suite_id), kPskIdHashLabel,
psk_id, psk_id_len)) {
return 0;
}
// info_hash = LabeledExtract("", "info_hash", info)
static const char kInfoHashLabel[] = "info_hash";
uint8_t info_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t info_hash_len;
if (!hpke_labeled_extract(hpke->hkdf_md, info_hash, &info_hash_len, NULL, 0,
suite_id, sizeof(suite_id), kInfoHashLabel, info,
info_len)) {
return 0;
}
// key_schedule_context = concat(mode, psk_id_hash, info_hash)
uint8_t context[sizeof(uint8_t) + 2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t context_len;
CBB context_cbb;
if (!CBB_init_fixed(&context_cbb, context, sizeof(context)) ||
!CBB_add_u8(&context_cbb, mode) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&context_cbb, psk_id_hash, psk_id_hash_len) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&context_cbb, info_hash, info_hash_len) ||
!CBB_finish(&context_cbb, NULL, &context_len)) {
return 0;
}
// psk_hash = LabeledExtract("", "psk_hash", psk)
static const char kPskHashLabel[] = "psk_hash";
uint8_t psk_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t psk_hash_len;
if (!hpke_labeled_extract(hpke->hkdf_md, psk_hash, &psk_hash_len, NULL, 0,
suite_id, sizeof(suite_id), kPskHashLabel, psk,
psk_len)) {
return 0;
}
// secret = LabeledExtract(psk_hash, "secret", shared_secret)
static const char kSecretExtractLabel[] = "secret";
uint8_t secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t secret_len;
if (!hpke_labeled_extract(hpke->hkdf_md, secret, &secret_len, psk_hash,
psk_hash_len, suite_id, sizeof(suite_id),
kSecretExtractLabel, shared_secret,
shared_secret_len)) {
return 0;
}
// key = LabeledExpand(secret, "key", key_schedule_context, Nk)
static const char kKeyExpandLabel[] = "key";
uint8_t key[EVP_AEAD_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
const size_t kKeyLen = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead);
if (!hpke_labeled_expand(hpke->hkdf_md, key, kKeyLen, secret, secret_len,
suite_id, sizeof(suite_id), kKeyExpandLabel, context,
context_len)) {
return 0;
}
// Initialize the HPKE context's AEAD context, storing a copy of |key|.
if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(&hpke->aead_ctx, aead, key, kKeyLen, 0, NULL)) {
return 0;
}
// nonce = LabeledExpand(secret, "nonce", key_schedule_context, Nn)
static const char kNonceExpandLabel[] = "nonce";
if (!hpke_labeled_expand(hpke->hkdf_md, hpke->nonce,
EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead), secret, secret_len,
suite_id, sizeof(suite_id), kNonceExpandLabel,
context, context_len)) {
return 0;
}
// exporter_secret = LabeledExpand(secret, "exp", key_schedule_context, Nh)
static const char kExporterSecretExpandLabel[] = "exp";
if (!hpke_labeled_expand(hpke->hkdf_md, hpke->exporter_secret,
EVP_MD_size(hpke->hkdf_md), secret, secret_len,
suite_id, sizeof(suite_id),
kExporterSecretExpandLabel, context, context_len)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
// The number of bytes written to |out_shared_secret| is the size of the KEM's
// KDF (currently we only support SHA256).
static int hpke_encap(EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke,
uint8_t out_shared_secret[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH],
const uint8_t public_key_r[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
const uint8_t ephemeral_private[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN],
const uint8_t ephemeral_public[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN]) {
uint8_t dh[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN];
if (!X25519(dh, ephemeral_private, public_key_r)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PEER_KEY);
return 0;
}
uint8_t kem_context[KEM_CONTEXT_LEN];
OPENSSL_memcpy(kem_context, ephemeral_public, X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN);
OPENSSL_memcpy(kem_context + X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN, public_key_r,
X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN);
if (!hpke_extract_and_expand(EVP_sha256(), out_shared_secret,
SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, dh, kem_context)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int hpke_decap(const EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke,
uint8_t out_shared_secret[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH],
const uint8_t enc[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
const uint8_t public_key_r[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
const uint8_t secret_key_r[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN]) {
uint8_t dh[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN];
if (!X25519(dh, secret_key_r, enc)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PEER_KEY);
return 0;
}
uint8_t kem_context[KEM_CONTEXT_LEN];
OPENSSL_memcpy(kem_context, enc, X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN);
OPENSSL_memcpy(kem_context + X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN, public_key_r,
X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN);
if (!hpke_extract_and_expand(EVP_sha256(), out_shared_secret,
SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, dh, kem_context)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
void EVP_HPKE_CTX_init(EVP_HPKE_CTX *ctx) {
OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(EVP_HPKE_CTX));
EVP_AEAD_CTX_zero(&ctx->aead_ctx);
}
void EVP_HPKE_CTX_cleanup(EVP_HPKE_CTX *ctx) {
EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->aead_ctx);
}
int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_base_s_x25519(
EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t out_enc[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
uint16_t kdf_id, uint16_t aead_id,
const uint8_t peer_public_value[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
const uint8_t *info, size_t info_len) {
// The GenerateKeyPair() step technically belongs in the KEM's Encap()
// function, but we've moved it up a layer to make it easier for tests to
// inject an ephemeral keypair.
uint8_t ephemeral_private[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN];
X25519_keypair(out_enc, ephemeral_private);
return EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_base_s_x25519_for_test(
hpke, kdf_id, aead_id, peer_public_value, info, info_len,
ephemeral_private, out_enc);
}
int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_base_s_x25519_for_test(
EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint16_t kdf_id, uint16_t aead_id,
const uint8_t peer_public_value[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
const uint8_t *info, size_t info_len,
const uint8_t ephemeral_private[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN],
const uint8_t ephemeral_public[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN]) {
hpke->is_sender = 1;
hpke->kdf_id = kdf_id;
hpke->aead_id = aead_id;
hpke->hkdf_md = hpke_get_kdf(kdf_id);
if (hpke->hkdf_md == NULL) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t shared_secret[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
if (!hpke_encap(hpke, shared_secret, peer_public_value, ephemeral_private,
ephemeral_public) ||
!hpke_key_schedule(hpke, HPKE_MODE_BASE, shared_secret,
sizeof(shared_secret), info, info_len, NULL, 0, NULL,
0)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_base_r_x25519(
EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint16_t kdf_id, uint16_t aead_id,
const uint8_t enc[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
const uint8_t public_key[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
const uint8_t private_key[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN], const uint8_t *info,
size_t info_len) {
hpke->is_sender = 0;
hpke->kdf_id = kdf_id;
hpke->aead_id = aead_id;
hpke->hkdf_md = hpke_get_kdf(kdf_id);
if (hpke->hkdf_md == NULL) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t shared_secret[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
if (!hpke_decap(hpke, shared_secret, enc, public_key, private_key) ||
!hpke_key_schedule(hpke, HPKE_MODE_BASE, shared_secret,
sizeof(shared_secret), info, info_len, NULL, 0, NULL,
0)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_psk_s_x25519(
EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t out_enc[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
uint16_t kdf_id, uint16_t aead_id,
const uint8_t peer_public_value[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
const uint8_t *info, size_t info_len, const uint8_t *psk, size_t psk_len,
const uint8_t *psk_id, size_t psk_id_len) {
// The GenerateKeyPair() step technically belongs in the KEM's Encap()
// function, but we've moved it up a layer to make it easier for tests to
// inject an ephemeral keypair.
uint8_t ephemeral_private[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN];
X25519_keypair(out_enc, ephemeral_private);
return EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_psk_s_x25519_for_test(
hpke, kdf_id, aead_id, peer_public_value, info, info_len, psk, psk_len,
psk_id, psk_id_len, ephemeral_private, out_enc);
}
int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_psk_s_x25519_for_test(
EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint16_t kdf_id, uint16_t aead_id,
const uint8_t peer_public_value[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
const uint8_t *info, size_t info_len, const uint8_t *psk, size_t psk_len,
const uint8_t *psk_id, size_t psk_id_len,
const uint8_t ephemeral_private[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN],
const uint8_t ephemeral_public[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN]) {
hpke->is_sender = 1;
hpke->kdf_id = kdf_id;
hpke->aead_id = aead_id;
hpke->hkdf_md = hpke_get_kdf(kdf_id);
if (hpke->hkdf_md == NULL) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t shared_secret[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
if (!hpke_encap(hpke, shared_secret, peer_public_value, ephemeral_private,
ephemeral_public) ||
!hpke_key_schedule(hpke, HPKE_MODE_PSK, shared_secret,
sizeof(shared_secret), info, info_len, psk, psk_len,
psk_id, psk_id_len)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_psk_r_x25519(
EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint16_t kdf_id, uint16_t aead_id,
const uint8_t enc[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
const uint8_t public_key[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
const uint8_t private_key[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN], const uint8_t *info,
size_t info_len, const uint8_t *psk, size_t psk_len, const uint8_t *psk_id,
size_t psk_id_len) {
hpke->is_sender = 0;
hpke->kdf_id = kdf_id;
hpke->aead_id = aead_id;
hpke->hkdf_md = hpke_get_kdf(kdf_id);
if (hpke->hkdf_md == NULL) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t shared_secret[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
if (!hpke_decap(hpke, shared_secret, enc, public_key, private_key) ||
!hpke_key_schedule(hpke, HPKE_MODE_PSK, shared_secret,
sizeof(shared_secret), info, info_len, psk, psk_len,
psk_id, psk_id_len)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static void hpke_nonce(const EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t *out_nonce,
size_t nonce_len) {
assert(nonce_len >= 8);
// Write padded big-endian bytes of |hpke->seq| to |out_nonce|.
OPENSSL_memset(out_nonce, 0, nonce_len);
uint64_t seq_copy = hpke->seq;
for (size_t i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
out_nonce[nonce_len - i - 1] = seq_copy & 0xff;
seq_copy >>= 8;
}
// XOR the encoded sequence with the |hpke->nonce|.
for (size_t i = 0; i < nonce_len; i++) {
out_nonce[i] ^= hpke->nonce[i];
}
}
size_t EVP_HPKE_CTX_max_overhead(const EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke) {
assert(hpke->is_sender);
return EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(hpke->aead_ctx.aead);
}
int EVP_HPKE_CTX_open(EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
size_t max_out_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
if (hpke->is_sender) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
if (hpke->seq == UINT64_MAX) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
return 0;
}
uint8_t nonce[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
const size_t nonce_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(hpke->aead_ctx.aead);
hpke_nonce(hpke, nonce, nonce_len);
if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(&hpke->aead_ctx, out, out_len, max_out_len, nonce,
nonce_len, in, in_len, ad, ad_len)) {
return 0;
}
hpke->seq++;
return 1;
}
int EVP_HPKE_CTX_seal(EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
size_t max_out_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
if (!hpke->is_sender) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
if (hpke->seq == UINT64_MAX) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
return 0;
}
uint8_t nonce[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
const size_t nonce_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(hpke->aead_ctx.aead);
hpke_nonce(hpke, nonce, nonce_len);
if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(&hpke->aead_ctx, out, out_len, max_out_len, nonce,
nonce_len, in, in_len, ad, ad_len)) {
return 0;
}
hpke->seq++;
return 1;
}
int EVP_HPKE_CTX_export(const EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t *out,
size_t secret_len, const uint8_t *context,
size_t context_len) {
uint8_t suite_id[HPKE_SUITE_ID_LEN];
if (!hpke_build_suite_id(suite_id, hpke->kdf_id, hpke->aead_id)) {
return 0;
}
static const char kExportExpandLabel[] = "sec";
if (!hpke_labeled_expand(hpke->hkdf_md, out, secret_len,
hpke->exporter_secret, EVP_MD_size(hpke->hkdf_md),
suite_id, sizeof(suite_id), kExportExpandLabel,
context, context_len)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2020, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_HPKE_INTERNAL_H
#define OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_HPKE_INTERNAL_H
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_aead.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_base.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_curve25519.h>
#if defined(__cplusplus)
extern "C" {
#endif
// Hybrid Public Key Encryption.
//
// Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE) enables a sender to encrypt messages to a
// receiver with a public key. Optionally, the sender may authenticate its
// possession of a pre-shared key to the recipient.
//
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-05.
// EVP_HPKE_AEAD_* are AEAD identifiers.
#define EVP_HPKE_AEAD_AES_GCM_128 0x0001
#define EVP_HPKE_AEAD_AES_GCM_256 0x0002
#define EVP_HPKE_AEAD_CHACHA20POLY1305 0x0003
// EVP_HPKE_HKDF_* are HKDF identifiers.
#define EVP_HPKE_HKDF_SHA256 0x0001
#define EVP_HPKE_HKDF_SHA384 0x0002
#define EVP_HPKE_HKDF_SHA512 0x0003
// EVP_HPKE_MAX_OVERHEAD contains the largest value that
// |EVP_HPKE_CTX_max_overhead| would ever return for any context.
#define EVP_HPKE_MAX_OVERHEAD EVP_AEAD_MAX_OVERHEAD
// Encryption contexts.
// An |EVP_HPKE_CTX| is an HPKE encryption context.
typedef struct evp_hpke_ctx_st {
const EVP_MD *hkdf_md;
EVP_AEAD_CTX aead_ctx;
uint16_t kdf_id;
uint16_t aead_id;
uint8_t nonce[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
uint8_t exporter_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
uint64_t seq;
int is_sender;
} EVP_HPKE_CTX;
// EVP_HPKE_CTX_init initializes an already-allocated |EVP_HPKE_CTX|. The caller
// should then use one of the |EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_*| functions.
//
// It is safe, but not necessary to call |EVP_HPKE_CTX_cleanup| in this state.
OPENSSL_EXPORT void EVP_HPKE_CTX_init(EVP_HPKE_CTX *ctx);
// EVP_HPKE_CTX_cleanup releases memory referenced by |ctx|. |ctx| must have
// been initialized with |EVP_HPKE_CTX_init|.
OPENSSL_EXPORT void EVP_HPKE_CTX_cleanup(EVP_HPKE_CTX *ctx);
// Setting up HPKE contexts.
//
// In each of the following functions, |hpke| must have been initialized with
// |EVP_HPKE_CTX_init|. |kdf_id| selects the KDF for non-KEM HPKE operations and
// must be one of the |EVP_HPKE_HKDF_*| constants. |aead_id| selects the AEAD
// for the "open" and "seal" operations and must be one of the |EVP_HPKE_AEAD_*"
// constants."
// EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_base_s_x25519 sets up |hpke| as a sender context that can
// encrypt for the private key corresponding to |peer_public_value| (the
// recipient's public key). It returns one on success, and zero otherwise. Note
// that this function will fail if |peer_public_value| is invalid.
//
// This function writes the encapsulated shared secret to |out_enc|.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_base_s_x25519(
EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t out_enc[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
uint16_t kdf_id, uint16_t aead_id,
const uint8_t peer_public_value[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
const uint8_t *info, size_t info_len);
// EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_base_s_x25519_for_test behaves like
// |EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_base_s_x25519|, but takes a pre-generated ephemeral
// sender key.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_base_s_x25519_for_test(
EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint16_t kdf_id, uint16_t aead_id,
const uint8_t peer_public_value[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
const uint8_t *info, size_t info_len,
const uint8_t ephemeral_private[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN],
const uint8_t ephemeral_public[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN]);
// EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_base_r_x25519 sets up |hpke| as a recipient context that
// can decrypt messages. |private_key| is the recipient's private key, and |enc|
// is the encapsulated shared secret from the sender. Note that this function
// will fail if |enc| is invalid.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_base_r_x25519(
EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint16_t kdf_id, uint16_t aead_id,
const uint8_t enc[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
const uint8_t public_key[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
const uint8_t private_key[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN], const uint8_t *info,
size_t info_len);
// EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_psk_s_x25519 sets up |hpke| as a sender context that can
// encrypt for the private key corresponding to |peer_public_value| (the
// recipient's public key) and authenticate its possession of a PSK. It returns
// one on success, and zero otherwise. Note that this function will fail if
// |peer_public_value| is invalid.
//
// The PSK and its ID must be provided in |psk| and |psk_id|, respectively. Both
// must be nonempty (|psk_len| and |psk_id_len| must be non-zero), or this
// function will fail.
//
// This function writes the encapsulated shared secret to |out_enc|.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_psk_s_x25519(
EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t out_enc[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
uint16_t kdf_id, uint16_t aead_id,
const uint8_t peer_public_value[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
const uint8_t *info, size_t info_len, const uint8_t *psk, size_t psk_len,
const uint8_t *psk_id, size_t psk_id_len);
// EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_psk_s_x25519_for_test behaves like
// |EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_psk_s_x25519|, but takes a pre-generated ephemeral sender
// key.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_psk_s_x25519_for_test(
EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint16_t kdf_id, uint16_t aead_id,
const uint8_t peer_public_value[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
const uint8_t *info, size_t info_len, const uint8_t *psk, size_t psk_len,
const uint8_t *psk_id, size_t psk_id_len,
const uint8_t ephemeral_private[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN],
const uint8_t ephemeral_public[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN]);
// EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_psk_r_x25519 sets up |hpke| as a recipient context that
// can decrypt messages. Future open (decrypt) operations will fail if the
// sender does not possess the PSK indicated by |psk| and |psk_id|.
// |private_key| is the recipient's private key, and |enc| is the encapsulated
// shared secret from the sender. If |enc| is invalid, this function will fail.
//
// The PSK and its ID must be provided in |psk| and |psk_id|, respectively. Both
// must be nonempty (|psk_len| and |psk_id_len| must be non-zero), or this
// function will fail.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_psk_r_x25519(
EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint16_t kdf_id, uint16_t aead_id,
const uint8_t enc[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
const uint8_t public_key[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
const uint8_t private_key[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN], const uint8_t *info,
size_t info_len, const uint8_t *psk, size_t psk_len, const uint8_t *psk_id,
size_t psk_id_len);
// Using an HPKE context.
// EVP_HPKE_CTX_open uses the HPKE context |hpke| to authenticate |in_len| bytes
// from |in| and |ad_len| bytes from |ad| and to decrypt at most |in_len| bytes
// into |out|. It returns one on success, and zero otherwise.
//
// This operation will fail if the |hpke| context is not set up as a receiver.
//
// Note that HPKE encryption is stateful and ordered. The sender's first call to
// |EVP_HPKE_CTX_seal| must correspond to the recipient's first call to
// |EVP_HPKE_CTX_open|, etc.
//
// At most |in_len| bytes are written to |out|. In order to ensure success,
// |max_out_len| should be at least |in_len|. On successful return, |*out_len|
// is set to the actual number of bytes written.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_HPKE_CTX_open(EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t *out,
size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len);
// EVP_HPKE_CTX_seal uses the HPKE context |hpke| to encrypt and authenticate
// |in_len| bytes of ciphertext |in| and authenticate |ad_len| bytes from |ad|,
// writing the result to |out|. It returns one on success and zero otherwise.
//
// This operation will fail if the |hpke| context is not set up as a sender.
//
// Note that HPKE encryption is stateful and ordered. The sender's first call to
// |EVP_HPKE_CTX_seal| must correspond to the recipient's first call to
// |EVP_HPKE_CTX_open|, etc.
//
// At most, |max_out_len| encrypted bytes are written to |out|. On successful
// return, |*out_len| is set to the actual number of bytes written.
//
// To ensure success, |max_out_len| should be |in_len| plus the result of
// |EVP_HPKE_CTX_max_overhead| or |EVP_HPKE_MAX_OVERHEAD|.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_HPKE_CTX_seal(EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t *out,
size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len);
// EVP_HPKE_CTX_export uses the HPKE context |hpke| to export a secret of
// |secret_len| bytes into |out|. This function uses |context_len| bytes from
// |context| as a context string for the secret. This is necessary to separate
// different uses of exported secrets and bind relevant caller-specific context
// into the output. It returns one on success and zero otherwise.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_HPKE_CTX_export(const EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t *out,
size_t secret_len,
const uint8_t *context,
size_t context_len);
// EVP_HPKE_CTX_max_overhead returns the maximum number of additional bytes
// added by sealing data with |EVP_HPKE_CTX_seal|. The |hpke| context must be
// set up as a sender.
OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t EVP_HPKE_CTX_max_overhead(const EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke);
#if defined(__cplusplus)
} // extern C
#endif
#if !defined(BORINGSSL_NO_CXX)
extern "C++" {
BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
using ScopedEVP_HPKE_CTX =
internal::StackAllocated<EVP_HPKE_CTX, void, EVP_HPKE_CTX_init,
EVP_HPKE_CTX_cleanup>;
BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
} // extern C++
#endif
#endif // OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_HPKE_INTERNAL_H
+29 -15
View File
@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(pop))
#define OPENSSL_MALLOC_PREFIX 8
OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(OPENSSL_MALLOC_PREFIX >= sizeof(size_t),
"size_t too large");
#if defined(OPENSSL_ASAN)
void __asan_poison_memory_region(const volatile void *addr, size_t size);
@@ -101,13 +103,21 @@ static void __asan_unpoison_memory_region(const void *addr, size_t size) {}
// linked. This isn't an ideal result, but its helps in some cases.
WEAK_SYMBOL_FUNC(void, sdallocx, (void *ptr, size_t size, int flags));
// The following two functions are for memory tracking. They are no-ops by
// default but can be overridden at link time if the application needs to
// observe heap operations.
WEAK_SYMBOL_FUNC(void, OPENSSL_track_memory_alloc, (void *ptr, size_t size));
WEAK_SYMBOL_FUNC(void, OPENSSL_track_memory_free, (void *ptr, size_t size));
// The following three functions can be defined to override default heap
// allocation and freeing. If defined, it is the responsibility of
// |OPENSSL_memory_free| to zero out the memory before returning it to the
// system. |OPENSSL_memory_free| will not be passed NULL pointers.
WEAK_SYMBOL_FUNC(void*, OPENSSL_memory_alloc, (size_t size));
WEAK_SYMBOL_FUNC(void, OPENSSL_memory_free, (void *ptr));
WEAK_SYMBOL_FUNC(size_t, OPENSSL_memory_get_size, (void *ptr));
void *OPENSSL_malloc(size_t size) {
if (OPENSSL_memory_alloc != NULL) {
assert(OPENSSL_memory_free != NULL);
assert(OPENSSL_memory_get_size != NULL);
return OPENSSL_memory_alloc(size);
}
if (size + OPENSSL_MALLOC_PREFIX < size) {
return NULL;
}
@@ -120,9 +130,6 @@ void *OPENSSL_malloc(size_t size) {
*(size_t *)ptr = size;
__asan_poison_memory_region(ptr, OPENSSL_MALLOC_PREFIX);
if (OPENSSL_track_memory_alloc) {
OPENSSL_track_memory_alloc(ptr, size + OPENSSL_MALLOC_PREFIX);
}
return ((uint8_t *)ptr) + OPENSSL_MALLOC_PREFIX;
}
@@ -131,13 +138,15 @@ void OPENSSL_free(void *orig_ptr) {
return;
}
if (OPENSSL_memory_free != NULL) {
OPENSSL_memory_free(orig_ptr);
return;
}
void *ptr = ((uint8_t *)orig_ptr) - OPENSSL_MALLOC_PREFIX;
__asan_unpoison_memory_region(ptr, OPENSSL_MALLOC_PREFIX);
size_t size = *(size_t *)ptr;
if (OPENSSL_track_memory_free) {
OPENSSL_track_memory_free(ptr, size + OPENSSL_MALLOC_PREFIX);
}
OPENSSL_cleanse(ptr, size + OPENSSL_MALLOC_PREFIX);
if (sdallocx) {
sdallocx(ptr, size + OPENSSL_MALLOC_PREFIX, 0 /* flags */);
@@ -151,10 +160,15 @@ void *OPENSSL_realloc(void *orig_ptr, size_t new_size) {
return OPENSSL_malloc(new_size);
}
void *ptr = ((uint8_t *)orig_ptr) - OPENSSL_MALLOC_PREFIX;
__asan_unpoison_memory_region(ptr, OPENSSL_MALLOC_PREFIX);
size_t old_size = *(size_t *)ptr;
__asan_poison_memory_region(ptr, OPENSSL_MALLOC_PREFIX);
size_t old_size;
if (OPENSSL_memory_get_size != NULL) {
old_size = OPENSSL_memory_get_size(orig_ptr);
} else {
void *ptr = ((uint8_t *)orig_ptr) - OPENSSL_MALLOC_PREFIX;
__asan_unpoison_memory_region(ptr, OPENSSL_MALLOC_PREFIX);
old_size = *(size_t *)ptr;
__asan_poison_memory_region(ptr, OPENSSL_MALLOC_PREFIX);
}
void *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(new_size);
if (ret == NULL) {
@@ -63,6 +63,13 @@ extern "C" {
#endif
struct pkcs8_priv_key_info_st {
ASN1_INTEGER *version;
X509_ALGOR *pkeyalg;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *pkey;
STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *attributes;
};
// pkcs8_pbe_decrypt decrypts |in| using the PBE scheme described by
// |algorithm|, which should be a serialized AlgorithmIdentifier structure. On
// success, it sets |*out| to a newly-allocated buffer containing the decrypted
@@ -96,10 +96,8 @@ static int pkey_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
// Since the structure must still be valid use ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE
if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) {
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *key = (PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *)*pval;
if (key->pkey && key->pkey->type == V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING &&
key->pkey->value.octet_string) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(key->pkey->value.octet_string->data,
key->pkey->value.octet_string->length);
if (key->pkey) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(key->pkey->data, key->pkey->length);
}
}
return 1;
@@ -108,12 +106,45 @@ static int pkey_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkey_cb) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkeyalg, X509_ALGOR),
ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkey, ASN1_ANY),
ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, attributes, X509_ATTRIBUTE, 0)
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO)
int PKCS8_pkey_set0(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *priv, ASN1_OBJECT *aobj, int version,
int ptype, void *pval, uint8_t *penc, int penclen) {
if (version >= 0 &&
!ASN1_INTEGER_set(priv->version, version)) {
return 0;
}
if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(priv->pkeyalg, aobj, ptype, pval)) {
return 0;
}
if (penc != NULL) {
ASN1_STRING_set0(priv->pkey, penc, penclen);
}
return 1;
}
int PKCS8_pkey_get0(ASN1_OBJECT **ppkalg, const uint8_t **pk, int *ppklen,
X509_ALGOR **pa, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) {
if (ppkalg) {
*ppkalg = p8->pkeyalg->algorithm;
}
if (pk) {
*pk = ASN1_STRING_data(p8->pkey);
*ppklen = ASN1_STRING_length(p8->pkey);
}
if (pa) {
*pa = p8->pkeyalg;
}
return 1;
}
EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKCS82PKEY(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) {
uint8_t *der = NULL;
int der_len = i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(p8, &der);
@@ -30,16 +30,20 @@ extern "C" {
#endif
// PMBTokens.
//
// PMBTokens is described in https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/072/20200324:214215
// and provides anonymous tokens with private metadata. We implement the
// construction with validity verification, described in appendix H,
// construction 6.
// For the following cryptographic schemes, we use P-384 instead of our usual
// choice of P-256. See Appendix I of
// https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/072/20200324:214215 which describes two attacks
// which may affect smaller curves. In particular, p-1 for P-256 is smooth,
// giving a low complexity for the p-1 attack. P-384's p-1 has a 281-bit prime
// factor,
// 3055465788140352002733946906144561090641249606160407884365391979704929268480326390471.
// This lower-bounds the p-1 attack at O(2^140). The p+1 attack is lower-bounded
// by O(p^(1/3)) or O(2^128), so we do not need to check the smoothness of p+1.
// PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE is the size of nonces used as part of the PMBToken
// TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE is the size of nonces used as part of the Trust_Token
// protocol.
#define PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE 64
#define TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE 64
typedef struct {
// TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/334): These should store |EC_PRECOMP| so
@@ -47,7 +51,7 @@ typedef struct {
EC_AFFINE pub0;
EC_AFFINE pub1;
EC_AFFINE pubs;
} PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY;
} TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY;
typedef struct {
EC_SCALAR x0;
@@ -62,68 +66,47 @@ typedef struct {
EC_PRECOMP pub1_precomp;
EC_AFFINE pubs;
EC_PRECOMP pubs_precomp;
} PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY;
} TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY;
// PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN represents the intermediate state a client keeps during a
// PMBToken issuance operation.
// TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN represents the intermediate state a client keeps during
// a Trust_Token issuance operation.
typedef struct pmb_pretoken_st {
uint8_t t[PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE];
uint8_t t[TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE];
EC_SCALAR r;
EC_AFFINE Tp;
} PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN;
} TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN;
// PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN_free releases the memory associated with |token|.
OPENSSL_EXPORT void PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN_free(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN *token);
// TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN_free releases the memory associated with |token|.
OPENSSL_EXPORT void TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN_free(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN *token);
DEFINE_STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN)
DEFINE_STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN)
// The following functions implement the corresponding |TRUST_TOKENS_METHOD|
// functions for |TRUST_TOKENS_experiment_v0|'s PMBTokens construction which
// uses P-521.
int pmbtoken_exp0_generate_key(CBB *out_private, CBB *out_public);
int pmbtoken_exp0_client_key_from_bytes(PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
int pmbtoken_exp0_issuer_key_from_bytes(PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pmbtoken_exp0_blind(CBB *cbb, size_t count);
int pmbtoken_exp0_sign(const PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, CBB *cbb, CBS *cbs,
size_t num_requested, size_t num_to_issue,
uint8_t private_metadata);
STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *
pmbtoken_exp0_unblind(const PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
const STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pretokens,
CBS *cbs, size_t count, uint32_t key_id);
int pmbtoken_exp0_read(const PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
uint8_t out_nonce[PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE],
uint8_t *out_private_metadata, const uint8_t *token,
size_t token_len);
// PMBTokens.
//
// PMBTokens is described in https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/072/20200324:214215
// and provides anonymous tokens with private metadata. We implement the
// construction with validity verification, described in appendix H,
// construction 6.
// The following functions implement the corresponding |TRUST_TOKENS_METHOD|
// functions for |TRUST_TOKENS_experiment_v1|'s PMBTokens construction which
// uses P-384.
//
// We use P-384 instead of our usual choice of P-256. See Appendix I which
// describes two attacks which may affect smaller curves. In particular, p-1 for
// P-256 is smooth, giving a low complexity for the p-1 attack. P-384's p-1 has
// a 281-bit prime factor,
// 3055465788140352002733946906144561090641249606160407884365391979704929268480326390471.
// This lower-bounds the p-1 attack at O(2^140). The p+1 attack is lower-bounded
// by O(p^(1/3)) or O(2^128), so we do not need to check the smoothness of p+1.
int pmbtoken_exp1_generate_key(CBB *out_private, CBB *out_public);
int pmbtoken_exp1_client_key_from_bytes(PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
int pmbtoken_exp1_client_key_from_bytes(TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
int pmbtoken_exp1_issuer_key_from_bytes(PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
int pmbtoken_exp1_issuer_key_from_bytes(TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pmbtoken_exp1_blind(CBB *cbb, size_t count);
int pmbtoken_exp1_sign(const PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, CBB *cbb, CBS *cbs,
STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pmbtoken_exp1_blind(CBB *cbb, size_t count);
int pmbtoken_exp1_sign(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, CBB *cbb, CBS *cbs,
size_t num_requested, size_t num_to_issue,
uint8_t private_metadata);
STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *
pmbtoken_exp1_unblind(const PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
const STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pretokens,
pmbtoken_exp1_unblind(const TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
const STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pretokens,
CBS *cbs, size_t count, uint32_t key_id);
int pmbtoken_exp1_read(const PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
uint8_t out_nonce[PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE],
int pmbtoken_exp1_read(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
uint8_t out_nonce[TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE],
uint8_t *out_private_metadata, const uint8_t *token,
size_t token_len);
@@ -131,6 +114,62 @@ int pmbtoken_exp1_read(const PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
// function is used to confirm H was computed as expected.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int pmbtoken_exp1_get_h_for_testing(uint8_t out[97]);
// The following functions implement the corresponding |TRUST_TOKENS_METHOD|
// functions for |TRUST_TOKENS_experiment_v2|'s PMBTokens construction which
// uses P-384.
int pmbtoken_exp2_generate_key(CBB *out_private, CBB *out_public);
int pmbtoken_exp2_client_key_from_bytes(TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
int pmbtoken_exp2_issuer_key_from_bytes(TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pmbtoken_exp2_blind(CBB *cbb, size_t count);
int pmbtoken_exp2_sign(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, CBB *cbb, CBS *cbs,
size_t num_requested, size_t num_to_issue,
uint8_t private_metadata);
STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *
pmbtoken_exp2_unblind(const TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
const STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pretokens,
CBS *cbs, size_t count, uint32_t key_id);
int pmbtoken_exp2_read(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
uint8_t out_nonce[TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE],
uint8_t *out_private_metadata, const uint8_t *token,
size_t token_len);
// pmbtoken_exp2_get_h_for_testing returns H in uncompressed coordinates. This
// function is used to confirm H was computed as expected.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int pmbtoken_exp2_get_h_for_testing(uint8_t out[97]);
// VOPRF.
//
// VOPRFs are described in https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-voprf-04
// and provide anonymous tokens. This implementation uses TrustToken DSTs and
// the DLEQ batching primitive from
// https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/072/20200324:214215.
// VOPRF only uses the |pub|' field of the TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY and
// |xs|/|pubs| fields of the TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY.
// The following functions implement the corresponding |TRUST_TOKENS_METHOD|
// functions for |TRUST_TOKENS_experiment_v2|'s VOPRF construction which uses
// P-384.
int voprf_exp2_generate_key(CBB *out_private, CBB *out_public);
int voprf_exp2_client_key_from_bytes(TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
int voprf_exp2_issuer_key_from_bytes(TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) * voprf_exp2_blind(CBB *cbb, size_t count);
int voprf_exp2_sign(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, CBB *cbb, CBS *cbs,
size_t num_requested, size_t num_to_issue,
uint8_t private_metadata);
STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *
voprf_exp2_unblind(const TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
const STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pretokens,
CBS *cbs, size_t count, uint32_t key_id);
int voprf_exp2_read(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
uint8_t out_nonce[TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE],
uint8_t *out_private_metadata, const uint8_t *token,
size_t token_len);
// Trust Tokens internals.
@@ -143,23 +182,23 @@ struct trust_token_method_st {
// client_key_from_bytes decodes a client key from |in| and sets |key|
// to the resulting key. It returns one on success and zero
// on failure.
int (*client_key_from_bytes)(PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key, const uint8_t *in,
int (*client_key_from_bytes)(TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key, const uint8_t *in,
size_t len);
// issuer_key_from_bytes decodes a issuer key from |in| and sets |key|
// to the resulting key. It returns one on success and zero
// on failure.
int (*issuer_key_from_bytes)(PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, const uint8_t *in,
int (*issuer_key_from_bytes)(TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, const uint8_t *in,
size_t len);
// blind generates a new issuance request for |count| tokens. On
// success, it returns a newly-allocated |STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN)| and
// success, it returns a newly-allocated |STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN)| and
// writes a request to the issuer to |cbb|. On failure, it returns NULL. The
// |STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN)|s should be passed to |pmbtoken_unblind| when
// |STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN)|s should be passed to |pmbtoken_unblind| when
// the server responds.
//
// This function implements the AT.Usr0 operation.
STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN) *(*blind)(CBB *cbb, size_t count);
STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) * (*blind)(CBB *cbb, size_t count);
// sign parses a request for |num_requested| tokens from |cbs| and
// issues |num_to_issue| tokens with |key| and a private metadata value of
@@ -167,7 +206,7 @@ struct trust_token_method_st {
// success and zero on failure.
//
// This function implements the AT.Sig operation.
int (*sign)(const PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, CBB *cbb, CBS *cbs,
int (*sign)(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, CBB *cbb, CBS *cbs,
size_t num_requested, size_t num_to_issue,
uint8_t private_metadata);
@@ -180,8 +219,8 @@ struct trust_token_method_st {
//
// This function implements the AT.Usr1 operation.
STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *
(*unblind)(const PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
const STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pretokens, CBS *cbs,
(*unblind)(const TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
const STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pretokens, CBS *cbs,
size_t count, uint32_t key_id);
// read parses a PMBToken from |token| and verifies it using |key|. On
@@ -189,31 +228,32 @@ struct trust_token_method_st {
// |out_nonce| and |*out_private_metadata|. Otherwise, it returns zero. Note
// that, unlike the output of |unblind|, |token| does not have a
// four-byte key ID prepended.
int (*read)(const PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
uint8_t out_nonce[PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE],
int (*read)(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
uint8_t out_nonce[TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE],
uint8_t *out_private_metadata, const uint8_t *token,
size_t token_len);
// use_token_hash determines whether to include the token hash in the SRR and
// private metadata encryption.
int use_token_hash : 1;
// whether the construction supports private metadata.
int has_private_metadata;
// batched_proof determines whether PMBToken uses a batched DLEQOR proof when
// signing tokens.
int batched_proof : 1;
// max keys that can be configured.
size_t max_keys;
// whether the SRR is part of the protocol.
int has_srr;
};
// Structure representing a single Trust Token public key with the specified ID.
struct trust_token_client_key_st {
uint32_t id;
PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY key;
TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY key;
};
// Structure representing a single Trust Token private key with the specified
// ID.
struct trust_token_issuer_key_st {
uint32_t id;
PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY key;
TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY key;
};
struct trust_token_client_st {
@@ -224,13 +264,13 @@ struct trust_token_client_st {
// keys is the set of public keys that are supported by the client for
// issuance/redemptions.
struct trust_token_client_key_st keys[3];
struct trust_token_client_key_st keys[6];
// num_keys is the number of keys currently configured.
size_t num_keys;
// pretokens is the intermediate state during an active issuance.
STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN)* pretokens;
STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN)* pretokens;
// srr_key is the public key used to verify the signature of the SRR.
EVP_PKEY *srr_key;
@@ -246,7 +286,7 @@ struct trust_token_issuer_st {
// keys is the set of private keys that are supported by the issuer for
// issuance/redemptions. The public metadata is an index into this list of
// keys.
struct trust_token_issuer_key_st keys[3];
struct trust_token_issuer_key_st keys[6];
// num_keys is the number of keys currently configured.
size_t num_keys;
@@ -268,7 +308,7 @@ extern "C++" {
BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
BORINGSSL_MAKE_DELETER(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN, PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN_free)
BORINGSSL_MAKE_DELETER(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN_free)
BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
@@ -27,21 +27,6 @@
// protocol for issuing and redeeming tokens built on top of the PMBTokens
// construction.
const TRUST_TOKEN_METHOD *TRUST_TOKEN_experiment_v0(void) {
static const TRUST_TOKEN_METHOD kMethod = {
pmbtoken_exp0_generate_key,
pmbtoken_exp0_client_key_from_bytes,
pmbtoken_exp0_issuer_key_from_bytes,
pmbtoken_exp0_blind,
pmbtoken_exp0_sign,
pmbtoken_exp0_unblind,
pmbtoken_exp0_read,
0 /* don't use token hash */,
0 /* don't use batched proof */,
};
return &kMethod;
}
const TRUST_TOKEN_METHOD *TRUST_TOKEN_experiment_v1(void) {
static const TRUST_TOKEN_METHOD kMethod = {
pmbtoken_exp1_generate_key,
@@ -51,12 +36,49 @@ const TRUST_TOKEN_METHOD *TRUST_TOKEN_experiment_v1(void) {
pmbtoken_exp1_sign,
pmbtoken_exp1_unblind,
pmbtoken_exp1_read,
1 /* use token hash */,
1 /* use batched proof */,
1, /* has_private_metadata */
3, /* max_keys */
1, /* has_srr */
};
return &kMethod;
}
const TRUST_TOKEN_METHOD *TRUST_TOKEN_experiment_v2_voprf(void) {
static const TRUST_TOKEN_METHOD kMethod = {
voprf_exp2_generate_key,
voprf_exp2_client_key_from_bytes,
voprf_exp2_issuer_key_from_bytes,
voprf_exp2_blind,
voprf_exp2_sign,
voprf_exp2_unblind,
voprf_exp2_read,
0, /* has_private_metadata */
6, /* max_keys */
0, /* has_srr */
};
return &kMethod;
}
const TRUST_TOKEN_METHOD *TRUST_TOKEN_experiment_v2_pmb(void) {
static const TRUST_TOKEN_METHOD kMethod = {
pmbtoken_exp2_generate_key,
pmbtoken_exp2_client_key_from_bytes,
pmbtoken_exp2_issuer_key_from_bytes,
pmbtoken_exp2_blind,
pmbtoken_exp2_sign,
pmbtoken_exp2_unblind,
pmbtoken_exp2_read,
1, /* has_private_metadata */
3, /* max_keys */
0, /* has_srr */
};
return &kMethod;
}
void TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN_free(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN *pretoken) {
OPENSSL_free(pretoken);
}
TRUST_TOKEN *TRUST_TOKEN_new(const uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
TRUST_TOKEN *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TRUST_TOKEN));
if (ret == NULL) {
@@ -142,13 +164,14 @@ void TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_free(TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT *ctx) {
return;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->srr_key);
sk_PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN_pop_free(ctx->pretokens, PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN_free);
sk_TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN_pop_free(ctx->pretokens, TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN_free);
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
int TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_add_key(TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT *ctx, size_t *out_key_index,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len) {
if (ctx->num_keys == OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->keys)) {
if (ctx->num_keys == OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->keys) ||
ctx->num_keys >= ctx->method->max_keys) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_TOO_MANY_KEYS);
return 0;
}
@@ -170,6 +193,9 @@ int TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_add_key(TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT *ctx, size_t *out_key_index,
}
int TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_set_srr_key(TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT *ctx, EVP_PKEY *key) {
if (!ctx->method->has_srr) {
return 1;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->srr_key);
EVP_PKEY_up_ref(key);
ctx->srr_key = key;
@@ -184,7 +210,7 @@ int TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_begin_issuance(TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT *ctx, uint8_t **out,
int ret = 0;
CBB request;
STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN) *pretokens = NULL;
STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) *pretokens = NULL;
if (!CBB_init(&request, 0) ||
!CBB_add_u16(&request, count)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -201,14 +227,14 @@ int TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_begin_issuance(TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT *ctx, uint8_t **out,
goto err;
}
sk_PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN_pop_free(ctx->pretokens, PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN_free);
sk_TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN_pop_free(ctx->pretokens, TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN_free);
ctx->pretokens = pretokens;
pretokens = NULL;
ret = 1;
err:
CBB_cleanup(&request);
sk_PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN_pop_free(pretokens, PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN_free);
sk_TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN_pop_free(pretokens, TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN_free);
return ret;
}
@@ -242,7 +268,7 @@ STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *
return NULL;
}
if (count > sk_PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN_num(ctx->pretokens)) {
if (count > sk_TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN_num(ctx->pretokens)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_DECODE_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
@@ -259,7 +285,7 @@ STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *
return NULL;
}
sk_PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN_pop_free(ctx->pretokens, PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN_free);
sk_TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN_pop_free(ctx->pretokens, TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN_free);
ctx->pretokens = NULL;
*out_key_index = key_index;
@@ -277,7 +303,7 @@ int TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_begin_redemption(TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT *ctx, uint8_t **out,
!CBB_add_bytes(&token_inner, token->data, token->len) ||
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&request, &inner) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&inner, data, data_len) ||
!CBB_add_u64(&request, time) ||
(ctx->method->has_srr && !CBB_add_u64(&request, time)) ||
!CBB_finish(&request, out, out_len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
CBB_cleanup(&request);
@@ -287,20 +313,32 @@ int TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_begin_redemption(TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT *ctx, uint8_t **out,
}
int TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_finish_redemption(TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT *ctx,
uint8_t **out_srr, size_t *out_srr_len,
uint8_t **out_rr, size_t *out_rr_len,
uint8_t **out_sig, size_t *out_sig_len,
const uint8_t *response,
size_t response_len) {
if (ctx->srr_key == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_NO_SRR_KEY_CONFIGURED);
CBS in, srr, sig;
CBS_init(&in, response, response_len);
if (!ctx->method->has_srr) {
if (!CBS_stow(&in, out_rr, out_rr_len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
*out_sig = NULL;
*out_sig_len = 0;
return 1;
}
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&in, &srr) ||
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&in, &sig) ||
CBS_len(&in) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_DECODE_ERROR);
return 0;
}
CBS in, srr, sig;
CBS_init(&in, response, response_len);
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&in, &srr) ||
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&in, &sig)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_DECODE_ERROR);
if (ctx->srr_key == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_NO_SRR_KEY_CONFIGURED);
return 0;
}
@@ -326,8 +364,8 @@ int TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_finish_redemption(TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT *ctx,
return 0;
}
*out_srr = srr_buf;
*out_srr_len = srr_len;
*out_rr = srr_buf;
*out_rr_len = srr_len;
*out_sig = sig_buf;
*out_sig_len = sig_len;
return 1;
@@ -363,7 +401,8 @@ void TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_free(TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER *ctx) {
int TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_add_key(TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
size_t key_len) {
if (ctx->num_keys == OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->keys)) {
if (ctx->num_keys == OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->keys) ||
ctx->num_keys >= ctx->method->max_keys) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_TOO_MANY_KEYS);
return 0;
}
@@ -428,7 +467,8 @@ int TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_issue(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER *ctx, uint8_t **out,
const struct trust_token_issuer_key_st *key =
trust_token_issuer_get_key(ctx, public_metadata);
if (key == NULL || private_metadata > 1) {
if (key == NULL || private_metadata > 1 ||
(!ctx->method->has_private_metadata && private_metadata != 0)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_INVALID_METADATA);
return 0;
}
@@ -478,6 +518,72 @@ err:
return ret;
}
int TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_redeem_raw(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER *ctx,
uint32_t *out_public, uint8_t *out_private,
TRUST_TOKEN **out_token,
uint8_t **out_client_data,
size_t *out_client_data_len,
const uint8_t *request, size_t request_len) {
CBS request_cbs, token_cbs;
CBS_init(&request_cbs, request, request_len);
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&request_cbs, &token_cbs)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_DECODE_ERROR);
return 0;
}
uint32_t public_metadata = 0;
uint8_t private_metadata = 0;
// Parse the token. If there is an error, treat it as an invalid token.
if (!CBS_get_u32(&token_cbs, &public_metadata)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_INVALID_TOKEN);
return 0;
}
const struct trust_token_issuer_key_st *key =
trust_token_issuer_get_key(ctx, public_metadata);
uint8_t nonce[TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE];
if (key == NULL ||
!ctx->method->read(&key->key, nonce, &private_metadata,
CBS_data(&token_cbs), CBS_len(&token_cbs))) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_INVALID_TOKEN);
return 0;
}
CBS client_data;
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&request_cbs, &client_data) ||
(ctx->method->has_srr && !CBS_skip(&request_cbs, 8)) ||
CBS_len(&request_cbs) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_DECODE_ERROR);
return 0;
}
uint8_t *client_data_buf = NULL;
size_t client_data_len = 0;
if (!CBS_stow(&client_data, &client_data_buf, &client_data_len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
TRUST_TOKEN *token = TRUST_TOKEN_new(nonce, TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE);
if (token == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
*out_public = public_metadata;
*out_private = private_metadata;
*out_token = token;
*out_client_data = client_data_buf;
*out_client_data_len = client_data_len;
return 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(client_data_buf);
return 0;
}
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7049#section-2.1
static int add_cbor_int_with_type(CBB *cbb, uint8_t major_type,
uint64_t value) {
@@ -561,7 +667,7 @@ int TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_redeem(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER *ctx, uint8_t **out,
const struct trust_token_issuer_key_st *key =
trust_token_issuer_get_key(ctx, public_metadata);
uint8_t nonce[PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE];
uint8_t nonce[TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE];
if (key == NULL ||
!ctx->method->read(&key->key, nonce, &private_metadata,
CBS_data(&token_cbs), CBS_len(&token_cbs))) {
@@ -582,9 +688,9 @@ int TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_redeem(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER *ctx, uint8_t **out,
}
CBS client_data;
uint64_t redemption_time;
uint64_t redemption_time = 0;
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&request_cbs, &client_data) ||
!CBS_get_u64(&request_cbs, &redemption_time)) {
(ctx->method->has_srr && !CBS_get_u64(&request_cbs, &redemption_time))) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
@@ -597,20 +703,25 @@ int TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_redeem(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER *ctx, uint8_t **out,
SHA256_Update(&sha_ctx, CBS_data(&token_copy), CBS_len(&token_copy));
SHA256_Final(token_hash, &sha_ctx);
uint8_t metadata_obfuscator;
if (ctx->method->use_token_hash) {
metadata_obfuscator =
get_metadata_obfuscator(ctx->metadata_key, ctx->metadata_key_len,
token_hash, sizeof(token_hash));
} else {
metadata_obfuscator =
get_metadata_obfuscator(ctx->metadata_key, ctx->metadata_key_len,
CBS_data(&client_data), CBS_len(&client_data));
}
uint8_t metadata_obfuscator = get_metadata_obfuscator(
ctx->metadata_key, ctx->metadata_key_len, token_hash, sizeof(token_hash));
// The SRR is constructed as per the format described in
// https://docs.google.com/document/d/1TNnya6B8pyomDK2F1R9CL3dY10OAmqWlnCxsWyOBDVQ/edit#heading=h.7mkzvhpqb8l5
// The V2 protocol is intended to be used with
// |TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_redeem_raw|. However, we temporarily support it with
// |TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_redeem| to ease the transition for existing issuer
// callers. Those callers' consumers currently expect an expiry-timestamp
// field, so we fill in a placeholder value.
//
// TODO(svaldez): After the existing issues have migrated to
// |TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_redeem_raw| remove this logic.
uint64_t expiry_time = 0;
if (ctx->method->has_srr) {
expiry_time = redemption_time + lifetime;
}
static const char kClientDataLabel[] = "client-data";
static const char kExpiryTimestampLabel[] = "expiry-timestamp";
static const char kMetadataLabel[] = "metadata";
@@ -625,10 +736,7 @@ int TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_redeem(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER *ctx, uint8_t **out,
assert(strlen(kClientDataLabel) < strlen(kExpiryTimestampLabel));
assert(strlen(kPublicLabel) < strlen(kPrivateLabel));
size_t map_entries = 3;
if (ctx->method->use_token_hash) {
map_entries = 4;
}
size_t map_entries = 4;
if (!CBB_init(&srr, 0) ||
!add_cbor_map(&srr, map_entries) || // SRR map
@@ -637,24 +745,14 @@ int TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_redeem(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER *ctx, uint8_t **out,
!add_cbor_text(&srr, kPublicLabel, strlen(kPublicLabel)) ||
!add_cbor_int(&srr, public_metadata) ||
!add_cbor_text(&srr, kPrivateLabel, strlen(kPrivateLabel)) ||
!add_cbor_int(&srr, private_metadata ^ metadata_obfuscator)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (ctx->method->use_token_hash) {
if (!add_cbor_text(&srr, kTokenHashLabel, strlen(kTokenHashLabel)) ||
!add_cbor_bytes(&srr, token_hash, sizeof(token_hash))) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
if (!add_cbor_text(&srr, kClientDataLabel, strlen(kClientDataLabel)) ||
!add_cbor_int(&srr, private_metadata ^ metadata_obfuscator) ||
!add_cbor_text(&srr, kTokenHashLabel, strlen(kTokenHashLabel)) ||
!add_cbor_bytes(&srr, token_hash, sizeof(token_hash)) ||
!add_cbor_text(&srr, kClientDataLabel, strlen(kClientDataLabel)) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&srr, CBS_data(&client_data), CBS_len(&client_data)) ||
!add_cbor_text(&srr, kExpiryTimestampLabel,
strlen(kExpiryTimestampLabel)) ||
!add_cbor_int(&srr, redemption_time + lifetime) ||
!add_cbor_int(&srr, expiry_time) ||
!CBB_finish(&srr, &srr_buf, &srr_len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
@@ -666,16 +764,56 @@ int TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_redeem(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER *ctx, uint8_t **out,
goto err;
}
CBB child;
uint8_t *ptr;
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&response, &child) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&child, srr_buf, srr_len) ||
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&response, &child) ||
!CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, sig_len) ||
!EVP_DigestSign(&md_ctx, ptr, &sig_len, srr_buf, srr_len) ||
!CBB_did_write(&child, sig_len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
// Merge SRR and Signature into single string.
// TODO(svaldez): Expose API to construct this from the caller.
if (!ctx->method->has_srr) {
static const char kSRRHeader[] = "body=:";
static const char kSRRSplit[] = ":, signature=:";
static const char kSRREnd[] = ":";
size_t srr_b64_len, sig_b64_len;
if (!EVP_EncodedLength(&srr_b64_len, srr_len) ||
!EVP_EncodedLength(&sig_b64_len, sig_len)) {
goto err;
}
sig_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len);
uint8_t *srr_b64_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(srr_b64_len);
uint8_t *sig_b64_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_b64_len);
if (!sig_buf ||
!srr_b64_buf ||
!sig_b64_buf ||
!EVP_DigestSign(&md_ctx, sig_buf, &sig_len, srr_buf, srr_len) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&response, (const uint8_t *)kSRRHeader,
strlen(kSRRHeader)) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&response, srr_b64_buf,
EVP_EncodeBlock(srr_b64_buf, srr_buf, srr_len)) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&response, (const uint8_t *)kSRRSplit,
strlen(kSRRSplit)) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&response, sig_b64_buf,
EVP_EncodeBlock(sig_b64_buf, sig_buf, sig_len)) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&response, (const uint8_t *)kSRREnd, strlen(kSRREnd))) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
OPENSSL_free(srr_b64_buf);
OPENSSL_free(sig_b64_buf);
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(srr_b64_buf);
OPENSSL_free(sig_b64_buf);
} else {
CBB child;
uint8_t *ptr;
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&response, &child) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&child, srr_buf, srr_len) ||
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&response, &child) ||
!CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, sig_len) ||
!EVP_DigestSign(&md_ctx, ptr, &sig_len, srr_buf, srr_len) ||
!CBB_did_write(&child, sig_len) ||
!CBB_flush(&response)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
if (!CBS_stow(&client_data, &client_data_buf, &client_data_len) ||
@@ -684,7 +822,7 @@ int TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_redeem(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER *ctx, uint8_t **out,
goto err;
}
TRUST_TOKEN *token = TRUST_TOKEN_new(nonce, PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE);
TRUST_TOKEN *token = TRUST_TOKEN_new(nonce, TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE);
if (token == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
@@ -0,0 +1,766 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2020, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_trust_token.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_bn.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_bytestring.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_ec.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_err.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_nid.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_rand.h>
#include "../ec_extra/internal.h"
#include "../fipsmodule/ec/internal.h"
#include "internal.h"
typedef int (*hash_to_group_func_t)(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *out,
const uint8_t t[TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE]);
typedef int (*hash_to_scalar_func_t)(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out,
uint8_t *buf, size_t len);
typedef struct {
const EC_GROUP *group;
// hash_to_group implements the HashToGroup operation for VOPRFs. It returns
// one on success and zero on error.
hash_to_group_func_t hash_to_group;
// hash_to_scalar implements the HashToScalar operation for VOPRFs. It returns
// one on success and zero on error.
hash_to_scalar_func_t hash_to_scalar;
} VOPRF_METHOD;
static const uint8_t kDefaultAdditionalData[32] = {0};
static int voprf_init_method(VOPRF_METHOD *method, int curve_nid,
hash_to_group_func_t hash_to_group,
hash_to_scalar_func_t hash_to_scalar) {
method->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
if (method->group == NULL) {
return 0;
}
method->hash_to_group = hash_to_group;
method->hash_to_scalar = hash_to_scalar;
return 1;
}
static int cbb_add_point(CBB *out, const EC_GROUP *group,
const EC_AFFINE *point) {
size_t len =
ec_point_to_bytes(group, point, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0);
if (len == 0) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t *p;
return CBB_add_space(out, &p, len) &&
ec_point_to_bytes(group, point, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, p,
len) == len &&
CBB_flush(out);
}
static int cbs_get_point(CBS *cbs, const EC_GROUP *group, EC_AFFINE *out) {
CBS child;
size_t plen = 1 + 2 * BN_num_bytes(&group->field);
if (!CBS_get_bytes(cbs, &child, plen) ||
!ec_point_from_uncompressed(group, out, CBS_data(&child),
CBS_len(&child))) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int scalar_to_cbb(CBB *out, const EC_GROUP *group,
const EC_SCALAR *scalar) {
uint8_t *buf;
size_t scalar_len = BN_num_bytes(&group->order);
if (!CBB_add_space(out, &buf, scalar_len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
ec_scalar_to_bytes(group, buf, &scalar_len, scalar);
return 1;
}
static int scalar_from_cbs(CBS *cbs, const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out) {
size_t scalar_len = BN_num_bytes(&group->order);
CBS tmp;
if (!CBS_get_bytes(cbs, &tmp, scalar_len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_DECODE_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
ec_scalar_from_bytes(group, out, CBS_data(&tmp), CBS_len(&tmp));
return 1;
}
static int voprf_generate_key(const VOPRF_METHOD *method, CBB *out_private,
CBB *out_public) {
const EC_GROUP *group = method->group;
EC_RAW_POINT pub;
EC_SCALAR priv;
EC_AFFINE pub_affine;
if (!ec_random_nonzero_scalar(group, &priv, kDefaultAdditionalData) ||
!ec_point_mul_scalar_base(group, &pub, &priv) ||
!ec_jacobian_to_affine(group, &pub_affine, &pub)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_KEYGEN_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (!scalar_to_cbb(out_private, group, &priv) ||
!cbb_add_point(out_public, group, &pub_affine)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int voprf_client_key_from_bytes(const VOPRF_METHOD *method,
TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
const EC_GROUP *group = method->group;
if (!ec_point_from_uncompressed(group, &key->pubs, in, len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_DECODE_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int voprf_issuer_key_from_bytes(const VOPRF_METHOD *method,
TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
const EC_GROUP *group = method->group;
if (!ec_scalar_from_bytes(group, &key->xs, in, len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_DECODE_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
// Recompute the public key.
EC_RAW_POINT pub;
if (!ec_point_mul_scalar_base(group, &pub, &key->xs) ||
!ec_jacobian_to_affine(group, &key->pubs, &pub)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) *
voprf_blind(const VOPRF_METHOD *method, CBB *cbb, size_t count) {
const EC_GROUP *group = method->group;
STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) *pretokens =
sk_TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN_new_null();
if (pretokens == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < count; i++) {
// Insert |pretoken| into |pretokens| early to simplify error-handling.
TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN *pretoken =
OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN));
if (pretoken == NULL ||
!sk_TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN_push(pretokens, pretoken)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN_free(pretoken);
goto err;
}
RAND_bytes(pretoken->t, sizeof(pretoken->t));
// We sample r in Montgomery form to simplify inverting.
EC_SCALAR r;
if (!ec_random_nonzero_scalar(group, &r,
kDefaultAdditionalData)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
// pretoken->r is rinv.
ec_scalar_inv0_montgomery(group, &pretoken->r, &r);
// Convert both out of Montgomery form.
ec_scalar_from_montgomery(group, &r, &r);
ec_scalar_from_montgomery(group, &pretoken->r, &pretoken->r);
// Tp is the blinded token in the VOPRF protocol.
EC_RAW_POINT P, Tp;
if (!method->hash_to_group(group, &P, pretoken->t) ||
!ec_point_mul_scalar(group, &Tp, &P, &r) ||
!ec_jacobian_to_affine(group, &pretoken->Tp, &Tp)) {
goto err;
}
if (!cbb_add_point(cbb, group, &pretoken->Tp)) {
goto err;
}
}
return pretokens;
err:
sk_TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN_pop_free(pretokens, TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN_free);
return NULL;
}
static int hash_to_scalar_dleq(const VOPRF_METHOD *method, EC_SCALAR *out,
const EC_AFFINE *X, const EC_AFFINE *T,
const EC_AFFINE *W, const EC_AFFINE *K0,
const EC_AFFINE *K1) {
static const uint8_t kDLEQLabel[] = "DLEQ";
int ok = 0;
CBB cbb;
CBB_zero(&cbb);
uint8_t *buf = NULL;
size_t len;
if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, kDLEQLabel, sizeof(kDLEQLabel)) ||
!cbb_add_point(&cbb, method->group, X) ||
!cbb_add_point(&cbb, method->group, T) ||
!cbb_add_point(&cbb, method->group, W) ||
!cbb_add_point(&cbb, method->group, K0) ||
!cbb_add_point(&cbb, method->group, K1) ||
!CBB_finish(&cbb, &buf, &len) ||
!method->hash_to_scalar(method->group, out, buf, len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
ok = 1;
err:
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
OPENSSL_free(buf);
return ok;
}
static int hash_to_scalar_batch(const VOPRF_METHOD *method, EC_SCALAR *out,
const CBB *points, size_t index) {
static const uint8_t kDLEQBatchLabel[] = "DLEQ BATCH";
if (index > 0xffff) {
// The protocol supports only two-byte batches.
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
return 0;
}
int ok = 0;
CBB cbb;
CBB_zero(&cbb);
uint8_t *buf = NULL;
size_t len;
if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, kDLEQBatchLabel, sizeof(kDLEQBatchLabel)) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, CBB_data(points), CBB_len(points)) ||
!CBB_add_u16(&cbb, (uint16_t)index) ||
!CBB_finish(&cbb, &buf, &len) ||
!method->hash_to_scalar(method->group, out, buf, len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
ok = 1;
err:
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
OPENSSL_free(buf);
return ok;
}
static int dleq_generate(const VOPRF_METHOD *method, CBB *cbb,
const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *priv,
const EC_RAW_POINT *T, const EC_RAW_POINT *W) {
const EC_GROUP *group = method->group;
enum {
idx_T,
idx_W,
idx_k0,
idx_k1,
num_idx,
};
EC_RAW_POINT jacobians[num_idx];
// Setup the DLEQ proof.
EC_SCALAR r;
if (// r <- Zp
!ec_random_nonzero_scalar(group, &r, kDefaultAdditionalData) ||
// k0;k1 = r*(G;T)
!ec_point_mul_scalar_base(group, &jacobians[idx_k0], &r) ||
!ec_point_mul_scalar(group, &jacobians[idx_k1], T, &r)) {
return 0;
}
EC_AFFINE affines[num_idx];
jacobians[idx_T] = *T;
jacobians[idx_W] = *W;
if (!ec_jacobian_to_affine_batch(group, affines, jacobians, num_idx)) {
return 0;
}
// Compute c = Hc(...).
EC_SCALAR c;
if (!hash_to_scalar_dleq(method, &c, &priv->pubs, &affines[idx_T],
&affines[idx_W], &affines[idx_k0],
&affines[idx_k1])) {
return 0;
}
EC_SCALAR c_mont;
ec_scalar_to_montgomery(group, &c_mont, &c);
// u = r + c*xs
EC_SCALAR u;
ec_scalar_mul_montgomery(group, &u, &priv->xs, &c_mont);
ec_scalar_add(group, &u, &r, &u);
// Store DLEQ proof in transcript.
if (!scalar_to_cbb(cbb, group, &c) ||
!scalar_to_cbb(cbb, group, &u)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int mul_public_2(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *out,
const EC_RAW_POINT *p0, const EC_SCALAR *scalar0,
const EC_RAW_POINT *p1, const EC_SCALAR *scalar1) {
EC_RAW_POINT points[2] = {*p0, *p1};
EC_SCALAR scalars[2] = {*scalar0, *scalar1};
return ec_point_mul_scalar_public_batch(group, out, /*g_scalar=*/NULL, points,
scalars, 2);
}
static int dleq_verify(const VOPRF_METHOD *method, CBS *cbs,
const TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *pub, const EC_RAW_POINT *T,
const EC_RAW_POINT *W) {
const EC_GROUP *group = method->group;
enum {
idx_T,
idx_W,
idx_k0,
idx_k1,
num_idx,
};
EC_RAW_POINT jacobians[num_idx];
// Decode the DLEQ proof.
EC_SCALAR c, u;
if (!scalar_from_cbs(cbs, group, &c) ||
!scalar_from_cbs(cbs, group, &u)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_DECODE_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
// k0;k1 = u*(G;T) - c*(pub;W)
EC_RAW_POINT pubs;
ec_affine_to_jacobian(group, &pubs, &pub->pubs);
EC_SCALAR minus_c;
ec_scalar_neg(group, &minus_c, &c);
if (!ec_point_mul_scalar_public(group, &jacobians[idx_k0], &u, &pubs,
&minus_c) ||
!mul_public_2(group, &jacobians[idx_k1], T, &u, W, &minus_c)) {
return 0;
}
// Check the DLEQ proof.
EC_AFFINE affines[num_idx];
jacobians[idx_T] = *T;
jacobians[idx_W] = *W;
if (!ec_jacobian_to_affine_batch(group, affines, jacobians, num_idx)) {
return 0;
}
// Compute c = Hc(...).
EC_SCALAR calculated;
if (!hash_to_scalar_dleq(method, &calculated, &pub->pubs, &affines[idx_T],
&affines[idx_W], &affines[idx_k0],
&affines[idx_k1])) {
return 0;
}
// c == calculated
if (!ec_scalar_equal_vartime(group, &c, &calculated)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_INVALID_PROOF);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int voprf_sign(const VOPRF_METHOD *method,
const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, CBB *cbb, CBS *cbs,
size_t num_requested, size_t num_to_issue) {
const EC_GROUP *group = method->group;
if (num_requested < num_to_issue) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (num_to_issue > ((size_t)-1) / sizeof(EC_RAW_POINT) ||
num_to_issue > ((size_t)-1) / sizeof(EC_SCALAR)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
return 0;
}
int ret = 0;
EC_RAW_POINT *BTs = OPENSSL_malloc(num_to_issue * sizeof(EC_RAW_POINT));
EC_RAW_POINT *Zs = OPENSSL_malloc(num_to_issue * sizeof(EC_RAW_POINT));
EC_SCALAR *es = OPENSSL_malloc(num_to_issue * sizeof(EC_SCALAR));
CBB batch_cbb;
CBB_zero(&batch_cbb);
if (!BTs ||
!Zs ||
!es ||
!CBB_init(&batch_cbb, 0) ||
!cbb_add_point(&batch_cbb, method->group, &key->pubs)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_to_issue; i++) {
EC_AFFINE BT_affine, Z_affine;
EC_RAW_POINT BT, Z;
if (!cbs_get_point(cbs, group, &BT_affine)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_DECODE_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
ec_affine_to_jacobian(group, &BT, &BT_affine);
if (!ec_point_mul_scalar(group, &Z, &BT, &key->xs) ||
!ec_jacobian_to_affine(group, &Z_affine, &Z) ||
!cbb_add_point(cbb, group, &Z_affine)) {
goto err;
}
if (!cbb_add_point(&batch_cbb, group, &BT_affine) ||
!cbb_add_point(&batch_cbb, group, &Z_affine)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
BTs[i] = BT;
Zs[i] = Z;
if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) {
goto err;
}
}
// The DLEQ batching construction is described in appendix B of
// https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/072/20200324:214215. Note the additional
// computations all act on public inputs.
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_to_issue; i++) {
if (!hash_to_scalar_batch(method, &es[i], &batch_cbb, i)) {
goto err;
}
}
EC_RAW_POINT BT_batch, Z_batch;
if (!ec_point_mul_scalar_public_batch(group, &BT_batch,
/*g_scalar=*/NULL, BTs, es,
num_to_issue) ||
!ec_point_mul_scalar_public_batch(group, &Z_batch,
/*g_scalar=*/NULL, Zs, es,
num_to_issue)) {
goto err;
}
CBB proof;
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &proof) ||
!dleq_generate(method, &proof, key, &BT_batch, &Z_batch) ||
!CBB_flush(cbb)) {
goto err;
}
// Skip over any unused requests.
size_t point_len = 1 + 2 * BN_num_bytes(&group->field);
if (!CBS_skip(cbs, point_len * (num_requested - num_to_issue))) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_DECODE_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(BTs);
OPENSSL_free(Zs);
OPENSSL_free(es);
CBB_cleanup(&batch_cbb);
return ret;
}
static STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *
voprf_unblind(const VOPRF_METHOD *method, const TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
const STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pretokens, CBS *cbs,
size_t count, uint32_t key_id) {
const EC_GROUP *group = method->group;
if (count > sk_TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN_num(pretokens)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_DECODE_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
int ok = 0;
STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *ret = sk_TRUST_TOKEN_new_null();
if (ret == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
if (count > ((size_t)-1) / sizeof(EC_RAW_POINT) ||
count > ((size_t)-1) / sizeof(EC_SCALAR)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
return 0;
}
EC_RAW_POINT *BTs = OPENSSL_malloc(count * sizeof(EC_RAW_POINT));
EC_RAW_POINT *Zs = OPENSSL_malloc(count * sizeof(EC_RAW_POINT));
EC_SCALAR *es = OPENSSL_malloc(count * sizeof(EC_SCALAR));
CBB batch_cbb;
CBB_zero(&batch_cbb);
if (!BTs ||
!Zs ||
!es ||
!CBB_init(&batch_cbb, 0) ||
!cbb_add_point(&batch_cbb, method->group, &key->pubs)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < count; i++) {
const TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN *pretoken =
sk_TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN_value(pretokens, i);
EC_AFFINE Z_affine;
if (!cbs_get_point(cbs, group, &Z_affine)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_DECODE_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
ec_affine_to_jacobian(group, &BTs[i], &pretoken->Tp);
ec_affine_to_jacobian(group, &Zs[i], &Z_affine);
if (!cbb_add_point(&batch_cbb, group, &pretoken->Tp) ||
!cbb_add_point(&batch_cbb, group, &Z_affine)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
// Unblind the token.
// pretoken->r is rinv.
EC_RAW_POINT N;
EC_AFFINE N_affine;
if (!ec_point_mul_scalar(group, &N, &Zs[i], &pretoken->r) ||
!ec_jacobian_to_affine(group, &N_affine, &N)) {
goto err;
}
// Serialize the token. Include |key_id| to avoid an extra copy in the layer
// above.
CBB token_cbb;
size_t point_len = 1 + 2 * BN_num_bytes(&group->field);
if (!CBB_init(&token_cbb, 4 + TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE + (2 + point_len)) ||
!CBB_add_u32(&token_cbb, key_id) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&token_cbb, pretoken->t, TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE) ||
!cbb_add_point(&token_cbb, group, &N_affine) ||
!CBB_flush(&token_cbb)) {
CBB_cleanup(&token_cbb);
goto err;
}
TRUST_TOKEN *token =
TRUST_TOKEN_new(CBB_data(&token_cbb), CBB_len(&token_cbb));
CBB_cleanup(&token_cbb);
if (token == NULL ||
!sk_TRUST_TOKEN_push(ret, token)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
TRUST_TOKEN_free(token);
goto err;
}
}
// The DLEQ batching construction is described in appendix B of
// https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/072/20200324:214215. Note the additional
// computations all act on public inputs.
for (size_t i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if (!hash_to_scalar_batch(method, &es[i], &batch_cbb, i)) {
goto err;
}
}
EC_RAW_POINT BT_batch, Z_batch;
if (!ec_point_mul_scalar_public_batch(group, &BT_batch,
/*g_scalar=*/NULL, BTs, es, count) ||
!ec_point_mul_scalar_public_batch(group, &Z_batch,
/*g_scalar=*/NULL, Zs, es, count)) {
goto err;
}
CBS proof;
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &proof) ||
!dleq_verify(method, &proof, key, &BT_batch, &Z_batch) ||
CBS_len(&proof) != 0) {
goto err;
}
ok = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(BTs);
OPENSSL_free(Zs);
OPENSSL_free(es);
CBB_cleanup(&batch_cbb);
if (!ok) {
sk_TRUST_TOKEN_pop_free(ret, TRUST_TOKEN_free);
ret = NULL;
}
return ret;
}
static int voprf_read(const VOPRF_METHOD *method,
const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
uint8_t out_nonce[TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE],
const uint8_t *token, size_t token_len) {
const EC_GROUP *group = method->group;
CBS cbs;
CBS_init(&cbs, token, token_len);
EC_AFFINE Ws;
if (!CBS_copy_bytes(&cbs, out_nonce, TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE) ||
!cbs_get_point(&cbs, group, &Ws) ||
CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_INVALID_TOKEN);
return 0;
}
EC_RAW_POINT T;
if (!method->hash_to_group(group, &T, out_nonce)) {
return 0;
}
EC_RAW_POINT Ws_calculated;
if (!ec_point_mul_scalar(group, &Ws_calculated, &T, &key->xs) ||
!ec_affine_jacobian_equal(group, &Ws, &Ws_calculated)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_BAD_VALIDITY_CHECK);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
// VOPRF experiment v2.
static int voprf_exp2_hash_to_group(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *out,
const uint8_t t[TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE]) {
const uint8_t kHashTLabel[] = "TrustToken VOPRF Experiment V2 HashToGroup";
return ec_hash_to_curve_p384_xmd_sha512_sswu_draft07(
group, out, kHashTLabel, sizeof(kHashTLabel), t, TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE);
}
static int voprf_exp2_hash_to_scalar(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out,
uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
const uint8_t kHashCLabel[] = "TrustToken VOPRF Experiment V2 HashToScalar";
return ec_hash_to_scalar_p384_xmd_sha512_draft07(
group, out, kHashCLabel, sizeof(kHashCLabel), buf, len);
}
static int voprf_exp2_ok = 0;
static VOPRF_METHOD voprf_exp2_method;
static CRYPTO_once_t voprf_exp2_method_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_INIT;
static void voprf_exp2_init_method_impl(void) {
voprf_exp2_ok =
voprf_init_method(&voprf_exp2_method, NID_secp384r1,
voprf_exp2_hash_to_group, voprf_exp2_hash_to_scalar);
}
static int voprf_exp2_init_method(void) {
CRYPTO_once(&voprf_exp2_method_once, voprf_exp2_init_method_impl);
if (!voprf_exp2_ok) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int voprf_exp2_generate_key(CBB *out_private, CBB *out_public) {
if (!voprf_exp2_init_method()) {
return 0;
}
return voprf_generate_key(&voprf_exp2_method, out_private, out_public);
}
int voprf_exp2_client_key_from_bytes(TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
if (!voprf_exp2_init_method()) {
return 0;
}
return voprf_client_key_from_bytes(&voprf_exp2_method, key, in, len);
}
int voprf_exp2_issuer_key_from_bytes(TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
if (!voprf_exp2_init_method()) {
return 0;
}
return voprf_issuer_key_from_bytes(&voprf_exp2_method, key, in, len);
}
STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) * voprf_exp2_blind(CBB *cbb, size_t count) {
if (!voprf_exp2_init_method()) {
return NULL;
}
return voprf_blind(&voprf_exp2_method, cbb, count);
}
int voprf_exp2_sign(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, CBB *cbb, CBS *cbs,
size_t num_requested, size_t num_to_issue,
uint8_t private_metadata) {
if (!voprf_exp2_init_method() || private_metadata != 0) {
return 0;
}
return voprf_sign(&voprf_exp2_method, key, cbb, cbs, num_requested,
num_to_issue);
}
STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *
voprf_exp2_unblind(const TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
const STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pretokens,
CBS *cbs, size_t count, uint32_t key_id) {
if (!voprf_exp2_init_method()) {
return NULL;
}
return voprf_unblind(&voprf_exp2_method, key, pretokens, cbs, count,
key_id);
}
int voprf_exp2_read(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
uint8_t out_nonce[TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE],
uint8_t *out_private_metadata, const uint8_t *token,
size_t token_len) {
if (!voprf_exp2_init_method()) {
return 0;
}
return voprf_read(&voprf_exp2_method, key, out_nonce, token, token_len);
}
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ static int do_hex_dump(char_io *io_ch, void *arg, unsigned char *buf,
*/
static int do_dump(unsigned long lflags, char_io *io_ch, void *arg,
ASN1_STRING *str)
const ASN1_STRING *str)
{
/*
* Placing the ASN1_STRING in a temp ASN1_TYPE allows the DER encoding to
@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ static const signed char tag2nbyte[] = {
*/
static int do_print_ex(char_io *io_ch, void *arg, unsigned long lflags,
ASN1_STRING *str)
const ASN1_STRING *str)
{
int outlen, len;
int type;
@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ static int do_indent(char_io *io_ch, void *arg, int indent)
#define FN_WIDTH_LN 25
#define FN_WIDTH_SN 10
static int do_name_ex(char_io *io_ch, void *arg, X509_NAME *n,
static int do_name_ex(char_io *io_ch, void *arg, const X509_NAME *n,
int indent, unsigned long flags)
{
int i, prev = -1, orflags, cnt;
@@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ static int do_name_ex(char_io *io_ch, void *arg, X509_NAME *n,
/* Wrappers round the main functions */
int X509_NAME_print_ex(BIO *out, X509_NAME *nm, int indent,
int X509_NAME_print_ex(BIO *out, const X509_NAME *nm, int indent,
unsigned long flags)
{
if (flags == XN_FLAG_COMPAT)
@@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ int X509_NAME_print_ex(BIO *out, X509_NAME *nm, int indent,
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
int X509_NAME_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, X509_NAME *nm, int indent,
int X509_NAME_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, const X509_NAME *nm, int indent,
unsigned long flags)
{
if (flags == XN_FLAG_COMPAT) {
@@ -610,13 +610,13 @@ int X509_NAME_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, X509_NAME *nm, int indent,
}
#endif
int ASN1_STRING_print_ex(BIO *out, ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags)
int ASN1_STRING_print_ex(BIO *out, const ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags)
{
return do_print_ex(send_bio_chars, out, flags, str);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
int ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags)
int ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, const ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags)
{
return do_print_ex(send_fp_chars, fp, flags, str);
}
@@ -142,6 +142,16 @@ int x509_digest_verify_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
return 0;
}
/* The parameter should be an explicit NULL for RSA and omitted for ECDSA. For
* compatibility, we allow either for both algorithms. See b/167375496.
*
* TODO(davidben): Chromium's verifier allows both forms for RSA, but enforces
* ECDSA more strictly. Align with Chromium and add a flag for b/167375496. */
if (sigalg->parameter != NULL && sigalg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
/* Otherwise, initialize with the digest from the OID. */
const EVP_MD *digest = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest_nid);
if (digest == NULL) {
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ typedef struct {
int exp_count;
} tag_exp_arg;
static ASN1_TYPE *generate_v3(char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf, int depth,
static ASN1_TYPE *generate_v3(const char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf, int depth,
int *perr);
static int bitstr_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr);
static int asn1_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr);
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf,
static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_str2type(const char *str, int format, int utype);
static int asn1_str2tag(const char *tagstr, int len);
ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_nconf(char *str, CONF *nconf)
ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_nconf(const char *str, CONF *nconf)
{
X509V3_CTX cnf;
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_nconf(char *str, CONF *nconf)
return ASN1_generate_v3(str, &cnf);
}
ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_v3(char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf)
ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_v3(const char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf)
{
int err = 0;
ASN1_TYPE *ret = generate_v3(str, cnf, 0, &err);
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_v3(char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf)
return ret;
}
static ASN1_TYPE *generate_v3(char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf, int depth,
static ASN1_TYPE *generate_v3(const char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf, int depth,
int *perr)
{
ASN1_TYPE *ret;
Loaded 100 of 245 files, more files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff. Show more