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48 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Si Beaumont ffca28be3c crypto: Equatable and Hashable conformance for CryptoKitError and CryptoKitASN1Error (#266) 2024-10-02 09:59:06 +01:00
Si Beaumont 35703579f6 Drop support for Swift 5.8 (#259) 2024-09-19 13:55:18 +01:00
George Barnett a24950b8aa Only include privacy manifest on Darwin (#257)
Motivation:

The privacy manifest is only required on Darwin. It's currently included
on all platforms which results in build warnings.

Modifications:

- Only include manifest on Darwin
- Exclude the privacy manifest from the build on other platforms

Result:

- Fewer warnings
- Resolves #256
2024-09-18 17:21:21 +01:00
Paul Toffoloni e8f2ddd49e extras: Add API to create RSA keys with random primes (#250)
This adds a _createFromNumbers API which creates an RSA key generating p and q primes based on n, e and d

Motivation:

There might be cases where private RSA keys have to be generated based on their raw elements (modulus n, exponent e and private exponent d) without p and q. These are random primes which are integral parts of the key but can be generated based on the former numbers, and are not always included when representing RSA keys, for example these parameters are not required in JWKs

Modifications:

This adds a static _createFromNumbers method which creates a new RSA key given its raw modulus, exponent and private exponent, generating the needed p and q primes without having to provide them as parameters. The algorithm to generate primes is based on a hybrid approach of the Miller Rabin primality test and the proof of Fact 1 in Dan Boneh's Twenty Years of Attacks on the RSA Cryptosystem paper. To write this algorithm, some additions had to be made to the ArbitraryPrecisionInteger

Result:

Private RSA keys can now be generated without providing p and q
2024-09-16 13:52:23 +01:00
Paul ToffoloniandCory Benfield 55201a8f83 extras: Add RSA primitives decoding API (#249)
Motivation:

At times we might need to get the raw elements of an RSA key, e.g when debugging.

Modifications:

Add a getKeyPrimitives method to the RSA (public and private) key structures that returns the elements.
To do this we leverage the built in BoringSSL methods (CCryptoBoringSSL_RSA_get0_n etc.) which return the raw elements of the key. In the Security version of the key we convert the key to a BoringSSL one and just call the BoringSSL method.

Once we get ASN.1 support in _CryptoExtras it might make sense switching the implementation of this method to decode the ASN.1 structure and returns the elements from there.

Result:

New APIs to fetch the key primitives.

---------

Co-authored-by: Cory Benfield <lukasa@apple.com>
2024-09-16 04:34:21 -07:00
Cory Benfield 81bee98e70 Update BoringSSL to 6a2ccdcc2ed1d37a43a2183658d2ae61fd5ce208 (#255) 2024-09-16 10:02:51 +01:00
Franz Busch ce204da6f6 Add release.yml (#253) 2024-09-06 13:57:39 +01:00
Si Beaumont 9f95b4d033 Add support for AES CFB mode in _CryptoExtras (#252) 2024-09-03 09:28:28 +01:00
Jake Petroules a53a7e8f85 Convert PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy symlinks to files (#251)
It is expected behavior of the swift-build build system to copy links as-is, so presenting these as symlinks results in broken symlinks being present in the produced resource bundles, which won't work properly.

On Windows, it even causes the build entirely to fail due to a related bug: https://github.com/apple/swift-foundation/issues/845

Convert these to flat files instead.
2024-08-13 07:53:29 +01:00
Si BeaumontandCory Benfield 8dafe0fdce extras: Provide initializers for RSA keys from RSA numbers as bytes (#247)
Co-authored-by: Cory Benfield <lukasa@apple.com>
2024-07-22 04:01:44 -07:00
Nicolas BachschmidtandCory Benfield e2dd5a547b Reduce the number of heap allocations when computing hash digests (#238)
* Remove array allocation when computing digest

Instead of creating a temporary array, the digest bytes are stored in a temporary stack-allocated buffer.

This reduces the number of heap allocations needed to hash a message from 7 to 6.

* Store digest context inline

This reduces the number of heap allocations needed to hash a message from 6 to 2.

Before:
  1. the DigestContext object is created
  2. the EVP_MD_CTX struct is allocated by EVP_MD_CTX_new
  3. md_data is allocated when initializing the context

After:
  1. the DigestContext object is created

In both cases, the number is doubled because COW happens during finalize().

* Use temporary variable to finalize context

This reduces the number of heap allocations needed to hash a message from 2 to 1.

---------

Co-authored-by: Cory Benfield <lukasa@apple.com>
2024-07-18 08:34:52 -07:00
Si Beaumont 46072478ca build: Revert to using @_implementationOnly for all BoringSSL modules (#246) 2024-07-03 14:37:23 +01:00
Si BeaumontandCory Benfield c370ad81a1 symbols (#245)
Co-authored-by: Cory Benfield <lukasa@apple.com>
2024-07-02 11:10:27 -07:00
Si Beaumont 33f65a3cbc Change inclusiveMin param of ArbitraryPrecisionInteger.random from UInt64 to UInt (#242) 2024-06-27 15:01:40 +01:00
Si Beaumont fdfdc11707 extras: Add APIs for RSA Blind Signatures (#232)
* API for RSA blind signing and verification from RFC 9474

* Add blind signing backend for Security framework

* Hide PSSZERO variants from public API for now

* Update CMakeLists.txt

* Verify signature produced within SecurityRSAPrivateKey.blindSignature(_:)

* Update API: bake params  into key, use wrappers for intermidiate values

* Throw specific error when message too large for key modulus

* Drop Security framework backend and support all variants

* Factor out withNewBignumContext helper

* Align parameter names and labels in internal functions with public API

* Fix typo in doc comments: public -> private

* Implement client operations for RSA Blind Signatures

* Remove the BlindedMessage type

* Move prepare function to public key method

* Throw (internal) errors defined in the RFC

* Fix test function names for Linux test discovery

* Factor saltLength into a computed property on Parameters

* Improve allocations for temporary bytes

* Fixup documentation typos

* Parameters are Sendable, regardless of H type parameter

* PublicKey and PrivateKey are also Sendable, regardless of H

* Wrap internal errors in most appropriate CryptoKitError

* Factor code differently

* Tweak API to return BlindingResult nominal type instead of tuple

* Prefer withUnsafeTemporaryAllocation(of:capacity:_:) to Array.init(unsafeUnitializedCapacity:_:)

* Move unsafe temporary allocations into BlindSigningHelpers methods

* Replace hand-rolled BN ops with ArbitraryPrecisionInteger and FFAC

* Fixup placement of paren in guards with closures

* Replace closure invocation let binding with looped var

* Use ERR_peek_last_error, not ERR_get_error
2024-06-26 13:20:43 +01:00
Si BeaumontandCory Benfield a3866d45d9 Move ArbitraryPrecisionInteger type to CryptoBoringWrapper module (#236)
* Move ArbitraryPrecisionInteger_boring.swift to CryptoBoringWrapper

* Remove conditional compilation guards for ArbitraryPrecisionInteger

* Throw CryptoBoringWrapperError.internalBoringSSLError instead of CryptoKitError.internalBoringSSLError

* Make most operations public and add raw pointer APIs

* Move ArbitraryPrecisionIntegerTests to new CryptoBoringWrapperTests target

* rename some files

* Remove @_implementationOnly from imports and raw pointer APIs

* Also move over FiniteFieldArithmeticContext to CryptoBoringWrapper

* Add FiniteFieldArithmeticContext.inverse

* Remove conditional compilation guards for FFAC

* Update CMakeLists.txt for moved files

* Revert "Add FiniteFieldArithmeticContext.inverse"

This reverts commit e02700e07c.

* Fix CMakeLists.txt

* Make most public symbols @inlinable

---------

Co-authored-by: Cory Benfield <lukasa@apple.com>
2024-06-21 16:35:50 +01:00
Neil Jones 5fb3819b51 add support for riscv64 (#240) 2024-06-17 12:34:29 -07:00
Rick Newton-Rogers 3c060cc4af update README recommended versions (#233) 2024-05-23 03:57:01 -07:00
Si Beaumont c36d19a064 Fix broken DataProtocol.hexString test utility (#230) 2024-05-21 11:09:20 +01:00
Si Beaumont bc1c29221f Use BoringSSL implementation for AES_CTR (#229) 2024-05-07 16:10:20 +01:00
Cory Benfield 2adec617e6 Add empty privacy manifest files (#226)
BoringSSL distributions need to be covered by privacy manifest files,
so we add one here.
2024-03-26 13:25:06 +00:00
Paul ToffoloniandCory Benfield 89876ab72c Update lower bound for RSA key sizes (#218)
* Update lower bound for RSA key sizes

* Add unsafe initialiser for smaller keys

---------

Co-authored-by: Cory Benfield <lukasa@apple.com>
2024-03-25 12:42:29 +00:00
Cory Benfield f0525da24d Update BoringSSL to dbad745811195c00b729efd0ee0a09b7d9fce1d2 (#222)
* Update vendoring script for changed layout

* Update BoringSSL to dbad745811195c00b729efd0ee0a09b7d9fce1d2
2024-03-12 10:50:25 +00:00
George Barnett 52d0d9f15a Raise minimum Swift version to 5.7 (#221) 2024-03-12 10:40:24 +00:00
Cory Benfield 9960a73340 Add support for AES CTR mode in _CryptoExtras (#220) 2024-03-08 09:47:06 +00:00
David Benjamin 606608da08 Remove dtls1.h as part of removing libssl (#217)
It's just an empty compatibility header at this point, but as nominally
a part of libssl, remove it with the rest.
2024-01-26 08:17:28 +00:00
coldjugular 029eeacda4 Update macOS development instructions (#216)
Update the macOS local development instructions to correspond to the change made in commit 17d95a6782.
2024-01-24 01:51:38 -08:00
Cory Benfield cc76b89416 Update BoringSSL to 7a813621dac6878ab53b6ed7392939a8982226e8 (#215) 2024-01-08 16:41:09 +00:00
Gustavo CairoandYim Lee 3e8497753e Add cxx interop build pipeline (#212)
* Add cxx interop build pipeline

* Update docker-compose.2204.59.yaml

* Change cxx interop CI step to build separate project instead of using cxx compiler flag

* Update docker-compose for 5.10

* Fix package name in docker

* Change code root dirname and remove test target

---------

Co-authored-by: Yim Lee <yim_lee@apple.com>
2023-12-21 12:55:03 +00:00
Rick Newton-Rogers c1825df19b Add more Sendable annotations to Crypto Extras (#214)
Motivation

Add Sendable annotations to Crypto Extras to reflect current sandability
so that downstream packages can implement sendable conformance.

Modifications

* Add Sendable conformance to some missed public symbols.
* RSA public and private keys are now marked sendable with their backing storage on darwin OS marked unchecked sendable until SecKey from security framework has sendability annotations

Result

* More accurate Sendable annotations
2023-12-20 13:20:12 +00:00
Si Beaumont 09f7a993f6 Update availability annotations in tests (#213) 2023-12-19 12:00:45 -08:00
Rick Newton-Rogers ed66091040 Add Sendables annotation to Crypto Extras (#211)
Motivation

Add Sendable annotations to Crypto Extras to reflect current sandability
so that downstream packages can implement sendable conformance.

Modifications

* Add Sendable conformance to appropriate public symbols.
* RSA public and private keys are notable omissions, this is because
  they are backed by SecKey from security framework and we have no
  guarantees about their sendability

Result

* Accurate Sendable annotations
2023-12-12 15:52:13 +00:00
Timo b793a1e564 Add support for CBC without padding (#210)
Motivation:

As described in #209, I personally need this to migrate an oracle driver from a third party crypto lib to swift-crypto. I think other users might benefit from this addition too.

Modifications:

I've added an overload to the encrypt and decrypt methods of AES._CBC, allowing the user to configure if padding should be added or not. With noPadding set to true, an error will be thrown if the plaintext isn't a multiple of the block size. I've added the corresponding inline documentation.

I've also added tests to ensure both encrypting and decrypting without padding work as expected. Although those tests might not be sufficient enough, because I couldn't find good resources online. I've created a bunch of random hex strings and encrypted/decrypted them using another implementation of paddingless CBC and checked if I receive the expected results. To further validate the feature, I've tested it as part of the authentication in oracle-nio, which worked in all test scenarios I've been running.

Result:

After merging this, it will be possible to use CBC without padding. This closes #209
2023-12-05 18:23:27 +00:00
Rick Newton-Rogers f4b21dbde7 Add support for pkcs1 oaep sha256 (#206)
Motivation

Add RSA OAEP-sha256 support in addition to the increasingly aged SHA-1
implementation.

Modifications

* Add a `Digest` enum to `_RSA.Encryption.Padding`
* Add a digest associated type to the `.pkcs1_oaep` padding enum case
  to allow us to distinguish different digest hash functions.
* Add a `PKCS1_OAEP_SHA256` public static let to allow users to use the
  new hash function.
* Enable SHA-256 RSA encryption tests

Result

* Support for RSA OAEP-sha256
2023-11-06 11:25:42 +00:00
Cory Benfield 3df7fa0626 Update BoringSSL to 3309ca66385ecb0c37f1ac1be9f88712e25aa8ec (#207)
* Update perlasm

* Update BoringSSL to 3309ca66385ecb0c37f1ac1be9f88712e25aa8ec

* Update CMakeLists.txt
2023-10-30 11:38:26 +00:00
Rick Newton-Rogers 7644bdcc76 BoringSSLRSAPublicKey use EVP_PKEY API (#205)
Motivation

Increased versatility of the `BoringSSLRSAPublicKey` encrypt and decrypt
methods to make future extensions possible.

Modifications

Switch the `BoringSSLRSAPublicKey` encrypt and decrypt methods to use
the `EVP_PKEY_*` API directly rather than going through the RSA
abstractions.

Result

Increased versatility of the `BoringSSLRSAPublicKey` encrypt and decrypt
methods.
2023-10-24 19:53:14 +01:00
Brian Michel fade397763 Add extern C markers (#204)
* Add extern C markers

* Only add extern in header file.
2023-10-20 08:05:48 +01:00
BJ Homer c4f2e9938a pkcs8PEMRepresentation for RSA private keys (#203)
* Teach CryptoExtras about CRYPTO_IN_SWIFTPM_FORCE_BUILD_API

* Add pkcs8PEMRepresentation to RSA private keys
2023-10-11 13:21:18 +01:00
Rick Newton-RogersandCory Benfield b51f1d6845 Bump minimum Swift version to 5.7 (#201)
Motivation:

Now that Swift 5.9 is GM we should update the supported versions and
remove 5.6

Modifications:

* Update `Package.swift`
* Delete the 5.6 docker compose file and make a 5.10 one
* Update docs

Result:

Remove support for Swift 5.6, add 5.10

Co-authored-by: Cory Benfield <lukasa@apple.com>
2023-10-04 02:19:44 -07:00
Franz Busch faad1cf4fd Add support for AES-CBC in _CryptoExtras (#200)
# Motivation
We want to support AES-CBC for encryption and decryption purposes.

# Modification
This PR adds support AES-CBC. Furthermore, it adds wycheproof tests for it.
2023-10-03 18:42:08 +01:00
Cory Benfield 629f0b679d Update to CryptoKit 2023 final API (#199)
Motivation

This patch brings us up-to-date with CryptoKit's final 2023 API form.

Modifications

Slight tweak to exporter secrets for HPKE to match final spec.
New representation for SecureBytes when empty.

Result

We're ready for the future
2023-09-13 12:03:22 +01:00
David Nadoba 953b34a601 Use SecKeyGetBlockSize instead of kSecAttrKeySizeInBits (#198) 2023-08-17 06:53:44 -07:00
Cory BenfieldandSaleem Abdulrasool 710deacf79 Set missing Windows defines (#197)
Motivation

We need a few extra Windows defines to match what BoringSSL does, and
to suppress warnings.

Modifications

Add the missing defines.

Result

Fewer warnings.
Resolves #195.

Co-authored-by: Saleem Abdulrasool <compnerd@compnerd.org>
2023-08-15 02:50:51 -07:00
Cory Benfield a234f8a62e Update BoringSSL to 7ae2b910c13017b63f1a8bd6c8decfce692869b0 (#190)
* Update vendoring script to use docker

* Update BoringSSL to 7ae2b910c13017b63f1a8bd6c8decfce692869b0

* RSA is opaque now
2023-08-03 11:34:38 +01:00
Franz BuschandCory Benfield 9c1b699540 Switch to canImport instead of os conditions (#184)
* Rework canImport to just defines with platform conditions

* Soundness and make

---------

Co-authored-by: Cory Benfield <lukasa@apple.com>
2023-07-20 22:31:12 +01:00
Gwynne Raskind 5ac5632286 Add API providing basic RSA pubkey encrypt and privkey decrypt (#125)
* Add basic RSA encrypt/decrypt API.

* Add test vectors and tests for RSA encryption API

* Fix build failures

* Fix soundness issue

* Remove support for RSA encryption using the unsafe PKCS1 v1.5 padding

* Fix deprecation warning about the "pointer" version of Data.withUnsafeMutableBytes() by nudging the compiler to infer the "buffer" version.

* Fix deprecation warning about String.init(bytesNoCopy:length:freeWhenDone:) by using String.init(unsafeInitializedCapacity:initializingWith:) instead.

* Make _RSA.Encryption.[Public|Private]Key their own types

* Remove _RSA.Encryption.RSA[Encrypted|Decrypted]Data and just use Data directly. Don't use intermediate Array in BoringSSL implementations.

* Document the message size limits on RSA encrypt/decrypt operations

* Mark `_RSA` visible to documentation so the new docs can actually be seen (underscored name is assumed private by default)

* Fix generic type parameter shadowing warning (new warning in Swift 5.9)

* Fix pre-5.8 build

* Un-correct switch case indentation to make it wrong
2023-07-17 17:51:49 +01:00
Joey cba358dec9 Documentation - Typos & Consistency Fixes (#186) 2023-06-29 02:20:15 -07:00
Cory Benfield c433cd3341 Bring over the WWDC 2023 CryptoKit API (#181)
Motivation

WWDC has arrived! 🎉 As part of the celebration, let's
bring Crypto up to speed with the new CryptoKit API surface.

Modifications

Substantial new docstrings
HPKE support

Result

WWDC 2023 support.
2023-06-13 18:27:01 +01:00
601 changed files with 81096 additions and 41042 deletions

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+14
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@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
changelog:
categories:
- title: SemVer Major
labels:
- ⚠️ semver/major
- title: SemVer Minor
labels:
- semver/minor
- title: SemVer Patch
labels:
- semver/patch
- title: Other Changes
labels:
- semver/none
+1
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@@ -15,3 +15,4 @@ DerivedData
.*.sw[nop]
.vscode
+42 -18
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
// swift-tools-version:5.6
// swift-tools-version:5.9
//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
//
// This source file is part of the SwiftCrypto open source project
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
// Sources/CCryptoBoringSSL directory. The source repository is at
// https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl.
//
// BoringSSL Commit: 7ae2b910c13017b63f1a8bd6c8decfce692869b0
// BoringSSL Commit: 6a2ccdcc2ed1d37a43a2183658d2ae61fd5ce208
import PackageDescription
@@ -57,6 +57,18 @@ if development {
]
}
// This doesn't work when cross-compiling: the privacy manifest will be included in the Bundle and
// Foundation will be linked. This is, however, strictly better than unconditionally adding the
// resource.
#if canImport(Darwin)
let privacyManifestExclude: [String] = []
let privacyManifestResource: [PackageDescription.Resource] = [.copy("PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy")]
#else
// Exclude on other platforms to avoid build warnings.
let privacyManifestExclude: [String] = ["PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy"]
let privacyManifestResource: [PackageDescription.Resource] = []
#endif
let package = Package(
name: "swift-crypto",
platforms: [
@@ -76,7 +88,7 @@ let package = Package(
targets: [
.target(
name: "CCryptoBoringSSL",
exclude: [
exclude: privacyManifestExclude + [
"hash.txt",
"include/boringssl_prefix_symbols_nasm.inc",
"CMakeLists.txt",
@@ -88,13 +100,13 @@ let package = Package(
"crypto/bio/socket_helper.c",
"crypto/bio/socket.c"
],
resources: privacyManifestResource,
cSettings: [
/*
* This define is required on Windows, but because we need older
* versions of SPM, we cannot conditionally define this on Windows
* only. Unconditionally define it instead.
*/
.define("WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN"),
// These defines come from BoringSSL's build system
.define("_HAS_EXCEPTIONS", to: "0", .when(platforms: [Platform.windows])),
.define("WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN", .when(platforms: [Platform.windows])),
.define("NOMINMAX", .when(platforms: [Platform.windows])),
.define("_CRT_SECURE_NO_WARNINGS", .when(platforms: [Platform.windows])),
/*
* These defines are required on Wasm/WASI, to disable use of pthread.
*/
@@ -105,21 +117,23 @@ let package = Package(
.target(
name: "CCryptoBoringSSLShims",
dependencies: ["CCryptoBoringSSL"],
exclude: [
exclude: privacyManifestExclude + [
"CMakeLists.txt"
]
],
resources: privacyManifestResource
),
.target(
name: "Crypto",
dependencies: dependencies,
exclude: [
exclude: privacyManifestExclude + [
"CMakeLists.txt",
"AEADs/Nonces.swift.gyb",
"Digests/Digests.swift.gyb",
"Key Agreement/ECDH.swift.gyb",
"Signatures/ECDSA.swift.gyb",
],
swiftSettings: swiftSettings
resources: privacyManifestResource,
swiftSettings: swiftSettings + [.define("MODULE_IS_CRYPTO")]
),
.target(
name: "_CryptoExtras",
@@ -129,9 +143,11 @@ let package = Package(
"CryptoBoringWrapper",
"Crypto"
],
exclude: [
exclude: privacyManifestExclude + [
"CMakeLists.txt",
]
],
resources: privacyManifestResource,
swiftSettings: swiftSettings
),
.target(
name: "CryptoBoringWrapper",
@@ -139,12 +155,20 @@ let package = Package(
"CCryptoBoringSSL",
"CCryptoBoringSSLShims"
],
exclude: [
exclude: privacyManifestExclude + [
"CMakeLists.txt",
]
],
resources: privacyManifestResource
),
.executableTarget(name: "crypto-shasum", dependencies: ["Crypto"]),
.testTarget(name: "CryptoTests", dependencies: ["Crypto"], swiftSettings: swiftSettings),
.testTarget(
name: "CryptoTests",
dependencies: ["Crypto"],
resources: [
.copy("HPKE/hpke-test-vectors.json"),
],
swiftSettings: swiftSettings
),
.testTarget(name: "_CryptoExtrasTests", dependencies: ["_CryptoExtras"]),
],
cxxLanguageStandard: .cxx11
+9 -6
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ Swift Crypto is an open-source implementation of a substantial portion of the AP
Swift Crypto is available as a Swift Package Manager package. To use it, add the following dependency in your `Package.swift`:
```swift
// swift-crypto 1.x and 2.x are almost API compatible, so most clients should
// allow either
.package(url: "https://github.com/apple/swift-crypto.git", "1.0.0" ..< "3.0.0"),
// swift-crypto 1.x, 2.x and 3.x are almost API compatible, so most clients
// should allow any of them
.package(url: "https://github.com/apple/swift-crypto.git", "1.0.0" ..< "4.0.0"),
```
and to your target, add `Crypto` to your dependencies. You can then `import Crypto` to get access to Swift Crypto's functionality.
@@ -108,14 +108,17 @@ If you believe you have identified a vulnerability in Swift Crypto, please [repo
### Swift versions
The most recent versions of Swift Crypto support Swift 5.6 and newer. The minimum Swift version supported by Swift Crypto releases are detailed below:
The most recent versions of Swift Crypto support Swift 5.7 and newer. The minimum Swift version supported by Swift Crypto releases are detailed below:
Swift Crypto | Minimum Swift Version
------------------|----------------------
`2.0.0 ..< 2.1.0` | 5.2
`2.1.0 ..< 2.2.0` | 5.4
`2.2.0 ..< 2.4.2` | 5.5
`2.4.2 ...` | 5.6
`2.4.2 ..< 3.1.0` | 5.6
`3.1.0 ..< 3.3.0` | 5.7
`3.3.0 ..< 3.8.0` | 5.8
`3.8.0 ...` | 5.9
### Compatibility
@@ -135,5 +138,5 @@ To do so, please use the following dependency in your `Package.swift`:
### Developing Swift Crypto on macOS
Swift Crypto normally defers to the OS implementation of CryptoKit on macOS. Naturally, this makes developing Swift Crypto on macOS tricky. To get Swift Crypto to build the open source implementation on macOS, in `Package.swift`, uncomment the line that reads: `//.define("CRYPTO_IN_SWIFTPM_FORCE_BUILD_API")`, as this will force Swift Crypto to build its public API.
Swift Crypto normally defers to the OS implementation of CryptoKit on macOS. Naturally, this makes developing Swift Crypto on macOS tricky. To get Swift Crypto to build the open source implementation on macOS, in `Package.swift`, change `let development = false` to `let development = true`, as this will force Swift Crypto to build its public API.
+106 -168
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@@ -80,7 +80,6 @@ add_library(CCryptoBoringSSL STATIC
"crypto/cpu_aarch64_openbsd.c"
"crypto/cpu_aarch64_sysreg.c"
"crypto/cpu_aarch64_win.c"
"crypto/cpu_arm.c"
"crypto/cpu_arm_freebsd.c"
"crypto/cpu_arm_linux.c"
"crypto/cpu_intel.c"
@@ -92,6 +91,7 @@ add_library(CCryptoBoringSSL STATIC
"crypto/dh_extra/dh_asn1.c"
"crypto/dh_extra/params.c"
"crypto/digest_extra/digest_extra.c"
"crypto/dilithium/dilithium.c"
"crypto/dsa/dsa.c"
"crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c"
"crypto/ec_extra/ec_asn1.c"
@@ -101,10 +101,11 @@ add_library(CCryptoBoringSSL STATIC
"crypto/ecdsa_extra/ecdsa_asn1.c"
"crypto/engine/engine.c"
"crypto/err/err.c"
"crypto/err/err_data.c"
"crypto/evp/evp.c"
"crypto/evp/evp_asn1.c"
"crypto/evp/evp_ctx.c"
"crypto/evp/p_dh.c"
"crypto/evp/p_dh_asn1.c"
"crypto/evp/p_dsa_asn1.c"
"crypto/evp/p_ec.c"
"crypto/evp/p_ec_asn1.c"
@@ -120,89 +121,17 @@ add_library(CCryptoBoringSSL STATIC
"crypto/evp/scrypt.c"
"crypto/evp/sign.c"
"crypto/ex_data.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/aes/aes.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/aes/aes_nohw.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/aes/key_wrap.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/aes/mode_wrappers.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/add.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/bn.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/bytes.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/cmp.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/ctx.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/div.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/div_extra.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/exponentiation.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/gcd.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/gcd_extra.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/generic.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/jacobi.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/montgomery.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/montgomery_inv.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/mul.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/prime.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/random.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/rsaz_exp.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/shift.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/sqrt.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/aead.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/cipher.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/e_aes.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/e_aesccm.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/cmac/cmac.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/dh/check.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/dh/dh.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/digest/digest.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/digest/digests.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/digestsign/digestsign.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/ec.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/ec_key.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/ec_montgomery.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/felem.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/oct.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/p224-64.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/p256-nistz.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/p256.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/scalar.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/simple.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/simple_mul.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/util.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/wnaf.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ecdh/ecdh.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ecdsa/ecdsa.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bcm.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/fips_shared_support.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/hkdf/hkdf.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/hmac/hmac.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/md4/md4.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/md5/md5.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/modes/cbc.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/modes/cfb.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/modes/ctr.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/modes/gcm.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/modes/gcm_nohw.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/modes/ofb.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/modes/polyval.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/rand/ctrdrbg.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/rand/fork_detect.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/rand/rand.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/rand/urandom.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/rsa/blinding.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/rsa/padding.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/rsa/rsa.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/rsa/rsa_impl.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/self_check/fips.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/self_check/self_check.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/service_indicator/service_indicator.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/sha/sha1.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/sha/sha256.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/sha/sha512.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/tls/kdf.c"
"crypto/hpke/hpke.c"
"crypto/hrss/hrss.c"
"crypto/kyber/keccak.c"
"crypto/keccak/keccak.c"
"crypto/kyber/kyber.c"
"crypto/lhash/lhash.c"
"crypto/md4/md4.c"
"crypto/md5/md5.c"
"crypto/mem.c"
"crypto/mldsa/mldsa.c"
"crypto/obj/obj.c"
"crypto/obj/obj_xref.c"
"crypto/pem/pem_all.c"
@@ -223,19 +152,29 @@ add_library(CCryptoBoringSSL STATIC
"crypto/poly1305/poly1305_vec.c"
"crypto/pool/pool.c"
"crypto/rand_extra/deterministic.c"
"crypto/rand_extra/fork_detect.c"
"crypto/rand_extra/forkunsafe.c"
"crypto/rand_extra/getentropy.c"
"crypto/rand_extra/ios.c"
"crypto/rand_extra/passive.c"
"crypto/rand_extra/rand_extra.c"
"crypto/rand_extra/trusty.c"
"crypto/rand_extra/urandom.c"
"crypto/rand_extra/windows.c"
"crypto/rc4/rc4.c"
"crypto/refcount.c"
"crypto/rsa_extra/rsa_asn1.c"
"crypto/rsa_extra/rsa_crypt.c"
"crypto/rsa_extra/rsa_print.c"
"crypto/sha/sha1.c"
"crypto/siphash/siphash.c"
"crypto/spx/spx.c"
"crypto/spx/spx_address.c"
"crypto/spx/spx_fors.c"
"crypto/spx/spx_merkle.c"
"crypto/spx/spx_thash.c"
"crypto/spx/spx_util.c"
"crypto/spx/spx_wots.c"
"crypto/stack/stack.c"
"crypto/thread.c"
"crypto/thread_none.c"
@@ -259,6 +198,29 @@ add_library(CCryptoBoringSSL STATIC
"crypto/x509/t_req.c"
"crypto/x509/t_x509.c"
"crypto/x509/t_x509a.c"
"crypto/x509/v3_akey.c"
"crypto/x509/v3_akeya.c"
"crypto/x509/v3_alt.c"
"crypto/x509/v3_bcons.c"
"crypto/x509/v3_bitst.c"
"crypto/x509/v3_conf.c"
"crypto/x509/v3_cpols.c"
"crypto/x509/v3_crld.c"
"crypto/x509/v3_enum.c"
"crypto/x509/v3_extku.c"
"crypto/x509/v3_genn.c"
"crypto/x509/v3_ia5.c"
"crypto/x509/v3_info.c"
"crypto/x509/v3_int.c"
"crypto/x509/v3_lib.c"
"crypto/x509/v3_ncons.c"
"crypto/x509/v3_ocsp.c"
"crypto/x509/v3_pcons.c"
"crypto/x509/v3_pmaps.c"
"crypto/x509/v3_prn.c"
"crypto/x509/v3_purp.c"
"crypto/x509/v3_skey.c"
"crypto/x509/v3_utl.c"
"crypto/x509/x509.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_att.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c"
@@ -283,9 +245,7 @@ add_library(CCryptoBoringSSL STATIC
"crypto/x509/x_attrib.c"
"crypto/x509/x_crl.c"
"crypto/x509/x_exten.c"
"crypto/x509/x_info.c"
"crypto/x509/x_name.c"
"crypto/x509/x_pkey.c"
"crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c"
"crypto/x509/x_req.c"
"crypto/x509/x_sig.c"
@@ -293,102 +253,80 @@ add_library(CCryptoBoringSSL STATIC
"crypto/x509/x_val.c"
"crypto/x509/x_x509.c"
"crypto/x509/x_x509a.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_akey.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_akeya.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_bcons.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_bitst.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_conf.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_crld.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_enum.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_extku.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_ia5.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_info.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_int.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_lib.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_ocsp.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_pcons.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_pmaps.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_prn.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_skey.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c")
"gen/crypto/err_data.c")
if(CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME STREQUAL Darwin AND CMAKE_SYSTEM_PROCESSOR MATCHES "amd64|x86_64")
target_sources(CCryptoBoringSSL PRIVATE
crypto/chacha/chacha-x86_64-mac.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/cipher_extra/aes128gcmsiv-x86_64-mac.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/cipher_extra/chacha20_poly1305_x86_64-mac.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/aesni-gcm-x86_64-mac.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/aesni-x86_64-mac.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/ghash-ssse3-x86_64-mac.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/ghash-x86_64-mac.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/md5-x86_64-mac.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/p256-x86_64-asm-mac.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/p256_beeu-x86_64-asm-mac.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/rdrand-x86_64-mac.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/rsaz-avx2-mac.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha1-x86_64-mac.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha256-x86_64-mac.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha512-x86_64-mac.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/vpaes-x86_64-mac.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/x86_64-mont-mac.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/x86_64-mont5-mac.mac.x86_64.S)
gen/bcm/aesni-gcm-x86_64-apple.S
gen/bcm/aesni-x86_64-apple.S
gen/bcm/ghash-ssse3-x86_64-apple.S
gen/bcm/ghash-x86_64-apple.S
gen/bcm/p256-x86_64-asm-apple.S
gen/bcm/p256_beeu-x86_64-asm-apple.S
gen/bcm/rdrand-x86_64-apple.S
gen/bcm/rsaz-avx2-apple.S
gen/bcm/sha1-x86_64-apple.S
gen/bcm/sha256-x86_64-apple.S
gen/bcm/sha512-x86_64-apple.S
gen/bcm/vpaes-x86_64-apple.S
gen/bcm/x86_64-mont-apple.S
gen/bcm/x86_64-mont5-apple.S
gen/crypto/aes128gcmsiv-x86_64-apple.S
gen/crypto/chacha-x86_64-apple.S
gen/crypto/chacha20_poly1305_x86_64-apple.S
gen/crypto/md5-x86_64-apple.S)
elseif(CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME MATCHES "Linux|Android" AND CMAKE_SYSTEM_PROCESSOR MATCHES "amd64|x86_64")
target_sources(CCryptoBoringSSL PRIVATE
crypto/chacha/chacha-x86_64-linux.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/cipher_extra/aes128gcmsiv-x86_64-linux.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/cipher_extra/chacha20_poly1305_x86_64-linux.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/aesni-gcm-x86_64-linux.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/aesni-x86_64-linux.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/ghash-ssse3-x86_64-linux.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/ghash-x86_64-linux.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/md5-x86_64-linux.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/p256-x86_64-asm-linux.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/p256_beeu-x86_64-asm-linux.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/rdrand-x86_64-linux.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/rsaz-avx2-linux.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha1-x86_64-linux.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha256-x86_64-linux.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha512-x86_64-linux.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/vpaes-x86_64-linux.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/x86_64-mont-linux.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/x86_64-mont5-linux.linux.x86_64.S)
gen/bcm/aesni-gcm-x86_64-linux.S
gen/bcm/aesni-x86_64-linux.S
gen/bcm/ghash-ssse3-x86_64-linux.S
gen/bcm/ghash-x86_64-linux.S
gen/bcm/p256-x86_64-asm-linux.S
gen/bcm/p256_beeu-x86_64-asm-linux.S
gen/bcm/rdrand-x86_64-linux.S
gen/bcm/rsaz-avx2-linux.S
gen/bcm/sha1-x86_64-linux.S
gen/bcm/sha256-x86_64-linux.S
gen/bcm/sha512-x86_64-linux.S
gen/bcm/vpaes-x86_64-linux.S
gen/bcm/x86_64-mont-linux.S
gen/bcm/x86_64-mont5-linux.S
gen/crypto/aes128gcmsiv-x86_64-linux.S
gen/crypto/chacha-x86_64-linux.S
gen/crypto/chacha20_poly1305_x86_64-linux.S
gen/crypto/md5-x86_64-linux.S)
elseif(CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME STREQUAL Darwin AND CMAKE_SYSTEM_PROCESSOR MATCHES "arm64|aarch64")
target_sources(CCryptoBoringSSL PRIVATE
crypto/chacha/chacha-armv8-ios.ios.aarch64.S
crypto/cipher_extra/chacha20_poly1305_armv8-ios.ios.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/aesv8-armv8-ios.ios.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/aesv8-gcm-armv8-ios.ios.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/armv8-mont-ios.ios.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/bn-armv8-ios.ios.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/ghash-neon-armv8-ios.ios.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/ghashv8-armv8-ios.ios.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/p256-armv8-asm-ios.ios.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/p256_beeu-armv8-asm-ios.ios.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha1-armv8-ios.ios.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha256-armv8-ios.ios.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha512-armv8-ios.ios.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/vpaes-armv8-ios.ios.aarch64.S)
gen/bcm/aesv8-armv8-apple.S
gen/bcm/aesv8-gcm-armv8-apple.S
gen/bcm/armv8-mont-apple.S
gen/bcm/bn-armv8-apple.S
gen/bcm/ghash-neon-armv8-apple.S
gen/bcm/ghashv8-armv8-apple.S
gen/bcm/p256-armv8-asm-apple.S
gen/bcm/p256_beeu-armv8-asm-apple.S
gen/bcm/sha1-armv8-apple.S
gen/bcm/sha256-armv8-apple.S
gen/bcm/sha512-armv8-apple.S
gen/bcm/vpaes-armv8-apple.S
gen/crypto/chacha-armv8-apple.S
gen/crypto/chacha20_poly1305_armv8-apple.S)
elseif(CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME MATCHES "Linux|Android" AND CMAKE_SYSTEM_PROCESSOR MATCHES "arm64|aarch64")
target_sources(CCryptoBoringSSL PRIVATE
crypto/chacha/chacha-armv8-linux.linux.aarch64.S
crypto/cipher_extra/chacha20_poly1305_armv8-linux.linux.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/aesv8-armv8-linux.linux.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/aesv8-gcm-armv8-linux.linux.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/armv8-mont-linux.linux.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/bn-armv8-linux.linux.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/ghash-neon-armv8-linux.linux.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/ghashv8-armv8-linux.linux.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/p256-armv8-asm-linux.linux.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/p256_beeu-armv8-asm-linux.linux.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha1-armv8-linux.linux.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha256-armv8-linux.linux.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha512-armv8-linux.linux.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/vpaes-armv8-linux.linux.aarch64.S)
gen/bcm/aesv8-armv8-linux.S
gen/bcm/aesv8-gcm-armv8-linux.S
gen/bcm/armv8-mont-linux.S
gen/bcm/bn-armv8-linux.S
gen/bcm/ghash-neon-armv8-linux.S
gen/bcm/ghashv8-armv8-linux.S
gen/bcm/p256-armv8-asm-linux.S
gen/bcm/p256_beeu-armv8-asm-linux.S
gen/bcm/sha1-armv8-linux.S
gen/bcm/sha256-armv8-linux.S
gen/bcm/sha512-armv8-linux.S
gen/bcm/vpaes-armv8-linux.S
gen/crypto/chacha-armv8-linux.S
gen/crypto/chacha20_poly1305_armv8-linux.S)
endif()
target_include_directories(CCryptoBoringSSL PUBLIC
+15
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>NSPrivacyTracking</key>
<false/>
<key>NSPrivacyAccessedAPITypes</key>
<array/>
<key>NSPrivacyCollectedDataTypes</key>
<array/>
<key>NSPrivacyTrackingDomains</key>
<array/>
</dict>
</plist>
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_bytestring.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_err.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_time.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_posix_time.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -97,22 +97,22 @@ int ASN1_mbstring_ncopy(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in,
int error;
switch (inform) {
case MBSTRING_BMP:
decode_func = cbs_get_ucs2_be;
decode_func = CBS_get_ucs2_be;
error = ASN1_R_INVALID_BMPSTRING;
break;
case MBSTRING_UNIV:
decode_func = cbs_get_utf32_be;
decode_func = CBS_get_utf32_be;
error = ASN1_R_INVALID_UNIVERSALSTRING;
break;
case MBSTRING_UTF8:
decode_func = cbs_get_utf8;
decode_func = CBS_get_utf8;
error = ASN1_R_INVALID_UTF8STRING;
break;
case MBSTRING_ASC:
decode_func = cbs_get_latin1;
decode_func = CBS_get_latin1;
error = ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; // Latin-1 inputs are never invalid.
break;
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ int ASN1_mbstring_ncopy(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in,
}
nchar++;
utf8_len += cbb_get_utf8_len(c);
utf8_len += CBB_get_utf8_len(c);
if (maxsize > 0 && nchar > (size_t)maxsize) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_LONG);
ERR_add_error_dataf("maxsize=%zu", (size_t)maxsize);
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ int ASN1_mbstring_ncopy(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in,
// Now work out output format and string type
int str_type;
int (*encode_func)(CBB *, uint32_t) = cbb_add_latin1;
int (*encode_func)(CBB *, uint32_t) = CBB_add_latin1;
size_t size_estimate = nchar;
int outform = MBSTRING_ASC;
if (mask & B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING) {
@@ -190,17 +190,17 @@ int ASN1_mbstring_ncopy(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in,
} else if (mask & B_ASN1_BMPSTRING) {
str_type = V_ASN1_BMPSTRING;
outform = MBSTRING_BMP;
encode_func = cbb_add_ucs2_be;
encode_func = CBB_add_ucs2_be;
size_estimate = 2 * nchar;
} else if (mask & B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING) {
str_type = V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING;
encode_func = cbb_add_utf32_be;
encode_func = CBB_add_utf32_be;
size_estimate = 4 * nchar;
outform = MBSTRING_UNIV;
} else if (mask & B_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
str_type = V_ASN1_UTF8STRING;
outform = MBSTRING_UTF8;
encode_func = cbb_add_utf8;
encode_func = CBB_add_utf8;
size_estimate = utf8_len;
} else {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_CHARACTERS);
+8 -21
View File
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include "../bytestring/internal.h"
#include "../internal.h"
#include "internal.h"
@@ -137,19 +138,19 @@ static int do_buf(const unsigned char *buf, int buflen, int encoding,
int get_char_error;
switch (encoding) {
case MBSTRING_UNIV:
get_char = cbs_get_utf32_be;
get_char = CBS_get_utf32_be;
get_char_error = ASN1_R_INVALID_UNIVERSALSTRING;
break;
case MBSTRING_BMP:
get_char = cbs_get_ucs2_be;
get_char = CBS_get_ucs2_be;
get_char_error = ASN1_R_INVALID_BMPSTRING;
break;
case MBSTRING_ASC:
get_char = cbs_get_latin1;
get_char = CBS_get_latin1;
get_char_error = ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; // Should not be possible.
break;
case MBSTRING_UTF8:
get_char = cbs_get_utf8;
get_char = CBS_get_utf8;
get_char_error = ASN1_R_INVALID_UTF8STRING;
break;
default:
@@ -172,7 +173,7 @@ static int do_buf(const unsigned char *buf, int buflen, int encoding,
uint8_t utf8_buf[6];
CBB utf8_cbb;
CBB_init_fixed(&utf8_cbb, utf8_buf, sizeof(utf8_buf));
if (!cbb_add_utf8(&utf8_cbb, c)) {
if (!CBB_add_utf8(&utf8_cbb, c)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 1;
}
@@ -238,22 +239,8 @@ static int do_dump(unsigned long flags, BIO *out, const ASN1_STRING *str) {
// Placing the ASN1_STRING in a temporary ASN1_TYPE allows the DER encoding
// to readily obtained.
ASN1_TYPE t;
t.type = str->type;
// Negative INTEGER and ENUMERATED values are the only case where
// |ASN1_STRING| and |ASN1_TYPE| types do not match.
//
// TODO(davidben): There are also some type fields which, in |ASN1_TYPE|, do
// not correspond to |ASN1_STRING|. It is unclear whether those are allowed
// in |ASN1_STRING| at all, or what the space of allowed types is.
// |ASN1_item_ex_d2i| will never produce such a value so, for now, we say
// this is an invalid input. But this corner of the library in general
// should be more robust.
if (t.type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) {
t.type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
} else if (t.type == V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED) {
t.type = V_ASN1_ENUMERATED;
}
t.value.asn1_string = (ASN1_STRING *)str;
OPENSSL_memset(&t, 0, sizeof(ASN1_TYPE));
asn1_type_set0_string(&t, (ASN1_STRING *)str);
unsigned char *der_buf = NULL;
int der_len = i2d_ASN1_TYPE(&t, &der_buf);
if (der_len < 0) {
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@
* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_asn1.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_time.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_posix_time.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
+19 -1
View File
@@ -56,7 +56,8 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_asn1.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_asn1t.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_err.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_obj.h>
@@ -89,6 +90,23 @@ const void *asn1_type_value_as_pointer(const ASN1_TYPE *a) {
}
}
void asn1_type_set0_string(ASN1_TYPE *a, ASN1_STRING *str) {
// |ASN1_STRING| types are almost the same as |ASN1_TYPE| types, except that
// the negative flag is not reflected into |ASN1_TYPE|.
int type = str->type;
if (type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) {
type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
} else if (type == V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED) {
type = V_ASN1_ENUMERATED;
}
// These types are not |ASN1_STRING| types and use a different
// representation when stored in |ASN1_TYPE|.
assert(type != V_ASN1_NULL && type != V_ASN1_OBJECT &&
type != V_ASN1_BOOLEAN);
ASN1_TYPE_set(a, type, str);
}
void asn1_type_cleanup(ASN1_TYPE *a) {
switch (a->type) {
case V_ASN1_NULL:
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_bytestring.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_err.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_time.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_posix_time.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -102,6 +102,15 @@ OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(ASN1, UNKNOWN_FORMAT)
OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(ASN1, UNKNOWN_TAG)
OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(ASN1, UNSUPPORTED_TYPE)
// Limit |ASN1_STRING|s to 64 MiB of data. Most of this module, as well as
// downstream code, does not correctly handle overflow. We cap string fields
// more tightly than strictly necessary to fit in |int|. This is not expected to
// impact real world uses of this field.
//
// In particular, this limit is small enough that the bit count of a BIT STRING
// comfortably fits in an |int|, with room for arithmetic.
#define ASN1_STRING_MAX (64 * 1024 * 1024)
static void asn1_put_length(unsigned char **pp, int length);
int ASN1_get_object(const unsigned char **inp, long *out_len, int *out_tag,
@@ -273,9 +282,8 @@ int ASN1_STRING_set(ASN1_STRING *str, const void *_data, ossl_ssize_t len_s) {
len = (size_t)len_s;
}
// |ASN1_STRING| cannot represent strings that exceed |int|, and we must
// reserve space for a trailing NUL below.
if (len > INT_MAX || len + 1 < len) {
static_assert(ASN1_STRING_MAX < INT_MAX, "len will not overflow int");
if (len > ASN1_STRING_MAX) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
return 0;
}
@@ -76,18 +76,12 @@ extern "C" {
// returned. On failure NULL is returned.
OPENSSL_EXPORT struct tm *OPENSSL_gmtime(const time_t *time, struct tm *result);
// OPENSSL_timegm converts a time value between the years 0 and 9999 in |tm| to
// a time_t value in |out|. One is returned on success, zero is returned on
// failure. It is a failure if the converted time can not be represented in a
// time_t, or if the tm contains out of range values.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int OPENSSL_timegm(const struct tm *tm, time_t *out);
// OPENSSL_gmtime_adj returns one on success, and updates |tm| by adding
// |offset_day| days and |offset_sec| seconds. It returns zero on failure. |tm|
// must be in the range of year 0000 to 9999 both before and after the update or
// a failure will be returned.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(struct tm *tm, int offset_day,
long offset_sec);
int64_t offset_sec);
// OPENSSL_gmtime_diff calculates the difference between |from| and |to|. It
// returns one, and outputs the difference as a number of days and seconds in
@@ -210,6 +204,10 @@ void asn1_encoding_clear(ASN1_ENCODING *enc);
// a pointer.
const void *asn1_type_value_as_pointer(const ASN1_TYPE *a);
// asn1_type_set0_string sets |a|'s value to the object represented by |str| and
// takes ownership of |str|.
void asn1_type_set0_string(ASN1_TYPE *a, ASN1_STRING *str);
// asn1_type_cleanup releases memory associated with |a|'s value, without
// freeing |a| itself.
void asn1_type_cleanup(ASN1_TYPE *a);
@@ -256,7 +254,6 @@ typedef void ASN1_ex_free_func(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
typedef struct ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS_st {
ASN1_ex_new_func *asn1_ex_new;
ASN1_ex_free_func *asn1_ex_free;
ASN1_ex_free_func *asn1_ex_clear;
ASN1_ex_d2i *asn1_ex_d2i;
ASN1_ex_i2d *asn1_ex_i2d;
} ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS;
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
// Time conversion to/from POSIX time_t and struct tm, with no support
// for time zones other than UTC
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_time.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_posix_time.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
@@ -26,12 +26,12 @@
#include "internal.h"
#define SECS_PER_HOUR (60 * 60)
#define SECS_PER_DAY (24 * SECS_PER_HOUR)
#define SECS_PER_DAY (INT64_C(24) * SECS_PER_HOUR)
// Is a year/month/day combination valid, in the range from year 0000
// to 9999?
static int is_valid_date(int year, int month, int day) {
static int is_valid_date(int64_t year, int64_t month, int64_t day) {
if (day < 1 || month < 1 || year < 0 || year > 9999) {
return 0;
}
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static int is_valid_date(int year, int month, int day) {
// Is a time valid? Leap seconds of 60 are not considered valid, as
// the POSIX time in seconds does not include them.
static int is_valid_time(int hours, int minutes, int seconds) {
static int is_valid_time(int64_t hours, int64_t minutes, int64_t seconds) {
if (hours < 0 || minutes < 0 || seconds < 0 || hours > 23 || minutes > 59 ||
seconds > 59) {
return 0;
@@ -70,17 +70,22 @@ static int is_valid_time(int hours, int minutes, int seconds) {
return 1;
}
// Is a int64 time representing a time within our expected range?
static int is_valid_epoch_time(int64_t time) {
// 0000-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 9999-12-31 23:59:59 UTC
return (int64_t)-62167219200 <= time && time <= (int64_t)253402300799;
// 0000-01-01 00:00:00 UTC
#define MIN_POSIX_TIME INT64_C(-62167219200)
// 9999-12-31 23:59:59 UTC
#define MAX_POSIX_TIME INT64_C(253402300799)
// Is an int64 time within our expected range?
static int is_valid_posix_time(int64_t time) {
return MIN_POSIX_TIME <= time && time <= MAX_POSIX_TIME;
}
// Inspired by algorithms presented in
// https://howardhinnant.github.io/date_algorithms.html
// (Public Domain)
static int posix_time_from_utc(int year, int month, int day, int hours,
int minutes, int seconds, int64_t *out_time) {
static int posix_time_from_utc(int64_t year, int64_t month, int64_t day,
int64_t hours, int64_t minutes, int64_t seconds,
int64_t *out_time) {
if (!is_valid_date(year, month, day) ||
!is_valid_time(hours, minutes, seconds)) {
return 0;
@@ -108,7 +113,7 @@ static int posix_time_from_utc(int year, int month, int day, int hours,
static int utc_from_posix_time(int64_t time, int *out_year, int *out_month,
int *out_day, int *out_hours, int *out_minutes,
int *out_seconds) {
if (!is_valid_epoch_time(time)) {
if (!is_valid_posix_time(time)) {
return 0;
}
int64_t days = time / SECS_PER_DAY;
@@ -143,19 +148,21 @@ static int utc_from_posix_time(int64_t time, int *out_year, int *out_month,
}
int OPENSSL_tm_to_posix(const struct tm *tm, int64_t *out) {
return posix_time_from_utc(tm->tm_year + 1900, tm->tm_mon + 1, tm->tm_mday,
tm->tm_hour, tm->tm_min, tm->tm_sec, out);
return posix_time_from_utc(tm->tm_year + INT64_C(1900),
tm->tm_mon + INT64_C(1), tm->tm_mday, tm->tm_hour,
tm->tm_min, tm->tm_sec, out);
}
int OPENSSL_posix_to_tm(int64_t time, struct tm *out_tm) {
memset(out_tm, 0, sizeof(struct tm));
if (!utc_from_posix_time(time, &out_tm->tm_year, &out_tm->tm_mon,
&out_tm->tm_mday, &out_tm->tm_hour, &out_tm->tm_min,
&out_tm->tm_sec)) {
struct tm tmp_tm = {0};
if (!utc_from_posix_time(time, &tmp_tm.tm_year, &tmp_tm.tm_mon,
&tmp_tm.tm_mday, &tmp_tm.tm_hour, &tmp_tm.tm_min,
&tmp_tm.tm_sec)) {
return 0;
}
out_tm->tm_year -= 1900;
out_tm->tm_mon -= 1;
tmp_tm.tm_year -= 1900;
tmp_tm.tm_mon -= 1;
*out_tm = tmp_tm;
return 1;
}
@@ -187,43 +194,47 @@ struct tm *OPENSSL_gmtime(const time_t *time, struct tm *out_tm) {
return out_tm;
}
int OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(struct tm *tm, int off_day, long offset_sec) {
int OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(struct tm *tm, int offset_day, int64_t offset_sec) {
int64_t posix_time;
if (!posix_time_from_utc(tm->tm_year + 1900, tm->tm_mon + 1, tm->tm_mday,
tm->tm_hour, tm->tm_min, tm->tm_sec, &posix_time)) {
if (!OPENSSL_tm_to_posix(tm, &posix_time)) {
return 0;
}
if (!utc_from_posix_time(
posix_time + (int64_t)off_day * SECS_PER_DAY + offset_sec,
&tm->tm_year, &tm->tm_mon, &tm->tm_mday, &tm->tm_hour, &tm->tm_min,
&tm->tm_sec)) {
static_assert(INT_MAX <= INT64_MAX / SECS_PER_DAY,
"day offset in seconds cannot overflow");
static_assert(MAX_POSIX_TIME <= INT64_MAX - INT_MAX * SECS_PER_DAY,
"addition cannot overflow");
static_assert(MIN_POSIX_TIME >= INT64_MIN - INT_MIN * SECS_PER_DAY,
"addition cannot underflow");
posix_time += offset_day * SECS_PER_DAY;
if (posix_time > 0 && offset_sec > INT64_MAX - posix_time) {
return 0;
}
if (posix_time < 0 && offset_sec < INT64_MIN - posix_time) {
return 0;
}
posix_time += offset_sec;
if (!OPENSSL_posix_to_tm(posix_time, tm)) {
return 0;
}
tm->tm_year -= 1900;
tm->tm_mon -= 1;
return 1;
}
int OPENSSL_gmtime_diff(int *out_days, int *out_secs, const struct tm *from,
const struct tm *to) {
int64_t time_to;
if (!posix_time_from_utc(to->tm_year + 1900, to->tm_mon + 1, to->tm_mday,
to->tm_hour, to->tm_min, to->tm_sec, &time_to)) {
return 0;
}
int64_t time_from;
if (!posix_time_from_utc(from->tm_year + 1900, from->tm_mon + 1,
from->tm_mday, from->tm_hour, from->tm_min,
from->tm_sec, &time_from)) {
int64_t time_to, time_from;
if (!OPENSSL_tm_to_posix(to, &time_to) ||
!OPENSSL_tm_to_posix(from, &time_from)) {
return 0;
}
// Times are in range, so these calculations can not overflow.
static_assert(SECS_PER_DAY <= INT_MAX, "seconds per day does not fit in int");
static_assert((MAX_POSIX_TIME - MIN_POSIX_TIME) / SECS_PER_DAY <= INT_MAX,
"range of valid POSIX times, in days, does not fit in int");
int64_t timediff = time_to - time_from;
int64_t daydiff = timediff / SECS_PER_DAY;
timediff %= SECS_PER_DAY;
if (daydiff > INT_MAX || daydiff < INT_MIN) {
return 0;
}
*out_secs = (int)timediff;
*out_days = (int)daydiff;
return 1;
@@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ static int asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, long len,
if (utype == V_ASN1_BMPSTRING) {
while (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
uint32_t c;
if (!cbs_get_ucs2_be(&cbs, &c)) {
if (!CBS_get_ucs2_be(&cbs, &c)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_INVALID_BMPSTRING);
goto err;
}
@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ static int asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, long len,
if (utype == V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING) {
while (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
uint32_t c;
if (!cbs_get_utf32_be(&cbs, &c)) {
if (!CBS_get_utf32_be(&cbs, &c)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_INVALID_UNIVERSALSTRING);
goto err;
}
@@ -868,7 +868,7 @@ static int asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, long len,
if (utype == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
while (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
uint32_t c;
if (!cbs_get_utf8(&cbs, &c)) {
if (!CBS_get_utf8(&cbs, &c)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_INVALID_UTF8STRING);
goto err;
}
@@ -452,14 +452,9 @@ static int asn1_set_seq_out(STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sk, unsigned char **out,
return 1;
}
if (sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk) > ((size_t)-1) / sizeof(DER_ENC)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
return 0;
}
int ret = 0;
unsigned char *const buf = OPENSSL_malloc(skcontlen);
DER_ENC *encoded = OPENSSL_malloc(sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk) * sizeof(*encoded));
DER_ENC *encoded = OPENSSL_calloc(sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk), sizeof(*encoded));
if (encoded == NULL || buf == NULL) {
goto err;
}
@@ -127,11 +127,10 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) {
return 1;
}
}
*pval = OPENSSL_malloc(it->size);
*pval = OPENSSL_zalloc(it->size);
if (!*pval) {
goto memerr;
}
OPENSSL_memset(*pval, 0, it->size);
asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, -1, it);
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_NEW_POST, pval, it, NULL)) {
goto auxerr2;
@@ -151,11 +150,10 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) {
return 1;
}
}
*pval = OPENSSL_malloc(it->size);
*pval = OPENSSL_zalloc(it->size);
if (!*pval) {
goto memerr;
}
OPENSSL_memset(*pval, 0, it->size);
asn1_refcount_set_one(pval, it);
asn1_enc_init(pval, it);
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) {
@@ -185,16 +183,9 @@ auxerr:
}
static void asn1_item_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) {
const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
switch (it->itype) {
case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN:
ef = it->funcs;
if (ef && ef->asn1_ex_clear) {
ef->asn1_ex_clear(pval, it);
} else {
*pval = NULL;
}
*pval = NULL;
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE:
@@ -276,7 +267,7 @@ static int ASN1_primitive_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) {
}
switch (utype) {
case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
*pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)OBJ_nid2obj(NID_undef);
*pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)OBJ_get_undef();
return 1;
case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
@@ -121,12 +121,7 @@ int EVP_EncodedLength(size_t *out_len, size_t len) {
}
EVP_ENCODE_CTX *EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new(void) {
EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_ENCODE_CTX));
if (ret == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(EVP_ENCODE_CTX));
return ret;
return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_ENCODE_CTX));
}
void EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx) {
@@ -312,6 +307,10 @@ static int base64_decode_quad(uint8_t *out, size_t *out_num_bytes,
(in[2] == '=') << 1 |
(in[3] == '=');
// In presence of padding, the lowest bits of v are unused. Canonical encoding
// (RFC 4648, section 3.5) requires that these bits all be set to zero. Common
// PEM parsers accept noncanonical base64, adding to the malleability of the
// format. This decoder follows OpenSSL's and Go's PEM parsers and accepts it.
switch (padding_pattern) {
case 0:
// The common case of no padding.
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2024, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_BCM_SUPPORT_H
#define OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_BCM_SUPPORT_H
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_base.h>
// Provided by libcrypto, called from BCM
#if defined(__cplusplus)
extern "C" {
#endif
#if defined(OPENSSL_LINUX)
// On linux we use MADVISE instead of pthread_atfork(), due
// to concerns about clone() being used for address space
// duplication.
#define OPENSSL_FORK_DETECTION
#define OPENSSL_FORK_DETECTION_MADVISE
#elif defined(OPENSSL_MACOS) || defined(OPENSSL_IOS) || \
defined(OPENSSL_OPENBSD) || defined(OPENSSL_FREEBSD)
// These platforms may detect address space duplication with pthread_atfork.
// iOS doesn't normally allow fork in apps, but it's there.
#define OPENSSL_FORK_DETECTION
#define OPENSSL_FORK_DETECTION_PTHREAD_ATFORK
#elif defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_TRUSTY) || \
defined(__ZEPHYR__) || defined(CROS_EC)
// These platforms do not fork.
#define OPENSSL_DOES_NOT_FORK
#endif
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_DETERMINISTIC_MODE)
#define OPENSSL_RAND_DETERMINISTIC
#elif defined(OPENSSL_TRUSTY)
#define OPENSSL_RAND_TRUSTY
#elif defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
#define OPENSSL_RAND_WINDOWS
#elif defined(OPENSSL_LINUX)
#define OPENSSL_RAND_URANDOM
#elif defined(OPENSSL_APPLE) && !defined(OPENSSL_MACOS)
// Unlike macOS, iOS and similar hide away getentropy().
#define OPENSSL_RAND_IOS
#else
// By default if you are integrating BoringSSL we expect you to
// provide getentropy from the <unistd.h> header file.
#define OPENSSL_RAND_GETENTROPY
#endif
// Provided by libcrypto, called from BCM
// CRYPTO_init_sysrand initializes long-lived resources needed to draw entropy
// from the operating system, if the operating system requires initialization.
void CRYPTO_init_sysrand(void);
// CRYPTO_sysrand fills |len| bytes at |buf| with entropy from the operating
// system.
void CRYPTO_sysrand(uint8_t *buf, size_t len);
// CRYPTO_sysrand_if_available fills |len| bytes at |buf| with entropy from the
// operating system, or early /dev/urandom data, and returns 1, _if_ the entropy
// pool is initialized or if getrandom() is not available and not in FIPS mode.
// Otherwise it will not block and will instead fill |buf| with all zeros and
// return 0.
int CRYPTO_sysrand_if_available(uint8_t *buf, size_t len);
// CRYPTO_sysrand_for_seed fills |len| bytes at |buf| with entropy from the
// operating system. It may draw from the |GRND_RANDOM| pool on Android,
// depending on the vendor's configuration.
void CRYPTO_sysrand_for_seed(uint8_t *buf, size_t len);
// RAND_need_entropy is called whenever the BCM module has stopped because it
// has run out of entropy.
void RAND_need_entropy(size_t bytes_needed);
// crypto_get_fork_generation returns the fork generation number for the current
// process, or zero if not supported on the platform. The fork generation number
// is a non-zero, strictly-monotonic counter with the property that, if queried
// in an address space and then again in a subsequently forked copy, the forked
// address space will observe a greater value.
//
// This function may be used to clear cached values across a fork. When
// initializing a cache, record the fork generation. Before using the cache,
// check if the fork generation has changed. If so, drop the cache and update
// the save fork generation. Note this logic transparently handles platforms
// which always return zero.
//
// This is not reliably supported on all platforms which implement |fork|, so it
// should only be used as a hardening measure.
OPENSSL_EXPORT uint64_t CRYPTO_get_fork_generation(void);
// CRYPTO_fork_detect_force_madv_wipeonfork_for_testing is an internal detail
// used for testing purposes.
OPENSSL_EXPORT void CRYPTO_fork_detect_force_madv_wipeonfork_for_testing(
int on);
#if defined(__cplusplus)
} // extern C
#endif
#endif // OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_BCM_SUPPORT_H
+36 -18
View File
@@ -69,16 +69,19 @@
#include "../internal.h"
static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class =
CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA;
BIO *BIO_new(const BIO_METHOD *method) {
BIO *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BIO));
BIO *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(BIO));
if (ret == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(BIO));
ret->method = method;
ret->shutdown = 1;
ret->references = 1;
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ret->ex_data);
if (method->create != NULL && !method->create(ret)) {
OPENSSL_free(ret);
@@ -102,6 +105,7 @@ int BIO_free(BIO *bio) {
bio->method->destroy(bio);
}
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, bio, &bio->ex_data);
OPENSSL_free(bio);
}
return 1;
@@ -341,11 +345,11 @@ int BIO_set_close(BIO *bio, int close_flag) {
return (int)BIO_ctrl(bio, BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE, close_flag, NULL);
}
OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t BIO_number_read(const BIO *bio) {
OPENSSL_EXPORT uint64_t BIO_number_read(const BIO *bio) {
return bio->num_read;
}
OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t BIO_number_written(const BIO *bio) {
OPENSSL_EXPORT uint64_t BIO_number_written(const BIO *bio) {
return bio->num_write;
}
@@ -640,11 +644,10 @@ int BIO_get_new_index(void) {
}
BIO_METHOD *BIO_meth_new(int type, const char *name) {
BIO_METHOD *method = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BIO_METHOD));
BIO_METHOD *method = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(BIO_METHOD));
if (method == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
OPENSSL_memset(method, 0, sizeof(BIO_METHOD));
method->type = type;
method->name = name;
return method;
@@ -655,38 +658,38 @@ void BIO_meth_free(BIO_METHOD *method) {
}
int BIO_meth_set_create(BIO_METHOD *method,
int (*create)(BIO *)) {
method->create = create;
int (*create_func)(BIO *)) {
method->create = create_func;
return 1;
}
int BIO_meth_set_destroy(BIO_METHOD *method,
int (*destroy)(BIO *)) {
method->destroy = destroy;
int (*destroy_func)(BIO *)) {
method->destroy = destroy_func;
return 1;
}
int BIO_meth_set_write(BIO_METHOD *method,
int (*write)(BIO *, const char *, int)) {
method->bwrite = write;
int (*write_func)(BIO *, const char *, int)) {
method->bwrite = write_func;
return 1;
}
int BIO_meth_set_read(BIO_METHOD *method,
int (*read)(BIO *, char *, int)) {
method->bread = read;
int (*read_func)(BIO *, char *, int)) {
method->bread = read_func;
return 1;
}
int BIO_meth_set_gets(BIO_METHOD *method,
int (*gets)(BIO *, char *, int)) {
method->bgets = gets;
int (*gets_func)(BIO *, char *, int)) {
method->bgets = gets_func;
return 1;
}
int BIO_meth_set_ctrl(BIO_METHOD *method,
long (*ctrl)(BIO *, int, long, void *)) {
method->ctrl = ctrl;
long (*ctrl_func)(BIO *, int, long, void *)) {
method->ctrl = ctrl_func;
return 1;
}
@@ -706,3 +709,18 @@ int BIO_meth_set_puts(BIO_METHOD *method, int (*puts)(BIO *, const char *)) {
// Ignore the parameter. We implement |BIO_puts| using |BIO_write|.
return 1;
}
int BIO_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused,
CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index_ex(&g_ex_data_class, argl, argp, free_func);
}
int BIO_set_ex_data(BIO *bio, int idx, void *data) {
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&bio->ex_data, idx, data);
}
void *BIO_get_ex_data(const BIO *bio, int idx) {
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&bio->ex_data, idx);
}
@@ -296,13 +296,10 @@ end:
}
static BIO_CONNECT *BIO_CONNECT_new(void) {
BIO_CONNECT *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BIO_CONNECT));
BIO_CONNECT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(BIO_CONNECT));
if (ret == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(BIO_CONNECT));
ret->state = BIO_CONN_S_BEFORE;
return ret;
}
+25 -10
View File
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_bio.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -82,6 +83,10 @@
#include "../internal.h"
#if defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <io.h>
#endif
#define BIO_FP_READ 0x02
#define BIO_FP_WRITE 0x04
@@ -122,14 +127,13 @@ BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode) {
return ret;
}
BIO *BIO_new_fp(FILE *stream, int close_flag) {
BIO *BIO_new_fp(FILE *stream, int flags) {
BIO *ret = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (ret == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
BIO_set_fp(ret, stream, close_flag);
BIO_set_fp(ret, stream, flags);
return ret;
}
@@ -196,6 +200,17 @@ static long file_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) {
break;
case BIO_C_SET_FILE_PTR:
file_free(b);
static_assert((BIO_CLOSE & BIO_FP_TEXT) == 0,
"BIO_CLOSE and BIO_FP_TEXT must not collide");
#if defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
// If |BIO_FP_TEXT| is not set, OpenSSL will switch the file to binary
// mode. BoringSSL intentionally diverges here because it means code
// tested under POSIX will inadvertently change the state of |FILE|
// objects when wrapping them in a |BIO|.
if (num & BIO_FP_TEXT) {
_setmode(_fileno(ptr), _O_TEXT);
}
#endif
b->shutdown = (int)num & BIO_CLOSE;
b->ptr = ptr;
b->init = 1;
@@ -206,16 +221,16 @@ static long file_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) {
const char *mode;
if (num & BIO_FP_APPEND) {
if (num & BIO_FP_READ) {
mode = "a+";
mode = "ab+";
} else {
mode = "a";
mode = "ab";
}
} else if ((num & BIO_FP_READ) && (num & BIO_FP_WRITE)) {
mode = "r+";
mode = "rb+";
} else if (num & BIO_FP_WRITE) {
mode = "w";
mode = "wb";
} else if (num & BIO_FP_READ) {
mode = "r";
mode = "rb";
} else {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BIO, BIO_R_BAD_FOPEN_MODE);
ret = 0;
@@ -287,8 +302,8 @@ int BIO_get_fp(BIO *bio, FILE **out_file) {
return (int)BIO_ctrl(bio, BIO_C_GET_FILE_PTR, 0, (char *)out_file);
}
int BIO_set_fp(BIO *bio, FILE *file, int close_flag) {
return (int)BIO_ctrl(bio, BIO_C_SET_FILE_PTR, close_flag, (char *)file);
int BIO_set_fp(BIO *bio, FILE *file, int flags) {
return (int)BIO_ctrl(bio, BIO_C_SET_FILE_PTR, flags, (char *)file);
}
int BIO_read_filename(BIO *bio, const char *filename) {
+1 -4
View File
@@ -81,13 +81,10 @@ struct bio_bio_st {
};
static int bio_new(BIO *bio) {
struct bio_bio_st *b;
b = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *b);
struct bio_bio_st *b = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof *b);
if (b == NULL) {
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_memset(b, 0, sizeof(struct bio_bio_st));
b->size = 17 * 1024; // enough for one TLS record (just a default)
bio->ptr = b;
@@ -455,3 +455,11 @@ int BN_bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *in, uint8_t *out, int len) {
}
return len;
}
int BN_bn2lebinpad(const BIGNUM *in, uint8_t *out, int len) {
if (len < 0 ||
!BN_bn2le_padded(out, (size_t)len, in)) {
return -1;
}
return len;
}
+1 -11
View File
@@ -64,17 +64,7 @@
#include "../internal.h"
BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new(void) {
BUF_MEM *ret;
ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BUF_MEM));
if (ret == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(BUF_MEM));
return ret;
}
BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new(void) { return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(BUF_MEM)); }
void BUF_MEM_free(BUF_MEM *buf) {
if (buf == NULL) {
@@ -18,13 +18,10 @@
#include <string.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "../internal.h"
// kMaxDepth is a just a sanity limit. The code should be such that the length
// of the input being processes always decreases. None the less, a very large
// input could otherwise cause the stack to overflow.
static const uint32_t kMaxDepth = 2048;
// kMaxDepth limits the recursion depth to avoid overflowing the stack.
static const uint32_t kMaxDepth = 128;
// is_string_type returns one if |tag| is a string type and zero otherwise. It
// ignores the constructed bit.
@@ -56,13 +53,11 @@ static int is_string_type(CBS_ASN1_TAG tag) {
// found. The value of |orig_in| is not changed. It returns one on success (i.e.
// |*ber_found| was set) and zero on error.
static int cbs_find_ber(const CBS *orig_in, int *ber_found, uint32_t depth) {
CBS in;
if (depth > kMaxDepth) {
return 0;
}
CBS_init(&in, CBS_data(orig_in), CBS_len(orig_in));
CBS in = *orig_in;
*ber_found = 0;
while (CBS_len(&in) > 0) {
@@ -87,6 +82,10 @@ static int cbs_find_ber(const CBS *orig_in, int *ber_found, uint32_t depth) {
!cbs_find_ber(&contents, ber_found, depth + 1)) {
return 0;
}
if (*ber_found) {
// We already found BER. No need to continue parsing.
return 1;
}
}
}
@@ -155,6 +155,29 @@ static struct cbb_buffer_st *cbb_get_base(CBB *cbb) {
return &cbb->u.base;
}
static void cbb_on_error(CBB *cbb) {
// Due to C's lack of destructors and |CBB|'s auto-flushing API, a failing
// |CBB|-taking function may leave a dangling pointer to a child |CBB|. As a
// result, the convention is callers may not write to |CBB|s that have failed.
// But, as a safety measure, we lock the |CBB| into an error state. Once the
// error bit is set, |cbb->child| will not be read.
//
// TODO(davidben): This still isn't quite ideal. A |CBB| function *outside*
// this file may originate an error while the |CBB| points to a local child.
// In that case we don't set the error bit and are reliant on the error
// convention. Perhaps we allow |CBB_cleanup| on child |CBB|s and make every
// child's |CBB_cleanup| set the error bit if unflushed. That will be
// convenient for C++ callers, but very tedious for C callers. So C callers
// perhaps should get a |CBB_on_error| function that can be, less tediously,
// stuck in a |goto err| block.
cbb_get_base(cbb)->error = 1;
// Clearing the pointer is not strictly necessary, but GCC's dangling pointer
// warning does not know |cbb->child| will not be read once |error| is set
// above.
cbb->child = NULL;
}
// CBB_flush recurses and then writes out any pending length prefix. The
// current length of the underlying base is taken to be the length of the
// length-prefixed data.
@@ -244,7 +267,7 @@ int CBB_flush(CBB *cbb) {
return 1;
err:
base->error = 1;
cbb_on_error(cbb);
return 0;
}
@@ -420,7 +443,7 @@ static int cbb_add_u(CBB *cbb, uint64_t v, size_t len_len) {
// |v| must fit in |len_len| bytes.
if (v != 0) {
cbb_get_base(cbb)->error = 1;
cbb_on_error(cbb);
return 0;
}
@@ -479,7 +502,7 @@ int CBB_add_asn1_uint64(CBB *cbb, uint64_t value) {
int CBB_add_asn1_uint64_with_tag(CBB *cbb, uint64_t value, CBS_ASN1_TAG tag) {
CBB child;
if (!CBB_add_asn1(cbb, &child, tag)) {
return 0;
goto err;
}
int started = 0;
@@ -493,21 +516,25 @@ int CBB_add_asn1_uint64_with_tag(CBB *cbb, uint64_t value, CBS_ASN1_TAG tag) {
// If the high bit is set, add a padding byte to make it
// unsigned.
if ((byte & 0x80) && !CBB_add_u8(&child, 0)) {
return 0;
goto err;
}
started = 1;
}
if (!CBB_add_u8(&child, byte)) {
return 0;
goto err;
}
}
// 0 is encoded as a single 0, not the empty string.
if (!started && !CBB_add_u8(&child, 0)) {
return 0;
goto err;
}
return CBB_flush(cbb);
err:
cbb_on_error(cbb);
return 0;
}
int CBB_add_asn1_int64(CBB *cbb, int64_t value) {
@@ -529,14 +556,18 @@ int CBB_add_asn1_int64_with_tag(CBB *cbb, int64_t value, CBS_ASN1_TAG tag) {
CBB child;
if (!CBB_add_asn1(cbb, &child, tag)) {
return 0;
goto err;
}
for (int i = start; i >= 0; i--) {
if (!CBB_add_u8(&child, bytes[i])) {
return 0;
goto err;
}
}
return CBB_flush(cbb);
err:
cbb_on_error(cbb);
return 0;
}
int CBB_add_asn1_octet_string(CBB *cbb, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len) {
@@ -544,6 +575,7 @@ int CBB_add_asn1_octet_string(CBB *cbb, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len) {
if (!CBB_add_asn1(cbb, &child, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&child, data, data_len) ||
!CBB_flush(cbb)) {
cbb_on_error(cbb);
return 0;
}
@@ -555,6 +587,7 @@ int CBB_add_asn1_bool(CBB *cbb, int value) {
if (!CBB_add_asn1(cbb, &child, CBS_ASN1_BOOLEAN) ||
!CBB_add_u8(&child, value != 0 ? 0xff : 0) ||
!CBB_flush(cbb)) {
cbb_on_error(cbb);
return 0;
}
@@ -649,16 +682,13 @@ int CBB_flush_asn1_set_of(CBB *cbb) {
if (num_children < 2) {
return 1; // Nothing to do. This is the common case for X.509.
}
if (num_children > ((size_t)-1) / sizeof(CBS)) {
return 0; // Overflow.
}
// Parse out the children and sort. We alias them into a copy of so they
// remain valid as we rewrite |cbb|.
int ret = 0;
size_t buf_len = CBB_len(cbb);
uint8_t *buf = OPENSSL_memdup(CBB_data(cbb), buf_len);
CBS *children = OPENSSL_malloc(num_children * sizeof(CBS));
CBS *children = OPENSSL_calloc(num_children, sizeof(CBS));
if (buf == NULL || children == NULL) {
goto err;
}
@@ -26,11 +26,6 @@
#include "internal.h"
void CBS_init(CBS *cbs, const uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
cbs->data = data;
cbs->len = len;
}
static int cbs_get(CBS *cbs, const uint8_t **p, size_t n) {
if (cbs->len < n) {
return 0;
@@ -47,14 +42,6 @@ int CBS_skip(CBS *cbs, size_t len) {
return cbs_get(cbs, &dummy, len);
}
const uint8_t *CBS_data(const CBS *cbs) {
return cbs->data;
}
size_t CBS_len(const CBS *cbs) {
return cbs->len;
}
int CBS_stow(const CBS *cbs, uint8_t **out_ptr, size_t *out_len) {
OPENSSL_free(*out_ptr);
*out_ptr = NULL;
@@ -520,11 +507,9 @@ int CBS_get_asn1_int64(CBS *cbs, int64_t *out) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t sign_extend[sizeof(int64_t)];
memset(sign_extend, is_negative ? 0xff : 0, sizeof(sign_extend));
for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {
sign_extend[i] = data[len - i - 1];
}
memcpy(out, sign_extend, sizeof(sign_extend));
OPENSSL_memset(sign_extend, is_negative ? 0xff : 0, sizeof(sign_extend));
OPENSSL_memcpy(sign_extend + sizeof(int64_t) - len, data, len);
*out = CRYPTO_load_u64_be(sign_extend);
return 1;
}
@@ -67,28 +67,6 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int CBS_get_asn1_implicit_string(CBS *in, CBS *out,
int CBB_finish_i2d(CBB *cbb, uint8_t **outp);
// Unicode utilities.
// The following functions read one Unicode code point from |cbs| with the
// corresponding encoding and store it in |*out|. They return one on success and
// zero on error.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int cbs_get_utf8(CBS *cbs, uint32_t *out);
OPENSSL_EXPORT int cbs_get_latin1(CBS *cbs, uint32_t *out);
OPENSSL_EXPORT int cbs_get_ucs2_be(CBS *cbs, uint32_t *out);
OPENSSL_EXPORT int cbs_get_utf32_be(CBS *cbs, uint32_t *out);
// cbb_get_utf8_len returns the number of bytes needed to represent |u| in
// UTF-8.
OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t cbb_get_utf8_len(uint32_t u);
// The following functions encode |u| to |cbb| with the corresponding
// encoding. They return one on success and zero on error.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int cbb_add_utf8(CBB *cbb, uint32_t u);
OPENSSL_EXPORT int cbb_add_latin1(CBB *cbb, uint32_t u);
OPENSSL_EXPORT int cbb_add_ucs2_be(CBB *cbb, uint32_t u);
OPENSSL_EXPORT int cbb_add_utf32_be(CBB *cbb, uint32_t u);
#if defined(__cplusplus)
} // extern C
#endif
@@ -18,11 +18,12 @@
static int is_valid_code_point(uint32_t v) {
// References in the following are to Unicode 9.0.0.
// References in the following are to Unicode 15.0.0.
if (// The Unicode space runs from zero to 0x10ffff (3.4 D9).
v > 0x10ffff ||
// Values 0x...fffe, 0x...ffff, and 0xfdd0-0xfdef are permanently reserved
// (3.4 D14)
// as noncharacters (3.4 D14). See also 23.7. As our APIs are intended for
// "open interchange", such as ASN.1, we reject them.
(v & 0xfffe) == 0xfffe ||
(v >= 0xfdd0 && v <= 0xfdef) ||
// Surrogate code points are invalid (3.2 C1).
@@ -38,7 +39,7 @@ static int is_valid_code_point(uint32_t v) {
// TOP_BITS returns a byte with the top |n| bits set.
#define TOP_BITS(n) ((uint8_t)~BOTTOM_BITS(8 - (n)))
int cbs_get_utf8(CBS *cbs, uint32_t *out) {
int CBS_get_utf8(CBS *cbs, uint32_t *out) {
uint8_t c;
if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &c)) {
return 0;
@@ -80,7 +81,7 @@ int cbs_get_utf8(CBS *cbs, uint32_t *out) {
return 1;
}
int cbs_get_latin1(CBS *cbs, uint32_t *out) {
int CBS_get_latin1(CBS *cbs, uint32_t *out) {
uint8_t c;
if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &c)) {
return 0;
@@ -89,7 +90,7 @@ int cbs_get_latin1(CBS *cbs, uint32_t *out) {
return 1;
}
int cbs_get_ucs2_be(CBS *cbs, uint32_t *out) {
int CBS_get_ucs2_be(CBS *cbs, uint32_t *out) {
// Note UCS-2 (used by BMPString) does not support surrogates.
uint16_t c;
if (!CBS_get_u16(cbs, &c) ||
@@ -100,11 +101,11 @@ int cbs_get_ucs2_be(CBS *cbs, uint32_t *out) {
return 1;
}
int cbs_get_utf32_be(CBS *cbs, uint32_t *out) {
int CBS_get_utf32_be(CBS *cbs, uint32_t *out) {
return CBS_get_u32(cbs, out) && is_valid_code_point(*out);
}
size_t cbb_get_utf8_len(uint32_t u) {
size_t CBB_get_utf8_len(uint32_t u) {
if (u <= 0x7f) {
return 1;
}
@@ -117,7 +118,7 @@ size_t cbb_get_utf8_len(uint32_t u) {
return 4;
}
int cbb_add_utf8(CBB *cbb, uint32_t u) {
int CBB_add_utf8(CBB *cbb, uint32_t u) {
if (!is_valid_code_point(u)) {
return 0;
}
@@ -142,14 +143,14 @@ int cbb_add_utf8(CBB *cbb, uint32_t u) {
return 0;
}
int cbb_add_latin1(CBB *cbb, uint32_t u) {
int CBB_add_latin1(CBB *cbb, uint32_t u) {
return u <= 0xff && CBB_add_u8(cbb, (uint8_t)u);
}
int cbb_add_ucs2_be(CBB *cbb, uint32_t u) {
int CBB_add_ucs2_be(CBB *cbb, uint32_t u) {
return u <= 0xffff && is_valid_code_point(u) && CBB_add_u16(cbb, (uint16_t)u);
}
int cbb_add_utf32_be(CBB *cbb, uint32_t u) {
int CBB_add_utf32_be(CBB *cbb, uint32_t u) {
return is_valid_code_point(u) && CBB_add_u32(cbb, u);
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
@@ -1,987 +0,0 @@
#define BORINGSSL_PREFIX CCryptoBoringSSL
#if defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
; This file is generated from a similarly-named Perl script in the BoringSSL
; source tree. Do not edit by hand.
%ifdef BORINGSSL_PREFIX
%include "boringssl_prefix_symbols_nasm.inc"
%endif
%ifidn __OUTPUT_FORMAT__, win32
%ifidn __OUTPUT_FORMAT__,obj
section code use32 class=code align=64
%elifidn __OUTPUT_FORMAT__,win32
$@feat.00 equ 1
section .text code align=64
%else
section .text code
%endif
global _ChaCha20_ctr32
align 16
_ChaCha20_ctr32:
L$_ChaCha20_ctr32_begin:
push ebp
push ebx
push esi
push edi
xor eax,eax
cmp eax,DWORD [28+esp]
je NEAR L$000no_data
call L$pic_point
L$pic_point:
pop eax
lea ebp,[_OPENSSL_ia32cap_P]
test DWORD [ebp],16777216
jz NEAR L$001x86
test DWORD [4+ebp],512
jz NEAR L$001x86
jmp NEAR L$ssse3_shortcut
L$001x86:
mov esi,DWORD [32+esp]
mov edi,DWORD [36+esp]
sub esp,132
mov eax,DWORD [esi]
mov ebx,DWORD [4+esi]
mov ecx,DWORD [8+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [12+esi]
mov DWORD [80+esp],eax
mov DWORD [84+esp],ebx
mov DWORD [88+esp],ecx
mov DWORD [92+esp],edx
mov eax,DWORD [16+esi]
mov ebx,DWORD [20+esi]
mov ecx,DWORD [24+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [28+esi]
mov DWORD [96+esp],eax
mov DWORD [100+esp],ebx
mov DWORD [104+esp],ecx
mov DWORD [108+esp],edx
mov eax,DWORD [edi]
mov ebx,DWORD [4+edi]
mov ecx,DWORD [8+edi]
mov edx,DWORD [12+edi]
sub eax,1
mov DWORD [112+esp],eax
mov DWORD [116+esp],ebx
mov DWORD [120+esp],ecx
mov DWORD [124+esp],edx
jmp NEAR L$002entry
align 16
L$003outer_loop:
mov DWORD [156+esp],ebx
mov DWORD [152+esp],eax
mov DWORD [160+esp],ecx
L$002entry:
mov eax,1634760805
mov DWORD [4+esp],857760878
mov DWORD [8+esp],2036477234
mov DWORD [12+esp],1797285236
mov ebx,DWORD [84+esp]
mov ebp,DWORD [88+esp]
mov ecx,DWORD [104+esp]
mov esi,DWORD [108+esp]
mov edx,DWORD [116+esp]
mov edi,DWORD [120+esp]
mov DWORD [20+esp],ebx
mov DWORD [24+esp],ebp
mov DWORD [40+esp],ecx
mov DWORD [44+esp],esi
mov DWORD [52+esp],edx
mov DWORD [56+esp],edi
mov ebx,DWORD [92+esp]
mov edi,DWORD [124+esp]
mov edx,DWORD [112+esp]
mov ebp,DWORD [80+esp]
mov ecx,DWORD [96+esp]
mov esi,DWORD [100+esp]
add edx,1
mov DWORD [28+esp],ebx
mov DWORD [60+esp],edi
mov DWORD [112+esp],edx
mov ebx,10
jmp NEAR L$004loop
align 16
L$004loop:
add eax,ebp
mov DWORD [128+esp],ebx
mov ebx,ebp
xor edx,eax
rol edx,16
add ecx,edx
xor ebx,ecx
mov edi,DWORD [52+esp]
rol ebx,12
mov ebp,DWORD [20+esp]
add eax,ebx
xor edx,eax
mov DWORD [esp],eax
rol edx,8
mov eax,DWORD [4+esp]
add ecx,edx
mov DWORD [48+esp],edx
xor ebx,ecx
add eax,ebp
rol ebx,7
xor edi,eax
mov DWORD [32+esp],ecx
rol edi,16
mov DWORD [16+esp],ebx
add esi,edi
mov ecx,DWORD [40+esp]
xor ebp,esi
mov edx,DWORD [56+esp]
rol ebp,12
mov ebx,DWORD [24+esp]
add eax,ebp
xor edi,eax
mov DWORD [4+esp],eax
rol edi,8
mov eax,DWORD [8+esp]
add esi,edi
mov DWORD [52+esp],edi
xor ebp,esi
add eax,ebx
rol ebp,7
xor edx,eax
mov DWORD [36+esp],esi
rol edx,16
mov DWORD [20+esp],ebp
add ecx,edx
mov esi,DWORD [44+esp]
xor ebx,ecx
mov edi,DWORD [60+esp]
rol ebx,12
mov ebp,DWORD [28+esp]
add eax,ebx
xor edx,eax
mov DWORD [8+esp],eax
rol edx,8
mov eax,DWORD [12+esp]
add ecx,edx
mov DWORD [56+esp],edx
xor ebx,ecx
add eax,ebp
rol ebx,7
xor edi,eax
rol edi,16
mov DWORD [24+esp],ebx
add esi,edi
xor ebp,esi
rol ebp,12
mov ebx,DWORD [20+esp]
add eax,ebp
xor edi,eax
mov DWORD [12+esp],eax
rol edi,8
mov eax,DWORD [esp]
add esi,edi
mov edx,edi
xor ebp,esi
add eax,ebx
rol ebp,7
xor edx,eax
rol edx,16
mov DWORD [28+esp],ebp
add ecx,edx
xor ebx,ecx
mov edi,DWORD [48+esp]
rol ebx,12
mov ebp,DWORD [24+esp]
add eax,ebx
xor edx,eax
mov DWORD [esp],eax
rol edx,8
mov eax,DWORD [4+esp]
add ecx,edx
mov DWORD [60+esp],edx
xor ebx,ecx
add eax,ebp
rol ebx,7
xor edi,eax
mov DWORD [40+esp],ecx
rol edi,16
mov DWORD [20+esp],ebx
add esi,edi
mov ecx,DWORD [32+esp]
xor ebp,esi
mov edx,DWORD [52+esp]
rol ebp,12
mov ebx,DWORD [28+esp]
add eax,ebp
xor edi,eax
mov DWORD [4+esp],eax
rol edi,8
mov eax,DWORD [8+esp]
add esi,edi
mov DWORD [48+esp],edi
xor ebp,esi
add eax,ebx
rol ebp,7
xor edx,eax
mov DWORD [44+esp],esi
rol edx,16
mov DWORD [24+esp],ebp
add ecx,edx
mov esi,DWORD [36+esp]
xor ebx,ecx
mov edi,DWORD [56+esp]
rol ebx,12
mov ebp,DWORD [16+esp]
add eax,ebx
xor edx,eax
mov DWORD [8+esp],eax
rol edx,8
mov eax,DWORD [12+esp]
add ecx,edx
mov DWORD [52+esp],edx
xor ebx,ecx
add eax,ebp
rol ebx,7
xor edi,eax
rol edi,16
mov DWORD [28+esp],ebx
add esi,edi
xor ebp,esi
mov edx,DWORD [48+esp]
rol ebp,12
mov ebx,DWORD [128+esp]
add eax,ebp
xor edi,eax
mov DWORD [12+esp],eax
rol edi,8
mov eax,DWORD [esp]
add esi,edi
mov DWORD [56+esp],edi
xor ebp,esi
rol ebp,7
dec ebx
jnz NEAR L$004loop
mov ebx,DWORD [160+esp]
add eax,1634760805
add ebp,DWORD [80+esp]
add ecx,DWORD [96+esp]
add esi,DWORD [100+esp]
cmp ebx,64
jb NEAR L$005tail
mov ebx,DWORD [156+esp]
add edx,DWORD [112+esp]
add edi,DWORD [120+esp]
xor eax,DWORD [ebx]
xor ebp,DWORD [16+ebx]
mov DWORD [esp],eax
mov eax,DWORD [152+esp]
xor ecx,DWORD [32+ebx]
xor esi,DWORD [36+ebx]
xor edx,DWORD [48+ebx]
xor edi,DWORD [56+ebx]
mov DWORD [16+eax],ebp
mov DWORD [32+eax],ecx
mov DWORD [36+eax],esi
mov DWORD [48+eax],edx
mov DWORD [56+eax],edi
mov ebp,DWORD [4+esp]
mov ecx,DWORD [8+esp]
mov esi,DWORD [12+esp]
mov edx,DWORD [20+esp]
mov edi,DWORD [24+esp]
add ebp,857760878
add ecx,2036477234
add esi,1797285236
add edx,DWORD [84+esp]
add edi,DWORD [88+esp]
xor ebp,DWORD [4+ebx]
xor ecx,DWORD [8+ebx]
xor esi,DWORD [12+ebx]
xor edx,DWORD [20+ebx]
xor edi,DWORD [24+ebx]
mov DWORD [4+eax],ebp
mov DWORD [8+eax],ecx
mov DWORD [12+eax],esi
mov DWORD [20+eax],edx
mov DWORD [24+eax],edi
mov ebp,DWORD [28+esp]
mov ecx,DWORD [40+esp]
mov esi,DWORD [44+esp]
mov edx,DWORD [52+esp]
mov edi,DWORD [60+esp]
add ebp,DWORD [92+esp]
add ecx,DWORD [104+esp]
add esi,DWORD [108+esp]
add edx,DWORD [116+esp]
add edi,DWORD [124+esp]
xor ebp,DWORD [28+ebx]
xor ecx,DWORD [40+ebx]
xor esi,DWORD [44+ebx]
xor edx,DWORD [52+ebx]
xor edi,DWORD [60+ebx]
lea ebx,[64+ebx]
mov DWORD [28+eax],ebp
mov ebp,DWORD [esp]
mov DWORD [40+eax],ecx
mov ecx,DWORD [160+esp]
mov DWORD [44+eax],esi
mov DWORD [52+eax],edx
mov DWORD [60+eax],edi
mov DWORD [eax],ebp
lea eax,[64+eax]
sub ecx,64
jnz NEAR L$003outer_loop
jmp NEAR L$006done
L$005tail:
add edx,DWORD [112+esp]
add edi,DWORD [120+esp]
mov DWORD [esp],eax
mov DWORD [16+esp],ebp
mov DWORD [32+esp],ecx
mov DWORD [36+esp],esi
mov DWORD [48+esp],edx
mov DWORD [56+esp],edi
mov ebp,DWORD [4+esp]
mov ecx,DWORD [8+esp]
mov esi,DWORD [12+esp]
mov edx,DWORD [20+esp]
mov edi,DWORD [24+esp]
add ebp,857760878
add ecx,2036477234
add esi,1797285236
add edx,DWORD [84+esp]
add edi,DWORD [88+esp]
mov DWORD [4+esp],ebp
mov DWORD [8+esp],ecx
mov DWORD [12+esp],esi
mov DWORD [20+esp],edx
mov DWORD [24+esp],edi
mov ebp,DWORD [28+esp]
mov ecx,DWORD [40+esp]
mov esi,DWORD [44+esp]
mov edx,DWORD [52+esp]
mov edi,DWORD [60+esp]
add ebp,DWORD [92+esp]
add ecx,DWORD [104+esp]
add esi,DWORD [108+esp]
add edx,DWORD [116+esp]
add edi,DWORD [124+esp]
mov DWORD [28+esp],ebp
mov ebp,DWORD [156+esp]
mov DWORD [40+esp],ecx
mov ecx,DWORD [152+esp]
mov DWORD [44+esp],esi
xor esi,esi
mov DWORD [52+esp],edx
mov DWORD [60+esp],edi
xor eax,eax
xor edx,edx
L$007tail_loop:
mov al,BYTE [ebp*1+esi]
mov dl,BYTE [esi*1+esp]
lea esi,[1+esi]
xor al,dl
mov BYTE [esi*1+ecx-1],al
dec ebx
jnz NEAR L$007tail_loop
L$006done:
add esp,132
L$000no_data:
pop edi
pop esi
pop ebx
pop ebp
ret
global _ChaCha20_ssse3
align 16
_ChaCha20_ssse3:
L$_ChaCha20_ssse3_begin:
push ebp
push ebx
push esi
push edi
L$ssse3_shortcut:
mov edi,DWORD [20+esp]
mov esi,DWORD [24+esp]
mov ecx,DWORD [28+esp]
mov edx,DWORD [32+esp]
mov ebx,DWORD [36+esp]
mov ebp,esp
sub esp,524
and esp,-64
mov DWORD [512+esp],ebp
lea eax,[(L$ssse3_data-L$pic_point)+eax]
movdqu xmm3,[ebx]
cmp ecx,256
jb NEAR L$0081x
mov DWORD [516+esp],edx
mov DWORD [520+esp],ebx
sub ecx,256
lea ebp,[384+esp]
movdqu xmm7,[edx]
pshufd xmm0,xmm3,0
pshufd xmm1,xmm3,85
pshufd xmm2,xmm3,170
pshufd xmm3,xmm3,255
paddd xmm0,[48+eax]
pshufd xmm4,xmm7,0
pshufd xmm5,xmm7,85
psubd xmm0,[64+eax]
pshufd xmm6,xmm7,170
pshufd xmm7,xmm7,255
movdqa [64+ebp],xmm0
movdqa [80+ebp],xmm1
movdqa [96+ebp],xmm2
movdqa [112+ebp],xmm3
movdqu xmm3,[16+edx]
movdqa [ebp-64],xmm4
movdqa [ebp-48],xmm5
movdqa [ebp-32],xmm6
movdqa [ebp-16],xmm7
movdqa xmm7,[32+eax]
lea ebx,[128+esp]
pshufd xmm0,xmm3,0
pshufd xmm1,xmm3,85
pshufd xmm2,xmm3,170
pshufd xmm3,xmm3,255
pshufd xmm4,xmm7,0
pshufd xmm5,xmm7,85
pshufd xmm6,xmm7,170
pshufd xmm7,xmm7,255
movdqa [ebp],xmm0
movdqa [16+ebp],xmm1
movdqa [32+ebp],xmm2
movdqa [48+ebp],xmm3
movdqa [ebp-128],xmm4
movdqa [ebp-112],xmm5
movdqa [ebp-96],xmm6
movdqa [ebp-80],xmm7
lea esi,[128+esi]
lea edi,[128+edi]
jmp NEAR L$009outer_loop
align 16
L$009outer_loop:
movdqa xmm1,[ebp-112]
movdqa xmm2,[ebp-96]
movdqa xmm3,[ebp-80]
movdqa xmm5,[ebp-48]
movdqa xmm6,[ebp-32]
movdqa xmm7,[ebp-16]
movdqa [ebx-112],xmm1
movdqa [ebx-96],xmm2
movdqa [ebx-80],xmm3
movdqa [ebx-48],xmm5
movdqa [ebx-32],xmm6
movdqa [ebx-16],xmm7
movdqa xmm2,[32+ebp]
movdqa xmm3,[48+ebp]
movdqa xmm4,[64+ebp]
movdqa xmm5,[80+ebp]
movdqa xmm6,[96+ebp]
movdqa xmm7,[112+ebp]
paddd xmm4,[64+eax]
movdqa [32+ebx],xmm2
movdqa [48+ebx],xmm3
movdqa [64+ebx],xmm4
movdqa [80+ebx],xmm5
movdqa [96+ebx],xmm6
movdqa [112+ebx],xmm7
movdqa [64+ebp],xmm4
movdqa xmm0,[ebp-128]
movdqa xmm6,xmm4
movdqa xmm3,[ebp-64]
movdqa xmm4,[ebp]
movdqa xmm5,[16+ebp]
mov edx,10
nop
align 16
L$010loop:
paddd xmm0,xmm3
movdqa xmm2,xmm3
pxor xmm6,xmm0
pshufb xmm6,[eax]
paddd xmm4,xmm6
pxor xmm2,xmm4
movdqa xmm3,[ebx-48]
movdqa xmm1,xmm2
pslld xmm2,12
psrld xmm1,20
por xmm2,xmm1
movdqa xmm1,[ebx-112]
paddd xmm0,xmm2
movdqa xmm7,[80+ebx]
pxor xmm6,xmm0
movdqa [ebx-128],xmm0
pshufb xmm6,[16+eax]
paddd xmm4,xmm6
movdqa [64+ebx],xmm6
pxor xmm2,xmm4
paddd xmm1,xmm3
movdqa xmm0,xmm2
pslld xmm2,7
psrld xmm0,25
pxor xmm7,xmm1
por xmm2,xmm0
movdqa [ebx],xmm4
pshufb xmm7,[eax]
movdqa [ebx-64],xmm2
paddd xmm5,xmm7
movdqa xmm4,[32+ebx]
pxor xmm3,xmm5
movdqa xmm2,[ebx-32]
movdqa xmm0,xmm3
pslld xmm3,12
psrld xmm0,20
por xmm3,xmm0
movdqa xmm0,[ebx-96]
paddd xmm1,xmm3
movdqa xmm6,[96+ebx]
pxor xmm7,xmm1
movdqa [ebx-112],xmm1
pshufb xmm7,[16+eax]
paddd xmm5,xmm7
movdqa [80+ebx],xmm7
pxor xmm3,xmm5
paddd xmm0,xmm2
movdqa xmm1,xmm3
pslld xmm3,7
psrld xmm1,25
pxor xmm6,xmm0
por xmm3,xmm1
movdqa [16+ebx],xmm5
pshufb xmm6,[eax]
movdqa [ebx-48],xmm3
paddd xmm4,xmm6
movdqa xmm5,[48+ebx]
pxor xmm2,xmm4
movdqa xmm3,[ebx-16]
movdqa xmm1,xmm2
pslld xmm2,12
psrld xmm1,20
por xmm2,xmm1
movdqa xmm1,[ebx-80]
paddd xmm0,xmm2
movdqa xmm7,[112+ebx]
pxor xmm6,xmm0
movdqa [ebx-96],xmm0
pshufb xmm6,[16+eax]
paddd xmm4,xmm6
movdqa [96+ebx],xmm6
pxor xmm2,xmm4
paddd xmm1,xmm3
movdqa xmm0,xmm2
pslld xmm2,7
psrld xmm0,25
pxor xmm7,xmm1
por xmm2,xmm0
pshufb xmm7,[eax]
movdqa [ebx-32],xmm2
paddd xmm5,xmm7
pxor xmm3,xmm5
movdqa xmm2,[ebx-48]
movdqa xmm0,xmm3
pslld xmm3,12
psrld xmm0,20
por xmm3,xmm0
movdqa xmm0,[ebx-128]
paddd xmm1,xmm3
pxor xmm7,xmm1
movdqa [ebx-80],xmm1
pshufb xmm7,[16+eax]
paddd xmm5,xmm7
movdqa xmm6,xmm7
pxor xmm3,xmm5
paddd xmm0,xmm2
movdqa xmm1,xmm3
pslld xmm3,7
psrld xmm1,25
pxor xmm6,xmm0
por xmm3,xmm1
pshufb xmm6,[eax]
movdqa [ebx-16],xmm3
paddd xmm4,xmm6
pxor xmm2,xmm4
movdqa xmm3,[ebx-32]
movdqa xmm1,xmm2
pslld xmm2,12
psrld xmm1,20
por xmm2,xmm1
movdqa xmm1,[ebx-112]
paddd xmm0,xmm2
movdqa xmm7,[64+ebx]
pxor xmm6,xmm0
movdqa [ebx-128],xmm0
pshufb xmm6,[16+eax]
paddd xmm4,xmm6
movdqa [112+ebx],xmm6
pxor xmm2,xmm4
paddd xmm1,xmm3
movdqa xmm0,xmm2
pslld xmm2,7
psrld xmm0,25
pxor xmm7,xmm1
por xmm2,xmm0
movdqa [32+ebx],xmm4
pshufb xmm7,[eax]
movdqa [ebx-48],xmm2
paddd xmm5,xmm7
movdqa xmm4,[ebx]
pxor xmm3,xmm5
movdqa xmm2,[ebx-16]
movdqa xmm0,xmm3
pslld xmm3,12
psrld xmm0,20
por xmm3,xmm0
movdqa xmm0,[ebx-96]
paddd xmm1,xmm3
movdqa xmm6,[80+ebx]
pxor xmm7,xmm1
movdqa [ebx-112],xmm1
pshufb xmm7,[16+eax]
paddd xmm5,xmm7
movdqa [64+ebx],xmm7
pxor xmm3,xmm5
paddd xmm0,xmm2
movdqa xmm1,xmm3
pslld xmm3,7
psrld xmm1,25
pxor xmm6,xmm0
por xmm3,xmm1
movdqa [48+ebx],xmm5
pshufb xmm6,[eax]
movdqa [ebx-32],xmm3
paddd xmm4,xmm6
movdqa xmm5,[16+ebx]
pxor xmm2,xmm4
movdqa xmm3,[ebx-64]
movdqa xmm1,xmm2
pslld xmm2,12
psrld xmm1,20
por xmm2,xmm1
movdqa xmm1,[ebx-80]
paddd xmm0,xmm2
movdqa xmm7,[96+ebx]
pxor xmm6,xmm0
movdqa [ebx-96],xmm0
pshufb xmm6,[16+eax]
paddd xmm4,xmm6
movdqa [80+ebx],xmm6
pxor xmm2,xmm4
paddd xmm1,xmm3
movdqa xmm0,xmm2
pslld xmm2,7
psrld xmm0,25
pxor xmm7,xmm1
por xmm2,xmm0
pshufb xmm7,[eax]
movdqa [ebx-16],xmm2
paddd xmm5,xmm7
pxor xmm3,xmm5
movdqa xmm0,xmm3
pslld xmm3,12
psrld xmm0,20
por xmm3,xmm0
movdqa xmm0,[ebx-128]
paddd xmm1,xmm3
movdqa xmm6,[64+ebx]
pxor xmm7,xmm1
movdqa [ebx-80],xmm1
pshufb xmm7,[16+eax]
paddd xmm5,xmm7
movdqa [96+ebx],xmm7
pxor xmm3,xmm5
movdqa xmm1,xmm3
pslld xmm3,7
psrld xmm1,25
por xmm3,xmm1
dec edx
jnz NEAR L$010loop
movdqa [ebx-64],xmm3
movdqa [ebx],xmm4
movdqa [16+ebx],xmm5
movdqa [64+ebx],xmm6
movdqa [96+ebx],xmm7
movdqa xmm1,[ebx-112]
movdqa xmm2,[ebx-96]
movdqa xmm3,[ebx-80]
paddd xmm0,[ebp-128]
paddd xmm1,[ebp-112]
paddd xmm2,[ebp-96]
paddd xmm3,[ebp-80]
movdqa xmm6,xmm0
punpckldq xmm0,xmm1
movdqa xmm7,xmm2
punpckldq xmm2,xmm3
punpckhdq xmm6,xmm1
punpckhdq xmm7,xmm3
movdqa xmm1,xmm0
punpcklqdq xmm0,xmm2
movdqa xmm3,xmm6
punpcklqdq xmm6,xmm7
punpckhqdq xmm1,xmm2
punpckhqdq xmm3,xmm7
movdqu xmm4,[esi-128]
movdqu xmm5,[esi-64]
movdqu xmm2,[esi]
movdqu xmm7,[64+esi]
lea esi,[16+esi]
pxor xmm4,xmm0
movdqa xmm0,[ebx-64]
pxor xmm5,xmm1
movdqa xmm1,[ebx-48]
pxor xmm6,xmm2
movdqa xmm2,[ebx-32]
pxor xmm7,xmm3
movdqa xmm3,[ebx-16]
movdqu [edi-128],xmm4
movdqu [edi-64],xmm5
movdqu [edi],xmm6
movdqu [64+edi],xmm7
lea edi,[16+edi]
paddd xmm0,[ebp-64]
paddd xmm1,[ebp-48]
paddd xmm2,[ebp-32]
paddd xmm3,[ebp-16]
movdqa xmm6,xmm0
punpckldq xmm0,xmm1
movdqa xmm7,xmm2
punpckldq xmm2,xmm3
punpckhdq xmm6,xmm1
punpckhdq xmm7,xmm3
movdqa xmm1,xmm0
punpcklqdq xmm0,xmm2
movdqa xmm3,xmm6
punpcklqdq xmm6,xmm7
punpckhqdq xmm1,xmm2
punpckhqdq xmm3,xmm7
movdqu xmm4,[esi-128]
movdqu xmm5,[esi-64]
movdqu xmm2,[esi]
movdqu xmm7,[64+esi]
lea esi,[16+esi]
pxor xmm4,xmm0
movdqa xmm0,[ebx]
pxor xmm5,xmm1
movdqa xmm1,[16+ebx]
pxor xmm6,xmm2
movdqa xmm2,[32+ebx]
pxor xmm7,xmm3
movdqa xmm3,[48+ebx]
movdqu [edi-128],xmm4
movdqu [edi-64],xmm5
movdqu [edi],xmm6
movdqu [64+edi],xmm7
lea edi,[16+edi]
paddd xmm0,[ebp]
paddd xmm1,[16+ebp]
paddd xmm2,[32+ebp]
paddd xmm3,[48+ebp]
movdqa xmm6,xmm0
punpckldq xmm0,xmm1
movdqa xmm7,xmm2
punpckldq xmm2,xmm3
punpckhdq xmm6,xmm1
punpckhdq xmm7,xmm3
movdqa xmm1,xmm0
punpcklqdq xmm0,xmm2
movdqa xmm3,xmm6
punpcklqdq xmm6,xmm7
punpckhqdq xmm1,xmm2
punpckhqdq xmm3,xmm7
movdqu xmm4,[esi-128]
movdqu xmm5,[esi-64]
movdqu xmm2,[esi]
movdqu xmm7,[64+esi]
lea esi,[16+esi]
pxor xmm4,xmm0
movdqa xmm0,[64+ebx]
pxor xmm5,xmm1
movdqa xmm1,[80+ebx]
pxor xmm6,xmm2
movdqa xmm2,[96+ebx]
pxor xmm7,xmm3
movdqa xmm3,[112+ebx]
movdqu [edi-128],xmm4
movdqu [edi-64],xmm5
movdqu [edi],xmm6
movdqu [64+edi],xmm7
lea edi,[16+edi]
paddd xmm0,[64+ebp]
paddd xmm1,[80+ebp]
paddd xmm2,[96+ebp]
paddd xmm3,[112+ebp]
movdqa xmm6,xmm0
punpckldq xmm0,xmm1
movdqa xmm7,xmm2
punpckldq xmm2,xmm3
punpckhdq xmm6,xmm1
punpckhdq xmm7,xmm3
movdqa xmm1,xmm0
punpcklqdq xmm0,xmm2
movdqa xmm3,xmm6
punpcklqdq xmm6,xmm7
punpckhqdq xmm1,xmm2
punpckhqdq xmm3,xmm7
movdqu xmm4,[esi-128]
movdqu xmm5,[esi-64]
movdqu xmm2,[esi]
movdqu xmm7,[64+esi]
lea esi,[208+esi]
pxor xmm4,xmm0
pxor xmm5,xmm1
pxor xmm6,xmm2
pxor xmm7,xmm3
movdqu [edi-128],xmm4
movdqu [edi-64],xmm5
movdqu [edi],xmm6
movdqu [64+edi],xmm7
lea edi,[208+edi]
sub ecx,256
jnc NEAR L$009outer_loop
add ecx,256
jz NEAR L$011done
mov ebx,DWORD [520+esp]
lea esi,[esi-128]
mov edx,DWORD [516+esp]
lea edi,[edi-128]
movd xmm2,DWORD [64+ebp]
movdqu xmm3,[ebx]
paddd xmm2,[96+eax]
pand xmm3,[112+eax]
por xmm3,xmm2
L$0081x:
movdqa xmm0,[32+eax]
movdqu xmm1,[edx]
movdqu xmm2,[16+edx]
movdqa xmm6,[eax]
movdqa xmm7,[16+eax]
mov DWORD [48+esp],ebp
movdqa [esp],xmm0
movdqa [16+esp],xmm1
movdqa [32+esp],xmm2
movdqa [48+esp],xmm3
mov edx,10
jmp NEAR L$012loop1x
align 16
L$013outer1x:
movdqa xmm3,[80+eax]
movdqa xmm0,[esp]
movdqa xmm1,[16+esp]
movdqa xmm2,[32+esp]
paddd xmm3,[48+esp]
mov edx,10
movdqa [48+esp],xmm3
jmp NEAR L$012loop1x
align 16
L$012loop1x:
paddd xmm0,xmm1
pxor xmm3,xmm0
db 102,15,56,0,222
paddd xmm2,xmm3
pxor xmm1,xmm2
movdqa xmm4,xmm1
psrld xmm1,20
pslld xmm4,12
por xmm1,xmm4
paddd xmm0,xmm1
pxor xmm3,xmm0
db 102,15,56,0,223
paddd xmm2,xmm3
pxor xmm1,xmm2
movdqa xmm4,xmm1
psrld xmm1,25
pslld xmm4,7
por xmm1,xmm4
pshufd xmm2,xmm2,78
pshufd xmm1,xmm1,57
pshufd xmm3,xmm3,147
nop
paddd xmm0,xmm1
pxor xmm3,xmm0
db 102,15,56,0,222
paddd xmm2,xmm3
pxor xmm1,xmm2
movdqa xmm4,xmm1
psrld xmm1,20
pslld xmm4,12
por xmm1,xmm4
paddd xmm0,xmm1
pxor xmm3,xmm0
db 102,15,56,0,223
paddd xmm2,xmm3
pxor xmm1,xmm2
movdqa xmm4,xmm1
psrld xmm1,25
pslld xmm4,7
por xmm1,xmm4
pshufd xmm2,xmm2,78
pshufd xmm1,xmm1,147
pshufd xmm3,xmm3,57
dec edx
jnz NEAR L$012loop1x
paddd xmm0,[esp]
paddd xmm1,[16+esp]
paddd xmm2,[32+esp]
paddd xmm3,[48+esp]
cmp ecx,64
jb NEAR L$014tail
movdqu xmm4,[esi]
movdqu xmm5,[16+esi]
pxor xmm0,xmm4
movdqu xmm4,[32+esi]
pxor xmm1,xmm5
movdqu xmm5,[48+esi]
pxor xmm2,xmm4
pxor xmm3,xmm5
lea esi,[64+esi]
movdqu [edi],xmm0
movdqu [16+edi],xmm1
movdqu [32+edi],xmm2
movdqu [48+edi],xmm3
lea edi,[64+edi]
sub ecx,64
jnz NEAR L$013outer1x
jmp NEAR L$011done
L$014tail:
movdqa [esp],xmm0
movdqa [16+esp],xmm1
movdqa [32+esp],xmm2
movdqa [48+esp],xmm3
xor eax,eax
xor edx,edx
xor ebp,ebp
L$015tail_loop:
mov al,BYTE [ebp*1+esp]
mov dl,BYTE [ebp*1+esi]
lea ebp,[1+ebp]
xor al,dl
mov BYTE [ebp*1+edi-1],al
dec ecx
jnz NEAR L$015tail_loop
L$011done:
mov esp,DWORD [512+esp]
pop edi
pop esi
pop ebx
pop ebp
ret
align 64
L$ssse3_data:
db 2,3,0,1,6,7,4,5,10,11,8,9,14,15,12,13
db 3,0,1,2,7,4,5,6,11,8,9,10,15,12,13,14
dd 1634760805,857760878,2036477234,1797285236
dd 0,1,2,3
dd 4,4,4,4
dd 1,0,0,0
dd 4,0,0,0
dd 0,-1,-1,-1
align 64
db 67,104,97,67,104,97,50,48,32,102,111,114,32,120,56,54
db 44,32,67,82,89,80,84,79,71,65,77,83,32,98,121,32
db 60,97,112,112,114,111,64,111,112,101,110,115,115,108,46,111
db 114,103,62,0
segment .bss
common _OPENSSL_ia32cap_P 16
%else
; Work around https://bugzilla.nasm.us/show_bug.cgi?id=3392738
ret
%endif
#endif // defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__ELF__)
.section .note.GNU-stack,"",%progbits
#endif
@@ -60,7 +60,40 @@ void CRYPTO_hchacha20(uint8_t out[32], const uint8_t key[32],
OPENSSL_memcpy(&out[16], &x[12], sizeof(uint32_t) * 4);
}
#if defined(CHACHA20_ASM)
#if defined(CHACHA20_ASM_NOHW)
static void ChaCha20_ctr32(uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint32_t key[8], const uint32_t counter[4]) {
#if defined(CHACHA20_ASM_NEON)
if (ChaCha20_ctr32_neon_capable(in_len)) {
ChaCha20_ctr32_neon(out, in, in_len, key, counter);
return;
}
#endif
#if defined(CHACHA20_ASM_AVX2)
if (ChaCha20_ctr32_avx2_capable(in_len)) {
ChaCha20_ctr32_avx2(out, in, in_len, key, counter);
return;
}
#endif
#if defined(CHACHA20_ASM_SSSE3_4X)
if (ChaCha20_ctr32_ssse3_4x_capable(in_len)) {
ChaCha20_ctr32_ssse3_4x(out, in, in_len, key, counter);
return;
}
#endif
#if defined(CHACHA20_ASM_SSSE3)
if (ChaCha20_ctr32_ssse3_capable(in_len)) {
ChaCha20_ctr32_ssse3(out, in, in_len, key, counter);
return;
}
#endif
if (in_len > 0) {
ChaCha20_ctr32_nohw(out, in, in_len, key, counter);
}
}
#endif
#if defined(CHACHA20_ASM_NOHW)
void CRYPTO_chacha_20(uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t key[32], const uint8_t nonce[12],
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_base.h>
#include "../internal.h"
#if defined(__cplusplus)
extern "C" {
#endif
@@ -27,21 +29,69 @@ extern "C" {
void CRYPTO_hchacha20(uint8_t out[32], const uint8_t key[32],
const uint8_t nonce[16]);
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && \
(defined(OPENSSL_X86) || defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) || \
defined(OPENSSL_ARM) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64))
#define CHACHA20_ASM
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86)
// ChaCha20_ctr32 encrypts |in_len| bytes from |in| and writes the result to
// |out|. If |in| and |out| alias, they must be equal.
#define CHACHA20_ASM_NOHW
#define CHACHA20_ASM_SSSE3
OPENSSL_INLINE int ChaCha20_ctr32_ssse3_capable(size_t len) {
// Unlike the x86_64 version, the x86 SSSE3 routine runs for all non-zero
// lengths.
return len > 0 && CRYPTO_is_SSSE3_capable() && CRYPTO_is_FXSR_capable();
}
void ChaCha20_ctr32_ssse3(uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint32_t key[8], const uint32_t counter[4]);
#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && \
(defined(OPENSSL_ARM) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64))
#define CHACHA20_ASM_NOHW
#define CHACHA20_ASM_NEON
OPENSSL_INLINE int ChaCha20_ctr32_neon_capable(size_t len) {
return len >= 192 && CRYPTO_is_NEON_capable();
}
void ChaCha20_ctr32_neon(uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint32_t key[8], const uint32_t counter[4]);
#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
#define CHACHA20_ASM_NOHW
#define CHACHA20_ASM_AVX2
OPENSSL_INLINE int ChaCha20_ctr32_avx2_capable(size_t len) {
return len > 128 && CRYPTO_is_AVX2_capable();
}
void ChaCha20_ctr32_avx2(uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint32_t key[8], const uint32_t counter[4]);
#define CHACHA20_ASM_SSSE3_4X
OPENSSL_INLINE int ChaCha20_ctr32_ssse3_4x_capable(size_t len) {
int capable = len > 128 && CRYPTO_is_SSSE3_capable();
int faster = len > 192 || !CRYPTO_cpu_perf_is_like_silvermont();
return capable && faster;
}
void ChaCha20_ctr32_ssse3_4x(uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint32_t key[8], const uint32_t counter[4]);
#define CHACHA20_ASM_SSSE3
OPENSSL_INLINE int ChaCha20_ctr32_ssse3_capable(size_t len) {
return len > 128 && CRYPTO_is_SSSE3_capable();
}
void ChaCha20_ctr32_ssse3(uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint32_t key[8], const uint32_t counter[4]);
#endif
#if defined(CHACHA20_ASM_NOHW)
// ChaCha20_ctr32_nohw encrypts |in_len| bytes from |in| and writes the result
// to |out|. If |in| and |out| alias, they must be equal. |in_len| may not be
// zero.
//
// |counter[0]| is the initial 32-bit block counter, and the remainder is the
// 96-bit nonce. If the counter overflows, the output is undefined. The function
// will produce output, but the output may vary by machine and may not be
// self-consistent. (On some architectures, the assembly implements a mix of
// 64-bit and 32-bit counters.)
void ChaCha20_ctr32(uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint32_t key[8], const uint32_t counter[4]);
void ChaCha20_ctr32_nohw(uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint32_t key[8], const uint32_t counter[4]);
#endif
@@ -126,16 +126,16 @@ extern void aesgcmsiv_htable_polyval(const uint8_t htable[16 * 8],
uint8_t in_out_poly[16]);
// aes128gcmsiv_dec decrypts |in_len| & ~15 bytes from |out| and writes them to
// |in|. (The full value of |in_len| is still used to find the authentication
// tag appended to the ciphertext, however, so must not be pre-masked.)
// |in|. |in| and |out| may be equal, but must not otherwise alias.
//
// |in| and |out| may be equal, but must not otherwise overlap.
// |in_out_calculated_tag_and_scratch|, on entry, must contain:
// 1. The current value of the calculated tag, which will be updated during
// decryption and written back to the beginning of this buffer on exit.
// 2. The claimed tag, which is needed to derive counter values.
//
// While decrypting, it updates the POLYVAL value found at the beginning of
// |in_out_calculated_tag_and_scratch| and writes the updated value back before
// return. During executation, it may use the whole of this space for other
// purposes. In order to decrypt and update the POLYVAL value, it uses the
// expanded key from |key| and the table of powers in |htable|.
// While decrypting, the whole of |in_out_calculated_tag_and_scratch| may be
// used for other purposes. In order to decrypt and update the POLYVAL value, it
// uses the expanded key from |key| and the table of powers in |htable|.
extern void aes128gcmsiv_dec(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out,
uint8_t in_out_calculated_tag_and_scratch[16 * 8],
const uint8_t htable[16 * 6],
@@ -393,14 +393,10 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_seal_scatter(
return 1;
}
// TODO(martinkr): Add aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_open_gather. N.B. aes128gcmsiv_dec
// expects ciphertext and tag in a contiguous buffer.
static int aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
static int aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_open_gather(
const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *nonce,
size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *in_tag,
size_t in_tag_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
const uint64_t ad_len_64 = ad_len;
if (ad_len_64 >= (UINT64_C(1) << 61)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
@@ -408,8 +404,8 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
}
const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;
if (in_len < EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN ||
in_len_64 > (UINT64_C(1) << 36) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
if (in_len_64 > UINT64_C(1) << 36 ||
in_tag_len != EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return 0;
}
@@ -420,13 +416,6 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
}
const struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_ctx *gcm_siv_ctx = asm_ctx_from_ctx(ctx);
const size_t plaintext_len = in_len - EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN;
const uint8_t *const given_tag = in + plaintext_len;
if (max_out_len < plaintext_len) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
alignas(16) uint64_t record_auth_key[2];
alignas(16) uint64_t record_enc_key[4];
@@ -459,27 +448,27 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
alignas(16) uint8_t htable[16 * 6];
aesgcmsiv_htable6_init(htable, (const uint8_t *)record_auth_key);
// aes[128|256]gcmsiv_dec needs access to the claimed tag. So it's put into
// its scratch space.
memcpy(calculated_tag + 16, in_tag, EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN);
if (gcm_siv_ctx->is_128_bit) {
aes128gcmsiv_dec(in, out, calculated_tag, htable, &expanded_key,
plaintext_len);
aes128gcmsiv_dec(in, out, calculated_tag, htable, &expanded_key, in_len);
} else {
aes256gcmsiv_dec(in, out, calculated_tag, htable, &expanded_key,
plaintext_len);
aes256gcmsiv_dec(in, out, calculated_tag, htable, &expanded_key, in_len);
}
if (plaintext_len & 15) {
if (in_len & 15) {
aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_crypt_last_block(gcm_siv_ctx->is_128_bit, out, in,
plaintext_len, given_tag,
&expanded_key);
in_len, in_tag, &expanded_key);
OPENSSL_memset(scratch, 0, sizeof(scratch));
OPENSSL_memcpy(scratch, out + (plaintext_len & ~15), plaintext_len & 15);
OPENSSL_memcpy(scratch, out + (in_len & ~15), in_len & 15);
aesgcmsiv_polyval_horner(calculated_tag, (const uint8_t *)record_auth_key,
scratch, 1);
}
uint8_t length_block[16];
CRYPTO_store_u64_le(length_block, ad_len * 8);
CRYPTO_store_u64_le(length_block + 8, plaintext_len * 8);
CRYPTO_store_u64_le(length_block + 8, in_len * 8);
aesgcmsiv_polyval_horner(calculated_tag, (const uint8_t *)record_auth_key,
length_block, 1);
@@ -495,13 +484,12 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
aes256gcmsiv_ecb_enc_block(calculated_tag, calculated_tag, &expanded_key);
}
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(calculated_tag, given_tag, EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN) !=
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(calculated_tag, in_tag, EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN) !=
0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return 0;
}
*out_len = in_len - EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN;
return 1;
}
@@ -515,9 +503,9 @@ static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_gcm_siv_asm = {
aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_init,
NULL /* init_with_direction */,
aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_cleanup,
aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_open,
NULL /* open */,
aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_seal_scatter,
NULL /* open_gather */,
aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_open_gather,
NULL /* get_iv */,
NULL /* tag_len */,
};
@@ -532,9 +520,9 @@ static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_gcm_siv_asm = {
aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_init,
NULL /* init_with_direction */,
aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_cleanup,
aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_open,
NULL /* open */,
aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_seal_scatter,
NULL /* open_gather */,
aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_open_gather,
NULL /* get_iv */,
NULL /* tag_len */,
};
@@ -647,8 +635,8 @@ static void gcm_siv_polyval(
}
uint8_t length_block[16];
CRYPTO_store_u64_le(length_block, ad_len * 8);
CRYPTO_store_u64_le(length_block + 8, in_len * 8);
CRYPTO_store_u64_le(length_block, ((uint64_t) ad_len) * 8);
CRYPTO_store_u64_le(length_block + 8, ((uint64_t) in_len) * 8);
CRYPTO_POLYVAL_update_blocks(&polyval_ctx, length_block,
sizeof(length_block));
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_des.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_nid.h>
#include "../des/internal.h"
#include "../fipsmodule/cipher/internal.h"
#include "internal.h"
@@ -71,35 +72,27 @@ typedef struct {
static int des_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
const uint8_t *iv, int enc) {
DES_cblock *deskey = (DES_cblock *)key;
EVP_DES_KEY *dat = (EVP_DES_KEY *)ctx->cipher_data;
DES_set_key(deskey, &dat->ks.ks);
DES_set_key_ex(key, &dat->ks.ks);
return 1;
}
static int des_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
size_t in_len) {
EVP_DES_KEY *dat = (EVP_DES_KEY *)ctx->cipher_data;
DES_ncbc_encrypt(in, out, in_len, &dat->ks.ks, (DES_cblock *)ctx->iv,
ctx->encrypt);
DES_ncbc_encrypt_ex(in, out, in_len, &dat->ks.ks, ctx->iv, ctx->encrypt);
return 1;
}
static const EVP_CIPHER evp_des_cbc = {
/* nid = */ NID_des_cbc,
/* block_size = */ 8,
/* key_len = */ 8,
/* iv_len = */ 8,
/* ctx_size = */ sizeof(EVP_DES_KEY),
/* flags = */ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
/* app_data = */ NULL,
/* init = */ des_init_key,
/* cipher = */ des_cbc_cipher,
/* cleanup = */ NULL,
/* ctrl = */ NULL,
.nid = NID_des_cbc,
.block_size = 8,
.key_len = 8,
.iv_len = 8,
.ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_DES_KEY),
.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
.init = des_init_key,
.cipher = des_cbc_cipher,
};
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_cbc(void) { return &evp_des_cbc; }
@@ -113,24 +106,20 @@ static int des_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
EVP_DES_KEY *dat = (EVP_DES_KEY *)ctx->cipher_data;
for (size_t i = 0; i <= in_len; i += ctx->cipher->block_size) {
DES_ecb_encrypt((DES_cblock *)(in + i), (DES_cblock *)(out + i),
&dat->ks.ks, ctx->encrypt);
DES_ecb_encrypt_ex(in + i, out + i, &dat->ks.ks, ctx->encrypt);
}
return 1;
}
static const EVP_CIPHER evp_des_ecb = {
/* nid = */ NID_des_ecb,
/* block_size = */ 8,
/* key_len = */ 8,
/* iv_len = */ 0,
/* ctx_size = */ sizeof(EVP_DES_KEY),
/* flags = */ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
/* app_data = */ NULL,
/* init = */ des_init_key,
/* cipher = */ des_ecb_cipher,
/* cleanup = */ NULL,
/* ctrl = */ NULL,
.nid = NID_des_ecb,
.block_size = 8,
.key_len = 8,
.iv_len = 0,
.ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_DES_KEY),
.flags = EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
.init = des_init_key,
.cipher = des_ecb_cipher,
};
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ecb(void) { return &evp_des_ecb; }
@@ -144,66 +133,53 @@ typedef struct {
static int des_ede3_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
const uint8_t *iv, int enc) {
DES_cblock *deskey = (DES_cblock *)key;
DES_EDE_KEY *dat = (DES_EDE_KEY *)ctx->cipher_data;
DES_set_key(&deskey[0], &dat->ks.ks[0]);
DES_set_key(&deskey[1], &dat->ks.ks[1]);
DES_set_key(&deskey[2], &dat->ks.ks[2]);
DES_set_key_ex(key, &dat->ks.ks[0]);
DES_set_key_ex(key + 8, &dat->ks.ks[1]);
DES_set_key_ex(key + 16, &dat->ks.ks[2]);
return 1;
}
static int des_ede3_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
DES_EDE_KEY *dat = (DES_EDE_KEY *)ctx->cipher_data;
DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(in, out, in_len, &dat->ks.ks[0], &dat->ks.ks[1],
&dat->ks.ks[2], (DES_cblock *)ctx->iv, ctx->encrypt);
DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt_ex(in, out, in_len, &dat->ks.ks[0], &dat->ks.ks[1],
&dat->ks.ks[2], ctx->iv, ctx->encrypt);
return 1;
}
static const EVP_CIPHER evp_des_ede3_cbc = {
/* nid = */ NID_des_ede3_cbc,
/* block_size = */ 8,
/* key_len = */ 24,
/* iv_len = */ 8,
/* ctx_size = */ sizeof(DES_EDE_KEY),
/* flags = */ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
/* app_data = */ NULL,
/* init = */ des_ede3_init_key,
/* cipher = */ des_ede3_cbc_cipher,
/* cleanup = */ NULL,
/* ctrl = */ NULL,
.nid = NID_des_ede3_cbc,
.block_size = 8,
.key_len = 24,
.iv_len = 8,
.ctx_size = sizeof(DES_EDE_KEY),
.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
.init = des_ede3_init_key,
.cipher = des_ede3_cbc_cipher,
};
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_cbc(void) { return &evp_des_ede3_cbc; }
static int des_ede_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
const uint8_t *iv, int enc) {
DES_cblock *deskey = (DES_cblock *)key;
DES_EDE_KEY *dat = (DES_EDE_KEY *)ctx->cipher_data;
DES_set_key(&deskey[0], &dat->ks.ks[0]);
DES_set_key(&deskey[1], &dat->ks.ks[1]);
DES_set_key(&deskey[0], &dat->ks.ks[2]);
// 2-DES is 3-DES with the first key used twice.
DES_set_key_ex(key, &dat->ks.ks[0]);
DES_set_key_ex(key + 8, &dat->ks.ks[1]);
DES_set_key_ex(key, &dat->ks.ks[2]);
return 1;
}
static const EVP_CIPHER evp_des_ede_cbc = {
/* nid = */ NID_des_ede_cbc,
/* block_size = */ 8,
/* key_len = */ 16,
/* iv_len = */ 8,
/* ctx_size = */ sizeof(DES_EDE_KEY),
/* flags = */ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
/* app_data = */ NULL,
/* init = */ des_ede_init_key,
/* cipher = */ des_ede3_cbc_cipher,
/* cleanup = */ NULL,
/* ctrl = */ NULL,
.nid = NID_des_ede_cbc,
.block_size = 8,
.key_len = 16,
.iv_len = 8,
.ctx_size = sizeof(DES_EDE_KEY),
.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
.init = des_ede_init_key,
.cipher = des_ede3_cbc_cipher,
};
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede_cbc(void) { return &evp_des_ede_cbc; }
@@ -217,41 +193,34 @@ static int des_ede_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
DES_EDE_KEY *dat = (DES_EDE_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
for (size_t i = 0; i <= in_len; i += ctx->cipher->block_size) {
DES_ecb3_encrypt((DES_cblock *) (in + i), (DES_cblock *) (out + i),
&dat->ks.ks[0], &dat->ks.ks[1], &dat->ks.ks[2],
ctx->encrypt);
DES_ecb3_encrypt_ex(in + i, out + i, &dat->ks.ks[0], &dat->ks.ks[1],
&dat->ks.ks[2], ctx->encrypt);
}
return 1;
}
static const EVP_CIPHER evp_des_ede = {
/* nid = */ NID_des_ede_ecb,
/* block_size = */ 8,
/* key_len = */ 16,
/* iv_len = */ 0,
/* ctx_size = */ sizeof(DES_EDE_KEY),
/* flags = */ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
/* app_data = */ NULL,
/* init = */ des_ede_init_key,
/* cipher = */ des_ede_ecb_cipher,
/* cleanup = */ NULL,
/* ctrl = */ NULL,
.nid = NID_des_ede_ecb,
.block_size = 8,
.key_len = 16,
.iv_len = 0,
.ctx_size = sizeof(DES_EDE_KEY),
.flags = EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
.init = des_ede_init_key,
.cipher = des_ede_ecb_cipher,
};
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede(void) { return &evp_des_ede; }
static const EVP_CIPHER evp_des_ede3 = {
/* nid = */ NID_des_ede3_ecb,
/* block_size = */ 8,
/* key_len = */ 24,
/* iv_len = */ 0,
/* ctx_size = */ sizeof(DES_EDE_KEY),
/* flags = */ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
/* app_data = */ NULL,
/* init = */ des_ede3_init_key,
/* cipher = */ des_ede_ecb_cipher,
/* cleanup = */ NULL,
/* ctrl = */ NULL,
.nid = NID_des_ede3_ecb,
.block_size = 8,
.key_len = 24,
.iv_len = 0,
.ctx_size = sizeof(DES_EDE_KEY),
.flags = EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
.init = des_ede3_init_key,
.cipher = des_ede_ecb_cipher,
};
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3(void) { return &evp_des_ede3; }
@@ -78,9 +78,13 @@ static int null_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
}
static const EVP_CIPHER n_cipher = {
NID_undef, 1 /* block size */, 0 /* key_len */, 0 /* iv_len */,
0 /* ctx_size */, 0 /* flags */, NULL /* app_data */, null_init_key,
null_cipher, NULL /* cleanup */, NULL /* ctrl */,
.nid = NID_undef,
.block_size = 1,
.key_len = 0,
.iv_len = 0,
.ctx_size = 0,
.init = null_init_key,
.cipher = null_cipher,
};
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_enc_null(void) { return &n_cipher; }
@@ -427,37 +427,29 @@ static int rc2_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void *ptr) {
}
static const EVP_CIPHER rc2_40_cbc = {
NID_rc2_40_cbc,
8 /* block size */,
5 /* 40 bit */,
8 /* iv len */,
sizeof(EVP_RC2_KEY),
EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT,
NULL /* app_data */,
rc2_init_key,
rc2_cbc_cipher,
NULL,
rc2_ctrl,
.nid = NID_rc2_40_cbc,
.block_size = 8,
.key_len = 5 /* 40 bit */,
.iv_len = 8,
.ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_RC2_KEY),
.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT,
.init = rc2_init_key,
.cipher = rc2_cbc_cipher,
.ctrl = rc2_ctrl,
};
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_40_cbc(void) {
return &rc2_40_cbc;
}
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_40_cbc(void) { return &rc2_40_cbc; }
static const EVP_CIPHER rc2_cbc = {
NID_rc2_cbc,
8 /* block size */,
16 /* 128 bit */,
8 /* iv len */,
sizeof(EVP_RC2_KEY),
EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT,
NULL /* app_data */,
rc2_init_key,
rc2_cbc_cipher,
NULL,
rc2_ctrl,
.nid = NID_rc2_cbc,
.block_size = 8,
.key_len = 16 /* 128 bit */,
.iv_len = 8,
.ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_RC2_KEY),
.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT,
.init = rc2_init_key,
.cipher = rc2_cbc_cipher,
.ctrl = rc2_ctrl,
};
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_cbc(void) {
return &rc2_cbc;
}
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_cbc(void) { return &rc2_cbc; }
@@ -81,9 +81,14 @@ static int rc4_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
}
static const EVP_CIPHER rc4 = {
NID_rc4, 1 /* block_size */, 16 /* key_size */,
0 /* iv_len */, sizeof(RC4_KEY), EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
NULL /* app_data */, rc4_init_key, rc4_cipher,
NULL /* cleanup */, NULL /* ctrl */, };
.nid = NID_rc4,
.block_size = 1,
.key_len = 16,
.iv_len = 0,
.ctx_size = sizeof(RC4_KEY),
.flags = EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
.init = rc4_init_key,
.cipher = rc4_cipher,
};
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc4(void) { return &rc4; }
@@ -192,22 +192,65 @@ OPENSSL_INLINE int chacha20_poly1305_asm_capable(void) {
// Additional input parameters are passed in |aead_data->in|. On exit, it will
// write calculated tag value to |aead_data->out.tag|, which the caller must
// check.
#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
extern void chacha20_poly1305_open_nohw(
uint8_t *out_plaintext, const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t plaintext_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len, union chacha20_poly1305_open_data *data);
extern void chacha20_poly1305_open_avx2(
uint8_t *out_plaintext, const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t plaintext_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len, union chacha20_poly1305_open_data *data);
OPENSSL_INLINE void chacha20_poly1305_open(uint8_t *out_plaintext,
const uint8_t *ciphertext,
size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
size_t ad_len,
union chacha20_poly1305_open_data *data) {
if (CRYPTO_is_AVX2_capable() && CRYPTO_is_BMI2_capable()) {
chacha20_poly1305_open_avx2(out_plaintext, ciphertext, plaintext_len, ad,
ad_len, data);
} else {
chacha20_poly1305_open_nohw(out_plaintext, ciphertext, plaintext_len, ad,
ad_len, data);
}
}
#else
extern void chacha20_poly1305_open(uint8_t *out_plaintext,
const uint8_t *ciphertext,
size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
size_t ad_len,
union chacha20_poly1305_open_data *data);
#endif
// chacha20_poly1305_open is defined in chacha20_poly1305_*.pl. It encrypts
// |plaintext_len| bytes from |plaintext| and writes them to |out_ciphertext|.
// Additional input parameters are passed in |aead_data->in|. The calculated tag
// value is over the computed ciphertext concatenated with |extra_ciphertext|
// and written to |aead_data->out.tag|.
#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
extern void chacha20_poly1305_seal_nohw(
uint8_t *out_ciphertext, const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len, union chacha20_poly1305_seal_data *data);
extern void chacha20_poly1305_seal_avx2(
uint8_t *out_ciphertext, const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len, union chacha20_poly1305_seal_data *data);
OPENSSL_INLINE void chacha20_poly1305_seal(
uint8_t *out_ciphertext, const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len, union chacha20_poly1305_seal_data *data) {
if (CRYPTO_is_AVX2_capable() && CRYPTO_is_BMI2_capable()) {
chacha20_poly1305_seal_avx2(out_ciphertext, plaintext, plaintext_len, ad,
ad_len, data);
} else {
chacha20_poly1305_seal_nohw(out_ciphertext, plaintext, plaintext_len, ad,
ad_len, data);
}
}
#else
extern void chacha20_poly1305_seal(uint8_t *out_ciphertext,
const uint8_t *plaintext,
size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
size_t ad_len,
union chacha20_poly1305_seal_data *data);
#endif
#else
OPENSSL_INLINE int chacha20_poly1305_asm_capable(void) { return 0; }
@@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ void EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac(uint8_t *out, size_t md_size, const uint8_t *in,
size_t mac_end = in_len;
size_t mac_start = mac_end - md_size;
assert(orig_len >= in_len);
assert(in_len >= md_size);
declassify_assert(orig_len >= in_len);
declassify_assert(in_len >= md_size);
assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
assert(md_size > 0);
+156 -140
View File
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_conf.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <ctype.h>
@@ -65,131 +66,141 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_lhash.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include "conf_def.h"
#include "internal.h"
#include "../internal.h"
struct conf_section_st {
char *name;
// values contains non-owning pointers to the values in the section.
STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values;
};
static const char kDefaultSectionName[] = "default";
static uint32_t conf_section_hash(const CONF_SECTION *s) {
return OPENSSL_strhash(s->name);
}
static int conf_section_cmp(const CONF_SECTION *a, const CONF_SECTION *b) {
return strcmp(a->name, b->name);
}
static uint32_t conf_value_hash(const CONF_VALUE *v) {
const uint32_t section_hash = v->section ? OPENSSL_strhash(v->section) : 0;
const uint32_t name_hash = v->name ? OPENSSL_strhash(v->name) : 0;
const uint32_t section_hash = OPENSSL_strhash(v->section);
const uint32_t name_hash = OPENSSL_strhash(v->name);
return (section_hash << 2) ^ name_hash;
}
static int conf_value_cmp(const CONF_VALUE *a, const CONF_VALUE *b) {
int i;
if (a->section != b->section) {
i = strcmp(a->section, b->section);
if (i) {
return i;
}
int cmp = strcmp(a->section, b->section);
if (cmp != 0) {
return cmp;
}
if (a->name != NULL && b->name != NULL) {
return strcmp(a->name, b->name);
} else if (a->name == b->name) {
return 0;
} else {
return (a->name == NULL) ? -1 : 1;
}
return strcmp(a->name, b->name);
}
CONF *NCONF_new(void *method) {
CONF *conf;
if (method != NULL) {
return NULL;
}
conf = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CONF));
CONF *conf = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CONF));
if (conf == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
conf->data = lh_CONF_VALUE_new(conf_value_hash, conf_value_cmp);
if (conf->data == NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(conf);
conf->sections = lh_CONF_SECTION_new(conf_section_hash, conf_section_cmp);
conf->values = lh_CONF_VALUE_new(conf_value_hash, conf_value_cmp);
if (conf->sections == NULL || conf->values == NULL) {
NCONF_free(conf);
return NULL;
}
return conf;
}
CONF_VALUE *CONF_VALUE_new(void) {
CONF_VALUE *v = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CONF_VALUE));
if (!v) {
return NULL;
}
OPENSSL_memset(v, 0, sizeof(CONF_VALUE));
return v;
}
static void value_free_contents(CONF_VALUE *value) {
OPENSSL_free(value->section);
if (value->name) {
OPENSSL_free(value->name);
OPENSSL_free(value->value);
} else {
// TODO(davidben): When |value->name| is NULL, |CONF_VALUE| is actually an
// entirely different structure. This is fragile and confusing. Make a
// proper |CONF_SECTION| type that doesn't require this.
sk_CONF_VALUE_free((STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *)value->value);
}
}
CONF_VALUE *CONF_VALUE_new(void) { return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(CONF_VALUE)); }
static void value_free(CONF_VALUE *value) {
if (value != NULL) {
value_free_contents(value);
OPENSSL_free(value);
if (value == NULL) {
return;
}
OPENSSL_free(value->section);
OPENSSL_free(value->name);
OPENSSL_free(value->value);
OPENSSL_free(value);
}
static void section_free(CONF_SECTION *section) {
if (section == NULL) {
return;
}
OPENSSL_free(section->name);
sk_CONF_VALUE_free(section->values);
OPENSSL_free(section);
}
static void value_free_arg(CONF_VALUE *value, void *arg) { value_free(value); }
static void section_free_arg(CONF_SECTION *section, void *arg) {
section_free(section);
}
void NCONF_free(CONF *conf) {
if (conf == NULL || conf->data == NULL) {
if (conf == NULL) {
return;
}
lh_CONF_VALUE_doall_arg(conf->data, value_free_arg, NULL);
lh_CONF_VALUE_free(conf->data);
lh_CONF_SECTION_doall_arg(conf->sections, section_free_arg, NULL);
lh_CONF_SECTION_free(conf->sections);
lh_CONF_VALUE_doall_arg(conf->values, value_free_arg, NULL);
lh_CONF_VALUE_free(conf->values);
OPENSSL_free(conf);
}
static CONF_VALUE *NCONF_new_section(const CONF *conf, const char *section) {
STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk = NULL;
int ok = 0;
CONF_VALUE *v = NULL, *old_value;
sk = sk_CONF_VALUE_new_null();
v = CONF_VALUE_new();
if (sk == NULL || v == NULL) {
goto err;
static CONF_SECTION *NCONF_new_section(const CONF *conf, const char *section) {
CONF_SECTION *s = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CONF_SECTION));
if (!s) {
return NULL;
}
v->section = OPENSSL_strdup(section);
if (v->section == NULL) {
s->name = OPENSSL_strdup(section);
s->values = sk_CONF_VALUE_new_null();
if (s->name == NULL || s->values == NULL) {
goto err;
}
v->name = NULL;
v->value = (char *)sk;
if (!lh_CONF_VALUE_insert(conf->data, &old_value, v)) {
CONF_SECTION *old_section;
if (!lh_CONF_SECTION_insert(conf->sections, &old_section, s)) {
goto err;
}
value_free(old_value);
ok = 1;
section_free(old_section);
return s;
err:
if (!ok) {
sk_CONF_VALUE_free(sk);
OPENSSL_free(v);
v = NULL;
}
return v;
section_free(s);
return NULL;
}
static int is_comment(char c) { return c == '#'; }
static int is_quote(char c) { return c == '"' || c == '\'' || c == '`'; }
static int is_esc(char c) { return c == '\\'; }
static int is_conf_ws(char c) {
// This differs from |OPENSSL_isspace| in that CONF does not accept '\v' and
// '\f' as whitespace.
return c == ' ' || c == '\t' || c == '\r' || c == '\n';
}
static int is_name_char(char c) {
// Alphanumeric characters, and a handful of symbols, may appear in value and
// section names without escaping.
return OPENSSL_isalnum(c) || c == '_' || c == '!' || c == '.' || c == '%' ||
c == '&' || c == '*' || c == '+' || c == ',' || c == '/' || c == ';' ||
c == '?' || c == '@' || c == '^' || c == '~' || c == '|' || c == '-';
}
static int str_copy(CONF *conf, char *section, char **pto, char *from) {
@@ -208,13 +219,13 @@ static int str_copy(CONF *conf, char *section, char **pto, char *from) {
}
for (;;) {
if (IS_QUOTE(conf, *from)) {
if (is_quote(*from)) {
q = *from;
from++;
while (!IS_EOF(conf, *from) && (*from != q)) {
if (IS_ESC(conf, *from)) {
while (*from != '\0' && *from != q) {
if (is_esc(*from)) {
from++;
if (IS_EOF(conf, *from)) {
if (*from == '\0') {
break;
}
}
@@ -223,10 +234,10 @@ static int str_copy(CONF *conf, char *section, char **pto, char *from) {
if (*from == q) {
from++;
}
} else if (IS_ESC(conf, *from)) {
} else if (is_esc(*from)) {
from++;
v = *(from++);
if (IS_EOF(conf, v)) {
if (v == '\0') {
break;
} else if (v == 'r') {
v = '\r';
@@ -238,11 +249,13 @@ static int str_copy(CONF *conf, char *section, char **pto, char *from) {
v = '\t';
}
buf->data[to++] = v;
} else if (IS_EOF(conf, *from)) {
} else if (*from == '\0') {
break;
} else if (*from == '$') {
// Historically, $foo would expand to a previously-parsed value. This
// feature has been removed as it was unused and is a DoS vector.
// feature has been removed as it was unused and is a DoS vector. If
// trying to embed '$' in a line, either escape it or wrap the value in
// quotes.
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CONF, CONF_R_VARIABLE_EXPANSION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
goto err;
} else {
@@ -261,21 +274,20 @@ err:
return 0;
}
static CONF_VALUE *get_section(const CONF *conf, const char *section) {
CONF_VALUE template;
static CONF_SECTION *get_section(const CONF *conf, const char *section) {
CONF_SECTION template;
OPENSSL_memset(&template, 0, sizeof(template));
template.section = (char *) section;
return lh_CONF_VALUE_retrieve(conf->data, &template);
template.name = (char *) section;
return lh_CONF_SECTION_retrieve(conf->sections, &template);
}
const STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *NCONF_get_section(const CONF *conf,
const char *section) {
const CONF_VALUE *section_value = get_section(conf, section);
if (section_value == NULL) {
const CONF_SECTION *section_obj = get_section(conf, section);
if (section_obj == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
return (STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE)*) section_value->value;
return section_obj->values;
}
const char *NCONF_get_string(const CONF *conf, const char *section,
@@ -287,66 +299,74 @@ const char *NCONF_get_string(const CONF *conf, const char *section,
}
OPENSSL_memset(&template, 0, sizeof(template));
template.section = (char *) section;
template.name = (char *) name;
value = lh_CONF_VALUE_retrieve(conf->data, &template);
template.section = (char *)section;
template.name = (char *)name;
value = lh_CONF_VALUE_retrieve(conf->values, &template);
if (value == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
return value->value;
}
static int add_string(const CONF *conf, CONF_VALUE *section,
static int add_string(const CONF *conf, CONF_SECTION *section,
CONF_VALUE *value) {
STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *section_stack = (STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE)*) section->value;
CONF_VALUE *old_value;
value->section = OPENSSL_strdup(section->section);
if (!sk_CONF_VALUE_push(section_stack, value)) {
value->section = OPENSSL_strdup(section->name);
if (value->section == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (!lh_CONF_VALUE_insert(conf->data, &old_value, value)) {
if (!sk_CONF_VALUE_push(section->values, value)) {
return 0;
}
CONF_VALUE *old_value;
if (!lh_CONF_VALUE_insert(conf->values, &old_value, value)) {
// Remove |value| from |section->values|, so we do not leave a dangling
// pointer.
sk_CONF_VALUE_pop(section->values);
return 0;
}
if (old_value != NULL) {
(void)sk_CONF_VALUE_delete_ptr(section_stack, old_value);
(void)sk_CONF_VALUE_delete_ptr(section->values, old_value);
value_free(old_value);
}
return 1;
}
static char *eat_ws(CONF *conf, char *p) {
while (IS_WS(conf, *p) && !IS_EOF(conf, *p)) {
static char *eat_ws(char *p) {
while (*p != '\0' && is_conf_ws(*p)) {
p++;
}
return p;
}
#define scan_esc(conf, p) (((IS_EOF((conf), (p)[1])) ? ((p) + 1) : ((p) + 2)))
static char *scan_esc(char *p) {
assert(p[0] == '\\');
return p[1] == '\0' ? p + 1 : p + 2;
}
static char *eat_alpha_numeric(CONF *conf, char *p) {
static char *eat_name(char *p) {
for (;;) {
if (IS_ESC(conf, *p)) {
p = scan_esc(conf, p);
if (is_esc(*p)) {
p = scan_esc(p);
continue;
}
if (!IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT(conf, *p)) {
if (!is_name_char(*p)) {
return p;
}
p++;
}
}
static char *scan_quote(CONF *conf, char *p) {
static char *scan_quote(char *p) {
int q = *p;
p++;
while (!IS_EOF(conf, *p) && *p != q) {
if (IS_ESC(conf, *p)) {
while (*p != '\0' && *p != q) {
if (is_esc(*p)) {
p++;
if (IS_EOF(conf, *p)) {
if (*p == '\0') {
return p;
}
}
@@ -358,28 +378,28 @@ static char *scan_quote(CONF *conf, char *p) {
return p;
}
static void clear_comments(CONF *conf, char *p) {
static void clear_comments(char *p) {
for (;;) {
if (!IS_WS(conf, *p)) {
if (!is_conf_ws(*p)) {
break;
}
p++;
}
for (;;) {
if (IS_COMMENT(conf, *p)) {
if (is_comment(*p)) {
*p = '\0';
return;
}
if (IS_QUOTE(conf, *p)) {
p = scan_quote(conf, p);
if (is_quote(*p)) {
p = scan_quote(p);
continue;
}
if (IS_ESC(conf, *p)) {
p = scan_esc(conf, p);
if (is_esc(*p)) {
p = scan_esc(p);
continue;
}
if (IS_EOF(conf, *p)) {
if (*p == '\0') {
return;
} else {
p++;
@@ -395,8 +415,8 @@ int NCONF_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *in, long *out_error_line) {
int again;
long eline = 0;
char btmp[DECIMAL_SIZE(eline) + 1];
CONF_VALUE *v = NULL, *tv;
CONF_VALUE *sv = NULL;
CONF_VALUE *v = NULL;
CONF_SECTION *sv = NULL;
char *section = NULL, *buf;
char *start, *psection, *pname;
@@ -459,7 +479,7 @@ int NCONF_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *in, long *out_error_line) {
// If we have bytes and the last char '\\' and
// second last char is not '\\'
p = &(buff->data[bufnum - 1]);
if (IS_ESC(conf, p[0]) && ((bufnum <= 1) || !IS_ESC(conf, p[-1]))) {
if (is_esc(p[0]) && ((bufnum <= 1) || !is_esc(p[-1]))) {
bufnum--;
again = 1;
}
@@ -470,20 +490,20 @@ int NCONF_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *in, long *out_error_line) {
bufnum = 0;
buf = buff->data;
clear_comments(conf, buf);
s = eat_ws(conf, buf);
if (IS_EOF(conf, *s)) {
clear_comments(buf);
s = eat_ws(buf);
if (*s == '\0') {
continue; // blank line
}
if (*s == '[') {
char *ss;
s++;
start = eat_ws(conf, s);
start = eat_ws(s);
ss = start;
again:
end = eat_alpha_numeric(conf, ss);
p = eat_ws(conf, end);
end = eat_name(ss);
p = eat_ws(end);
if (*p != ']') {
if (*p != '\0' && ss != p) {
ss = p;
@@ -507,27 +527,27 @@ int NCONF_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *in, long *out_error_line) {
} else {
pname = s;
psection = NULL;
end = eat_alpha_numeric(conf, s);
end = eat_name(s);
if ((end[0] == ':') && (end[1] == ':')) {
*end = '\0';
end += 2;
psection = pname;
pname = end;
end = eat_alpha_numeric(conf, end);
end = eat_name(end);
}
p = eat_ws(conf, end);
p = eat_ws(end);
if (*p != '=') {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CONF, CONF_R_MISSING_EQUAL_SIGN);
goto err;
}
*end = '\0';
p++;
start = eat_ws(conf, p);
while (!IS_EOF(conf, *p)) {
start = eat_ws(p);
while (*p != '\0') {
p++;
}
p--;
while ((p != start) && (IS_WS(conf, *p))) {
while (p != start && is_conf_ws(*p)) {
p--;
}
p++;
@@ -547,6 +567,7 @@ int NCONF_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *in, long *out_error_line) {
goto err;
}
CONF_SECTION *tv;
if (strcmp(psection, section) != 0) {
if ((tv = get_section(conf, psection)) == NULL) {
tv = NCONF_new_section(conf, psection);
@@ -576,12 +597,7 @@ err:
}
snprintf(btmp, sizeof btmp, "%ld", eline);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "line ", btmp);
if (v != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(v->name);
OPENSSL_free(v->value);
OPENSSL_free(v);
}
value_free(v);
return 0;
}
@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
// This file was historically generated by keysets.pl in OpenSSL.
//
// TODO(davidben): Replace it with something more readable.
#define CONF_NUMBER 1
#define CONF_UPPER 2
#define CONF_LOWER 4
#define CONF_UNDER 256
#define CONF_PUNCTUATION 512
#define CONF_WS 16
#define CONF_ESC 32
#define CONF_QUOTE 64
#define CONF_COMMENT 128
#define CONF_EOF 8
#define CONF_HIGHBIT 4096
#define CONF_ALPHA (CONF_UPPER|CONF_LOWER)
#define CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC (CONF_ALPHA|CONF_NUMBER|CONF_UNDER)
#define CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT (CONF_ALPHA|CONF_NUMBER|CONF_UNDER| \
CONF_PUNCTUATION)
#define KEYTYPES(c) CONF_type_default
#define IS_COMMENT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_COMMENT)
#define IS_EOF(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_EOF)
#define IS_ESC(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_ESC)
#define IS_NUMBER(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_NUMBER)
#define IS_WS(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_WS)
#define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC)
#define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT(c,a) \
(KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT)
#define IS_QUOTE(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_QUOTE)
static const unsigned short CONF_type_default[256]={
0x0008,0x0000,0x0000,0x0000,0x0000,0x0000,0x0000,0x0000,
0x0000,0x0010,0x0010,0x0000,0x0000,0x0010,0x0000,0x0000,
0x0000,0x0000,0x0000,0x0000,0x0000,0x0000,0x0000,0x0000,
0x0000,0x0000,0x0000,0x0000,0x0000,0x0000,0x0000,0x0000,
0x0010,0x0200,0x0040,0x0080,0x0000,0x0200,0x0200,0x0040,
0x0000,0x0000,0x0200,0x0200,0x0200,0x0200,0x0200,0x0200,
0x0001,0x0001,0x0001,0x0001,0x0001,0x0001,0x0001,0x0001,
0x0001,0x0001,0x0000,0x0200,0x0000,0x0000,0x0000,0x0200,
0x0200,0x0002,0x0002,0x0002,0x0002,0x0002,0x0002,0x0002,
0x0002,0x0002,0x0002,0x0002,0x0002,0x0002,0x0002,0x0002,
0x0002,0x0002,0x0002,0x0002,0x0002,0x0002,0x0002,0x0002,
0x0002,0x0002,0x0002,0x0000,0x0020,0x0000,0x0200,0x0100,
0x0040,0x0004,0x0004,0x0004,0x0004,0x0004,0x0004,0x0004,
0x0004,0x0004,0x0004,0x0004,0x0004,0x0004,0x0004,0x0004,
0x0004,0x0004,0x0004,0x0004,0x0004,0x0004,0x0004,0x0004,
0x0004,0x0004,0x0004,0x0000,0x0200,0x0000,0x0200,0x0000,
0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,
0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,
0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,
0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,
0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,
0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,
0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,
0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,
0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,
0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,
0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,
0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,
0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,
0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,
0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,
0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,0x1000,
};
@@ -24,10 +24,14 @@ extern "C" {
#endif
typedef struct conf_section_st CONF_SECTION;
DEFINE_LHASH_OF(CONF_SECTION)
DEFINE_LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE)
struct conf_st {
LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *data;
LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values;
LHASH_OF(CONF_SECTION) *sections;
};
// CONF_VALUE_new returns a freshly allocated and zeroed |CONF_VALUE|.
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
#include "internal.h"
#if defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64) && defined(OPENSSL_APPLE) && \
!defined(OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP)
!defined(OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
#include "internal.h"
#if defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64) && defined(OPENSSL_FUCHSIA) && \
!defined(OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP)
!defined(OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
#include <zircon/features.h>
#include <zircon/syscalls.h>
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
#include "internal.h"
#if defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64) && defined(OPENSSL_LINUX) && \
!defined(OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP)
!defined(OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
#include <sys/auxv.h>
@@ -15,11 +15,11 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_cpu.h>
#if defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64) && defined(OPENSSL_OPENBSD) && \
!defined(OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP)
!defined(OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <machine/cpu.h>
#include <machine/armreg.h>
#include <machine/cpu.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_arm_arch.h>
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) {
int isar0_mib[] = { CTL_MACHDEP, CPU_ID_AA64ISAR0 };
int isar0_mib[] = {CTL_MACHDEP, CPU_ID_AA64ISAR0};
uint64_t cpu_id = 0;
size_t len = sizeof(cpu_id);
@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@
// expects userspace to simply read them. It traps the reads and fills in CPU
// capabilities.
#if defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64) && !defined(OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP) && \
(defined(ANDROID_BAREMETAL) || defined(OPENSSL_FREEBSD))
(defined(ANDROID_BAREMETAL) || defined(OPENSSL_FREEBSD)) && \
!defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_arm_arch.h>
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
#include "internal.h"
#if defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64) && defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS) && \
!defined(OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP)
!defined(OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
#include <windows.h>
-36
View File
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#include "internal.h"
#if (defined(OPENSSL_ARM) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)) && \
!defined(OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_arm_arch.h>
int CRYPTO_is_NEON_capable_at_runtime(void) {
return (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV7_NEON) != 0;
}
int CRYPTO_is_ARMv8_AES_capable_at_runtime(void) {
return (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV8_AES) != 0;
}
int CRYPTO_is_ARMv8_PMULL_capable_at_runtime(void) {
return (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV8_PMULL) != 0;
}
#endif /* (defined(OPENSSL_ARM) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)) &&
!defined(OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP) */
@@ -143,6 +143,9 @@ void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) {
int CRYPTO_has_broken_NEON(void) { return 0; }
int CRYPTO_needs_hwcap2_workaround(void) { return g_needs_hwcap2_workaround; }
int CRYPTO_needs_hwcap2_workaround(void) {
OPENSSL_init_cpuid();
return g_needs_hwcap2_workaround;
}
#endif // OPENSSL_ARM && OPENSSL_LINUX && !OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP
+71 -35
View File
@@ -173,20 +173,21 @@ void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) {
OPENSSL_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx, 1);
const uint32_t base_family = (eax >> 8) & 15;
const uint32_t base_model = (eax >> 4) & 15;
uint32_t family = base_family;
uint32_t model = base_model;
if (base_family == 15) {
const uint32_t ext_family = (eax >> 20) & 255;
family += ext_family;
}
if (base_family == 6 || base_family == 15) {
const uint32_t ext_model = (eax >> 16) & 15;
model |= ext_model << 4;
}
if (is_amd) {
// See https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/25481.pdf, page 10.
const uint32_t base_family = (eax >> 8) & 15;
const uint32_t base_model = (eax >> 4) & 15;
uint32_t family = base_family;
uint32_t model = base_model;
if (base_family == 0xf) {
const uint32_t ext_family = (eax >> 20) & 255;
family += ext_family;
const uint32_t ext_model = (eax >> 16) & 15;
model |= ext_model << 4;
}
if (family < 0x17 || (family == 0x17 && 0x70 <= model && model <= 0x7f)) {
// Disable RDRAND on AMD families before 0x17 (Zen) due to reported
// failures after suspend.
@@ -208,14 +209,6 @@ void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) {
// Reserved bit #30 is repurposed to signal an Intel CPU.
if (is_intel) {
edx |= (1u << 30);
// Clear the XSAVE bit on Knights Landing to mimic Silvermont. This enables
// some Silvermont-specific codepaths which perform better. See OpenSSL
// commit 64d92d74985ebb3d0be58a9718f9e080a14a8e7f.
if ((eax & 0x0fff0ff0) == 0x00050670 /* Knights Landing */ ||
(eax & 0x0fff0ff0) == 0x00080650 /* Knights Mill (per SDE) */) {
ecx &= ~(1u << 26);
}
} else {
edx &= ~(1u << 30);
}
@@ -235,24 +228,67 @@ void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) {
ecx &= ~(1u << 28); // AVX
ecx &= ~(1u << 12); // FMA
ecx &= ~(1u << 11); // AMD XOP
// Clear AVX2 and AVX512* bits.
//
// TODO(davidben): Should bits 17 and 26-28 also be cleared? Upstream
// doesn't clear those.
extended_features[0] &=
~((1u << 5) | (1u << 16) | (1u << 21) | (1u << 30) | (1u << 31));
extended_features[0] &= ~(1u << 5); // AVX2
extended_features[1] &= ~(1u << 9); // VAES
extended_features[1] &= ~(1u << 10); // VPCLMULQDQ
}
// See Intel manual, volume 1, section 15.2.
// See Intel manual, volume 1, sections 15.2 ("Detection of AVX-512 Foundation
// Instructions") through 15.4 ("Detection of Intel AVX-512 Instruction Groups
// Operating at 256 and 128-bit Vector Lengths").
if ((xcr0 & 0xe6) != 0xe6) {
// Clear AVX512F. Note we don't touch other AVX512 extensions because they
// can be used with YMM.
extended_features[0] &= ~(1u << 16);
// Without XCR0.111xx11x, no AVX512 feature can be used. This includes ZMM
// registers, masking, SIMD registers 16-31 (even if accessed as YMM or
// XMM), and EVEX-coded instructions (even on YMM or XMM). Even if only
// XCR0.ZMM_Hi256 is missing, it isn't valid to use AVX512 features on
// shorter vectors, since AVX512 ties everything to the availability of
// 512-bit vectors. See the above-mentioned sections of the Intel manual,
// which say that *all* these XCR0 bits must be checked even when just using
// 128-bit or 256-bit vectors, and also volume 2a section 2.7.11 ("#UD
// Equations for EVEX") which says that all EVEX-coded instructions raise an
// undefined-instruction exception if any of these XCR0 bits is zero.
//
// AVX10 fixes this by reorganizing the features that used to be part of
// "AVX512" and allowing them to be used independently of 512-bit support.
// TODO: add AVX10 detection.
extended_features[0] &= ~(1u << 16); // AVX512F
extended_features[0] &= ~(1u << 17); // AVX512DQ
extended_features[0] &= ~(1u << 21); // AVX512IFMA
extended_features[0] &= ~(1u << 26); // AVX512PF
extended_features[0] &= ~(1u << 27); // AVX512ER
extended_features[0] &= ~(1u << 28); // AVX512CD
extended_features[0] &= ~(1u << 30); // AVX512BW
extended_features[0] &= ~(1u << 31); // AVX512VL
extended_features[1] &= ~(1u << 1); // AVX512VBMI
extended_features[1] &= ~(1u << 6); // AVX512VBMI2
extended_features[1] &= ~(1u << 11); // AVX512VNNI
extended_features[1] &= ~(1u << 12); // AVX512BITALG
extended_features[1] &= ~(1u << 14); // AVX512VPOPCNTDQ
}
// Disable ADX instructions on Knights Landing. See OpenSSL commit
// 64d92d74985ebb3d0be58a9718f9e080a14a8e7f.
if ((ecx & (1u << 26)) == 0) {
extended_features[0] &= ~(1u << 19);
// Repurpose the bit for the removed MPX feature to indicate when using zmm
// registers should be avoided even when they are supported. (When set, AVX512
// features can still be used, but only using ymm or xmm registers.) Skylake
// suffered from severe downclocking when zmm registers were used, which
// affected unrelated code running on the system, making zmm registers not too
// useful outside of benchmarks. The situation improved significantly by Ice
// Lake, but a small amount of downclocking remained. (See
// https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/e8ce1146-3952-6977-1d0e-a22758e58914@intel.com/)
// We take a conservative approach of not allowing zmm registers until after
// Ice Lake and Tiger Lake, i.e. until Sapphire Rapids on the server side.
//
// AMD CPUs, which support AVX512 starting with Zen 4, have not been reported
// to have any downclocking problem when zmm registers are used.
if (is_intel && family == 6 &&
(model == 85 || // Skylake, Cascade Lake, Cooper Lake (server)
model == 106 || // Ice Lake (server)
model == 108 || // Ice Lake (micro server)
model == 125 || // Ice Lake (client)
model == 126 || // Ice Lake (mobile)
model == 140 || // Tiger Lake (mobile)
model == 141)) { // Tiger Lake (client)
extended_features[0] |= 1u << 14;
} else {
extended_features[0] &= ~(1u << 14);
}
OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] = edx;
+16 -59
View File
@@ -16,31 +16,14 @@
#include <assert.h>
#include "fipsmodule/rand/fork_detect.h"
#include "fipsmodule/rand/internal.h"
#include "bcm_support.h"
#include "internal.h"
static_assert(sizeof(ossl_ssize_t) == sizeof(size_t),
"ossl_ssize_t should be the same size as size_t");
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP) && \
(defined(OPENSSL_X86) || defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) || \
defined(OPENSSL_ARM) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64))
// x86, x86_64, and the ARMs need to record the result of a cpuid/getauxval call
// for the asm to work correctly, unless compiled without asm code.
#define NEED_CPUID
#else
// Otherwise, don't emit a static initialiser.
#if !defined(BORINGSSL_NO_STATIC_INITIALIZER)
#define BORINGSSL_NO_STATIC_INITIALIZER
#endif
#endif // !NO_ASM && !STATIC_ARMCAP && (X86 || X86_64 || ARM || AARCH64)
// Our assembly does not use the GOT to reference symbols, which means
// references to visible symbols will often require a TEXTREL. This is
@@ -78,6 +61,11 @@ HIDDEN uint8_t BORINGSSL_function_hit[7] = {0};
// This value must be explicitly initialized to zero. See similar comment above.
HIDDEN uint32_t OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[4] = {0};
uint32_t OPENSSL_get_ia32cap(int idx) {
OPENSSL_init_cpuid();
return OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[idx];
}
#elif defined(OPENSSL_ARM) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_arm_arch.h>
@@ -116,54 +104,24 @@ HIDDEN uint32_t OPENSSL_armcap_P =
HIDDEN uint32_t OPENSSL_armcap_P = 0;
uint32_t *OPENSSL_get_armcap_pointer_for_test(void) {
OPENSSL_init_cpuid();
return &OPENSSL_armcap_P;
}
#endif
uint32_t OPENSSL_get_armcap(void) {
OPENSSL_init_cpuid();
return OPENSSL_armcap_P;
}
#endif
#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
// In FIPS mode, the power-on self-test function calls |CRYPTO_library_init|
// because we have to ensure that CPUID detection occurs first.
#define BORINGSSL_NO_STATIC_INITIALIZER
#endif
#if defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS) && !defined(BORINGSSL_NO_STATIC_INITIALIZER)
#define OPENSSL_CDECL __cdecl
#else
#define OPENSSL_CDECL
#endif
#if defined(BORINGSSL_NO_STATIC_INITIALIZER)
static CRYPTO_once_t once = CRYPTO_ONCE_INIT;
#elif defined(_MSC_VER)
#pragma section(".CRT$XCU", read)
static void __cdecl do_library_init(void);
__declspec(allocate(".CRT$XCU")) void(*library_init_constructor)(void) =
do_library_init;
#else
static void do_library_init(void) __attribute__ ((constructor));
#endif
// do_library_init is the actual initialization function. If
// BORINGSSL_NO_STATIC_INITIALIZER isn't defined, this is set as a static
// initializer. Otherwise, it is called by CRYPTO_library_init.
static void OPENSSL_CDECL do_library_init(void) {
// WARNING: this function may only configure the capability variables. See the
// note above about the linker bug.
#if defined(NEED_CPUID)
OPENSSL_cpuid_setup();
static CRYPTO_once_t once = CRYPTO_ONCE_INIT;
void OPENSSL_init_cpuid(void) { CRYPTO_once(&once, OPENSSL_cpuid_setup); }
#endif
}
void CRYPTO_library_init(void) {
// TODO(davidben): It would be tidier if this build knob could be replaced
// with an internal lazy-init mechanism that would handle things correctly
// in-library. https://crbug.com/542879
#if defined(BORINGSSL_NO_STATIC_INITIALIZER)
CRYPTO_once(&once, do_library_init);
#endif
}
void CRYPTO_library_init(void) {}
int CRYPTO_is_confidential_build(void) {
#if defined(BORINGSSL_CONFIDENTIAL)
@@ -183,7 +141,7 @@ int CRYPTO_has_asm(void) {
void CRYPTO_pre_sandbox_init(void) {
// Read from /proc/cpuinfo if needed.
CRYPTO_library_init();
OPENSSL_init_cpuid();
// Open /dev/urandom if needed.
CRYPTO_init_sysrand();
// Set up MADV_WIPEONFORK state if needed.
@@ -224,7 +182,6 @@ int ENGINE_register_all_complete(void) { return 1; }
void OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules(void) {}
int OPENSSL_init_crypto(uint64_t opts, const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings) {
CRYPTO_library_init();
return 1;
}
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ typedef uint64_t fe_limb_t;
#define assert_fe(f) \
do { \
for (unsigned _assert_fe_i = 0; _assert_fe_i < 5; _assert_fe_i++) { \
assert(f[_assert_fe_i] <= UINT64_C(0x8cccccccccccc)); \
declassify_assert(f[_assert_fe_i] <= UINT64_C(0x8cccccccccccc)); \
} \
} while (0)
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ typedef uint64_t fe_limb_t;
#define assert_fe_loose(f) \
do { \
for (unsigned _assert_fe_i = 0; _assert_fe_i < 5; _assert_fe_i++) { \
assert(f[_assert_fe_i] <= UINT64_C(0x1a666666666664)); \
declassify_assert(f[_assert_fe_i] <= UINT64_C(0x1a666666666664)); \
} \
} while (0)
@@ -120,8 +120,8 @@ typedef uint32_t fe_limb_t;
#define assert_fe(f) \
do { \
for (unsigned _assert_fe_i = 0; _assert_fe_i < 10; _assert_fe_i++) { \
assert(f[_assert_fe_i] <= \
((_assert_fe_i & 1) ? 0x2333333u : 0x4666666u)); \
declassify_assert(f[_assert_fe_i] <= \
((_assert_fe_i & 1) ? 0x2333333u : 0x4666666u)); \
} \
} while (0)
@@ -138,8 +138,8 @@ typedef uint32_t fe_limb_t;
#define assert_fe_loose(f) \
do { \
for (unsigned _assert_fe_i = 0; _assert_fe_i < 10; _assert_fe_i++) { \
assert(f[_assert_fe_i] <= \
((_assert_fe_i & 1) ? 0x6999999u : 0xd333332u)); \
declassify_assert(f[_assert_fe_i] <= \
((_assert_fe_i & 1) ? 0x6999999u : 0xd333332u)); \
} \
} while (0)
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static_assert(sizeof(fe) == sizeof(fe_limb_t) * FE_NUM_LIMBS,
static void fe_frombytes_strict(fe *h, const uint8_t s[32]) {
// |fiat_25519_from_bytes| requires the top-most bit be clear.
assert((s[31] & 0x80) == 0);
declassify_assert((s[31] & 0x80) == 0);
fiat_25519_from_bytes(h->v, s);
assert_fe(h->v);
}
@@ -1906,6 +1906,8 @@ int ED25519_sign(uint8_t out_sig[64], const uint8_t *message,
x25519_sc_reduce(hram);
sc_muladd(out_sig + 32, hram, az, nonce);
// The signature is computed from the private key, but is public.
CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(out_sig, 64);
return 1;
}
@@ -1983,6 +1985,8 @@ void ED25519_keypair_from_seed(uint8_t out_public_key[32],
ge_p3 A;
x25519_ge_scalarmult_base(&A, az);
ge_p3_tobytes(out_public_key, &A);
// The public key is derived from the private key, but it is public.
CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(out_public_key, 32);
OPENSSL_memcpy(out_private_key, seed, 32);
OPENSSL_memcpy(out_private_key + 32, out_public_key, 32);
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ void x25519_NEON(uint8_t out[32], const uint8_t scalar[32],
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL) && \
defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__x86_64__)
defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__x86_64__) && !defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
#define BORINGSSL_FE25519_ADX
// fiat_curve25519_adx_mul is defined in
@@ -272,12 +272,11 @@ static const uint8_t kSpakeMSmallPrecomp[15 * 2 * 32] = {
SPAKE2_CTX *SPAKE2_CTX_new(enum spake2_role_t my_role,
const uint8_t *my_name, size_t my_name_len,
const uint8_t *their_name, size_t their_name_len) {
SPAKE2_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SPAKE2_CTX));
SPAKE2_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(SPAKE2_CTX));
if (ctx == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(SPAKE2_CTX));
ctx->my_role = my_role;
CBS my_name_cbs, their_name_cbs;
+150 -63
View File
@@ -61,6 +61,91 @@
#include "internal.h"
/* IP and FP
* The problem is more of a geometric problem that random bit fiddling.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 62 54 46 38 30 22 14 6
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 60 52 44 36 28 20 12 4
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 58 50 42 34 26 18 10 2
24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 to 56 48 40 32 24 16 8 0
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 63 55 47 39 31 23 15 7
40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 61 53 45 37 29 21 13 5
48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 59 51 43 35 27 19 11 3
56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 57 49 41 33 25 17 9 1
The output has been subject to swaps of the form
0 1 -> 3 1 but the odd and even bits have been put into
2 3 2 0
different words. The main trick is to remember that
t=((l>>size)^r)&(mask);
r^=t;
l^=(t<<size);
can be used to swap and move bits between words.
So l = 0 1 2 3 r = 16 17 18 19
4 5 6 7 20 21 22 23
8 9 10 11 24 25 26 27
12 13 14 15 28 29 30 31
becomes (for size == 2 and mask == 0x3333)
t = 2^16 3^17 -- -- l = 0 1 16 17 r = 2 3 18 19
6^20 7^21 -- -- 4 5 20 21 6 7 22 23
10^24 11^25 -- -- 8 9 24 25 10 11 24 25
14^28 15^29 -- -- 12 13 28 29 14 15 28 29
Thanks for hints from Richard Outerbridge - he told me IP&FP
could be done in 15 xor, 10 shifts and 5 ands.
When I finally started to think of the problem in 2D
I first got ~42 operations without xors. When I remembered
how to use xors :-) I got it to its final state.
*/
#define PERM_OP(a, b, t, n, m) \
do { \
(t) = ((((a) >> (n)) ^ (b)) & (m)); \
(b) ^= (t); \
(a) ^= ((t) << (n)); \
} while (0)
#define IP(l, r) \
do { \
uint32_t tt; \
PERM_OP(r, l, tt, 4, 0x0f0f0f0fL); \
PERM_OP(l, r, tt, 16, 0x0000ffffL); \
PERM_OP(r, l, tt, 2, 0x33333333L); \
PERM_OP(l, r, tt, 8, 0x00ff00ffL); \
PERM_OP(r, l, tt, 1, 0x55555555L); \
} while (0)
#define FP(l, r) \
do { \
uint32_t tt; \
PERM_OP(l, r, tt, 1, 0x55555555L); \
PERM_OP(r, l, tt, 8, 0x00ff00ffL); \
PERM_OP(l, r, tt, 2, 0x33333333L); \
PERM_OP(r, l, tt, 16, 0x0000ffffL); \
PERM_OP(l, r, tt, 4, 0x0f0f0f0fL); \
} while (0)
#define LOAD_DATA(ks, R, S, u, t, E0, E1) \
do { \
(u) = (R) ^ (ks)->subkeys[S][0]; \
(t) = (R) ^ (ks)->subkeys[S][1]; \
} while (0)
#define D_ENCRYPT(ks, LL, R, S) \
do { \
LOAD_DATA(ks, R, S, u, t, E0, E1); \
t = CRYPTO_rotr_u32(t, 4); \
(LL) ^= \
DES_SPtrans[0][(u >> 2L) & 0x3f] ^ DES_SPtrans[2][(u >> 10L) & 0x3f] ^ \
DES_SPtrans[4][(u >> 18L) & 0x3f] ^ \
DES_SPtrans[6][(u >> 26L) & 0x3f] ^ DES_SPtrans[1][(t >> 2L) & 0x3f] ^ \
DES_SPtrans[3][(t >> 10L) & 0x3f] ^ \
DES_SPtrans[5][(t >> 18L) & 0x3f] ^ DES_SPtrans[7][(t >> 26L) & 0x3f]; \
} while (0)
#define ITERATIONS 16
#define HALF_ITERATIONS 8
static const uint32_t des_skb[8][64] = {
{ // for C bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 1 2 3 4 5 6
0x00000000, 0x00000010, 0x20000000, 0x20000010, 0x00010000,
@@ -294,13 +379,17 @@ static const uint32_t DES_SPtrans[8][64] = {
(a) = (a) ^ (t) ^ ((t) >> (16 - (n))))
void DES_set_key(const DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule) {
DES_set_key_ex(key->bytes, schedule);
}
void DES_set_key_ex(const uint8_t key[8], DES_key_schedule *schedule) {
static const int shifts2[16] = {0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0};
uint32_t c, d, t, s, t2;
const uint8_t *in;
int i;
in = key->bytes;
in = key;
c2l(in, c);
c2l(in, d);
@@ -378,7 +467,8 @@ void DES_set_odd_parity(DES_cblock *key) {
}
}
static void DES_encrypt1(uint32_t *data, const DES_key_schedule *ks, int enc) {
static void DES_encrypt1(uint32_t data[2], const DES_key_schedule *ks,
int enc) {
uint32_t l, r, t, u;
r = data[0];
@@ -442,7 +532,8 @@ static void DES_encrypt1(uint32_t *data, const DES_key_schedule *ks, int enc) {
data[1] = r;
}
static void DES_encrypt2(uint32_t *data, const DES_key_schedule *ks, int enc) {
static void DES_encrypt2(uint32_t data[2], const DES_key_schedule *ks,
int enc) {
uint32_t l, r, t, u;
r = data[0];
@@ -499,7 +590,7 @@ static void DES_encrypt2(uint32_t *data, const DES_key_schedule *ks, int enc) {
data[1] = CRYPTO_rotr_u32(r, 3);
}
void DES_encrypt3(uint32_t *data, const DES_key_schedule *ks1,
void DES_encrypt3(uint32_t data[2], const DES_key_schedule *ks1,
const DES_key_schedule *ks2, const DES_key_schedule *ks3) {
uint32_t l, r;
@@ -508,9 +599,9 @@ void DES_encrypt3(uint32_t *data, const DES_key_schedule *ks1,
IP(l, r);
data[0] = l;
data[1] = r;
DES_encrypt2((uint32_t *)data, ks1, DES_ENCRYPT);
DES_encrypt2((uint32_t *)data, ks2, DES_DECRYPT);
DES_encrypt2((uint32_t *)data, ks3, DES_ENCRYPT);
DES_encrypt2(data, ks1, DES_ENCRYPT);
DES_encrypt2(data, ks2, DES_DECRYPT);
DES_encrypt2(data, ks3, DES_ENCRYPT);
l = data[0];
r = data[1];
FP(r, l);
@@ -518,7 +609,7 @@ void DES_encrypt3(uint32_t *data, const DES_key_schedule *ks1,
data[1] = r;
}
void DES_decrypt3(uint32_t *data, const DES_key_schedule *ks1,
void DES_decrypt3(uint32_t data[2], const DES_key_schedule *ks1,
const DES_key_schedule *ks2, const DES_key_schedule *ks3) {
uint32_t l, r;
@@ -527,9 +618,9 @@ void DES_decrypt3(uint32_t *data, const DES_key_schedule *ks1,
IP(l, r);
data[0] = l;
data[1] = r;
DES_encrypt2((uint32_t *)data, ks3, DES_DECRYPT);
DES_encrypt2((uint32_t *)data, ks2, DES_ENCRYPT);
DES_encrypt2((uint32_t *)data, ks1, DES_DECRYPT);
DES_encrypt2(data, ks3, DES_DECRYPT);
DES_encrypt2(data, ks2, DES_ENCRYPT);
DES_encrypt2(data, ks1, DES_DECRYPT);
l = data[0];
r = data[1];
FP(r, l);
@@ -539,32 +630,34 @@ void DES_decrypt3(uint32_t *data, const DES_key_schedule *ks1,
void DES_ecb_encrypt(const DES_cblock *in_block, DES_cblock *out_block,
const DES_key_schedule *schedule, int is_encrypt) {
uint32_t l;
uint32_t ll[2];
const uint8_t *in = in_block->bytes;
uint8_t *out = out_block->bytes;
DES_ecb_encrypt_ex(in_block->bytes, out_block->bytes, schedule, is_encrypt);
}
c2l(in, l);
ll[0] = l;
c2l(in, l);
ll[1] = l;
void DES_ecb_encrypt_ex(const uint8_t in[8], uint8_t out[8],
const DES_key_schedule *schedule, int is_encrypt) {
uint32_t ll[2];
ll[0] = CRYPTO_load_u32_le(in);
ll[1] = CRYPTO_load_u32_le(in + 4);
DES_encrypt1(ll, schedule, is_encrypt);
l = ll[0];
l2c(l, out);
l = ll[1];
l2c(l, out);
ll[0] = ll[1] = 0;
CRYPTO_store_u32_le(out, ll[0]);
CRYPTO_store_u32_le(out + 4, ll[1]);
}
void DES_ncbc_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
const DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec,
int enc) {
DES_ncbc_encrypt_ex(in, out, len, schedule, ivec->bytes, enc);
}
void DES_ncbc_encrypt_ex(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
const DES_key_schedule *schedule, uint8_t ivec[8],
int enc) {
uint32_t tin0, tin1;
uint32_t tout0, tout1, xor0, xor1;
uint32_t tin[2];
unsigned char *iv;
iv = ivec->bytes;
iv = ivec;
if (enc) {
c2l(iv, tout0);
@@ -576,7 +669,7 @@ void DES_ncbc_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
tin[0] = tin0;
tin1 ^= tout1;
tin[1] = tin1;
DES_encrypt1((uint32_t *)tin, schedule, DES_ENCRYPT);
DES_encrypt1(tin, schedule, DES_ENCRYPT);
tout0 = tin[0];
l2c(tout0, out);
tout1 = tin[1];
@@ -588,13 +681,13 @@ void DES_ncbc_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
tin[0] = tin0;
tin1 ^= tout1;
tin[1] = tin1;
DES_encrypt1((uint32_t *)tin, schedule, DES_ENCRYPT);
DES_encrypt1(tin, schedule, DES_ENCRYPT);
tout0 = tin[0];
l2c(tout0, out);
tout1 = tin[1];
l2c(tout1, out);
}
iv = ivec->bytes;
iv = ivec;
l2c(tout0, iv);
l2c(tout1, iv);
} else {
@@ -605,7 +698,7 @@ void DES_ncbc_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
tin[0] = tin0;
c2l(in, tin1);
tin[1] = tin1;
DES_encrypt1((uint32_t *)tin, schedule, DES_DECRYPT);
DES_encrypt1(tin, schedule, DES_DECRYPT);
tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0;
tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1;
l2c(tout0, out);
@@ -618,14 +711,14 @@ void DES_ncbc_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
tin[0] = tin0;
c2l(in, tin1);
tin[1] = tin1;
DES_encrypt1((uint32_t *)tin, schedule, DES_DECRYPT);
DES_encrypt1(tin, schedule, DES_DECRYPT);
tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0;
tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1;
l2cn(tout0, tout1, out, len);
xor0 = tin0;
xor1 = tin1;
}
iv = ivec->bytes;
iv = ivec;
l2c(xor0, iv);
l2c(xor1, iv);
}
@@ -635,24 +728,23 @@ void DES_ncbc_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
void DES_ecb3_encrypt(const DES_cblock *input, DES_cblock *output,
const DES_key_schedule *ks1, const DES_key_schedule *ks2,
const DES_key_schedule *ks3, int enc) {
uint32_t l0, l1;
uint32_t ll[2];
const uint8_t *in = input->bytes;
uint8_t *out = output->bytes;
DES_ecb3_encrypt_ex(input->bytes, output->bytes, ks1, ks2, ks3, enc);
}
c2l(in, l0);
c2l(in, l1);
ll[0] = l0;
ll[1] = l1;
void DES_ecb3_encrypt_ex(const uint8_t in[8], uint8_t out[8],
const DES_key_schedule *ks1,
const DES_key_schedule *ks2,
const DES_key_schedule *ks3, int enc) {
uint32_t ll[2];
ll[0] = CRYPTO_load_u32_le(in);
ll[1] = CRYPTO_load_u32_le(in + 4);
if (enc) {
DES_encrypt3(ll, ks1, ks2, ks3);
} else {
DES_decrypt3(ll, ks1, ks2, ks3);
}
l0 = ll[0];
l1 = ll[1];
l2c(l0, out);
l2c(l1, out);
CRYPTO_store_u32_le(out, ll[0]);
CRYPTO_store_u32_le(out + 4, ll[1]);
}
void DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
@@ -660,12 +752,20 @@ void DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
const DES_key_schedule *ks2,
const DES_key_schedule *ks3, DES_cblock *ivec,
int enc) {
DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt_ex(in, out, len, ks1, ks2, ks3, ivec->bytes, enc);
}
void DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt_ex(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
const DES_key_schedule *ks1,
const DES_key_schedule *ks2,
const DES_key_schedule *ks3, uint8_t ivec[8],
int enc) {
uint32_t tin0, tin1;
uint32_t tout0, tout1, xor0, xor1;
uint32_t tin[2];
uint8_t *iv;
iv = ivec->bytes;
iv = ivec;
if (enc) {
c2l(iv, tout0);
@@ -678,7 +778,7 @@ void DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
tin[0] = tin0;
tin[1] = tin1;
DES_encrypt3((uint32_t *)tin, ks1, ks2, ks3);
DES_encrypt3(tin, ks1, ks2, ks3);
tout0 = tin[0];
tout1 = tin[1];
@@ -692,14 +792,14 @@ void DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
tin[0] = tin0;
tin[1] = tin1;
DES_encrypt3((uint32_t *)tin, ks1, ks2, ks3);
DES_encrypt3(tin, ks1, ks2, ks3);
tout0 = tin[0];
tout1 = tin[1];
l2c(tout0, out);
l2c(tout1, out);
}
iv = ivec->bytes;
iv = ivec;
l2c(tout0, iv);
l2c(tout1, iv);
} else {
@@ -716,7 +816,7 @@ void DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
tin[0] = tin0;
tin[1] = tin1;
DES_decrypt3((uint32_t *)tin, ks1, ks2, ks3);
DES_decrypt3(tin, ks1, ks2, ks3);
tout0 = tin[0];
tout1 = tin[1];
@@ -736,7 +836,7 @@ void DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
tin[0] = tin0;
tin[1] = tin1;
DES_decrypt3((uint32_t *)tin, ks1, ks2, ks3);
DES_decrypt3(tin, ks1, ks2, ks3);
tout0 = tin[0];
tout1 = tin[1];
@@ -747,7 +847,7 @@ void DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
xor1 = t1;
}
iv = ivec->bytes;
iv = ivec;
l2c(xor0, iv);
l2c(xor1, iv);
}
@@ -769,16 +869,3 @@ void DES_ede2_cbc_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
void DES_set_key_unchecked(const DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule) {
DES_set_key(key, schedule);
}
#undef HPERM_OP
#undef c2l
#undef l2c
#undef c2ln
#undef l2cn
#undef PERM_OP
#undef IP
#undef FP
#undef LOAD_DATA
#undef D_ENCRYPT
#undef ITERATIONS
#undef HALF_ITERATIONS
+31 -78
View File
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
#define OPENSSL_HEADER_DES_INTERNAL_H
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_base.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_des.h>
#include "../internal.h"
@@ -66,6 +67,9 @@ extern "C" {
#endif
// TODO(davidben): Ideally these macros would be replaced with
// |CRYPTO_load_u32_le| and |CRYPTO_store_u32_le|.
#define c2l(c, l) \
do { \
(l) = ((uint32_t)(*((c)++))); \
@@ -145,90 +149,39 @@ extern "C" {
} \
} while (0)
/* IP and FP
* The problem is more of a geometric problem that random bit fiddling.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 62 54 46 38 30 22 14 6
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 60 52 44 36 28 20 12 4
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 58 50 42 34 26 18 10 2
24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 to 56 48 40 32 24 16 8 0
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 63 55 47 39 31 23 15 7
40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 61 53 45 37 29 21 13 5
48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 59 51 43 35 27 19 11 3
56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 57 49 41 33 25 17 9 1
// Correctly-typed versions of DES functions.
//
// See https://crbug.com/boringssl/683.
The output has been subject to swaps of the form
0 1 -> 3 1 but the odd and even bits have been put into
2 3 2 0
different words. The main trick is to remember that
t=((l>>size)^r)&(mask);
r^=t;
l^=(t<<size);
can be used to swap and move bits between words.
void DES_set_key_ex(const uint8_t key[8], DES_key_schedule *schedule);
void DES_ecb_encrypt_ex(const uint8_t in[8], uint8_t out[8],
const DES_key_schedule *schedule, int is_encrypt);
void DES_ncbc_encrypt_ex(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
const DES_key_schedule *schedule, uint8_t ivec[8],
int enc);
void DES_ecb3_encrypt_ex(const uint8_t input[8], uint8_t output[8],
const DES_key_schedule *ks1,
const DES_key_schedule *ks2,
const DES_key_schedule *ks3, int enc);
void DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt_ex(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
const DES_key_schedule *ks1,
const DES_key_schedule *ks2,
const DES_key_schedule *ks3, uint8_t ivec[8],
int enc);
So l = 0 1 2 3 r = 16 17 18 19
4 5 6 7 20 21 22 23
8 9 10 11 24 25 26 27
12 13 14 15 28 29 30 31
becomes (for size == 2 and mask == 0x3333)
t = 2^16 3^17 -- -- l = 0 1 16 17 r = 2 3 18 19
6^20 7^21 -- -- 4 5 20 21 6 7 22 23
10^24 11^25 -- -- 8 9 24 25 10 11 24 25
14^28 15^29 -- -- 12 13 28 29 14 15 28 29
Thanks for hints from Richard Outerbridge - he told me IP&FP
could be done in 15 xor, 10 shifts and 5 ands.
When I finally started to think of the problem in 2D
I first got ~42 operations without xors. When I remembered
how to use xors :-) I got it to its final state.
*/
#define PERM_OP(a, b, t, n, m) \
do { \
(t) = ((((a) >> (n)) ^ (b)) & (m)); \
(b) ^= (t); \
(a) ^= ((t) << (n)); \
} while (0)
// Private functions.
//
// These functions are only exported for use in |decrepit|.
#define IP(l, r) \
do { \
uint32_t tt; \
PERM_OP(r, l, tt, 4, 0x0f0f0f0fL); \
PERM_OP(l, r, tt, 16, 0x0000ffffL); \
PERM_OP(r, l, tt, 2, 0x33333333L); \
PERM_OP(l, r, tt, 8, 0x00ff00ffL); \
PERM_OP(r, l, tt, 1, 0x55555555L); \
} while (0)
OPENSSL_EXPORT void DES_decrypt3(uint32_t data[2], const DES_key_schedule *ks1,
const DES_key_schedule *ks2,
const DES_key_schedule *ks3);
#define FP(l, r) \
do { \
uint32_t tt; \
PERM_OP(l, r, tt, 1, 0x55555555L); \
PERM_OP(r, l, tt, 8, 0x00ff00ffL); \
PERM_OP(l, r, tt, 2, 0x33333333L); \
PERM_OP(r, l, tt, 16, 0x0000ffffL); \
PERM_OP(l, r, tt, 4, 0x0f0f0f0fL); \
} while (0)
#define LOAD_DATA(ks, R, S, u, t, E0, E1) \
do { \
(u) = (R) ^ (ks)->subkeys[S][0]; \
(t) = (R) ^ (ks)->subkeys[S][1]; \
} while (0)
#define D_ENCRYPT(ks, LL, R, S) \
do { \
LOAD_DATA(ks, R, S, u, t, E0, E1); \
t = CRYPTO_rotr_u32(t, 4); \
(LL) ^= \
DES_SPtrans[0][(u >> 2L) & 0x3f] ^ DES_SPtrans[2][(u >> 10L) & 0x3f] ^ \
DES_SPtrans[4][(u >> 18L) & 0x3f] ^ \
DES_SPtrans[6][(u >> 26L) & 0x3f] ^ DES_SPtrans[1][(t >> 2L) & 0x3f] ^ \
DES_SPtrans[3][(t >> 10L) & 0x3f] ^ \
DES_SPtrans[5][(t >> 18L) & 0x3f] ^ DES_SPtrans[7][(t >> 26L) & 0x3f]; \
} while (0)
#define ITERATIONS 16
#define HALF_ITERATIONS 8
OPENSSL_EXPORT void DES_encrypt3(uint32_t data[2], const DES_key_schedule *ks1,
const DES_key_schedule *ks2,
const DES_key_schedule *ks3);
#if defined(__cplusplus)
@@ -110,6 +110,10 @@ DH *DH_parse_parameters(CBS *cbs) {
goto err;
}
if (!dh_check_params_fast(ret)) {
goto err;
}
return ret;
err:
@@ -337,6 +337,11 @@ int DH_generate_parameters_ex(DH *dh, int prime_bits, int generator,
// It's just as OK (and in some sense better) to use a generator of the
// order-q subgroup.
if (prime_bits <= 0 || prime_bits > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
BIGNUM *t1, *t2;
int g, ok = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_blake2.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_bytestring.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_obj.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_md4.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_md5.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_nid.h>
#include "../asn1/internal.h"
@@ -220,6 +222,7 @@ int EVP_marshal_digest_algorithm(CBB *cbb, const EVP_MD *md) {
return 0;
}
// TODO(crbug.com/boringssl/710): Is this correct? See RFC 4055, section 2.1.
if (!CBB_add_asn1(&algorithm, &null, CBS_ASN1_NULL) ||
!CBB_flush(cbb)) {
return 0;
@@ -263,3 +266,90 @@ static const EVP_MD evp_md_blake2b256 = {
};
const EVP_MD *EVP_blake2b256(void) { return &evp_md_blake2b256; }
static void md4_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) {
BSSL_CHECK(MD4_Init(ctx->md_data));
}
static void md4_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) {
BSSL_CHECK(MD4_Update(ctx->md_data, data, count));
}
static void md4_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out) {
BSSL_CHECK(MD4_Final(out, ctx->md_data));
}
static const EVP_MD evp_md_md4 = {
NID_md4,
MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH,
0,
md4_init,
md4_update,
md4_final,
64,
sizeof(MD4_CTX),
};
const EVP_MD *EVP_md4(void) { return &evp_md_md4; }
static void md5_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) {
BSSL_CHECK(MD5_Init(ctx->md_data));
}
static void md5_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) {
BSSL_CHECK(MD5_Update(ctx->md_data, data, count));
}
static void md5_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out) {
BSSL_CHECK(MD5_Final(out, ctx->md_data));
}
static const EVP_MD evp_md_md5 = {
NID_md5,
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
0,
md5_init,
md5_update,
md5_final,
64,
sizeof(MD5_CTX),
};
const EVP_MD *EVP_md5(void) { return &evp_md_md5; }
typedef struct {
MD5_CTX md5;
SHA_CTX sha1;
} MD5_SHA1_CTX;
static void md5_sha1_init(EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx) {
MD5_SHA1_CTX *ctx = md_ctx->md_data;
BSSL_CHECK(MD5_Init(&ctx->md5) && SHA1_Init(&ctx->sha1));
}
static void md5_sha1_update(EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx, const void *data,
size_t count) {
MD5_SHA1_CTX *ctx = md_ctx->md_data;
BSSL_CHECK(MD5_Update(&ctx->md5, data, count) &&
SHA1_Update(&ctx->sha1, data, count));
}
static void md5_sha1_final(EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx, uint8_t *out) {
MD5_SHA1_CTX *ctx = md_ctx->md_data;
BSSL_CHECK(MD5_Final(out, &ctx->md5) &&
SHA1_Final(out + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, &ctx->sha1));
}
const EVP_MD evp_md_md5_sha1 = {
NID_md5_sha1,
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
0,
md5_sha1_init,
md5_sha1_update,
md5_sha1_final,
64,
sizeof(MD5_SHA1_CTX),
};
const EVP_MD *EVP_md5_sha1(void) { return &evp_md_md5_sha1; }
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2023, Google LLC
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_DILITHIUM_INTERNAL_H
#define OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_DILITHIUM_INTERNAL_H
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_base.h>
#include <experimental/CCryptoBoringSSL_dilithium.h>
#if defined(__cplusplus)
extern "C" {
#endif
// DILITHIUM_GENERATE_KEY_ENTROPY is the number of bytes of uniformly random
// entropy necessary to generate a key pair.
#define DILITHIUM_GENERATE_KEY_ENTROPY 32
// DILITHIUM_SIGNATURE_RANDOMIZER_BYTES is the number of bytes of uniformly
// random entropy necessary to generate a signature in randomized mode.
#define DILITHIUM_SIGNATURE_RANDOMIZER_BYTES 32
// DILITHIUM_generate_key_external_entropy generates a public/private key pair
// using the given seed, writes the encoded public key to
// |out_encoded_public_key| and sets |out_private_key| to the private key,
// returning 1 on success and 0 on failure. Returns 1 on success and 0 on
// failure.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int DILITHIUM_generate_key_external_entropy(
uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[DILITHIUM_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
struct DILITHIUM_private_key *out_private_key,
const uint8_t entropy[DILITHIUM_GENERATE_KEY_ENTROPY]);
// DILITHIUM_sign_deterministic generates a signature for the message |msg| of
// length |msg_len| using |private_key| following the deterministic algorithm,
// and writes the encoded signature to |out_encoded_signature|. Returns 1 on
// success and 0 on failure.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int DILITHIUM_sign_deterministic(
uint8_t out_encoded_signature[DILITHIUM_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
const struct DILITHIUM_private_key *private_key, const uint8_t *msg,
size_t msg_len);
#if defined(__cplusplus)
} // extern C
#endif
#endif // OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_DILITHIUM_INTERNAL_H
+39 -36
View File
@@ -88,18 +88,14 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(const DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **out_kinv,
static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT;
DSA *DSA_new(void) {
DSA *dsa = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DSA));
DSA *dsa = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(DSA));
if (dsa == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
OPENSSL_memset(dsa, 0, sizeof(DSA));
dsa->references = 1;
CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&dsa->method_mont_lock);
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&dsa->ex_data);
return dsa;
}
@@ -212,6 +208,11 @@ int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g) {
int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *dsa, unsigned bits, const uint8_t *seed_in,
size_t seed_len, int *out_counter,
unsigned long *out_h, BN_GENCB *cb) {
if (bits > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
int ok = 0;
unsigned char seed[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
@@ -278,6 +279,8 @@ int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *dsa, unsigned bits, const uint8_t *seed_in,
if (!RAND_bytes(seed, qsize)) {
goto err;
}
// DSA parameters are public.
CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(seed, qsize);
} else {
// If we come back through, use random seed next time.
seed_in = NULL;
@@ -481,11 +484,13 @@ DSA *DSAparams_dup(const DSA *dsa) {
}
int DSA_generate_key(DSA *dsa) {
int ok = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
if (!dsa_check_key(dsa)) {
return 0;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
int ok = 0;
BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
@@ -517,6 +522,9 @@ int DSA_generate_key(DSA *dsa) {
goto err;
}
// The public key is computed from the private key, but is public.
bn_declassify(pub_key);
dsa->priv_key = priv_key;
dsa->pub_key = pub_key;
ok = 1;
@@ -533,16 +541,7 @@ err:
return ok;
}
DSA_SIG *DSA_SIG_new(void) {
DSA_SIG *sig;
sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DSA_SIG));
if (!sig) {
return NULL;
}
sig->r = NULL;
sig->s = NULL;
return sig;
}
DSA_SIG *DSA_SIG_new(void) { return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(DSA_SIG)); }
void DSA_SIG_free(DSA_SIG *sig) {
if (!sig) {
@@ -662,6 +661,10 @@ redo:
goto err;
}
// The signature is computed from the private key, but is public.
bn_declassify(r);
bn_declassify(s);
// Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is
// very unlikely.
if (BN_is_zero(r) || BN_is_zero(s)) {
@@ -694,7 +697,7 @@ err:
return ret;
}
int DSA_do_verify(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, DSA_SIG *sig,
int DSA_do_verify(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, const DSA_SIG *sig,
const DSA *dsa) {
int valid;
if (!DSA_do_check_signature(&valid, digest, digest_len, sig, dsa)) {
@@ -704,7 +707,8 @@ int DSA_do_verify(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, DSA_SIG *sig,
}
int DSA_do_check_signature(int *out_valid, const uint8_t *digest,
size_t digest_len, DSA_SIG *sig, const DSA *dsa) {
size_t digest_len, const DSA_SIG *sig,
const DSA *dsa) {
*out_valid = 0;
if (!dsa_check_key(dsa)) {
return 0;
@@ -912,15 +916,19 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(const DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM **out_kinv,
ctx) ||
// Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q
!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(r, dsa->g, &k, dsa->p, ctx,
dsa->method_mont_p) ||
// Note |BN_mod| below is not constant-time and may leak information about
// |r|. |dsa->p| may be significantly larger than |dsa->q|, so this is not
// easily performed in constant-time with Montgomery reduction.
//
// However, |r| at this point is g^k (mod p). It is almost the value of
// |r| revealed in the signature anyway (g^k (mod p) (mod q)), going from
// it to |k| would require computing a discrete log.
!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx) ||
dsa->method_mont_p)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
// Note |BN_mod| below is not constant-time and may leak information about
// |r|. |dsa->p| may be significantly larger than |dsa->q|, so this is not
// easily performed in constant-time with Montgomery reduction.
//
// However, |r| at this point is g^k (mod p). It is almost the value of |r|
// revealed in the signature anyway (g^k (mod p) (mod q)), going from it to
// |k| would require computing a discrete log.
bn_declassify(r);
if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx) ||
// Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' using Fermat's Little
// Theorem.
!bn_mod_inverse_prime(kinv, &k, dsa->q, ctx, dsa->method_mont_q)) {
@@ -947,12 +955,7 @@ err:
int DSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
int index;
if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
free_func)) {
return -1;
}
return index;
return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index_ex(&g_ex_data_class, argl, argp, free_func);
}
int DSA_set_ex_data(DSA *dsa, int idx, void *arg) {
@@ -65,8 +65,6 @@
#include "../bytestring/internal.h"
#define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
// This function is in dsa_asn1.c rather than dsa.c because it is reachable from
// |EVP_PKEY| parsers. This makes it easier for the static linker to drop most
// of the DSA implementation.
@@ -119,8 +117,9 @@ int dsa_check_key(const DSA *dsa) {
if (dsa->priv_key != NULL) {
// The private key is a non-zero element of the scalar field, determined by
// |q|.
if (BN_is_negative(dsa->priv_key) || BN_is_zero(dsa->priv_key) ||
BN_cmp(dsa->priv_key, dsa->q) >= 0) {
if (BN_is_negative(dsa->priv_key) ||
constant_time_declassify_int(BN_is_zero(dsa->priv_key)) ||
constant_time_declassify_int(BN_cmp(dsa->priv_key, dsa->q) >= 0)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ struct dsa_st {
CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
};
#define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
// dsa_check_key performs cheap self-checks on |dsa|, and ensures it is within
// DoS bounds. It returns one on success and zero on error.
int dsa_check_key(const DSA *dsa);
@@ -26,8 +26,7 @@
#include "../internal.h"
// This file implements hash-to-curve, as described in
// draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-16.
// This file implements hash-to-curve, as described in RFC 9380.
//
// This hash-to-curve implementation is written generically with the
// expectation that we will eventually wish to support other curves. If it
@@ -48,8 +47,7 @@
// templates to make specializing more convenient.
// expand_message_xmd implements the operation described in section 5.3.1 of
// draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-16. It returns one on success and zero on
// error.
// RFC 9380. It returns one on success and zero on error.
static int expand_message_xmd(const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len) {
@@ -138,7 +136,7 @@ err:
// num_bytes_to_derive determines the number of bytes to derive when hashing to
// a number modulo |modulus|. See the hash_to_field operation defined in
// section 5.2 of draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-16.
// section 5.2 of RFC 9380.
static int num_bytes_to_derive(size_t *out, const BIGNUM *modulus, unsigned k) {
size_t bits = BN_num_bits(modulus);
size_t L = (bits + k + 7) / 8;
@@ -171,8 +169,7 @@ static void big_endian_to_words(BN_ULONG *out, size_t num_words,
}
// hash_to_field implements the operation described in section 5.2
// of draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-16, with count = 2. |k| is the security
// factor.
// of RFC 9380, with count = 2. |k| is the security factor.
static int hash_to_field2(const EC_GROUP *group, const EVP_MD *md,
EC_FELEM *out1, EC_FELEM *out2, const uint8_t *dst,
size_t dst_len, unsigned k, const uint8_t *msg,
@@ -221,8 +218,7 @@ static inline void mul_A(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_FELEM *out,
ec_felem_sub(group, out, in, &tmp); // out = -3*in
}
// sgn0 implements the operation described in section 4.1.2 of
// draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-16.
// sgn0 implements the operation described in section 4.1.2 of RFC 9380.
static BN_ULONG sgn0(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_FELEM *a) {
uint8_t buf[EC_MAX_BYTES];
size_t len;
@@ -235,7 +231,7 @@ OPENSSL_UNUSED static int is_3mod4(const EC_GROUP *group) {
}
// sqrt_ratio_3mod4 implements the operation described in appendix F.2.1.2
// of draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-16.
// of RFC 9380.
static BN_ULONG sqrt_ratio_3mod4(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_FELEM *Z,
const BN_ULONG *c1, size_t num_c1,
const EC_FELEM *c2, EC_FELEM *out_y,
@@ -270,8 +266,7 @@ static BN_ULONG sqrt_ratio_3mod4(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_FELEM *Z,
}
// map_to_curve_simple_swu implements the operation described in section 6.6.2
// of draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-16, using the straight-line implementation
// in appendix F.2.
// of RFC 9380, using the straight-line implementation in appendix F.2.
static void map_to_curve_simple_swu(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_FELEM *Z,
const BN_ULONG *c1, size_t num_c1,
const EC_FELEM *c2, EC_JACOBIAN *out,
@@ -405,7 +400,7 @@ int ec_hash_to_curve_p256_xmd_sha256_sswu(const EC_GROUP *group,
EC_JACOBIAN *out, const uint8_t *dst,
size_t dst_len, const uint8_t *msg,
size_t msg_len) {
// See section 8.3 of draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-16.
// See section 8.3 of RFC 9380.
if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group) != NID_X9_62_prime256v1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_GROUP_MISMATCH);
return 0;
@@ -438,7 +433,7 @@ int ec_hash_to_curve_p384_xmd_sha384_sswu(const EC_GROUP *group,
EC_JACOBIAN *out, const uint8_t *dst,
size_t dst_len, const uint8_t *msg,
size_t msg_len) {
// See section 8.3 of draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-16.
// See section 8.3 of RFC 9380.
if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group) != NID_secp384r1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_GROUP_MISMATCH);
return 0;
@@ -30,24 +30,22 @@ extern "C" {
// ec_hash_to_curve_p256_xmd_sha256_sswu hashes |msg| to a point on |group| and
// writes the result to |out|, implementing the P256_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_ suite
// from draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-16. It returns one on success and zero on
// error.
// from RFC 9380. It returns one on success and zero on error.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int ec_hash_to_curve_p256_xmd_sha256_sswu(
const EC_GROUP *group, EC_JACOBIAN *out, const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len);
// ec_hash_to_curve_p384_xmd_sha384_sswu hashes |msg| to a point on |group| and
// writes the result to |out|, implementing the P384_XMD:SHA-384_SSWU_RO_ suite
// from draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-16. It returns one on success and zero on
// error.
// from RFC 9380. It returns one on success and zero on error.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int ec_hash_to_curve_p384_xmd_sha384_sswu(
const EC_GROUP *group, EC_JACOBIAN *out, const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len);
// ec_hash_to_scalar_p384_xmd_sha384 hashes |msg| to a scalar on |group|
// and writes the result to |out|, using the hash_to_field operation from the
// P384_XMD:SHA-384_SSWU_RO_ suite from draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-16, but
// generating a value modulo the group order rather than a field element.
// P384_XMD:SHA-384_SSWU_RO_ suite from RFC 9380, but generating a value modulo
// the group order rather than a field element.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int ec_hash_to_scalar_p384_xmd_sha384(
const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out, const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len);
@@ -62,34 +62,87 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include "../bytestring/internal.h"
#include "../fipsmodule/ec/internal.h"
#include "../fipsmodule/ecdsa/internal.h"
#include "../internal.h"
static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_sig_from_fixed(const EC_KEY *key, const uint8_t *in,
size_t len) {
const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(key);
if (group == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return NULL;
}
size_t scalar_len = BN_num_bytes(EC_GROUP_get0_order(group));
if (len != 2 * scalar_len) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
return NULL;
}
ECDSA_SIG *ret = ECDSA_SIG_new();
if (ret == NULL ||
!BN_bin2bn(in, scalar_len, ret->r) ||
!BN_bin2bn(in + scalar_len, scalar_len, ret->s)) {
ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
static int ecdsa_sig_to_fixed(const EC_KEY *key, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
size_t max_out, const ECDSA_SIG *sig) {
const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(key);
if (group == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
size_t scalar_len = BN_num_bytes(EC_GROUP_get0_order(group));
if (max_out < 2 * scalar_len) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
if (BN_is_negative(sig->r) ||
!BN_bn2bin_padded(out, scalar_len, sig->r) ||
BN_is_negative(sig->s) ||
!BN_bn2bin_padded(out + scalar_len, scalar_len, sig->s)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
return 0;
}
*out_len = 2 * scalar_len;
return 1;
}
int ECDSA_sign(int type, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, uint8_t *sig,
unsigned int *sig_len, const EC_KEY *eckey) {
unsigned int *out_sig_len, const EC_KEY *eckey) {
if (eckey->ecdsa_meth && eckey->ecdsa_meth->sign) {
return eckey->ecdsa_meth->sign(digest, digest_len, sig, sig_len,
return eckey->ecdsa_meth->sign(digest, digest_len, sig, out_sig_len,
(EC_KEY*) eckey /* cast away const */);
}
int ret = 0;
ECDSA_SIG *s = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, digest_len, eckey);
if (s == NULL) {
*sig_len = 0;
goto err;
*out_sig_len = 0;
uint8_t fixed[ECDSA_MAX_FIXED_LEN];
size_t fixed_len;
if (!ecdsa_sign_fixed(digest, digest_len, fixed, &fixed_len, sizeof(fixed),
eckey)) {
return 0;
}
// TODO(davidben): We can actually do better and go straight from the DER
// format to the fixed-width format without a malloc.
ECDSA_SIG *s = ecdsa_sig_from_fixed(eckey, fixed, fixed_len);
if (s == NULL) {
return 0;
}
int ret = 0;
CBB cbb;
CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, sig, ECDSA_size(eckey));
size_t len;
if (!ECDSA_SIG_marshal(&cbb, s) ||
!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
*sig_len = 0;
goto err;
}
*sig_len = (unsigned)len;
*out_sig_len = (unsigned)len;
ret = 1;
err:
@@ -99,12 +152,13 @@ err:
int ECDSA_verify(int type, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len, const EC_KEY *eckey) {
ECDSA_SIG *s;
// Decode the ECDSA signature.
//
// TODO(davidben): We can actually do better and go straight from the DER
// format to the fixed-width format without a malloc.
int ret = 0;
uint8_t *der = NULL;
// Decode the ECDSA signature.
s = ECDSA_SIG_from_bytes(sig, sig_len);
ECDSA_SIG *s = ECDSA_SIG_from_bytes(sig, sig_len);
if (s == NULL) {
goto err;
}
@@ -118,7 +172,10 @@ int ECDSA_verify(int type, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
goto err;
}
ret = ECDSA_do_verify(digest, digest_len, s, eckey);
uint8_t fixed[ECDSA_MAX_FIXED_LEN];
size_t fixed_len;
ret = ecdsa_sig_to_fixed(eckey, fixed, &fixed_len, sizeof(fixed), s) &&
ecdsa_verify_fixed(digest, digest_len, fixed, fixed_len, eckey);
err:
OPENSSL_free(der);
@@ -147,6 +204,95 @@ size_t ECDSA_size(const EC_KEY *key) {
return ECDSA_SIG_max_len(group_order_size);
}
ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_SIG_new(void) {
ECDSA_SIG *sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(ECDSA_SIG));
if (sig == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
sig->r = BN_new();
sig->s = BN_new();
if (sig->r == NULL || sig->s == NULL) {
ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
return NULL;
}
return sig;
}
void ECDSA_SIG_free(ECDSA_SIG *sig) {
if (sig == NULL) {
return;
}
BN_free(sig->r);
BN_free(sig->s);
OPENSSL_free(sig);
}
const BIGNUM *ECDSA_SIG_get0_r(const ECDSA_SIG *sig) {
return sig->r;
}
const BIGNUM *ECDSA_SIG_get0_s(const ECDSA_SIG *sig) {
return sig->s;
}
void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **out_r,
const BIGNUM **out_s) {
if (out_r != NULL) {
*out_r = sig->r;
}
if (out_s != NULL) {
*out_s = sig->s;
}
}
int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s) {
if (r == NULL || s == NULL) {
return 0;
}
BN_free(sig->r);
BN_free(sig->s);
sig->r = r;
sig->s = s;
return 1;
}
int ECDSA_do_verify(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const EC_KEY *eckey) {
uint8_t fixed[ECDSA_MAX_FIXED_LEN];
size_t fixed_len;
return ecdsa_sig_to_fixed(eckey, fixed, &fixed_len, sizeof(fixed), sig) &&
ecdsa_verify_fixed(digest, digest_len, fixed, fixed_len, eckey);
}
// This function is only exported for testing and is not called in production
// code.
ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_sign_with_nonce_and_leak_private_key_for_testing(
const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, const EC_KEY *eckey,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len) {
uint8_t sig[ECDSA_MAX_FIXED_LEN];
size_t sig_len;
if (!ecdsa_sign_fixed_with_nonce_for_known_answer_test(
digest, digest_len, sig, &sig_len, sizeof(sig), eckey, nonce,
nonce_len)) {
return NULL;
}
return ecdsa_sig_from_fixed(eckey, sig, sig_len);
}
ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_do_sign(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
const EC_KEY *eckey) {
uint8_t sig[ECDSA_MAX_FIXED_LEN];
size_t sig_len;
if (!ecdsa_sign_fixed(digest, digest_len, sig, &sig_len, sizeof(sig),
eckey)) {
return NULL;
}
return ecdsa_sig_from_fixed(eckey, sig, sig_len);
}
ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_SIG_parse(CBS *cbs) {
ECDSA_SIG *ret = ECDSA_SIG_new();
if (ret == NULL) {
@@ -31,15 +31,7 @@ struct engine_st {
ECDSA_METHOD *ecdsa_method;
};
ENGINE *ENGINE_new(void) {
ENGINE *engine = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(ENGINE));
if (engine == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
OPENSSL_memset(engine, 0, sizeof(ENGINE));
return engine;
}
ENGINE *ENGINE_new(void) { return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(ENGINE)); }
int ENGINE_free(ENGINE *engine) {
// Methods are currently required to be static so are not unref'ed.
+81 -60
View File
@@ -164,6 +164,17 @@ extern const uint32_t kOpenSSLReasonValues[];
extern const size_t kOpenSSLReasonValuesLen;
extern const char kOpenSSLReasonStringData[];
static char *strdup_libc_malloc(const char *str) {
// |strdup| is not in C until C23, so MSVC triggers deprecation warnings, and
// glibc and musl gate it on a feature macro. Reimplementing it is easier.
size_t len = strlen(str);
char *ret = malloc(len + 1);
if (ret != NULL) {
memcpy(ret, str, len + 1);
}
return ret;
}
// err_clear clears the given queued error.
static void err_clear(struct err_error_st *error) {
free(error->data);
@@ -174,13 +185,9 @@ static void err_copy(struct err_error_st *dst, const struct err_error_st *src) {
err_clear(dst);
dst->file = src->file;
if (src->data != NULL) {
// Disable deprecated functions on msvc so it doesn't complain about strdup.
OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(push))
OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(disable : 4996))
// We can't use OPENSSL_strdup because we don't want to call OPENSSL_malloc,
// which can affect the error stack.
dst->data = strdup(src->data);
OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(pop))
dst->data = strdup_libc_malloc(src->data);
}
dst->packed = src->packed;
dst->line = src->line;
@@ -428,50 +435,52 @@ static const char *err_string_lookup(uint32_t lib, uint32_t key,
return &string_data[(*result) & 0x7fff];
}
static const char *const kLibraryNames[ERR_NUM_LIBS] = {
"invalid library (0)",
"unknown library", // ERR_LIB_NONE
"system library", // ERR_LIB_SYS
"bignum routines", // ERR_LIB_BN
"RSA routines", // ERR_LIB_RSA
"Diffie-Hellman routines", // ERR_LIB_DH
"public key routines", // ERR_LIB_EVP
"memory buffer routines", // ERR_LIB_BUF
"object identifier routines", // ERR_LIB_OBJ
"PEM routines", // ERR_LIB_PEM
"DSA routines", // ERR_LIB_DSA
"X.509 certificate routines", // ERR_LIB_X509
"ASN.1 encoding routines", // ERR_LIB_ASN1
"configuration file routines", // ERR_LIB_CONF
"common libcrypto routines", // ERR_LIB_CRYPTO
"elliptic curve routines", // ERR_LIB_EC
"SSL routines", // ERR_LIB_SSL
"BIO routines", // ERR_LIB_BIO
"PKCS7 routines", // ERR_LIB_PKCS7
"PKCS8 routines", // ERR_LIB_PKCS8
"X509 V3 routines", // ERR_LIB_X509V3
"random number generator", // ERR_LIB_RAND
"ENGINE routines", // ERR_LIB_ENGINE
"OCSP routines", // ERR_LIB_OCSP
"UI routines", // ERR_LIB_UI
"COMP routines", // ERR_LIB_COMP
"ECDSA routines", // ERR_LIB_ECDSA
"ECDH routines", // ERR_LIB_ECDH
"HMAC routines", // ERR_LIB_HMAC
"Digest functions", // ERR_LIB_DIGEST
"Cipher functions", // ERR_LIB_CIPHER
"HKDF functions", // ERR_LIB_HKDF
"Trust Token functions", // ERR_LIB_TRUST_TOKEN
"User defined functions", // ERR_LIB_USER
typedef struct library_name_st {
const char *str;
const char *symbol;
const char *reason_symbol;
} LIBRARY_NAME;
static const LIBRARY_NAME kLibraryNames[ERR_NUM_LIBS] = {
{"invalid library (0)", NULL, NULL},
{"unknown library", "NONE", "NONE_LIB"},
{"system library", "SYS", "SYS_LIB"},
{"bignum routines", "BN", "BN_LIB"},
{"RSA routines", "RSA", "RSA_LIB"},
{"Diffie-Hellman routines", "DH", "DH_LIB"},
{"public key routines", "EVP", "EVP_LIB"},
{"memory buffer routines", "BUF", "BUF_LIB"},
{"object identifier routines", "OBJ", "OBJ_LIB"},
{"PEM routines", "PEM", "PEM_LIB"},
{"DSA routines", "DSA", "DSA_LIB"},
{"X.509 certificate routines", "X509", "X509_LIB"},
{"ASN.1 encoding routines", "ASN1", "ASN1_LIB"},
{"configuration file routines", "CONF", "CONF_LIB"},
{"common libcrypto routines", "CRYPTO", "CRYPTO_LIB"},
{"elliptic curve routines", "EC", "EC_LIB"},
{"SSL routines", "SSL", "SSL_LIB"},
{"BIO routines", "BIO", "BIO_LIB"},
{"PKCS7 routines", "PKCS7", "PKCS7_LIB"},
{"PKCS8 routines", "PKCS8", "PKCS8_LIB"},
{"X509 V3 routines", "X509V3", "X509V3_LIB"},
{"random number generator", "RAND", "RAND_LIB"},
{"ENGINE routines", "ENGINE", "ENGINE_LIB"},
{"OCSP routines", "OCSP", "OCSP_LIB"},
{"UI routines", "UI", "UI_LIB"},
{"COMP routines", "COMP", "COMP_LIB"},
{"ECDSA routines", "ECDSA", "ECDSA_LIB"},
{"ECDH routines", "ECDH", "ECDH_LIB"},
{"HMAC routines", "HMAC", "HMAC_LIB"},
{"Digest functions", "DIGEST", "DIGEST_LIB"},
{"Cipher functions", "CIPHER", "CIPHER_LIB"},
{"HKDF functions", "HKDF", "HKDF_LIB"},
{"Trust Token functions", "TRUST_TOKEN", "TRUST_TOKEN_LIB"},
{"User defined functions", "USER", "USER_LIB"},
};
static const char *err_lib_error_string(uint32_t packed_error) {
const uint32_t lib = ERR_GET_LIB(packed_error);
if (lib >= ERR_NUM_LIBS) {
return NULL;
}
return kLibraryNames[lib];
return lib >= ERR_NUM_LIBS ? NULL : kLibraryNames[lib].str;
}
const char *ERR_lib_error_string(uint32_t packed_error) {
@@ -479,51 +488,67 @@ const char *ERR_lib_error_string(uint32_t packed_error) {
return ret == NULL ? "unknown library" : ret;
}
const char *ERR_lib_symbol_name(uint32_t packed_error) {
const uint32_t lib = ERR_GET_LIB(packed_error);
return lib >= ERR_NUM_LIBS ? NULL : kLibraryNames[lib].symbol;
}
const char *ERR_func_error_string(uint32_t packed_error) {
return "OPENSSL_internal";
}
static const char *err_reason_error_string(uint32_t packed_error) {
static const char *err_reason_error_string(uint32_t packed_error, int symbol) {
const uint32_t lib = ERR_GET_LIB(packed_error);
const uint32_t reason = ERR_GET_REASON(packed_error);
if (lib == ERR_LIB_SYS) {
if (reason < 127) {
if (!symbol && reason < 127) {
return strerror(reason);
}
return NULL;
}
if (reason < ERR_NUM_LIBS) {
return kLibraryNames[reason];
return symbol ? kLibraryNames[reason].reason_symbol
: kLibraryNames[reason].str;
}
if (reason < 100) {
// TODO(davidben): All our other reason strings match the symbol name. Only
// the common ones differ. Should we just consistently return the symbol
// name?
switch (reason) {
case ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE:
return "malloc failure";
return symbol ? "MALLOC_FAILURE" : "malloc failure";
case ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED:
return "function should not have been called";
return symbol ? "SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED"
: "function should not have been called";
case ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER:
return "passed a null parameter";
return symbol ? "PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER" : "passed a null parameter";
case ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR:
return "internal error";
return symbol ? "INTERNAL_ERROR" : "internal error";
case ERR_R_OVERFLOW:
return "overflow";
return symbol ? "OVERFLOW" : "overflow";
default:
return NULL;
}
}
// Unlike OpenSSL, BoringSSL's reason strings already match symbol name, so we
// do not need to check |symbol|.
return err_string_lookup(lib, reason, kOpenSSLReasonValues,
kOpenSSLReasonValuesLen, kOpenSSLReasonStringData);
}
const char *ERR_reason_error_string(uint32_t packed_error) {
const char *ret = err_reason_error_string(packed_error);
const char *ret = err_reason_error_string(packed_error, /*symbol=*/0);
return ret == NULL ? "unknown error" : ret;
}
const char *ERR_reason_symbol_name(uint32_t packed_error) {
return err_reason_error_string(packed_error, /*symbol=*/1);
}
char *ERR_error_string(uint32_t packed_error, char *ret) {
static char buf[ERR_ERROR_STRING_BUF_LEN];
@@ -550,7 +575,7 @@ char *ERR_error_string_n(uint32_t packed_error, char *buf, size_t len) {
unsigned reason = ERR_GET_REASON(packed_error);
const char *lib_str = err_lib_error_string(packed_error);
const char *reason_str = err_reason_error_string(packed_error);
const char *reason_str = err_reason_error_string(packed_error, /*symbol=*/0);
char lib_buf[32], reason_buf[32];
if (lib_str == NULL) {
@@ -749,13 +774,9 @@ void ERR_set_error_data(char *data, int flags) {
assert(0);
return;
}
// Disable deprecated functions on msvc so it doesn't complain about strdup.
OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(push))
OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(disable : 4996))
// We can not use OPENSSL_strdup because we don't want to call OPENSSL_malloc,
// which can affect the error stack.
char *copy = strdup(data);
OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(pop))
char *copy = strdup_libc_malloc(data);
if (copy != NULL) {
err_set_error_data(copy);
}
+42 -125
View File
@@ -59,12 +59,9 @@
#include <assert.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_dsa.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_ec.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_err.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_nid.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_rsa.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_thread.h>
#include "internal.h"
@@ -81,17 +78,13 @@ OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(EVP, NOT_XOF_OR_INVALID_LENGTH)
OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(EVP, EMPTY_PSK)
EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new(void) {
EVP_PKEY *ret;
ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_PKEY));
EVP_PKEY *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_PKEY));
if (ret == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(EVP_PKEY));
ret->type = EVP_PKEY_NONE;
ret->references = 1;
return ret;
}
@@ -153,9 +146,7 @@ int EVP_PKEY_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) {
int EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from) {
if (to->type == EVP_PKEY_NONE) {
if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(to, from->type)) {
return 0;
}
evp_pkey_set_method(to, from->ameth);
} else if (to->type != from->type) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_DIFFERENT_KEY_TYPES);
return 0;
@@ -229,117 +220,21 @@ static const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *evp_pkey_asn1_find(int nid) {
}
}
static void evp_pkey_set_method(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *method) {
void evp_pkey_set_method(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *method) {
free_it(pkey);
pkey->ameth = method;
pkey->type = pkey->ameth->pkey_id;
}
int EVP_PKEY_type(int nid) {
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *meth = evp_pkey_asn1_find(nid);
if (meth == NULL) {
return NID_undef;
}
return meth->pkey_id;
// In OpenSSL, this was used to map between type aliases. BoringSSL supports
// no type aliases, so this function is just the identity.
return nid;
}
int EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, RSA *key) {
if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, key)) {
RSA_up_ref(key);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
int EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, RSA *key) {
evp_pkey_set_method(pkey, &rsa_asn1_meth);
pkey->pkey = key;
return key != NULL;
}
RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_RSA_KEY);
return NULL;
}
return pkey->pkey;
}
RSA *EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
if (rsa != NULL) {
RSA_up_ref(rsa);
}
return rsa;
}
int EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DSA *key) {
if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, key)) {
DSA_up_ref(key);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
int EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DSA *key) {
evp_pkey_set_method(pkey, &dsa_asn1_meth);
pkey->pkey = key;
return key != NULL;
}
DSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DSA_KEY);
return NULL;
}
return pkey->pkey;
}
DSA *EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
DSA *dsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pkey);
if (dsa != NULL) {
DSA_up_ref(dsa);
}
return dsa;
}
int EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey, EC_KEY *key) {
if (EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, key)) {
EC_KEY_up_ref(key);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
int EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey, EC_KEY *key) {
evp_pkey_set_method(pkey, &ec_asn1_meth);
pkey->pkey = key;
return key != NULL;
}
EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_EC_KEY_KEY);
return NULL;
}
return pkey->pkey;
}
EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
if (ec_key != NULL) {
EC_KEY_up_ref(ec_key);
}
return ec_key;
}
DH *EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return NULL; }
DH *EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return NULL; }
int EVP_PKEY_assign(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type, void *key) {
// This function can only be used to assign RSA, DSA, and EC keys. Other key
// types have internal representations which are not exposed through the
// This function can only be used to assign RSA, DSA, EC, and DH keys. Other
// key types have internal representations which are not exposed through the
// public API.
switch (type) {
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
@@ -348,6 +243,8 @@ int EVP_PKEY_assign(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type, void *key) {
return EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, key);
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
return EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, key);
case EVP_PKEY_DH:
return EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkey, key);
}
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
@@ -379,16 +276,26 @@ int EVP_PKEY_set_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type) {
EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(int type, ENGINE *unused,
const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
EVP_PKEY *ret = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (ret == NULL ||
!EVP_PKEY_set_type(ret, type)) {
goto err;
// To avoid pulling in all key types, look for specifically the key types that
// support |set_priv_raw|.
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *method;
switch (type) {
case EVP_PKEY_X25519:
method = &x25519_asn1_meth;
break;
case EVP_PKEY_ED25519:
method = &ed25519_asn1_meth;
break;
default:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
return 0;
}
if (ret->ameth->set_priv_raw == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
EVP_PKEY *ret = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (ret == NULL) {
goto err;
}
evp_pkey_set_method(ret, method);
if (!ret->ameth->set_priv_raw(ret, in, len)) {
goto err;
@@ -403,16 +310,26 @@ err:
EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key(int type, ENGINE *unused,
const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
EVP_PKEY *ret = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (ret == NULL ||
!EVP_PKEY_set_type(ret, type)) {
goto err;
// To avoid pulling in all key types, look for specifically the key types that
// support |set_pub_raw|.
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *method;
switch (type) {
case EVP_PKEY_X25519:
method = &x25519_asn1_meth;
break;
case EVP_PKEY_ED25519:
method = &ed25519_asn1_meth;
break;
default:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
return 0;
}
if (ret->ameth->set_pub_raw == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
EVP_PKEY *ret = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (ret == NULL) {
goto err;
}
evp_pkey_set_method(ret, method);
if (!ret->ameth->set_pub_raw(ret, in, len)) {
goto err;
+13 -13
View File
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
#include "../internal.h"
// We intentionally omit |dh_asn1_meth| from this list. It is not serializable.
static const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *const kASN1Methods[] = {
&rsa_asn1_meth,
&ec_asn1_meth,
@@ -77,28 +78,26 @@ static const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *const kASN1Methods[] = {
&x25519_asn1_meth,
};
static int parse_key_type(CBS *cbs, int *out_type) {
static const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *parse_key_type(CBS *cbs) {
CBS oid;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &oid, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT)) {
return 0;
return NULL;
}
for (unsigned i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kASN1Methods); i++) {
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *method = kASN1Methods[i];
if (CBS_len(&oid) == method->oid_len &&
OPENSSL_memcmp(CBS_data(&oid), method->oid, method->oid_len) == 0) {
*out_type = method->pkey_id;
return 1;
return method;
}
}
return 0;
return NULL;
}
EVP_PKEY *EVP_parse_public_key(CBS *cbs) {
// Parse the SubjectPublicKeyInfo.
CBS spki, algorithm, key;
int type;
uint8_t padding;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &spki, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&spki, &algorithm, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
@@ -107,7 +106,8 @@ EVP_PKEY *EVP_parse_public_key(CBS *cbs) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
if (!parse_key_type(&algorithm, &type)) {
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *method = parse_key_type(&algorithm);
if (method == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
return NULL;
}
@@ -121,10 +121,10 @@ EVP_PKEY *EVP_parse_public_key(CBS *cbs) {
// Set up an |EVP_PKEY| of the appropriate type.
EVP_PKEY *ret = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (ret == NULL ||
!EVP_PKEY_set_type(ret, type)) {
if (ret == NULL) {
goto err;
}
evp_pkey_set_method(ret, method);
// Call into the type-specific SPKI decoding function.
if (ret->ameth->pub_decode == NULL) {
@@ -155,7 +155,6 @@ EVP_PKEY *EVP_parse_private_key(CBS *cbs) {
// Parse the PrivateKeyInfo.
CBS pkcs8, algorithm, key;
uint64_t version;
int type;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &pkcs8, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
!CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&pkcs8, &version) ||
version != 0 ||
@@ -164,7 +163,8 @@ EVP_PKEY *EVP_parse_private_key(CBS *cbs) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
if (!parse_key_type(&algorithm, &type)) {
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *method = parse_key_type(&algorithm);
if (method == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
return NULL;
}
@@ -173,10 +173,10 @@ EVP_PKEY *EVP_parse_private_key(CBS *cbs) {
// Set up an |EVP_PKEY| of the appropriate type.
EVP_PKEY *ret = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (ret == NULL ||
!EVP_PKEY_set_type(ret, type)) {
if (ret == NULL) {
goto err;
}
evp_pkey_set_method(ret, method);
// Call into the type-specific PrivateKeyInfo decoding function.
if (ret->ameth->priv_decode == NULL) {
@@ -86,11 +86,10 @@ static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *evp_pkey_meth_find(int type) {
static EVP_PKEY_CTX *evp_pkey_ctx_new(EVP_PKEY *pkey, ENGINE *e,
const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth) {
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_PKEY_CTX));
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_PKEY_CTX));
if (!ret) {
return NULL;
}
OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(EVP_PKEY_CTX));
ret->engine = e;
ret->pmeth = pmeth;
@@ -156,13 +155,11 @@ EVP_PKEY_CTX *EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
return NULL;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_PKEY_CTX));
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_PKEY_CTX));
if (!ret) {
return NULL;
}
OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(EVP_PKEY_CTX));
ret->pmeth = ctx->pmeth;
ret->engine = ctx->engine;
ret->operation = ctx->operation;
@@ -213,6 +213,7 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int keytype, int optype,
#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_KEY (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 16)
#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_SALT (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 17)
#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_INFO (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 18)
#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PAD (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 19)
struct evp_pkey_ctx_st {
// Method associated with this operation
@@ -288,12 +289,18 @@ extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD ec_asn1_meth;
extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_asn1_meth;
extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD ed25519_asn1_meth;
extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD x25519_asn1_meth;
extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dh_asn1_meth;
extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pkey_meth;
extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD ec_pkey_meth;
extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD ed25519_pkey_meth;
extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD x25519_pkey_meth;
extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD hkdf_pkey_meth;
extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD dh_pkey_meth;
// evp_pkey_set_method behaves like |EVP_PKEY_set_type|, but takes a pointer to
// a method table. This avoids depending on every |EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD|.
void evp_pkey_set_method(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *method);
#if defined(__cplusplus)
+137
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
/*
* Copyright 2006-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_evp.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_dh.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_err.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include "internal.h"
typedef struct dh_pkey_ctx_st {
int pad;
} DH_PKEY_CTX;
static int pkey_dh_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(DH_PKEY_CTX));
if (dctx == NULL) {
return 0;
}
ctx->data = dctx;
return 1;
}
static int pkey_dh_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src) {
if (!pkey_dh_init(dst)) {
return 0;
}
const DH_PKEY_CTX *sctx = src->data;
DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx = dst->data;
dctx->pad = sctx->pad;
return 1;
}
static void pkey_dh_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
OPENSSL_free(ctx->data);
ctx->data = NULL;
}
static int pkey_dh_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
DH *dh = DH_new();
if (dh == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkey, dh)) {
DH_free(dh);
return 0;
}
if (ctx->pkey != NULL && !EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ctx->pkey)) {
return 0;
}
return DH_generate_key(dh);
}
static int pkey_dh_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len) {
DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
if (ctx->pkey == NULL || ctx->peerkey == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_KEYS_NOT_SET);
return 0;
}
DH *our_key = ctx->pkey->pkey;
DH *peer_key = ctx->peerkey->pkey;
if (our_key == NULL || peer_key == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_KEYS_NOT_SET);
return 0;
}
const BIGNUM *pub_key = DH_get0_pub_key(peer_key);
if (pub_key == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_KEYS_NOT_SET);
return 0;
}
if (out == NULL) {
*out_len = DH_size(our_key);
return 1;
}
if (*out_len < (size_t)DH_size(our_key)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
int ret = dctx->pad ? DH_compute_key_padded(out, pub_key, our_key)
: DH_compute_key(out, pub_key, our_key);
if (ret < 0) {
return 0;
}
assert(ret <= DH_size(our_key));
*out_len = (size_t)ret;
return 1;
}
static int pkey_dh_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) {
DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
switch (type) {
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY:
// |EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer| requires the key implement this command,
// even if it is a no-op.
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PAD:
dctx->pad = p1;
return 1;
default:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
return 0;
}
}
const EVP_PKEY_METHOD dh_pkey_meth = {
.pkey_id = EVP_PKEY_DH,
.init = pkey_dh_init,
.copy = pkey_dh_copy,
.cleanup = pkey_dh_cleanup,
.keygen = pkey_dh_keygen,
.derive = pkey_dh_derive,
.ctrl = pkey_dh_ctrl,
};
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_pad(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pad) {
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DH, EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PAD, pad, NULL);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
/*
* Copyright 2006-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_evp.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_bn.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_dh.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_err.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "../internal.h"
static void dh_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
DH_free(pkey->pkey);
pkey->pkey = NULL;
}
static int dh_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return DH_size(pkey->pkey); }
static int dh_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return DH_bits(pkey->pkey); }
static int dh_param_missing(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
const DH *dh = pkey->pkey;
return dh == NULL || DH_get0_p(dh) == NULL || DH_get0_g(dh) == NULL;
}
static int dh_param_copy(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from) {
if (dh_param_missing(from)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
const DH *dh = from->pkey;
const BIGNUM *q_old = DH_get0_q(dh);
BIGNUM *p = BN_dup(DH_get0_p(dh));
BIGNUM *q = q_old == NULL ? NULL : BN_dup(q_old);
BIGNUM *g = BN_dup(DH_get0_g(dh));
if (p == NULL || (q_old != NULL && q == NULL) || g == NULL ||
!DH_set0_pqg(to->pkey, p, q, g)) {
BN_free(p);
BN_free(q);
BN_free(g);
return 0;
}
// |DH_set0_pqg| took ownership of |p|, |q|, and |g|.
return 1;
}
static int dh_param_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) {
if (dh_param_missing(a) || dh_param_missing(b)) {
return -2;
}
// Matching OpenSSL, only compare p and g for PKCS#3-style Diffie-Hellman.
// OpenSSL only checks q in X9.42-style Diffie-Hellman ("DHX").
const DH *a_dh = a->pkey;
const DH *b_dh = b->pkey;
return BN_cmp(DH_get0_p(a_dh), DH_get0_p(b_dh)) == 0 &&
BN_cmp(DH_get0_g(a_dh), DH_get0_g(b_dh)) == 0;
}
static int dh_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) {
if (dh_param_cmp(a, b) <= 0) {
return 0;
}
const DH *a_dh = a->pkey;
const DH *b_dh = b->pkey;
return BN_cmp(DH_get0_pub_key(a_dh), DH_get0_pub_key(b_dh)) == 0;
}
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dh_asn1_meth = {
.pkey_id = EVP_PKEY_DH,
.pkey_method = &dh_pkey_meth,
.pub_cmp = dh_pub_cmp,
.pkey_size = dh_size,
.pkey_bits = dh_bits,
.param_missing = dh_param_missing,
.param_copy = dh_param_copy,
.param_cmp = dh_param_cmp,
.pkey_free = dh_free,
};
int EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DH *key) {
if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkey, key)) {
DH_up_ref(key);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
int EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DH *key) {
evp_pkey_set_method(pkey, &dh_asn1_meth);
pkey->pkey = key;
return key != NULL;
}
DH *EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DH_KEY);
return NULL;
}
return pkey->pkey;
}
DH *EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
DH *dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(pkey);
if (dh != NULL) {
DH_up_ref(dh);
}
return dh;
}
@@ -306,3 +306,33 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_q_bits(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int qbits) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
int EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DSA *key) {
if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, key)) {
DSA_up_ref(key);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
int EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DSA *key) {
evp_pkey_set_method(pkey, &dsa_asn1_meth);
pkey->pkey = key;
return key != NULL;
}
DSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DSA_KEY);
return NULL;
}
return pkey->pkey;
}
DSA *EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
DSA *dsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pkey);
if (dsa != NULL) {
DSA_up_ref(dsa);
}
return dsa;
}
+4 -8
View File
@@ -80,28 +80,24 @@ typedef struct {
static int pkey_ec_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx;
dctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EC_PKEY_CTX));
EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EC_PKEY_CTX));
if (!dctx) {
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_memset(dctx, 0, sizeof(EC_PKEY_CTX));
ctx->data = dctx;
return 1;
}
static int pkey_ec_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src) {
EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx;
if (!pkey_ec_init(dst)) {
return 0;
}
sctx = src->data;
dctx = dst->data;
const EC_PKEY_CTX *sctx = src->data;
EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = dst->data;
dctx->md = sctx->md;
dctx->gen_group = sctx->gen_group;
return 1;
}
@@ -300,3 +300,33 @@ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD ec_asn1_meth = {
int_ec_free,
};
int EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey, EC_KEY *key) {
if (EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, key)) {
EC_KEY_up_ref(key);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
int EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey, EC_KEY *key) {
evp_pkey_set_method(pkey, &ec_asn1_meth);
pkey->pkey = key;
return key != NULL;
}
EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_EC_KEY_KEY);
return NULL;
}
return pkey->pkey;
}
EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
if (ec_key != NULL) {
EC_KEY_up_ref(ec_key);
}
return ec_key;
}
@@ -30,10 +30,7 @@ static int pkey_ed25519_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
return 0;
}
if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, EVP_PKEY_ED25519)) {
OPENSSL_free(key);
return 0;
}
evp_pkey_set_method(pkey, &ed25519_asn1_meth);
uint8_t pubkey_unused[32];
ED25519_keypair(pubkey_unused, key->key);
+1 -2
View File
@@ -35,12 +35,11 @@ typedef struct {
} HKDF_PKEY_CTX;
static int pkey_hkdf_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
HKDF_PKEY_CTX *hctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(HKDF_PKEY_CTX));
HKDF_PKEY_CTX *hctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(HKDF_PKEY_CTX));
if (hctx == NULL) {
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_memset(hctx, 0, sizeof(HKDF_PKEY_CTX));
if (!CBB_init(&hctx->info, 0)) {
OPENSSL_free(hctx);
return 0;
+1 -3
View File
@@ -97,12 +97,10 @@ typedef struct {
} RSA_OAEP_LABEL_PARAMS;
static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx;
rctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA_PKEY_CTX));
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(RSA_PKEY_CTX));
if (!rctx) {
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_memset(rctx, 0, sizeof(RSA_PKEY_CTX));
rctx->nbits = 2048;
rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
@@ -209,3 +209,33 @@ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_asn1_meth = {
int_rsa_free,
};
int EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, RSA *key) {
if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, key)) {
RSA_up_ref(key);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
int EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, RSA *key) {
evp_pkey_set_method(pkey, &rsa_asn1_meth);
pkey->pkey = key;
return key != NULL;
}
RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_RSA_KEY);
return NULL;
}
return pkey->pkey;
}
RSA *EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
if (rsa != NULL) {
RSA_up_ref(rsa);
}
return rsa;
}
@@ -30,10 +30,7 @@ static int pkey_x25519_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
return 0;
}
if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, EVP_PKEY_X25519)) {
OPENSSL_free(key);
return 0;
}
evp_pkey_set_method(pkey, &x25519_asn1_meth);
X25519_keypair(key->pub, key->priv);
key->has_private = 1;
+2 -2
View File
@@ -170,12 +170,12 @@ int EVP_PBE_scrypt(const char *password, size_t password_len,
// Allocate and divide up the scratch space. |max_mem| fits in a size_t, which
// is no bigger than uint64_t, so none of these operations may overflow.
static_assert(UINT64_MAX >= ((size_t)-1), "size_t exceeds uint64_t");
static_assert(UINT64_MAX >= SIZE_MAX, "size_t exceeds uint64_t");
size_t B_blocks = p * 2 * r;
size_t B_bytes = B_blocks * sizeof(block_t);
size_t T_blocks = 2 * r;
size_t V_blocks = N * 2 * r;
block_t *B = OPENSSL_malloc((B_blocks + T_blocks + V_blocks) * sizeof(block_t));
block_t *B = OPENSSL_calloc(B_blocks + T_blocks + V_blocks, sizeof(block_t));
if (B == NULL) {
return 0;
}
+6 -7
View File
@@ -132,11 +132,11 @@ struct crypto_ex_data_func_st {
CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS *next;
};
int CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS *ex_data_class, int *out_index,
long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
int CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index_ex(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS *ex_data_class, long argl,
void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS *funcs = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS));
if (funcs == NULL) {
return 0;
return -1;
}
funcs->argl = argl;
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ int CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS *ex_data_class, int *out_index,
if (num_funcs > (size_t)(INT_MAX - ex_data_class->num_reserved)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CRYPTO, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&ex_data_class->lock);
return 0;
return -1;
}
// Append |funcs| to the linked list.
@@ -166,8 +166,7 @@ int CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS *ex_data_class, int *out_index,
CRYPTO_atomic_store_u32(&ex_data_class->num_funcs, num_funcs + 1);
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&ex_data_class->lock);
*out_index = (int)num_funcs + ex_data_class->num_reserved;
return 1;
return (int)num_funcs + ex_data_class->num_reserved;
}
int CRYPTO_set_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int index, void *val) {
@@ -215,7 +214,7 @@ void CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS *ex_data_class, void *obj,
}
uint32_t num_funcs = CRYPTO_atomic_load_u32(&ex_data_class->num_funcs);
// |CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index| will not allocate indices beyond |INT_MAX|.
// |CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index_ex| will not allocate indices beyond |INT_MAX|.
assert(num_funcs <= (size_t)(INT_MAX - ex_data_class->num_reserved));
// Defer dereferencing |ex_data_class->funcs| and |funcs->next|. It must come
@@ -104,3 +104,24 @@ int AES_set_decrypt_key(const uint8_t *key, unsigned bits, AES_KEY *aeskey) {
return aes_nohw_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, aeskey);
}
}
#if defined(HWAES) && (defined(OPENSSL_X86) || defined(OPENSSL_X86_64))
// On x86 and x86_64, |aes_hw_set_decrypt_key|, we implement
// |aes_hw_encrypt_key_to_decrypt_key| in assembly and rely on C code to combine
// the operations.
int aes_hw_set_decrypt_key(const uint8_t *user_key, int bits, AES_KEY *key) {
int ret = aes_hw_set_encrypt_key(user_key, bits, key);
if (ret == 0) {
aes_hw_encrypt_key_to_decrypt_key(key);
}
return ret;
}
int aes_hw_set_encrypt_key(const uint8_t *user_key, int bits, AES_KEY *key) {
if (aes_hw_set_encrypt_key_alt_preferred()) {
return aes_hw_set_encrypt_key_alt(user_key, bits, key);
} else {
return aes_hw_set_encrypt_key_base(user_key, bits, key);
}
}
#endif
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_aes.h>
#include "../../internal.h"
#if defined(__cplusplus)
@@ -66,17 +68,41 @@ OPENSSL_INLINE int vpaes_capable(void) { return CRYPTO_is_NEON_capable(); }
#if defined(HWAES)
int aes_hw_set_encrypt_key(const uint8_t *user_key, const int bits,
AES_KEY *key);
int aes_hw_set_decrypt_key(const uint8_t *user_key, const int bits,
AES_KEY *key);
int aes_hw_set_encrypt_key(const uint8_t *user_key, int bits, AES_KEY *key);
int aes_hw_set_decrypt_key(const uint8_t *user_key, int bits, AES_KEY *key);
void aes_hw_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const AES_KEY *key);
void aes_hw_decrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const AES_KEY *key);
void aes_hw_cbc_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t length,
const AES_KEY *key, uint8_t *ivec, const int enc);
const AES_KEY *key, uint8_t *ivec, int enc);
void aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
const AES_KEY *key, const uint8_t ivec[16]);
#if defined(OPENSSL_X86) || defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
// On x86 and x86_64, |aes_hw_set_decrypt_key| is implemented in terms of
// |aes_hw_set_encrypt_key| and a conversion function.
void aes_hw_encrypt_key_to_decrypt_key(AES_KEY *key);
// There are two variants of this function, one which uses aeskeygenassist
// ("base") and one which uses aesenclast + pshufb ("alt"). aesenclast is
// overall faster but is slower on some older processors. It doesn't use AVX,
// but AVX is used as a proxy to detecting this. See
// https://groups.google.com/g/mailing.openssl.dev/c/OuFXwW4NfO8/m/7d2ZXVjkxVkJ
//
// TODO(davidben): It is unclear if the aeskeygenassist version is still
// worthwhile. However, the aesenclast version requires SSSE3. SSSE3 long
// predates AES-NI, but it's not clear if AES-NI implies SSSE3. In OpenSSL, the
// CCM AES-NI assembly seems to assume it does.
OPENSSL_INLINE int aes_hw_set_encrypt_key_alt_capable(void) {
return hwaes_capable() && CRYPTO_is_SSSE3_capable();
}
OPENSSL_INLINE int aes_hw_set_encrypt_key_alt_preferred(void) {
return hwaes_capable() && CRYPTO_is_AVX_capable();
}
int aes_hw_set_encrypt_key_base(const uint8_t *user_key, int bits,
AES_KEY *key);
int aes_hw_set_encrypt_key_alt(const uint8_t *user_key, int bits, AES_KEY *key);
#endif // OPENSSL_X86 || OPENSSL_X86_64
#else
// If HWAES isn't defined then we provide dummy functions for each of the hwaes
@@ -120,7 +146,7 @@ OPENSSL_INLINE void aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out,
#if defined(HWAES_ECB)
void aes_hw_ecb_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t length,
const AES_KEY *key, const int enc);
const AES_KEY *key, int enc);
#endif // HWAES_ECB
@@ -218,7 +244,7 @@ void aes_nohw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out,
size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key,
const uint8_t ivec[16]);
void aes_nohw_cbc_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
const AES_KEY *key, uint8_t *ivec, const int enc);
const AES_KEY *key, uint8_t *ivec, int enc);
#if defined(__cplusplus)
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
@@ -1,808 +0,0 @@
#define BORINGSSL_PREFIX CCryptoBoringSSL
#if defined(__arm__) && defined(__APPLE__)
// This file is generated from a similarly-named Perl script in the BoringSSL
// source tree. Do not edit by hand.
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_asm_base.h>
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_ARM) && defined(__APPLE__)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_arm_arch.h>
#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
.text
.code 32
#undef __thumb2__
.align 5
Lrcon:
.long 0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01
.long 0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d @ rotate-n-splat
.long 0x1b,0x1b,0x1b,0x1b
.text
.globl _aes_hw_set_encrypt_key
.private_extern _aes_hw_set_encrypt_key
#ifdef __thumb2__
.thumb_func _aes_hw_set_encrypt_key
#endif
.align 5
_aes_hw_set_encrypt_key:
Lenc_key:
mov r3,#-1
cmp r0,#0
beq Lenc_key_abort
cmp r2,#0
beq Lenc_key_abort
mov r3,#-2
cmp r1,#128
blt Lenc_key_abort
cmp r1,#256
bgt Lenc_key_abort
tst r1,#0x3f
bne Lenc_key_abort
adr r3,Lrcon
cmp r1,#192
veor q0,q0,q0
vld1.8 {q3},[r0]!
mov r1,#8 @ reuse r1
vld1.32 {q1,q2},[r3]!
blt Loop128
beq L192
b L256
.align 4
Loop128:
vtbl.8 d20,{q3},d4
vtbl.8 d21,{q3},d5
vext.8 q9,q0,q3,#12
vst1.32 {q3},[r2]!
.byte 0x00,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q10,q0
subs r1,r1,#1
veor q3,q3,q9
vext.8 q9,q0,q9,#12
veor q3,q3,q9
vext.8 q9,q0,q9,#12
veor q10,q10,q1
veor q3,q3,q9
vshl.u8 q1,q1,#1
veor q3,q3,q10
bne Loop128
vld1.32 {q1},[r3]
vtbl.8 d20,{q3},d4
vtbl.8 d21,{q3},d5
vext.8 q9,q0,q3,#12
vst1.32 {q3},[r2]!
.byte 0x00,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q10,q0
veor q3,q3,q9
vext.8 q9,q0,q9,#12
veor q3,q3,q9
vext.8 q9,q0,q9,#12
veor q10,q10,q1
veor q3,q3,q9
vshl.u8 q1,q1,#1
veor q3,q3,q10
vtbl.8 d20,{q3},d4
vtbl.8 d21,{q3},d5
vext.8 q9,q0,q3,#12
vst1.32 {q3},[r2]!
.byte 0x00,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q10,q0
veor q3,q3,q9
vext.8 q9,q0,q9,#12
veor q3,q3,q9
vext.8 q9,q0,q9,#12
veor q10,q10,q1
veor q3,q3,q9
veor q3,q3,q10
vst1.32 {q3},[r2]
add r2,r2,#0x50
mov r12,#10
b Ldone
.align 4
L192:
vld1.8 {d16},[r0]!
vmov.i8 q10,#8 @ borrow q10
vst1.32 {q3},[r2]!
vsub.i8 q2,q2,q10 @ adjust the mask
Loop192:
vtbl.8 d20,{q8},d4
vtbl.8 d21,{q8},d5
vext.8 q9,q0,q3,#12
vst1.32 {d16},[r2]!
.byte 0x00,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q10,q0
subs r1,r1,#1
veor q3,q3,q9
vext.8 q9,q0,q9,#12
veor q3,q3,q9
vext.8 q9,q0,q9,#12
veor q3,q3,q9
vdup.32 q9,d7[1]
veor q9,q9,q8
veor q10,q10,q1
vext.8 q8,q0,q8,#12
vshl.u8 q1,q1,#1
veor q8,q8,q9
veor q3,q3,q10
veor q8,q8,q10
vst1.32 {q3},[r2]!
bne Loop192
mov r12,#12
add r2,r2,#0x20
b Ldone
.align 4
L256:
vld1.8 {q8},[r0]
mov r1,#7
mov r12,#14
vst1.32 {q3},[r2]!
Loop256:
vtbl.8 d20,{q8},d4
vtbl.8 d21,{q8},d5
vext.8 q9,q0,q3,#12
vst1.32 {q8},[r2]!
.byte 0x00,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q10,q0
subs r1,r1,#1
veor q3,q3,q9
vext.8 q9,q0,q9,#12
veor q3,q3,q9
vext.8 q9,q0,q9,#12
veor q10,q10,q1
veor q3,q3,q9
vshl.u8 q1,q1,#1
veor q3,q3,q10
vst1.32 {q3},[r2]!
beq Ldone
vdup.32 q10,d7[1]
vext.8 q9,q0,q8,#12
.byte 0x00,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q10,q0
veor q8,q8,q9
vext.8 q9,q0,q9,#12
veor q8,q8,q9
vext.8 q9,q0,q9,#12
veor q8,q8,q9
veor q8,q8,q10
b Loop256
Ldone:
str r12,[r2]
mov r3,#0
Lenc_key_abort:
mov r0,r3 @ return value
bx lr
.globl _aes_hw_set_decrypt_key
.private_extern _aes_hw_set_decrypt_key
#ifdef __thumb2__
.thumb_func _aes_hw_set_decrypt_key
#endif
.align 5
_aes_hw_set_decrypt_key:
stmdb sp!,{r4,lr}
bl Lenc_key
cmp r0,#0
bne Ldec_key_abort
sub r2,r2,#240 @ restore original r2
mov r4,#-16
add r0,r2,r12,lsl#4 @ end of key schedule
vld1.32 {q0},[r2]
vld1.32 {q1},[r0]
vst1.32 {q0},[r0],r4
vst1.32 {q1},[r2]!
Loop_imc:
vld1.32 {q0},[r2]
vld1.32 {q1},[r0]
.byte 0xc0,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesimc q0,q0
.byte 0xc2,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesimc q1,q1
vst1.32 {q0},[r0],r4
vst1.32 {q1},[r2]!
cmp r0,r2
bhi Loop_imc
vld1.32 {q0},[r2]
.byte 0xc0,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesimc q0,q0
vst1.32 {q0},[r0]
eor r0,r0,r0 @ return value
Ldec_key_abort:
ldmia sp!,{r4,pc}
.globl _aes_hw_encrypt
.private_extern _aes_hw_encrypt
#ifdef __thumb2__
.thumb_func _aes_hw_encrypt
#endif
.align 5
_aes_hw_encrypt:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ldr r3,[r2,#240]
vld1.32 {q0},[r2]!
vld1.8 {q2},[r0]
sub r3,r3,#2
vld1.32 {q1},[r2]!
Loop_enc:
.byte 0x00,0x43,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q2,q0
.byte 0x84,0x43,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q2,q2
vld1.32 {q0},[r2]!
subs r3,r3,#2
.byte 0x02,0x43,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q2,q1
.byte 0x84,0x43,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q2,q2
vld1.32 {q1},[r2]!
bgt Loop_enc
.byte 0x00,0x43,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q2,q0
.byte 0x84,0x43,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q2,q2
vld1.32 {q0},[r2]
.byte 0x02,0x43,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q2,q1
veor q2,q2,q0
vst1.8 {q2},[r1]
bx lr
.globl _aes_hw_decrypt
.private_extern _aes_hw_decrypt
#ifdef __thumb2__
.thumb_func _aes_hw_decrypt
#endif
.align 5
_aes_hw_decrypt:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ldr r3,[r2,#240]
vld1.32 {q0},[r2]!
vld1.8 {q2},[r0]
sub r3,r3,#2
vld1.32 {q1},[r2]!
Loop_dec:
.byte 0x40,0x43,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q2,q0
.byte 0xc4,0x43,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesimc q2,q2
vld1.32 {q0},[r2]!
subs r3,r3,#2
.byte 0x42,0x43,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q2,q1
.byte 0xc4,0x43,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesimc q2,q2
vld1.32 {q1},[r2]!
bgt Loop_dec
.byte 0x40,0x43,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q2,q0
.byte 0xc4,0x43,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesimc q2,q2
vld1.32 {q0},[r2]
.byte 0x42,0x43,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q2,q1
veor q2,q2,q0
vst1.8 {q2},[r1]
bx lr
.globl _aes_hw_cbc_encrypt
.private_extern _aes_hw_cbc_encrypt
#ifdef __thumb2__
.thumb_func _aes_hw_cbc_encrypt
#endif
.align 5
_aes_hw_cbc_encrypt:
mov ip,sp
stmdb sp!,{r4,r5,r6,r7,r8,lr}
vstmdb sp!,{d8,d9,d10,d11,d12,d13,d14,d15} @ ABI specification says so
ldmia ip,{r4,r5} @ load remaining args
subs r2,r2,#16
mov r8,#16
blo Lcbc_abort
moveq r8,#0
cmp r5,#0 @ en- or decrypting?
ldr r5,[r3,#240]
and r2,r2,#-16
vld1.8 {q6},[r4]
vld1.8 {q0},[r0],r8
vld1.32 {q8,q9},[r3] @ load key schedule...
sub r5,r5,#6
add r7,r3,r5,lsl#4 @ pointer to last 7 round keys
sub r5,r5,#2
vld1.32 {q10,q11},[r7]!
vld1.32 {q12,q13},[r7]!
vld1.32 {q14,q15},[r7]!
vld1.32 {q7},[r7]
add r7,r3,#32
mov r6,r5
beq Lcbc_dec
cmp r5,#2
veor q0,q0,q6
veor q5,q8,q7
beq Lcbc_enc128
vld1.32 {q2,q3},[r7]
add r7,r3,#16
add r6,r3,#16*4
add r12,r3,#16*5
.byte 0x20,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q8
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
add r14,r3,#16*6
add r3,r3,#16*7
b Lenter_cbc_enc
.align 4
Loop_cbc_enc:
.byte 0x20,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q8
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
vst1.8 {q6},[r1]!
Lenter_cbc_enc:
.byte 0x22,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q9
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
.byte 0x04,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q2
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
vld1.32 {q8},[r6]
cmp r5,#4
.byte 0x06,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q3
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
vld1.32 {q9},[r12]
beq Lcbc_enc192
.byte 0x20,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q8
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
vld1.32 {q8},[r14]
.byte 0x22,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q9
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
vld1.32 {q9},[r3]
nop
Lcbc_enc192:
.byte 0x20,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q8
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
subs r2,r2,#16
.byte 0x22,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q9
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
moveq r8,#0
.byte 0x24,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q10
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
.byte 0x26,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q11
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
vld1.8 {q8},[r0],r8
.byte 0x28,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q12
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
veor q8,q8,q5
.byte 0x2a,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q13
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
vld1.32 {q9},[r7] @ re-pre-load rndkey[1]
.byte 0x2c,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q14
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
.byte 0x2e,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q15
veor q6,q0,q7
bhs Loop_cbc_enc
vst1.8 {q6},[r1]!
b Lcbc_done
.align 5
Lcbc_enc128:
vld1.32 {q2,q3},[r7]
.byte 0x20,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q8
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
b Lenter_cbc_enc128
Loop_cbc_enc128:
.byte 0x20,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q8
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
vst1.8 {q6},[r1]!
Lenter_cbc_enc128:
.byte 0x22,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q9
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
subs r2,r2,#16
.byte 0x04,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q2
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
moveq r8,#0
.byte 0x06,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q3
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
.byte 0x24,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q10
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
.byte 0x26,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q11
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
vld1.8 {q8},[r0],r8
.byte 0x28,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q12
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
.byte 0x2a,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q13
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
.byte 0x2c,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q14
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
veor q8,q8,q5
.byte 0x2e,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q15
veor q6,q0,q7
bhs Loop_cbc_enc128
vst1.8 {q6},[r1]!
b Lcbc_done
.align 5
Lcbc_dec:
vld1.8 {q10},[r0]!
subs r2,r2,#32 @ bias
add r6,r5,#2
vorr q3,q0,q0
vorr q1,q0,q0
vorr q11,q10,q10
blo Lcbc_dec_tail
vorr q1,q10,q10
vld1.8 {q10},[r0]!
vorr q2,q0,q0
vorr q3,q1,q1
vorr q11,q10,q10
Loop3x_cbc_dec:
.byte 0x60,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q0,q8
.byte 0xc0,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesimc q0,q0
.byte 0x60,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q1,q8
.byte 0xc2,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesimc q1,q1
.byte 0x60,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesd q10,q8
.byte 0xe4,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesimc q10,q10
vld1.32 {q8},[r7]!
subs r6,r6,#2
.byte 0x62,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q0,q9
.byte 0xc0,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesimc q0,q0
.byte 0x62,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q1,q9
.byte 0xc2,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesimc q1,q1
.byte 0x62,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesd q10,q9
.byte 0xe4,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesimc q10,q10
vld1.32 {q9},[r7]!
bgt Loop3x_cbc_dec
.byte 0x60,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q0,q8
.byte 0xc0,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesimc q0,q0
.byte 0x60,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q1,q8
.byte 0xc2,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesimc q1,q1
.byte 0x60,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesd q10,q8
.byte 0xe4,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesimc q10,q10
veor q4,q6,q7
subs r2,r2,#0x30
veor q5,q2,q7
movlo r6,r2 @ r6, r6, is zero at this point
.byte 0x62,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q0,q9
.byte 0xc0,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesimc q0,q0
.byte 0x62,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q1,q9
.byte 0xc2,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesimc q1,q1
.byte 0x62,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesd q10,q9
.byte 0xe4,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesimc q10,q10
veor q9,q3,q7
add r0,r0,r6 @ r0 is adjusted in such way that
@ at exit from the loop q1-q10
@ are loaded with last "words"
vorr q6,q11,q11
mov r7,r3
.byte 0x68,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q0,q12
.byte 0xc0,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesimc q0,q0
.byte 0x68,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q1,q12
.byte 0xc2,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesimc q1,q1
.byte 0x68,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesd q10,q12
.byte 0xe4,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesimc q10,q10
vld1.8 {q2},[r0]!
.byte 0x6a,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q0,q13
.byte 0xc0,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesimc q0,q0
.byte 0x6a,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q1,q13
.byte 0xc2,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesimc q1,q1
.byte 0x6a,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesd q10,q13
.byte 0xe4,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesimc q10,q10
vld1.8 {q3},[r0]!
.byte 0x6c,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q0,q14
.byte 0xc0,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesimc q0,q0
.byte 0x6c,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q1,q14
.byte 0xc2,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesimc q1,q1
.byte 0x6c,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesd q10,q14
.byte 0xe4,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesimc q10,q10
vld1.8 {q11},[r0]!
.byte 0x6e,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q0,q15
.byte 0x6e,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q1,q15
.byte 0x6e,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesd q10,q15
vld1.32 {q8},[r7]! @ re-pre-load rndkey[0]
add r6,r5,#2
veor q4,q4,q0
veor q5,q5,q1
veor q10,q10,q9
vld1.32 {q9},[r7]! @ re-pre-load rndkey[1]
vst1.8 {q4},[r1]!
vorr q0,q2,q2
vst1.8 {q5},[r1]!
vorr q1,q3,q3
vst1.8 {q10},[r1]!
vorr q10,q11,q11
bhs Loop3x_cbc_dec
cmn r2,#0x30
beq Lcbc_done
nop
Lcbc_dec_tail:
.byte 0x60,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q1,q8
.byte 0xc2,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesimc q1,q1
.byte 0x60,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesd q10,q8
.byte 0xe4,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesimc q10,q10
vld1.32 {q8},[r7]!
subs r6,r6,#2
.byte 0x62,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q1,q9
.byte 0xc2,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesimc q1,q1
.byte 0x62,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesd q10,q9
.byte 0xe4,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesimc q10,q10
vld1.32 {q9},[r7]!
bgt Lcbc_dec_tail
.byte 0x60,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q1,q8
.byte 0xc2,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesimc q1,q1
.byte 0x60,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesd q10,q8
.byte 0xe4,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesimc q10,q10
.byte 0x62,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q1,q9
.byte 0xc2,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesimc q1,q1
.byte 0x62,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesd q10,q9
.byte 0xe4,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesimc q10,q10
.byte 0x68,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q1,q12
.byte 0xc2,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesimc q1,q1
.byte 0x68,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesd q10,q12
.byte 0xe4,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesimc q10,q10
cmn r2,#0x20
.byte 0x6a,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q1,q13
.byte 0xc2,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesimc q1,q1
.byte 0x6a,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesd q10,q13
.byte 0xe4,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesimc q10,q10
veor q5,q6,q7
.byte 0x6c,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q1,q14
.byte 0xc2,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesimc q1,q1
.byte 0x6c,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesd q10,q14
.byte 0xe4,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesimc q10,q10
veor q9,q3,q7
.byte 0x6e,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesd q1,q15
.byte 0x6e,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesd q10,q15
beq Lcbc_dec_one
veor q5,q5,q1
veor q9,q9,q10
vorr q6,q11,q11
vst1.8 {q5},[r1]!
vst1.8 {q9},[r1]!
b Lcbc_done
Lcbc_dec_one:
veor q5,q5,q10
vorr q6,q11,q11
vst1.8 {q5},[r1]!
Lcbc_done:
vst1.8 {q6},[r4]
Lcbc_abort:
vldmia sp!,{d8,d9,d10,d11,d12,d13,d14,d15}
ldmia sp!,{r4,r5,r6,r7,r8,pc}
.globl _aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
.private_extern _aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
#ifdef __thumb2__
.thumb_func _aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
#endif
.align 5
_aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
mov ip,sp
stmdb sp!,{r4,r5,r6,r7,r8,r9,r10,lr}
vstmdb sp!,{d8,d9,d10,d11,d12,d13,d14,d15} @ ABI specification says so
ldr r4, [ip] @ load remaining arg
ldr r5,[r3,#240]
ldr r8, [r4, #12]
vld1.32 {q0},[r4]
vld1.32 {q8,q9},[r3] @ load key schedule...
sub r5,r5,#4
mov r12,#16
cmp r2,#2
add r7,r3,r5,lsl#4 @ pointer to last 5 round keys
sub r5,r5,#2
vld1.32 {q12,q13},[r7]!
vld1.32 {q14,q15},[r7]!
vld1.32 {q7},[r7]
add r7,r3,#32
mov r6,r5
movlo r12,#0
@ ARM Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72 cores running in 32-bit mode are
@ affected by silicon errata #1742098 [0] and #1655431 [1],
@ respectively, where the second instruction of an aese/aesmc
@ instruction pair may execute twice if an interrupt is taken right
@ after the first instruction consumes an input register of which a
@ single 32-bit lane has been updated the last time it was modified.
@
@ This function uses a counter in one 32-bit lane. The
@ could write to q1 and q10 directly, but that trips this bugs.
@ We write to q6 and copy to the final register as a workaround.
@
@ [0] ARM-EPM-049219 v23 Cortex-A57 MPCore Software Developers Errata Notice
@ [1] ARM-EPM-012079 v11.0 Cortex-A72 MPCore Software Developers Errata Notice
#ifndef __ARMEB__
rev r8, r8
#endif
add r10, r8, #1
vorr q6,q0,q0
rev r10, r10
vmov.32 d13[1],r10
add r8, r8, #2
vorr q1,q6,q6
bls Lctr32_tail
rev r12, r8
vmov.32 d13[1],r12
sub r2,r2,#3 @ bias
vorr q10,q6,q6
b Loop3x_ctr32
.align 4
Loop3x_ctr32:
.byte 0x20,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q8
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
.byte 0x20,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q1,q8
.byte 0x82,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q1,q1
.byte 0x20,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q10,q8
.byte 0xa4,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesmc q10,q10
vld1.32 {q8},[r7]!
subs r6,r6,#2
.byte 0x22,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q9
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
.byte 0x22,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q1,q9
.byte 0x82,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q1,q1
.byte 0x22,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q10,q9
.byte 0xa4,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesmc q10,q10
vld1.32 {q9},[r7]!
bgt Loop3x_ctr32
.byte 0x20,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q8
.byte 0x80,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q4,q0
.byte 0x20,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q1,q8
.byte 0x82,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q5,q1
vld1.8 {q2},[r0]!
add r9,r8,#1
.byte 0x20,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q10,q8
.byte 0xa4,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesmc q10,q10
vld1.8 {q3},[r0]!
rev r9,r9
.byte 0x22,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q4,q9
.byte 0x88,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q4,q4
.byte 0x22,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q5,q9
.byte 0x8a,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q5,q5
vld1.8 {q11},[r0]!
mov r7,r3
.byte 0x22,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q10,q9
.byte 0xa4,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesmc q9,q10
.byte 0x28,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q4,q12
.byte 0x88,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q4,q4
.byte 0x28,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q5,q12
.byte 0x8a,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q5,q5
veor q2,q2,q7
add r10,r8,#2
.byte 0x28,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q9,q12
.byte 0xa2,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesmc q9,q9
veor q3,q3,q7
add r8,r8,#3
.byte 0x2a,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q4,q13
.byte 0x88,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q4,q4
.byte 0x2a,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q5,q13
.byte 0x8a,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q5,q5
@ Note the logic to update q0, q1, and q1 is written to work
@ around a bug in ARM Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72 cores running in
@ 32-bit mode. See the comment above.
veor q11,q11,q7
vmov.32 d13[1], r9
.byte 0x2a,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q9,q13
.byte 0xa2,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesmc q9,q9
vorr q0,q6,q6
rev r10,r10
.byte 0x2c,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q4,q14
.byte 0x88,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q4,q4
vmov.32 d13[1], r10
rev r12,r8
.byte 0x2c,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q5,q14
.byte 0x8a,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q5,q5
vorr q1,q6,q6
vmov.32 d13[1], r12
.byte 0x2c,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q9,q14
.byte 0xa2,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesmc q9,q9
vorr q10,q6,q6
subs r2,r2,#3
.byte 0x2e,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q4,q15
.byte 0x2e,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q5,q15
.byte 0x2e,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q9,q15
veor q2,q2,q4
vld1.32 {q8},[r7]! @ re-pre-load rndkey[0]
vst1.8 {q2},[r1]!
veor q3,q3,q5
mov r6,r5
vst1.8 {q3},[r1]!
veor q11,q11,q9
vld1.32 {q9},[r7]! @ re-pre-load rndkey[1]
vst1.8 {q11},[r1]!
bhs Loop3x_ctr32
adds r2,r2,#3
beq Lctr32_done
cmp r2,#1
mov r12,#16
moveq r12,#0
Lctr32_tail:
.byte 0x20,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q8
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
.byte 0x20,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q1,q8
.byte 0x82,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q1,q1
vld1.32 {q8},[r7]!
subs r6,r6,#2
.byte 0x22,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q9
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
.byte 0x22,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q1,q9
.byte 0x82,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q1,q1
vld1.32 {q9},[r7]!
bgt Lctr32_tail
.byte 0x20,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q8
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
.byte 0x20,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q1,q8
.byte 0x82,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q1,q1
.byte 0x22,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q9
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
.byte 0x22,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q1,q9
.byte 0x82,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q1,q1
vld1.8 {q2},[r0],r12
.byte 0x28,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q12
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
.byte 0x28,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q1,q12
.byte 0x82,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q1,q1
vld1.8 {q3},[r0]
.byte 0x2a,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q13
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
.byte 0x2a,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q1,q13
.byte 0x82,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q1,q1
veor q2,q2,q7
.byte 0x2c,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q14
.byte 0x80,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q0,q0
.byte 0x2c,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q1,q14
.byte 0x82,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q1,q1
veor q3,q3,q7
.byte 0x2e,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q0,q15
.byte 0x2e,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q1,q15
cmp r2,#1
veor q2,q2,q0
veor q3,q3,q1
vst1.8 {q2},[r1]!
beq Lctr32_done
vst1.8 {q3},[r1]
Lctr32_done:
vldmia sp!,{d8,d9,d10,d11,d12,d13,d14,d15}
ldmia sp!,{r4,r5,r6,r7,r8,r9,r10,pc}
#endif
#endif // !OPENSSL_NO_ASM && defined(OPENSSL_ARM) && defined(__APPLE__)
#endif // defined(__arm__) && defined(__APPLE__)
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__ELF__)
.section .note.GNU-stack,"",%progbits
#endif
@@ -1,981 +0,0 @@
#define BORINGSSL_PREFIX CCryptoBoringSSL
#if defined(__arm__) && defined(__APPLE__)
// This file is generated from a similarly-named Perl script in the BoringSSL
// source tree. Do not edit by hand.
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_asm_base.h>
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_ARM) && defined(__APPLE__)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_arm_arch.h>
@ Silence ARMv8 deprecated IT instruction warnings. This file is used by both
@ ARMv7 and ARMv8 processors and does not use ARMv8 instructions.
.text
#if defined(__thumb2__)
.syntax unified
.thumb
#else
.code 32
#endif
#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
.align 5
LOPENSSL_armcap:
.word OPENSSL_armcap_P-Lbn_mul_mont
#endif
.globl _bn_mul_mont
.private_extern _bn_mul_mont
#ifdef __thumb2__
.thumb_func _bn_mul_mont
#endif
.align 5
_bn_mul_mont:
Lbn_mul_mont:
ldr ip,[sp,#4] @ load num
stmdb sp!,{r0,r2} @ sp points at argument block
#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
tst ip,#7
bne Lialu
adr r0,Lbn_mul_mont
ldr r2,LOPENSSL_armcap
ldr r0,[r0,r2]
#ifdef __APPLE__
ldr r0,[r0]
#endif
tst r0,#ARMV7_NEON @ NEON available?
ldmia sp, {r0,r2}
beq Lialu
add sp,sp,#8
b bn_mul8x_mont_neon
.align 4
Lialu:
#endif
cmp ip,#2
mov r0,ip @ load num
#ifdef __thumb2__
ittt lt
#endif
movlt r0,#0
addlt sp,sp,#2*4
blt Labrt
stmdb sp!,{r4,r5,r6,r7,r8,r9,r10,r11,r12,lr} @ save 10 registers
mov r0,r0,lsl#2 @ rescale r0 for byte count
sub sp,sp,r0 @ alloca(4*num)
sub sp,sp,#4 @ +extra dword
sub r0,r0,#4 @ "num=num-1"
add r4,r2,r0 @ &bp[num-1]
add r0,sp,r0 @ r0 to point at &tp[num-1]
ldr r8,[r0,#14*4] @ &n0
ldr r2,[r2] @ bp[0]
ldr r5,[r1],#4 @ ap[0],ap++
ldr r6,[r3],#4 @ np[0],np++
ldr r8,[r8] @ *n0
str r4,[r0,#15*4] @ save &bp[num]
umull r10,r11,r5,r2 @ ap[0]*bp[0]
str r8,[r0,#14*4] @ save n0 value
mul r8,r10,r8 @ "tp[0]"*n0
mov r12,#0
umlal r10,r12,r6,r8 @ np[0]*n0+"t[0]"
mov r4,sp
L1st:
ldr r5,[r1],#4 @ ap[j],ap++
mov r10,r11
ldr r6,[r3],#4 @ np[j],np++
mov r11,#0
umlal r10,r11,r5,r2 @ ap[j]*bp[0]
mov r14,#0
umlal r12,r14,r6,r8 @ np[j]*n0
adds r12,r12,r10
str r12,[r4],#4 @ tp[j-1]=,tp++
adc r12,r14,#0
cmp r4,r0
bne L1st
adds r12,r12,r11
ldr r4,[r0,#13*4] @ restore bp
mov r14,#0
ldr r8,[r0,#14*4] @ restore n0
adc r14,r14,#0
str r12,[r0] @ tp[num-1]=
mov r7,sp
str r14,[r0,#4] @ tp[num]=
Louter:
sub r7,r0,r7 @ "original" r0-1 value
sub r1,r1,r7 @ "rewind" ap to &ap[1]
ldr r2,[r4,#4]! @ *(++bp)
sub r3,r3,r7 @ "rewind" np to &np[1]
ldr r5,[r1,#-4] @ ap[0]
ldr r10,[sp] @ tp[0]
ldr r6,[r3,#-4] @ np[0]
ldr r7,[sp,#4] @ tp[1]
mov r11,#0
umlal r10,r11,r5,r2 @ ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0]
str r4,[r0,#13*4] @ save bp
mul r8,r10,r8
mov r12,#0
umlal r10,r12,r6,r8 @ np[0]*n0+"tp[0]"
mov r4,sp
Linner:
ldr r5,[r1],#4 @ ap[j],ap++
adds r10,r11,r7 @ +=tp[j]
ldr r6,[r3],#4 @ np[j],np++
mov r11,#0
umlal r10,r11,r5,r2 @ ap[j]*bp[i]
mov r14,#0
umlal r12,r14,r6,r8 @ np[j]*n0
adc r11,r11,#0
ldr r7,[r4,#8] @ tp[j+1]
adds r12,r12,r10
str r12,[r4],#4 @ tp[j-1]=,tp++
adc r12,r14,#0
cmp r4,r0
bne Linner
adds r12,r12,r11
mov r14,#0
ldr r4,[r0,#13*4] @ restore bp
adc r14,r14,#0
ldr r8,[r0,#14*4] @ restore n0
adds r12,r12,r7
ldr r7,[r0,#15*4] @ restore &bp[num]
adc r14,r14,#0
str r12,[r0] @ tp[num-1]=
str r14,[r0,#4] @ tp[num]=
cmp r4,r7
#ifdef __thumb2__
itt ne
#endif
movne r7,sp
bne Louter
ldr r2,[r0,#12*4] @ pull rp
mov r5,sp
add r0,r0,#4 @ r0 to point at &tp[num]
sub r5,r0,r5 @ "original" num value
mov r4,sp @ "rewind" r4
mov r1,r4 @ "borrow" r1
sub r3,r3,r5 @ "rewind" r3 to &np[0]
subs r7,r7,r7 @ "clear" carry flag
Lsub: ldr r7,[r4],#4
ldr r6,[r3],#4
sbcs r7,r7,r6 @ tp[j]-np[j]
str r7,[r2],#4 @ rp[j]=
teq r4,r0 @ preserve carry
bne Lsub
sbcs r14,r14,#0 @ upmost carry
mov r4,sp @ "rewind" r4
sub r2,r2,r5 @ "rewind" r2
Lcopy: ldr r7,[r4] @ conditional copy
ldr r5,[r2]
str sp,[r4],#4 @ zap tp
#ifdef __thumb2__
it cc
#endif
movcc r5,r7
str r5,[r2],#4
teq r4,r0 @ preserve carry
bne Lcopy
mov sp,r0
add sp,sp,#4 @ skip over tp[num+1]
ldmia sp!,{r4,r5,r6,r7,r8,r9,r10,r11,r12,lr} @ restore registers
add sp,sp,#2*4 @ skip over {r0,r2}
mov r0,#1
Labrt:
#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5
bx lr @ bx lr
#else
tst lr,#1
moveq pc,lr @ be binary compatible with V4, yet
.word 0xe12fff1e @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
#endif
#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
#ifdef __thumb2__
.thumb_func bn_mul8x_mont_neon
#endif
.align 5
bn_mul8x_mont_neon:
mov ip,sp
stmdb sp!,{r4,r5,r6,r7,r8,r9,r10,r11}
vstmdb sp!,{d8,d9,d10,d11,d12,d13,d14,d15} @ ABI specification says so
ldmia ip,{r4,r5} @ load rest of parameter block
mov ip,sp
cmp r5,#8
bhi LNEON_8n
@ special case for r5==8, everything is in register bank...
vld1.32 {d28[0]}, [r2,:32]!
veor d8,d8,d8
sub r7,sp,r5,lsl#4
vld1.32 {d0,d1,d2,d3}, [r1]! @ can't specify :32 :-(
and r7,r7,#-64
vld1.32 {d30[0]}, [r4,:32]
mov sp,r7 @ alloca
vzip.16 d28,d8
vmull.u32 q6,d28,d0[0]
vmull.u32 q7,d28,d0[1]
vmull.u32 q8,d28,d1[0]
vshl.i64 d29,d13,#16
vmull.u32 q9,d28,d1[1]
vadd.u64 d29,d29,d12
veor d8,d8,d8
vmul.u32 d29,d29,d30
vmull.u32 q10,d28,d2[0]
vld1.32 {d4,d5,d6,d7}, [r3]!
vmull.u32 q11,d28,d2[1]
vmull.u32 q12,d28,d3[0]
vzip.16 d29,d8
vmull.u32 q13,d28,d3[1]
vmlal.u32 q6,d29,d4[0]
sub r9,r5,#1
vmlal.u32 q7,d29,d4[1]
vmlal.u32 q8,d29,d5[0]
vmlal.u32 q9,d29,d5[1]
vmlal.u32 q10,d29,d6[0]
vmov q5,q6
vmlal.u32 q11,d29,d6[1]
vmov q6,q7
vmlal.u32 q12,d29,d7[0]
vmov q7,q8
vmlal.u32 q13,d29,d7[1]
vmov q8,q9
vmov q9,q10
vshr.u64 d10,d10,#16
vmov q10,q11
vmov q11,q12
vadd.u64 d10,d10,d11
vmov q12,q13
veor q13,q13
vshr.u64 d10,d10,#16
b LNEON_outer8
.align 4
LNEON_outer8:
vld1.32 {d28[0]}, [r2,:32]!
veor d8,d8,d8
vzip.16 d28,d8
vadd.u64 d12,d12,d10
vmlal.u32 q6,d28,d0[0]
vmlal.u32 q7,d28,d0[1]
vmlal.u32 q8,d28,d1[0]
vshl.i64 d29,d13,#16
vmlal.u32 q9,d28,d1[1]
vadd.u64 d29,d29,d12
veor d8,d8,d8
subs r9,r9,#1
vmul.u32 d29,d29,d30
vmlal.u32 q10,d28,d2[0]
vmlal.u32 q11,d28,d2[1]
vmlal.u32 q12,d28,d3[0]
vzip.16 d29,d8
vmlal.u32 q13,d28,d3[1]
vmlal.u32 q6,d29,d4[0]
vmlal.u32 q7,d29,d4[1]
vmlal.u32 q8,d29,d5[0]
vmlal.u32 q9,d29,d5[1]
vmlal.u32 q10,d29,d6[0]
vmov q5,q6
vmlal.u32 q11,d29,d6[1]
vmov q6,q7
vmlal.u32 q12,d29,d7[0]
vmov q7,q8
vmlal.u32 q13,d29,d7[1]
vmov q8,q9
vmov q9,q10
vshr.u64 d10,d10,#16
vmov q10,q11
vmov q11,q12
vadd.u64 d10,d10,d11
vmov q12,q13
veor q13,q13
vshr.u64 d10,d10,#16
bne LNEON_outer8
vadd.u64 d12,d12,d10
mov r7,sp
vshr.u64 d10,d12,#16
mov r8,r5
vadd.u64 d13,d13,d10
add r6,sp,#96
vshr.u64 d10,d13,#16
vzip.16 d12,d13
b LNEON_tail_entry
.align 4
LNEON_8n:
veor q6,q6,q6
sub r7,sp,#128
veor q7,q7,q7
sub r7,r7,r5,lsl#4
veor q8,q8,q8
and r7,r7,#-64
veor q9,q9,q9
mov sp,r7 @ alloca
veor q10,q10,q10
add r7,r7,#256
veor q11,q11,q11
sub r8,r5,#8
veor q12,q12,q12
veor q13,q13,q13
LNEON_8n_init:
vst1.64 {q6,q7},[r7,:256]!
subs r8,r8,#8
vst1.64 {q8,q9},[r7,:256]!
vst1.64 {q10,q11},[r7,:256]!
vst1.64 {q12,q13},[r7,:256]!
bne LNEON_8n_init
add r6,sp,#256
vld1.32 {d0,d1,d2,d3},[r1]!
add r10,sp,#8
vld1.32 {d30[0]},[r4,:32]
mov r9,r5
b LNEON_8n_outer
.align 4
LNEON_8n_outer:
vld1.32 {d28[0]},[r2,:32]! @ *b++
veor d8,d8,d8
vzip.16 d28,d8
add r7,sp,#128
vld1.32 {d4,d5,d6,d7},[r3]!
vmlal.u32 q6,d28,d0[0]
vmlal.u32 q7,d28,d0[1]
veor d8,d8,d8
vmlal.u32 q8,d28,d1[0]
vshl.i64 d29,d13,#16
vmlal.u32 q9,d28,d1[1]
vadd.u64 d29,d29,d12
vmlal.u32 q10,d28,d2[0]
vmul.u32 d29,d29,d30
vmlal.u32 q11,d28,d2[1]
vst1.32 {d28},[sp,:64] @ put aside smashed b[8*i+0]
vmlal.u32 q12,d28,d3[0]
vzip.16 d29,d8
vmlal.u32 q13,d28,d3[1]
vld1.32 {d28[0]},[r2,:32]! @ *b++
vmlal.u32 q6,d29,d4[0]
veor d10,d10,d10
vmlal.u32 q7,d29,d4[1]
vzip.16 d28,d10
vmlal.u32 q8,d29,d5[0]
vshr.u64 d12,d12,#16
vmlal.u32 q9,d29,d5[1]
vmlal.u32 q10,d29,d6[0]
vadd.u64 d12,d12,d13
vmlal.u32 q11,d29,d6[1]
vshr.u64 d12,d12,#16
vmlal.u32 q12,d29,d7[0]
vmlal.u32 q13,d29,d7[1]
vadd.u64 d14,d14,d12
vst1.32 {d29},[r10,:64]! @ put aside smashed m[8*i+0]
vmlal.u32 q7,d28,d0[0]
vld1.64 {q6},[r6,:128]!
vmlal.u32 q8,d28,d0[1]
veor d8,d8,d8
vmlal.u32 q9,d28,d1[0]
vshl.i64 d29,d15,#16
vmlal.u32 q10,d28,d1[1]
vadd.u64 d29,d29,d14
vmlal.u32 q11,d28,d2[0]
vmul.u32 d29,d29,d30
vmlal.u32 q12,d28,d2[1]
vst1.32 {d28},[r10,:64]! @ put aside smashed b[8*i+1]
vmlal.u32 q13,d28,d3[0]
vzip.16 d29,d8
vmlal.u32 q6,d28,d3[1]
vld1.32 {d28[0]},[r2,:32]! @ *b++
vmlal.u32 q7,d29,d4[0]
veor d10,d10,d10
vmlal.u32 q8,d29,d4[1]
vzip.16 d28,d10
vmlal.u32 q9,d29,d5[0]
vshr.u64 d14,d14,#16
vmlal.u32 q10,d29,d5[1]
vmlal.u32 q11,d29,d6[0]
vadd.u64 d14,d14,d15
vmlal.u32 q12,d29,d6[1]
vshr.u64 d14,d14,#16
vmlal.u32 q13,d29,d7[0]
vmlal.u32 q6,d29,d7[1]
vadd.u64 d16,d16,d14
vst1.32 {d29},[r10,:64]! @ put aside smashed m[8*i+1]
vmlal.u32 q8,d28,d0[0]
vld1.64 {q7},[r6,:128]!
vmlal.u32 q9,d28,d0[1]
veor d8,d8,d8
vmlal.u32 q10,d28,d1[0]
vshl.i64 d29,d17,#16
vmlal.u32 q11,d28,d1[1]
vadd.u64 d29,d29,d16
vmlal.u32 q12,d28,d2[0]
vmul.u32 d29,d29,d30
vmlal.u32 q13,d28,d2[1]
vst1.32 {d28},[r10,:64]! @ put aside smashed b[8*i+2]
vmlal.u32 q6,d28,d3[0]
vzip.16 d29,d8
vmlal.u32 q7,d28,d3[1]
vld1.32 {d28[0]},[r2,:32]! @ *b++
vmlal.u32 q8,d29,d4[0]
veor d10,d10,d10
vmlal.u32 q9,d29,d4[1]
vzip.16 d28,d10
vmlal.u32 q10,d29,d5[0]
vshr.u64 d16,d16,#16
vmlal.u32 q11,d29,d5[1]
vmlal.u32 q12,d29,d6[0]
vadd.u64 d16,d16,d17
vmlal.u32 q13,d29,d6[1]
vshr.u64 d16,d16,#16
vmlal.u32 q6,d29,d7[0]
vmlal.u32 q7,d29,d7[1]
vadd.u64 d18,d18,d16
vst1.32 {d29},[r10,:64]! @ put aside smashed m[8*i+2]
vmlal.u32 q9,d28,d0[0]
vld1.64 {q8},[r6,:128]!
vmlal.u32 q10,d28,d0[1]
veor d8,d8,d8
vmlal.u32 q11,d28,d1[0]
vshl.i64 d29,d19,#16
vmlal.u32 q12,d28,d1[1]
vadd.u64 d29,d29,d18
vmlal.u32 q13,d28,d2[0]
vmul.u32 d29,d29,d30
vmlal.u32 q6,d28,d2[1]
vst1.32 {d28},[r10,:64]! @ put aside smashed b[8*i+3]
vmlal.u32 q7,d28,d3[0]
vzip.16 d29,d8
vmlal.u32 q8,d28,d3[1]
vld1.32 {d28[0]},[r2,:32]! @ *b++
vmlal.u32 q9,d29,d4[0]
veor d10,d10,d10
vmlal.u32 q10,d29,d4[1]
vzip.16 d28,d10
vmlal.u32 q11,d29,d5[0]
vshr.u64 d18,d18,#16
vmlal.u32 q12,d29,d5[1]
vmlal.u32 q13,d29,d6[0]
vadd.u64 d18,d18,d19
vmlal.u32 q6,d29,d6[1]
vshr.u64 d18,d18,#16
vmlal.u32 q7,d29,d7[0]
vmlal.u32 q8,d29,d7[1]
vadd.u64 d20,d20,d18
vst1.32 {d29},[r10,:64]! @ put aside smashed m[8*i+3]
vmlal.u32 q10,d28,d0[0]
vld1.64 {q9},[r6,:128]!
vmlal.u32 q11,d28,d0[1]
veor d8,d8,d8
vmlal.u32 q12,d28,d1[0]
vshl.i64 d29,d21,#16
vmlal.u32 q13,d28,d1[1]
vadd.u64 d29,d29,d20
vmlal.u32 q6,d28,d2[0]
vmul.u32 d29,d29,d30
vmlal.u32 q7,d28,d2[1]
vst1.32 {d28},[r10,:64]! @ put aside smashed b[8*i+4]
vmlal.u32 q8,d28,d3[0]
vzip.16 d29,d8
vmlal.u32 q9,d28,d3[1]
vld1.32 {d28[0]},[r2,:32]! @ *b++
vmlal.u32 q10,d29,d4[0]
veor d10,d10,d10
vmlal.u32 q11,d29,d4[1]
vzip.16 d28,d10
vmlal.u32 q12,d29,d5[0]
vshr.u64 d20,d20,#16
vmlal.u32 q13,d29,d5[1]
vmlal.u32 q6,d29,d6[0]
vadd.u64 d20,d20,d21
vmlal.u32 q7,d29,d6[1]
vshr.u64 d20,d20,#16
vmlal.u32 q8,d29,d7[0]
vmlal.u32 q9,d29,d7[1]
vadd.u64 d22,d22,d20
vst1.32 {d29},[r10,:64]! @ put aside smashed m[8*i+4]
vmlal.u32 q11,d28,d0[0]
vld1.64 {q10},[r6,:128]!
vmlal.u32 q12,d28,d0[1]
veor d8,d8,d8
vmlal.u32 q13,d28,d1[0]
vshl.i64 d29,d23,#16
vmlal.u32 q6,d28,d1[1]
vadd.u64 d29,d29,d22
vmlal.u32 q7,d28,d2[0]
vmul.u32 d29,d29,d30
vmlal.u32 q8,d28,d2[1]
vst1.32 {d28},[r10,:64]! @ put aside smashed b[8*i+5]
vmlal.u32 q9,d28,d3[0]
vzip.16 d29,d8
vmlal.u32 q10,d28,d3[1]
vld1.32 {d28[0]},[r2,:32]! @ *b++
vmlal.u32 q11,d29,d4[0]
veor d10,d10,d10
vmlal.u32 q12,d29,d4[1]
vzip.16 d28,d10
vmlal.u32 q13,d29,d5[0]
vshr.u64 d22,d22,#16
vmlal.u32 q6,d29,d5[1]
vmlal.u32 q7,d29,d6[0]
vadd.u64 d22,d22,d23
vmlal.u32 q8,d29,d6[1]
vshr.u64 d22,d22,#16
vmlal.u32 q9,d29,d7[0]
vmlal.u32 q10,d29,d7[1]
vadd.u64 d24,d24,d22
vst1.32 {d29},[r10,:64]! @ put aside smashed m[8*i+5]
vmlal.u32 q12,d28,d0[0]
vld1.64 {q11},[r6,:128]!
vmlal.u32 q13,d28,d0[1]
veor d8,d8,d8
vmlal.u32 q6,d28,d1[0]
vshl.i64 d29,d25,#16
vmlal.u32 q7,d28,d1[1]
vadd.u64 d29,d29,d24
vmlal.u32 q8,d28,d2[0]
vmul.u32 d29,d29,d30
vmlal.u32 q9,d28,d2[1]
vst1.32 {d28},[r10,:64]! @ put aside smashed b[8*i+6]
vmlal.u32 q10,d28,d3[0]
vzip.16 d29,d8
vmlal.u32 q11,d28,d3[1]
vld1.32 {d28[0]},[r2,:32]! @ *b++
vmlal.u32 q12,d29,d4[0]
veor d10,d10,d10
vmlal.u32 q13,d29,d4[1]
vzip.16 d28,d10
vmlal.u32 q6,d29,d5[0]
vshr.u64 d24,d24,#16
vmlal.u32 q7,d29,d5[1]
vmlal.u32 q8,d29,d6[0]
vadd.u64 d24,d24,d25
vmlal.u32 q9,d29,d6[1]
vshr.u64 d24,d24,#16
vmlal.u32 q10,d29,d7[0]
vmlal.u32 q11,d29,d7[1]
vadd.u64 d26,d26,d24
vst1.32 {d29},[r10,:64]! @ put aside smashed m[8*i+6]
vmlal.u32 q13,d28,d0[0]
vld1.64 {q12},[r6,:128]!
vmlal.u32 q6,d28,d0[1]
veor d8,d8,d8
vmlal.u32 q7,d28,d1[0]
vshl.i64 d29,d27,#16
vmlal.u32 q8,d28,d1[1]
vadd.u64 d29,d29,d26
vmlal.u32 q9,d28,d2[0]
vmul.u32 d29,d29,d30
vmlal.u32 q10,d28,d2[1]
vst1.32 {d28},[r10,:64]! @ put aside smashed b[8*i+7]
vmlal.u32 q11,d28,d3[0]
vzip.16 d29,d8
vmlal.u32 q12,d28,d3[1]
vld1.32 {d28},[sp,:64] @ pull smashed b[8*i+0]
vmlal.u32 q13,d29,d4[0]
vld1.32 {d0,d1,d2,d3},[r1]!
vmlal.u32 q6,d29,d4[1]
vmlal.u32 q7,d29,d5[0]
vshr.u64 d26,d26,#16
vmlal.u32 q8,d29,d5[1]
vmlal.u32 q9,d29,d6[0]
vadd.u64 d26,d26,d27
vmlal.u32 q10,d29,d6[1]
vshr.u64 d26,d26,#16
vmlal.u32 q11,d29,d7[0]
vmlal.u32 q12,d29,d7[1]
vadd.u64 d12,d12,d26
vst1.32 {d29},[r10,:64] @ put aside smashed m[8*i+7]
add r10,sp,#8 @ rewind
sub r8,r5,#8
b LNEON_8n_inner
.align 4
LNEON_8n_inner:
subs r8,r8,#8
vmlal.u32 q6,d28,d0[0]
vld1.64 {q13},[r6,:128]
vmlal.u32 q7,d28,d0[1]
vld1.32 {d29},[r10,:64]! @ pull smashed m[8*i+0]
vmlal.u32 q8,d28,d1[0]
vld1.32 {d4,d5,d6,d7},[r3]!
vmlal.u32 q9,d28,d1[1]
it ne
addne r6,r6,#16 @ don't advance in last iteration
vmlal.u32 q10,d28,d2[0]
vmlal.u32 q11,d28,d2[1]
vmlal.u32 q12,d28,d3[0]
vmlal.u32 q13,d28,d3[1]
vld1.32 {d28},[r10,:64]! @ pull smashed b[8*i+1]
vmlal.u32 q6,d29,d4[0]
vmlal.u32 q7,d29,d4[1]
vmlal.u32 q8,d29,d5[0]
vmlal.u32 q9,d29,d5[1]
vmlal.u32 q10,d29,d6[0]
vmlal.u32 q11,d29,d6[1]
vmlal.u32 q12,d29,d7[0]
vmlal.u32 q13,d29,d7[1]
vst1.64 {q6},[r7,:128]!
vmlal.u32 q7,d28,d0[0]
vld1.64 {q6},[r6,:128]
vmlal.u32 q8,d28,d0[1]
vld1.32 {d29},[r10,:64]! @ pull smashed m[8*i+1]
vmlal.u32 q9,d28,d1[0]
it ne
addne r6,r6,#16 @ don't advance in last iteration
vmlal.u32 q10,d28,d1[1]
vmlal.u32 q11,d28,d2[0]
vmlal.u32 q12,d28,d2[1]
vmlal.u32 q13,d28,d3[0]
vmlal.u32 q6,d28,d3[1]
vld1.32 {d28},[r10,:64]! @ pull smashed b[8*i+2]
vmlal.u32 q7,d29,d4[0]
vmlal.u32 q8,d29,d4[1]
vmlal.u32 q9,d29,d5[0]
vmlal.u32 q10,d29,d5[1]
vmlal.u32 q11,d29,d6[0]
vmlal.u32 q12,d29,d6[1]
vmlal.u32 q13,d29,d7[0]
vmlal.u32 q6,d29,d7[1]
vst1.64 {q7},[r7,:128]!
vmlal.u32 q8,d28,d0[0]
vld1.64 {q7},[r6,:128]
vmlal.u32 q9,d28,d0[1]
vld1.32 {d29},[r10,:64]! @ pull smashed m[8*i+2]
vmlal.u32 q10,d28,d1[0]
it ne
addne r6,r6,#16 @ don't advance in last iteration
vmlal.u32 q11,d28,d1[1]
vmlal.u32 q12,d28,d2[0]
vmlal.u32 q13,d28,d2[1]
vmlal.u32 q6,d28,d3[0]
vmlal.u32 q7,d28,d3[1]
vld1.32 {d28},[r10,:64]! @ pull smashed b[8*i+3]
vmlal.u32 q8,d29,d4[0]
vmlal.u32 q9,d29,d4[1]
vmlal.u32 q10,d29,d5[0]
vmlal.u32 q11,d29,d5[1]
vmlal.u32 q12,d29,d6[0]
vmlal.u32 q13,d29,d6[1]
vmlal.u32 q6,d29,d7[0]
vmlal.u32 q7,d29,d7[1]
vst1.64 {q8},[r7,:128]!
vmlal.u32 q9,d28,d0[0]
vld1.64 {q8},[r6,:128]
vmlal.u32 q10,d28,d0[1]
vld1.32 {d29},[r10,:64]! @ pull smashed m[8*i+3]
vmlal.u32 q11,d28,d1[0]
it ne
addne r6,r6,#16 @ don't advance in last iteration
vmlal.u32 q12,d28,d1[1]
vmlal.u32 q13,d28,d2[0]
vmlal.u32 q6,d28,d2[1]
vmlal.u32 q7,d28,d3[0]
vmlal.u32 q8,d28,d3[1]
vld1.32 {d28},[r10,:64]! @ pull smashed b[8*i+4]
vmlal.u32 q9,d29,d4[0]
vmlal.u32 q10,d29,d4[1]
vmlal.u32 q11,d29,d5[0]
vmlal.u32 q12,d29,d5[1]
vmlal.u32 q13,d29,d6[0]
vmlal.u32 q6,d29,d6[1]
vmlal.u32 q7,d29,d7[0]
vmlal.u32 q8,d29,d7[1]
vst1.64 {q9},[r7,:128]!
vmlal.u32 q10,d28,d0[0]
vld1.64 {q9},[r6,:128]
vmlal.u32 q11,d28,d0[1]
vld1.32 {d29},[r10,:64]! @ pull smashed m[8*i+4]
vmlal.u32 q12,d28,d1[0]
it ne
addne r6,r6,#16 @ don't advance in last iteration
vmlal.u32 q13,d28,d1[1]
vmlal.u32 q6,d28,d2[0]
vmlal.u32 q7,d28,d2[1]
vmlal.u32 q8,d28,d3[0]
vmlal.u32 q9,d28,d3[1]
vld1.32 {d28},[r10,:64]! @ pull smashed b[8*i+5]
vmlal.u32 q10,d29,d4[0]
vmlal.u32 q11,d29,d4[1]
vmlal.u32 q12,d29,d5[0]
vmlal.u32 q13,d29,d5[1]
vmlal.u32 q6,d29,d6[0]
vmlal.u32 q7,d29,d6[1]
vmlal.u32 q8,d29,d7[0]
vmlal.u32 q9,d29,d7[1]
vst1.64 {q10},[r7,:128]!
vmlal.u32 q11,d28,d0[0]
vld1.64 {q10},[r6,:128]
vmlal.u32 q12,d28,d0[1]
vld1.32 {d29},[r10,:64]! @ pull smashed m[8*i+5]
vmlal.u32 q13,d28,d1[0]
it ne
addne r6,r6,#16 @ don't advance in last iteration
vmlal.u32 q6,d28,d1[1]
vmlal.u32 q7,d28,d2[0]
vmlal.u32 q8,d28,d2[1]
vmlal.u32 q9,d28,d3[0]
vmlal.u32 q10,d28,d3[1]
vld1.32 {d28},[r10,:64]! @ pull smashed b[8*i+6]
vmlal.u32 q11,d29,d4[0]
vmlal.u32 q12,d29,d4[1]
vmlal.u32 q13,d29,d5[0]
vmlal.u32 q6,d29,d5[1]
vmlal.u32 q7,d29,d6[0]
vmlal.u32 q8,d29,d6[1]
vmlal.u32 q9,d29,d7[0]
vmlal.u32 q10,d29,d7[1]
vst1.64 {q11},[r7,:128]!
vmlal.u32 q12,d28,d0[0]
vld1.64 {q11},[r6,:128]
vmlal.u32 q13,d28,d0[1]
vld1.32 {d29},[r10,:64]! @ pull smashed m[8*i+6]
vmlal.u32 q6,d28,d1[0]
it ne
addne r6,r6,#16 @ don't advance in last iteration
vmlal.u32 q7,d28,d1[1]
vmlal.u32 q8,d28,d2[0]
vmlal.u32 q9,d28,d2[1]
vmlal.u32 q10,d28,d3[0]
vmlal.u32 q11,d28,d3[1]
vld1.32 {d28},[r10,:64]! @ pull smashed b[8*i+7]
vmlal.u32 q12,d29,d4[0]
vmlal.u32 q13,d29,d4[1]
vmlal.u32 q6,d29,d5[0]
vmlal.u32 q7,d29,d5[1]
vmlal.u32 q8,d29,d6[0]
vmlal.u32 q9,d29,d6[1]
vmlal.u32 q10,d29,d7[0]
vmlal.u32 q11,d29,d7[1]
vst1.64 {q12},[r7,:128]!
vmlal.u32 q13,d28,d0[0]
vld1.64 {q12},[r6,:128]
vmlal.u32 q6,d28,d0[1]
vld1.32 {d29},[r10,:64]! @ pull smashed m[8*i+7]
vmlal.u32 q7,d28,d1[0]
it ne
addne r6,r6,#16 @ don't advance in last iteration
vmlal.u32 q8,d28,d1[1]
vmlal.u32 q9,d28,d2[0]
vmlal.u32 q10,d28,d2[1]
vmlal.u32 q11,d28,d3[0]
vmlal.u32 q12,d28,d3[1]
it eq
subeq r1,r1,r5,lsl#2 @ rewind
vmlal.u32 q13,d29,d4[0]
vld1.32 {d28},[sp,:64] @ pull smashed b[8*i+0]
vmlal.u32 q6,d29,d4[1]
vld1.32 {d0,d1,d2,d3},[r1]!
vmlal.u32 q7,d29,d5[0]
add r10,sp,#8 @ rewind
vmlal.u32 q8,d29,d5[1]
vmlal.u32 q9,d29,d6[0]
vmlal.u32 q10,d29,d6[1]
vmlal.u32 q11,d29,d7[0]
vst1.64 {q13},[r7,:128]!
vmlal.u32 q12,d29,d7[1]
bne LNEON_8n_inner
add r6,sp,#128
vst1.64 {q6,q7},[r7,:256]!
veor q2,q2,q2 @ d4-d5
vst1.64 {q8,q9},[r7,:256]!
veor q3,q3,q3 @ d6-d7
vst1.64 {q10,q11},[r7,:256]!
vst1.64 {q12},[r7,:128]
subs r9,r9,#8
vld1.64 {q6,q7},[r6,:256]!
vld1.64 {q8,q9},[r6,:256]!
vld1.64 {q10,q11},[r6,:256]!
vld1.64 {q12,q13},[r6,:256]!
itt ne
subne r3,r3,r5,lsl#2 @ rewind
bne LNEON_8n_outer
add r7,sp,#128
vst1.64 {q2,q3}, [sp,:256]! @ start wiping stack frame
vshr.u64 d10,d12,#16
vst1.64 {q2,q3},[sp,:256]!
vadd.u64 d13,d13,d10
vst1.64 {q2,q3}, [sp,:256]!
vshr.u64 d10,d13,#16
vst1.64 {q2,q3}, [sp,:256]!
vzip.16 d12,d13
mov r8,r5
b LNEON_tail_entry
.align 4
LNEON_tail:
vadd.u64 d12,d12,d10
vshr.u64 d10,d12,#16
vld1.64 {q8,q9}, [r6, :256]!
vadd.u64 d13,d13,d10
vld1.64 {q10,q11}, [r6, :256]!
vshr.u64 d10,d13,#16
vld1.64 {q12,q13}, [r6, :256]!
vzip.16 d12,d13
LNEON_tail_entry:
vadd.u64 d14,d14,d10
vst1.32 {d12[0]}, [r7, :32]!
vshr.u64 d10,d14,#16
vadd.u64 d15,d15,d10
vshr.u64 d10,d15,#16
vzip.16 d14,d15
vadd.u64 d16,d16,d10
vst1.32 {d14[0]}, [r7, :32]!
vshr.u64 d10,d16,#16
vadd.u64 d17,d17,d10
vshr.u64 d10,d17,#16
vzip.16 d16,d17
vadd.u64 d18,d18,d10
vst1.32 {d16[0]}, [r7, :32]!
vshr.u64 d10,d18,#16
vadd.u64 d19,d19,d10
vshr.u64 d10,d19,#16
vzip.16 d18,d19
vadd.u64 d20,d20,d10
vst1.32 {d18[0]}, [r7, :32]!
vshr.u64 d10,d20,#16
vadd.u64 d21,d21,d10
vshr.u64 d10,d21,#16
vzip.16 d20,d21
vadd.u64 d22,d22,d10
vst1.32 {d20[0]}, [r7, :32]!
vshr.u64 d10,d22,#16
vadd.u64 d23,d23,d10
vshr.u64 d10,d23,#16
vzip.16 d22,d23
vadd.u64 d24,d24,d10
vst1.32 {d22[0]}, [r7, :32]!
vshr.u64 d10,d24,#16
vadd.u64 d25,d25,d10
vshr.u64 d10,d25,#16
vzip.16 d24,d25
vadd.u64 d26,d26,d10
vst1.32 {d24[0]}, [r7, :32]!
vshr.u64 d10,d26,#16
vadd.u64 d27,d27,d10
vshr.u64 d10,d27,#16
vzip.16 d26,d27
vld1.64 {q6,q7}, [r6, :256]!
subs r8,r8,#8
vst1.32 {d26[0]}, [r7, :32]!
bne LNEON_tail
vst1.32 {d10[0]}, [r7, :32] @ top-most bit
sub r3,r3,r5,lsl#2 @ rewind r3
subs r1,sp,#0 @ clear carry flag
add r2,sp,r5,lsl#2
LNEON_sub:
ldmia r1!, {r4,r5,r6,r7}
ldmia r3!, {r8,r9,r10,r11}
sbcs r8, r4,r8
sbcs r9, r5,r9
sbcs r10,r6,r10
sbcs r11,r7,r11
teq r1,r2 @ preserves carry
stmia r0!, {r8,r9,r10,r11}
bne LNEON_sub
ldr r10, [r1] @ load top-most bit
mov r11,sp
veor q0,q0,q0
sub r11,r2,r11 @ this is num*4
veor q1,q1,q1
mov r1,sp
sub r0,r0,r11 @ rewind r0
mov r3,r2 @ second 3/4th of frame
sbcs r10,r10,#0 @ result is carry flag
LNEON_copy_n_zap:
ldmia r1!, {r4,r5,r6,r7}
ldmia r0, {r8,r9,r10,r11}
it cc
movcc r8, r4
vst1.64 {q0,q1}, [r3,:256]! @ wipe
itt cc
movcc r9, r5
movcc r10,r6
vst1.64 {q0,q1}, [r3,:256]! @ wipe
it cc
movcc r11,r7
ldmia r1, {r4,r5,r6,r7}
stmia r0!, {r8,r9,r10,r11}
sub r1,r1,#16
ldmia r0, {r8,r9,r10,r11}
it cc
movcc r8, r4
vst1.64 {q0,q1}, [r1,:256]! @ wipe
itt cc
movcc r9, r5
movcc r10,r6
vst1.64 {q0,q1}, [r3,:256]! @ wipe
it cc
movcc r11,r7
teq r1,r2 @ preserves carry
stmia r0!, {r8,r9,r10,r11}
bne LNEON_copy_n_zap
mov sp,ip
vldmia sp!,{d8,d9,d10,d11,d12,d13,d14,d15}
ldmia sp!,{r4,r5,r6,r7,r8,r9,r10,r11}
bx lr @ bx lr
#endif
.byte 77,111,110,116,103,111,109,101,114,121,32,109,117,108,116,105,112,108,105,99,97,116,105,111,110,32,102,111,114,32,65,82,77,118,52,47,78,69,79,78,44,32,67,82,89,80,84,79,71,65,77,83,32,98,121,32,60,97,112,112,114,111,64,111,112,101,110,115,115,108,46,111,114,103,62,0
.align 2
.align 2
#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
.comm _OPENSSL_armcap_P,4
.non_lazy_symbol_pointer
OPENSSL_armcap_P:
.indirect_symbol _OPENSSL_armcap_P
.long 0
.private_extern _OPENSSL_armcap_P
#endif
#endif // !OPENSSL_NO_ASM && defined(OPENSSL_ARM) && defined(__APPLE__)
#endif // defined(__arm__) && defined(__APPLE__)
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__ELF__)
.section .note.GNU-stack,"",%progbits
#endif
@@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2017, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#if !defined(_GNU_SOURCE)
#define _GNU_SOURCE // needed for syscall() on Linux.
#endif
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_crypto.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#endif
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_digest.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_hmac.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_sha.h>
#include "bcm_interface.h"
#include "../internal.h"
// TODO(crbug.com/362530616): When delocate is removed, build these files as
// separate compilation units again.
#include "aes/aes.c.inc"
#include "aes/aes_nohw.c.inc"
#include "aes/key_wrap.c.inc"
#include "aes/mode_wrappers.c.inc"
#include "bn/add.c.inc"
#include "bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c.inc"
#include "bn/bn.c.inc"
#include "bn/bytes.c.inc"
#include "bn/cmp.c.inc"
#include "bn/ctx.c.inc"
#include "bn/div.c.inc"
#include "bn/div_extra.c.inc"
#include "bn/exponentiation.c.inc"
#include "bn/gcd.c.inc"
#include "bn/gcd_extra.c.inc"
#include "bn/generic.c.inc"
#include "bn/jacobi.c.inc"
#include "bn/montgomery.c.inc"
#include "bn/montgomery_inv.c.inc"
#include "bn/mul.c.inc"
#include "bn/prime.c.inc"
#include "bn/random.c.inc"
#include "bn/rsaz_exp.c.inc"
#include "bn/shift.c.inc"
#include "bn/sqrt.c.inc"
#include "cipher/aead.c.inc"
#include "cipher/cipher.c.inc"
#include "cipher/e_aes.c.inc"
#include "cipher/e_aesccm.c.inc"
#include "cmac/cmac.c.inc"
#include "dh/check.c.inc"
#include "dh/dh.c.inc"
#include "digest/digest.c.inc"
#include "digest/digests.c.inc"
#include "digestsign/digestsign.c.inc"
#include "ecdh/ecdh.c.inc"
#include "ecdsa/ecdsa.c.inc"
#include "ec/ec.c.inc"
#include "ec/ec_key.c.inc"
#include "ec/ec_montgomery.c.inc"
#include "ec/felem.c.inc"
#include "ec/oct.c.inc"
#include "ec/p224-64.c.inc"
#include "ec/p256.c.inc"
#include "ec/p256-nistz.c.inc"
#include "ec/scalar.c.inc"
#include "ec/simple.c.inc"
#include "ec/simple_mul.c.inc"
#include "ec/util.c.inc"
#include "ec/wnaf.c.inc"
#include "hkdf/hkdf.c.inc"
#include "hmac/hmac.c.inc"
#include "modes/cbc.c.inc"
#include "modes/cfb.c.inc"
#include "modes/ctr.c.inc"
#include "modes/gcm.c.inc"
#include "modes/gcm_nohw.c.inc"
#include "modes/ofb.c.inc"
#include "modes/polyval.c.inc"
#include "rand/ctrdrbg.c.inc"
#include "rand/rand.c.inc"
#include "rsa/blinding.c.inc"
#include "rsa/padding.c.inc"
#include "rsa/rsa.c.inc"
#include "rsa/rsa_impl.c.inc"
#include "self_check/fips.c.inc"
#include "self_check/self_check.c.inc"
#include "service_indicator/service_indicator.c.inc"
#include "sha/sha1.c.inc"
#include "sha/sha256.c.inc"
#include "sha/sha512.c.inc"
#include "tls/kdf.c.inc"
#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
#if !defined(OPENSSL_ASAN)
// These symbols are filled in by delocate.go (in static builds) or a linker
// script (in shared builds). They point to the start and end of the module, and
// the location of the integrity hash, respectively.
extern const uint8_t BORINGSSL_bcm_text_start[];
extern const uint8_t BORINGSSL_bcm_text_end[];
extern const uint8_t BORINGSSL_bcm_text_hash[];
#if defined(BORINGSSL_SHARED_LIBRARY)
extern const uint8_t BORINGSSL_bcm_rodata_start[];
extern const uint8_t BORINGSSL_bcm_rodata_end[];
#endif
// assert_within is used to sanity check that certain symbols are within the
// bounds of the integrity check. It checks that start <= symbol < end and
// aborts otherwise.
static void assert_within(const void *start, const void *symbol,
const void *end) {
const uintptr_t start_val = (uintptr_t) start;
const uintptr_t symbol_val = (uintptr_t) symbol;
const uintptr_t end_val = (uintptr_t) end;
if (start_val <= symbol_val && symbol_val < end_val) {
return;
}
fprintf(
stderr,
"FIPS module doesn't span expected symbol. Expected %p <= %p < %p\n",
start, symbol, end);
BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort();
}
#if defined(OPENSSL_ANDROID) && defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)
static void BORINGSSL_maybe_set_module_text_permissions(int permission) {
// Android may be compiled in execute-only-memory mode, in which case the
// .text segment cannot be read. That conflicts with the need for a FIPS
// module to hash its own contents, therefore |mprotect| is used to make
// the module's .text readable for the duration of the hashing process. In
// other build configurations this is a no-op.
const uintptr_t page_size = getpagesize();
const uintptr_t page_start =
((uintptr_t)BORINGSSL_bcm_text_start) & ~(page_size - 1);
if (mprotect((void *)page_start,
((uintptr_t)BORINGSSL_bcm_text_end) - page_start,
permission) != 0) {
perror("BoringSSL: mprotect");
}
}
#else
static void BORINGSSL_maybe_set_module_text_permissions(int permission) {}
#endif // !ANDROID
#endif // !ASAN
static void __attribute__((constructor))
BORINGSSL_bcm_power_on_self_test(void) {
#if !defined(OPENSSL_ASAN)
// Integrity tests cannot run under ASAN because it involves reading the full
// .text section, which triggers the global-buffer overflow detection.
if (!BORINGSSL_integrity_test()) {
goto err;
}
#endif // OPENSSL_ASAN
if (!boringssl_self_test_startup()) {
goto err;
}
return;
err:
BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort();
}
#if !defined(OPENSSL_ASAN)
int BORINGSSL_integrity_test(void) {
const uint8_t *const start = BORINGSSL_bcm_text_start;
const uint8_t *const end = BORINGSSL_bcm_text_end;
assert_within(start, AES_encrypt, end);
assert_within(start, RSA_sign, end);
assert_within(start, BCM_rand_bytes, end);
assert_within(start, EC_GROUP_cmp, end);
assert_within(start, SHA256_Update, end);
assert_within(start, ecdsa_verify_fixed, end);
assert_within(start, EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal, end);
#if defined(BORINGSSL_SHARED_LIBRARY)
const uint8_t *const rodata_start = BORINGSSL_bcm_rodata_start;
const uint8_t *const rodata_end = BORINGSSL_bcm_rodata_end;
#else
// In the static build, read-only data is placed within the .text segment.
const uint8_t *const rodata_start = BORINGSSL_bcm_text_start;
const uint8_t *const rodata_end = BORINGSSL_bcm_text_end;
#endif
assert_within(rodata_start, kPrimes, rodata_end);
assert_within(rodata_start, kP256Field, rodata_end);
assert_within(rodata_start, kPKCS1SigPrefixes, rodata_end);
uint8_t result[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
const EVP_MD *const kHashFunction = EVP_sha256();
if (!boringssl_self_test_sha256() ||
!boringssl_self_test_hmac_sha256()) {
return 0;
}
static const uint8_t kHMACKey[64] = {0};
unsigned result_len;
HMAC_CTX hmac_ctx;
HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac_ctx);
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac_ctx, kHMACKey, sizeof(kHMACKey), kHashFunction,
NULL /* no ENGINE */)) {
fprintf(stderr, "HMAC_Init_ex failed.\n");
return 0;
}
BORINGSSL_maybe_set_module_text_permissions(PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC);
#if defined(BORINGSSL_SHARED_LIBRARY)
uint64_t length = end - start;
HMAC_Update(&hmac_ctx, (const uint8_t *) &length, sizeof(length));
HMAC_Update(&hmac_ctx, start, length);
length = rodata_end - rodata_start;
HMAC_Update(&hmac_ctx, (const uint8_t *) &length, sizeof(length));
HMAC_Update(&hmac_ctx, rodata_start, length);
#else
HMAC_Update(&hmac_ctx, start, end - start);
#endif
BORINGSSL_maybe_set_module_text_permissions(PROT_EXEC);
if (!HMAC_Final(&hmac_ctx, result, &result_len) ||
result_len != sizeof(result)) {
fprintf(stderr, "HMAC failed.\n");
return 0;
}
HMAC_CTX_cleanse(&hmac_ctx); // FIPS 140-3, AS05.10.
const uint8_t *expected = BORINGSSL_bcm_text_hash;
if (!check_test(expected, result, sizeof(result), "FIPS integrity test")) {
#if !defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_BREAK_TESTS)
return 0;
#endif
}
OPENSSL_cleanse(result, sizeof(result)); // FIPS 140-3, AS05.10.
return 1;
}
const uint8_t* FIPS_module_hash(void) {
return BORINGSSL_bcm_text_hash;
}
#endif // OPENSSL_ASAN
void BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort(void) {
for (;;) {
abort();
exit(1);
}
}
#endif // BORINGSSL_FIPS
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2024, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_BCM_INTERFACE_H
#define OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_BCM_INTERFACE_H
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_bcm_public.h>
// This header will eventually become the interface between BCM and the
// rest of libcrypto. More cleanly separating the two is still a work in
// progress (see https://crbug.com/boringssl/722) so, at the moment, we
// consider this no different from any other header in BCM.
//
// Over time, calls from libcrypto to BCM will all move to this header
// and the separation will become more meaningful.
#if defined(__cplusplus)
extern "C" {
#endif
// Enumerated types for return values from bcm functions, both infallible
// and fallible functions. Two success values are used to correspond to the
// FIPS service indicator. For the moment, the official service indicator
// remains the counter, not these values. Once we fully transition to
// these return values from bcm we will change that.
enum bcm_infallible_t {
bcm_infallible_approved,
bcm_infallible_not_approved,
};
enum bcm_status_t {
bcm_status_approved,
bcm_status_not_approved,
// Failure codes, which must all be negative.
bcm_status_failure,
};
typedef enum bcm_status_t bcm_status;
typedef enum bcm_infallible_t bcm_infallible;
OPENSSL_INLINE int bcm_success(bcm_status status) {
return status == bcm_status_approved || status == bcm_status_not_approved;
}
// Random number generator.
#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
// We overread from /dev/urandom or RDRAND by a factor of 10 and XOR to whiten.
// TODO(bbe): disentangle this value which is used to calculate the size of the
// stack buffer in RAND_need entropy based on a calculation.
#define BORINGSSL_FIPS_OVERREAD 10
#endif // BORINGSSL_FIPS
// BCM_rand_load_entropy supplies |entropy_len| bytes of entropy to the BCM
// module. The |want_additional_input| parameter is true iff the entropy was
// obtained from a source other than the system, e.g. directly from the CPU.
bcm_infallible BCM_rand_load_entropy(const uint8_t *entropy, size_t entropy_len,
int want_additional_input);
// BCM_rand_bytes is the same as the public |RAND_bytes| function, other
// than returning a bcm_infallible status indicator.
OPENSSL_EXPORT bcm_infallible BCM_rand_bytes(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len);
// BCM_rand_bytes_hwrng attempts to fill |out| with |len| bytes of entropy from
// the CPU hardware random number generator if one is present.
// bcm_status_approved is returned on success, and a failure status is
// returned otherwise.
bcm_status BCM_rand_bytes_hwrng(uint8_t *out, size_t len);
// BCM_rand_bytes_with_additional_data samples from the RNG after mixing 32
// bytes from |user_additional_data| in.
bcm_infallible BCM_rand_bytes_with_additional_data(
uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const uint8_t user_additional_data[32]);
// SHA-1
// BCM_SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH is the length of a SHA-1 digest.
#define BCM_SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH 20
// BCM_sha1_init initialises |sha|.
bcm_infallible BCM_sha1_init(SHA_CTX *sha);
// BCM_SHA1_transform is a low-level function that performs a single, SHA-1
// block transformation using the state from |sha| and |SHA_CBLOCK| bytes from
// |block|.
bcm_infallible BCM_sha1_transform(SHA_CTX *c, const uint8_t data[BCM_SHA_CBLOCK]);
// BCM_sha1_update adds |len| bytes from |data| to |sha|.
bcm_infallible BCM_sha1_update(SHA_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len);
// BCM_sha1_final adds the final padding to |sha| and writes the resulting
// digest to |out|, which must have at least |SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH| bytes of space.
bcm_infallible BCM_sha1_final(uint8_t out[BCM_SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA_CTX *c);
// BCM_fips_186_2_prf derives |out_len| bytes from |xkey| using the PRF
// defined in FIPS 186-2, Appendix 3.1, with change notice 1 applied. The b
// parameter is 160 and seed, XKEY, is also 160 bits. The optional XSEED user
// input is all zeros.
//
// The PRF generates a sequence of 320-bit numbers. Each number is encoded as a
// 40-byte string in big-endian and then concatenated to form |out|. If
// |out_len| is not a multiple of 40, the result is truncated. This matches the
// construction used in Section 7 of RFC 4186 and Section 7 of RFC 4187.
//
// This PRF is based on SHA-1, a weak hash function, and should not be used
// in new protocols. It is provided for compatibility with some legacy EAP
// methods.
bcm_infallible BCM_fips_186_2_prf(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
const uint8_t xkey[BCM_SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]);
#if defined(__cplusplus)
} // extern C
#endif
#endif // OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_BCM_INTERFACE_H
@@ -1,850 +0,0 @@
#define BORINGSSL_PREFIX CCryptoBoringSSL
#if defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
; This file is generated from a similarly-named Perl script in the BoringSSL
; source tree. Do not edit by hand.
%ifdef BORINGSSL_PREFIX
%include "boringssl_prefix_symbols_nasm.inc"
%endif
%ifidn __OUTPUT_FORMAT__, win32
%ifidn __OUTPUT_FORMAT__,obj
section code use32 class=code align=64
%elifidn __OUTPUT_FORMAT__,win32
$@feat.00 equ 1
section .text code align=64
%else
section .text code
%endif
global _bn_mul_add_words
align 16
_bn_mul_add_words:
L$_bn_mul_add_words_begin:
push ebp
push ebx
push esi
push edi
;
xor esi,esi
mov edi,DWORD [20+esp]
mov ecx,DWORD [28+esp]
mov ebx,DWORD [24+esp]
and ecx,4294967288
mov ebp,DWORD [32+esp]
push ecx
jz NEAR L$000maw_finish
align 16
L$001maw_loop:
; Round 0
mov eax,DWORD [ebx]
mul ebp
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
add eax,DWORD [edi]
adc edx,0
mov DWORD [edi],eax
mov esi,edx
; Round 4
mov eax,DWORD [4+ebx]
mul ebp
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
add eax,DWORD [4+edi]
adc edx,0
mov DWORD [4+edi],eax
mov esi,edx
; Round 8
mov eax,DWORD [8+ebx]
mul ebp
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
add eax,DWORD [8+edi]
adc edx,0
mov DWORD [8+edi],eax
mov esi,edx
; Round 12
mov eax,DWORD [12+ebx]
mul ebp
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
add eax,DWORD [12+edi]
adc edx,0
mov DWORD [12+edi],eax
mov esi,edx
; Round 16
mov eax,DWORD [16+ebx]
mul ebp
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
add eax,DWORD [16+edi]
adc edx,0
mov DWORD [16+edi],eax
mov esi,edx
; Round 20
mov eax,DWORD [20+ebx]
mul ebp
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
add eax,DWORD [20+edi]
adc edx,0
mov DWORD [20+edi],eax
mov esi,edx
; Round 24
mov eax,DWORD [24+ebx]
mul ebp
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
add eax,DWORD [24+edi]
adc edx,0
mov DWORD [24+edi],eax
mov esi,edx
; Round 28
mov eax,DWORD [28+ebx]
mul ebp
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
add eax,DWORD [28+edi]
adc edx,0
mov DWORD [28+edi],eax
mov esi,edx
;
sub ecx,8
lea ebx,[32+ebx]
lea edi,[32+edi]
jnz NEAR L$001maw_loop
L$000maw_finish:
mov ecx,DWORD [32+esp]
and ecx,7
jnz NEAR L$002maw_finish2
jmp NEAR L$003maw_end
L$002maw_finish2:
; Tail Round 0
mov eax,DWORD [ebx]
mul ebp
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
add eax,DWORD [edi]
adc edx,0
dec ecx
mov DWORD [edi],eax
mov esi,edx
jz NEAR L$003maw_end
; Tail Round 1
mov eax,DWORD [4+ebx]
mul ebp
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
add eax,DWORD [4+edi]
adc edx,0
dec ecx
mov DWORD [4+edi],eax
mov esi,edx
jz NEAR L$003maw_end
; Tail Round 2
mov eax,DWORD [8+ebx]
mul ebp
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
add eax,DWORD [8+edi]
adc edx,0
dec ecx
mov DWORD [8+edi],eax
mov esi,edx
jz NEAR L$003maw_end
; Tail Round 3
mov eax,DWORD [12+ebx]
mul ebp
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
add eax,DWORD [12+edi]
adc edx,0
dec ecx
mov DWORD [12+edi],eax
mov esi,edx
jz NEAR L$003maw_end
; Tail Round 4
mov eax,DWORD [16+ebx]
mul ebp
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
add eax,DWORD [16+edi]
adc edx,0
dec ecx
mov DWORD [16+edi],eax
mov esi,edx
jz NEAR L$003maw_end
; Tail Round 5
mov eax,DWORD [20+ebx]
mul ebp
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
add eax,DWORD [20+edi]
adc edx,0
dec ecx
mov DWORD [20+edi],eax
mov esi,edx
jz NEAR L$003maw_end
; Tail Round 6
mov eax,DWORD [24+ebx]
mul ebp
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
add eax,DWORD [24+edi]
adc edx,0
mov DWORD [24+edi],eax
mov esi,edx
L$003maw_end:
mov eax,esi
pop ecx
pop edi
pop esi
pop ebx
pop ebp
ret
global _bn_mul_words
align 16
_bn_mul_words:
L$_bn_mul_words_begin:
push ebp
push ebx
push esi
push edi
;
xor esi,esi
mov edi,DWORD [20+esp]
mov ebx,DWORD [24+esp]
mov ebp,DWORD [28+esp]
mov ecx,DWORD [32+esp]
and ebp,4294967288
jz NEAR L$004mw_finish
L$005mw_loop:
; Round 0
mov eax,DWORD [ebx]
mul ecx
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
mov DWORD [edi],eax
mov esi,edx
; Round 4
mov eax,DWORD [4+ebx]
mul ecx
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
mov DWORD [4+edi],eax
mov esi,edx
; Round 8
mov eax,DWORD [8+ebx]
mul ecx
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
mov DWORD [8+edi],eax
mov esi,edx
; Round 12
mov eax,DWORD [12+ebx]
mul ecx
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
mov DWORD [12+edi],eax
mov esi,edx
; Round 16
mov eax,DWORD [16+ebx]
mul ecx
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
mov DWORD [16+edi],eax
mov esi,edx
; Round 20
mov eax,DWORD [20+ebx]
mul ecx
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
mov DWORD [20+edi],eax
mov esi,edx
; Round 24
mov eax,DWORD [24+ebx]
mul ecx
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
mov DWORD [24+edi],eax
mov esi,edx
; Round 28
mov eax,DWORD [28+ebx]
mul ecx
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
mov DWORD [28+edi],eax
mov esi,edx
;
add ebx,32
add edi,32
sub ebp,8
jz NEAR L$004mw_finish
jmp NEAR L$005mw_loop
L$004mw_finish:
mov ebp,DWORD [28+esp]
and ebp,7
jnz NEAR L$006mw_finish2
jmp NEAR L$007mw_end
L$006mw_finish2:
; Tail Round 0
mov eax,DWORD [ebx]
mul ecx
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
mov DWORD [edi],eax
mov esi,edx
dec ebp
jz NEAR L$007mw_end
; Tail Round 1
mov eax,DWORD [4+ebx]
mul ecx
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
mov DWORD [4+edi],eax
mov esi,edx
dec ebp
jz NEAR L$007mw_end
; Tail Round 2
mov eax,DWORD [8+ebx]
mul ecx
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
mov DWORD [8+edi],eax
mov esi,edx
dec ebp
jz NEAR L$007mw_end
; Tail Round 3
mov eax,DWORD [12+ebx]
mul ecx
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
mov DWORD [12+edi],eax
mov esi,edx
dec ebp
jz NEAR L$007mw_end
; Tail Round 4
mov eax,DWORD [16+ebx]
mul ecx
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
mov DWORD [16+edi],eax
mov esi,edx
dec ebp
jz NEAR L$007mw_end
; Tail Round 5
mov eax,DWORD [20+ebx]
mul ecx
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
mov DWORD [20+edi],eax
mov esi,edx
dec ebp
jz NEAR L$007mw_end
; Tail Round 6
mov eax,DWORD [24+ebx]
mul ecx
add eax,esi
adc edx,0
mov DWORD [24+edi],eax
mov esi,edx
L$007mw_end:
mov eax,esi
pop edi
pop esi
pop ebx
pop ebp
ret
global _bn_sqr_words
align 16
_bn_sqr_words:
L$_bn_sqr_words_begin:
push ebp
push ebx
push esi
push edi
;
mov esi,DWORD [20+esp]
mov edi,DWORD [24+esp]
mov ebx,DWORD [28+esp]
and ebx,4294967288
jz NEAR L$008sw_finish
L$009sw_loop:
; Round 0
mov eax,DWORD [edi]
mul eax
mov DWORD [esi],eax
mov DWORD [4+esi],edx
; Round 4
mov eax,DWORD [4+edi]
mul eax
mov DWORD [8+esi],eax
mov DWORD [12+esi],edx
; Round 8
mov eax,DWORD [8+edi]
mul eax
mov DWORD [16+esi],eax
mov DWORD [20+esi],edx
; Round 12
mov eax,DWORD [12+edi]
mul eax
mov DWORD [24+esi],eax
mov DWORD [28+esi],edx
; Round 16
mov eax,DWORD [16+edi]
mul eax
mov DWORD [32+esi],eax
mov DWORD [36+esi],edx
; Round 20
mov eax,DWORD [20+edi]
mul eax
mov DWORD [40+esi],eax
mov DWORD [44+esi],edx
; Round 24
mov eax,DWORD [24+edi]
mul eax
mov DWORD [48+esi],eax
mov DWORD [52+esi],edx
; Round 28
mov eax,DWORD [28+edi]
mul eax
mov DWORD [56+esi],eax
mov DWORD [60+esi],edx
;
add edi,32
add esi,64
sub ebx,8
jnz NEAR L$009sw_loop
L$008sw_finish:
mov ebx,DWORD [28+esp]
and ebx,7
jz NEAR L$010sw_end
; Tail Round 0
mov eax,DWORD [edi]
mul eax
mov DWORD [esi],eax
dec ebx
mov DWORD [4+esi],edx
jz NEAR L$010sw_end
; Tail Round 1
mov eax,DWORD [4+edi]
mul eax
mov DWORD [8+esi],eax
dec ebx
mov DWORD [12+esi],edx
jz NEAR L$010sw_end
; Tail Round 2
mov eax,DWORD [8+edi]
mul eax
mov DWORD [16+esi],eax
dec ebx
mov DWORD [20+esi],edx
jz NEAR L$010sw_end
; Tail Round 3
mov eax,DWORD [12+edi]
mul eax
mov DWORD [24+esi],eax
dec ebx
mov DWORD [28+esi],edx
jz NEAR L$010sw_end
; Tail Round 4
mov eax,DWORD [16+edi]
mul eax
mov DWORD [32+esi],eax
dec ebx
mov DWORD [36+esi],edx
jz NEAR L$010sw_end
; Tail Round 5
mov eax,DWORD [20+edi]
mul eax
mov DWORD [40+esi],eax
dec ebx
mov DWORD [44+esi],edx
jz NEAR L$010sw_end
; Tail Round 6
mov eax,DWORD [24+edi]
mul eax
mov DWORD [48+esi],eax
mov DWORD [52+esi],edx
L$010sw_end:
pop edi
pop esi
pop ebx
pop ebp
ret
global _bn_div_words
align 16
_bn_div_words:
L$_bn_div_words_begin:
mov edx,DWORD [4+esp]
mov eax,DWORD [8+esp]
mov ecx,DWORD [12+esp]
div ecx
ret
global _bn_add_words
align 16
_bn_add_words:
L$_bn_add_words_begin:
push ebp
push ebx
push esi
push edi
;
mov ebx,DWORD [20+esp]
mov esi,DWORD [24+esp]
mov edi,DWORD [28+esp]
mov ebp,DWORD [32+esp]
xor eax,eax
and ebp,4294967288
jz NEAR L$011aw_finish
L$012aw_loop:
; Round 0
mov ecx,DWORD [esi]
mov edx,DWORD [edi]
add ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
add ecx,edx
adc eax,0
mov DWORD [ebx],ecx
; Round 1
mov ecx,DWORD [4+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [4+edi]
add ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
add ecx,edx
adc eax,0
mov DWORD [4+ebx],ecx
; Round 2
mov ecx,DWORD [8+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [8+edi]
add ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
add ecx,edx
adc eax,0
mov DWORD [8+ebx],ecx
; Round 3
mov ecx,DWORD [12+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [12+edi]
add ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
add ecx,edx
adc eax,0
mov DWORD [12+ebx],ecx
; Round 4
mov ecx,DWORD [16+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [16+edi]
add ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
add ecx,edx
adc eax,0
mov DWORD [16+ebx],ecx
; Round 5
mov ecx,DWORD [20+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [20+edi]
add ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
add ecx,edx
adc eax,0
mov DWORD [20+ebx],ecx
; Round 6
mov ecx,DWORD [24+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [24+edi]
add ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
add ecx,edx
adc eax,0
mov DWORD [24+ebx],ecx
; Round 7
mov ecx,DWORD [28+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [28+edi]
add ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
add ecx,edx
adc eax,0
mov DWORD [28+ebx],ecx
;
add esi,32
add edi,32
add ebx,32
sub ebp,8
jnz NEAR L$012aw_loop
L$011aw_finish:
mov ebp,DWORD [32+esp]
and ebp,7
jz NEAR L$013aw_end
; Tail Round 0
mov ecx,DWORD [esi]
mov edx,DWORD [edi]
add ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
add ecx,edx
adc eax,0
dec ebp
mov DWORD [ebx],ecx
jz NEAR L$013aw_end
; Tail Round 1
mov ecx,DWORD [4+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [4+edi]
add ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
add ecx,edx
adc eax,0
dec ebp
mov DWORD [4+ebx],ecx
jz NEAR L$013aw_end
; Tail Round 2
mov ecx,DWORD [8+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [8+edi]
add ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
add ecx,edx
adc eax,0
dec ebp
mov DWORD [8+ebx],ecx
jz NEAR L$013aw_end
; Tail Round 3
mov ecx,DWORD [12+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [12+edi]
add ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
add ecx,edx
adc eax,0
dec ebp
mov DWORD [12+ebx],ecx
jz NEAR L$013aw_end
; Tail Round 4
mov ecx,DWORD [16+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [16+edi]
add ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
add ecx,edx
adc eax,0
dec ebp
mov DWORD [16+ebx],ecx
jz NEAR L$013aw_end
; Tail Round 5
mov ecx,DWORD [20+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [20+edi]
add ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
add ecx,edx
adc eax,0
dec ebp
mov DWORD [20+ebx],ecx
jz NEAR L$013aw_end
; Tail Round 6
mov ecx,DWORD [24+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [24+edi]
add ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
add ecx,edx
adc eax,0
mov DWORD [24+ebx],ecx
L$013aw_end:
pop edi
pop esi
pop ebx
pop ebp
ret
global _bn_sub_words
align 16
_bn_sub_words:
L$_bn_sub_words_begin:
push ebp
push ebx
push esi
push edi
;
mov ebx,DWORD [20+esp]
mov esi,DWORD [24+esp]
mov edi,DWORD [28+esp]
mov ebp,DWORD [32+esp]
xor eax,eax
and ebp,4294967288
jz NEAR L$014aw_finish
L$015aw_loop:
; Round 0
mov ecx,DWORD [esi]
mov edx,DWORD [edi]
sub ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
sub ecx,edx
adc eax,0
mov DWORD [ebx],ecx
; Round 1
mov ecx,DWORD [4+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [4+edi]
sub ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
sub ecx,edx
adc eax,0
mov DWORD [4+ebx],ecx
; Round 2
mov ecx,DWORD [8+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [8+edi]
sub ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
sub ecx,edx
adc eax,0
mov DWORD [8+ebx],ecx
; Round 3
mov ecx,DWORD [12+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [12+edi]
sub ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
sub ecx,edx
adc eax,0
mov DWORD [12+ebx],ecx
; Round 4
mov ecx,DWORD [16+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [16+edi]
sub ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
sub ecx,edx
adc eax,0
mov DWORD [16+ebx],ecx
; Round 5
mov ecx,DWORD [20+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [20+edi]
sub ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
sub ecx,edx
adc eax,0
mov DWORD [20+ebx],ecx
; Round 6
mov ecx,DWORD [24+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [24+edi]
sub ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
sub ecx,edx
adc eax,0
mov DWORD [24+ebx],ecx
; Round 7
mov ecx,DWORD [28+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [28+edi]
sub ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
sub ecx,edx
adc eax,0
mov DWORD [28+ebx],ecx
;
add esi,32
add edi,32
add ebx,32
sub ebp,8
jnz NEAR L$015aw_loop
L$014aw_finish:
mov ebp,DWORD [32+esp]
and ebp,7
jz NEAR L$016aw_end
; Tail Round 0
mov ecx,DWORD [esi]
mov edx,DWORD [edi]
sub ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
sub ecx,edx
adc eax,0
dec ebp
mov DWORD [ebx],ecx
jz NEAR L$016aw_end
; Tail Round 1
mov ecx,DWORD [4+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [4+edi]
sub ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
sub ecx,edx
adc eax,0
dec ebp
mov DWORD [4+ebx],ecx
jz NEAR L$016aw_end
; Tail Round 2
mov ecx,DWORD [8+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [8+edi]
sub ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
sub ecx,edx
adc eax,0
dec ebp
mov DWORD [8+ebx],ecx
jz NEAR L$016aw_end
; Tail Round 3
mov ecx,DWORD [12+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [12+edi]
sub ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
sub ecx,edx
adc eax,0
dec ebp
mov DWORD [12+ebx],ecx
jz NEAR L$016aw_end
; Tail Round 4
mov ecx,DWORD [16+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [16+edi]
sub ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
sub ecx,edx
adc eax,0
dec ebp
mov DWORD [16+ebx],ecx
jz NEAR L$016aw_end
; Tail Round 5
mov ecx,DWORD [20+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [20+edi]
sub ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
sub ecx,edx
adc eax,0
dec ebp
mov DWORD [20+ebx],ecx
jz NEAR L$016aw_end
; Tail Round 6
mov ecx,DWORD [24+esi]
mov edx,DWORD [24+edi]
sub ecx,eax
mov eax,0
adc eax,eax
sub ecx,edx
adc eax,0
mov DWORD [24+ebx],ecx
L$016aw_end:
pop edi
pop esi
pop ebx
pop ebp
ret
%else
; Work around https://bugzilla.nasm.us/show_bug.cgi?id=3392738
ret
%endif
#endif // defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__ELF__)
.section .note.GNU-stack,"",%progbits
#endif
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