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33 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Cory Benfield 127d3745c3 Update BoringSSL to 25773430c07075a368416c3646fa4b07daf4968a (#91) 2021-09-08 16:17:47 +01:00
Benedek Kozma d89b2ef9ed fix possible overindexing (#90) 2021-09-02 10:43:04 +01:00
Cory Benfield 684952cafa Update BoringSSL to 2e68a05c9943a8dec1758d4a393b2ae906fd3295 (#88)
Also update the vendor script to pass an explicit destination
2021-08-17 09:37:33 +01:00
Cory Benfield 8273610176 Only install Jazzy on focal (#89) 2021-08-17 09:31:47 +01:00
Cory Benfield 53da7b3706 Support compressed keys. (#87)
Motivation:

CryptoKit supports the compressed key format: we should as well.

Modifications:

Extend the constructors of public keys to tolerate the compressed
representation.

Result:

Users holding compressed keys can use them.
2021-07-30 07:20:33 +01:00
Cory Benfield 22fd389195 Update to CryptoKit 2021 API (#86)
This patch adds Crypto support for new API added in CryptoKit during the
summer releases of 2021.
2021-06-09 09:51:01 +01:00
buttafaceandCory Benfield 01c3fdfb85 Fix build for 32-bit platforms (#85)
Motivation:

I couldn't build for Android armv7 on the CI I set up without this.

Modifications:

Initialize with the right size of UInt to BoringSSL.

Result:

I can build for armv7 again.

Co-authored-by: Cory Benfield <lukasa@apple.com>
2021-06-01 10:30:49 +01:00
Cory Benfield eefb07cc59 Futz around with Swift versions. (#84)
Motivation:

The various Apple SoS projects are currently dropping Swift 5.1 support.
Swift Crypto should do the same. While we're here, let's add CI for 5.4,
5.5 nightlies, and main nightlies.

Modifications:

- Remove 5.1 dockerfile.
- Stop claiming we support 5.1.
- Add 5.4, 5.5, and main dockerfiles.
- Updated Swift Format to 5.2.
- Associated formatting changes.

Result:

Better test matrix and support matrix.
2021-06-01 10:27:50 +01:00
Cory Benfield 158e2b140c Add SECURITY.md for swift-crypto (#83) 2021-05-27 14:27:10 +01:00
buttaface 8b7b68753f build: add amd64 and aarch64 assembly files to CMake build for Android (#81) 2021-05-19 14:55:27 +01:00
Cory Benfield 6c245a7f7f Provide initial proposal for RSA signing (#80)
Motivation:

Some critical use-cases require RSA signing support. This is most
commonly required when interacting with legacy systems. While RSA is an
older and less efficient cryptosystem than the elliptic-curve algorithms
supported by Swift Crypto already, those interop use-cases are
unavoidable.

This version of the patch does not promote RSA to supported API at this
time, as we'd like to let the API bake somewhat. Users are free to use
it, but these APIs are not covered by semantic versioning at this time
and may break in future.

Modifications:

- Defined new RSA API
- Implemented on top of `Security` when available
- Implemented on top of BoringSSL when `Security` is unavailable

Result:

Users can do RSA if needed.
2021-04-23 15:01:56 +01:00
Cory Benfield 3bea268b22 Update BoringSSL to 04b3213d43492b6c9e0434d8e2a4530a9938f958 (#79) 2021-03-10 14:25:25 +00:00
Yim LeeandCory Benfield 0141f53dd5 Add ARM64 assembly files to cmake build (#78)
Motivation:
See https://github.com/apple/swift-crypto/issues/74

Modifications:
- Add ARM64 assembly files to cmake build
- Update script to handle ARM64 assembly files

Result:
Resolves https://github.com/apple/swift-crypto/issues/74

Co-authored-by: Cory Benfield <lukasa@apple.com>
2021-03-03 09:52:54 +00:00
Max Desiatov b985ba6482 Stop referring to the missing master branch in BUG_REPORT.md (#75) 2021-03-03 08:36:39 +00:00
Yim Lee 296d3308b4 Fix typo in license header (#72) 2021-02-09 07:51:02 +00:00
Saleem Abdulrasool 8ff3d9dc83 build: explicitly include include in interface directories (#71)
The `include` directory is required for the interface include
directories for using `CCryptoBoringSSL` as a module from an external
package (i.e. SPM).  This allows SPM to include `CCryptoBoringSSL`
and find the module map.
2021-02-05 18:55:23 -08:00
Yim Lee 5c066af98c Update vendor-boringssl to save modulemap (#69)
* Update vendor-boringssl to save modulemap

Motivation:
The vendor-boringssl script rewrites `include`, which leads to deletion of `module.modulemap`.

Modification:
Save a copy of modulemap to tmp dir and copy it back at the end.

Result:
`module.modulemap` remains after running the script.

* Recreate modulemap each time instead of copying
2021-02-05 09:53:10 +00:00
Saleem Abdulrasoolandtomer doron 26d3f525eb build: allow using a build tree of dispatch, Foundation (#67)
When building swift-crypto from source for a toolchain build, it is
convenient to build it without building up a toolchain image.  This
additional knob allows for building swift-crypto with the build
artifacts of previous builds, allowing building up a toolchain image
while chaining multiple builds together.

Co-authored-by: tomer doron <tomer@apple.com>
2021-02-05 08:44:03 +00:00
Yim Lee 03581fe6ef Setup docker for cmake build (#70)
* Setup docker for cmake build

Motivation:
Be able to run cmake build in CI

Modifications:
- Add "cmake" service to `docker-compose.yaml`
- Update `Dockerfile` to install `cmake` and `ninja`. Remove unneeded dependencies.
- Add `docker-compose.2004.53.yaml`. `cmake` on previous Ubuntu versions are too old and it would be a pain to upgrade, so using Ubuntu 20.04 to simplify things.
- Add back modulemap to ensure cmake build is successful

Result:
Can run cmake in CI
2021-02-04 13:45:56 -08:00
Cory Benfield f9e47ba809 Update BoringSSL to bb43a45d6de7375f3310511d37f040d1055f8a10 (#66) 2021-02-04 12:31:56 +00:00
Yim Lee 42f5ffecd4 Update/Fix CMake build (#65)
Motivation:
SwiftPM's CMake build
(https://github.com/apple/swift-package-manager/pull/3202) unsuccessful
even with https://github.com/apple/swift-crypto/pull/60.

Modifications:
- Use consistent `SWIFT_CRYPTO_EXPORTS` naming. In some places `CRYPTO_EXPORTS` was used instead.
- Install `CCryptoBoringSSL` so we can import it in code (see https://github.com/apple/swift-package-manager/pull/3202)
- Always set `BUILD_SHARED_LIBS`

Result:
Successful CMake build.
2021-01-29 14:09:36 +00:00
47640ada33 Add CMake build files (#60)
Motivation:
This is to support https://github.com/apple/swift-package-manager/pull/3202, which adds swift-crypto as a dependency to SwiftPM.

Modifications:
Add CMake files.

Result:
Can build swift-crypto with cmake.

Co-authored-by: Saleem Abdulrasool <compnerd@compnerd.org>
Co-authored-by: Saleem Abdulrasool <abdulras@google.com>
2021-01-27 20:21:59 +00:00
Colin TremblayandCory Benfield 73dc51e2b2 fix a typo in documentation (#64)
Co-authored-by: Cory Benfield <lukasa@apple.com>
2021-01-26 18:15:55 +00:00
Fabian Fett f8034c8319 Use welcoming language (#63) 2021-01-26 07:54:17 +00:00
Saleem Abdulrasool 85d00fea15 Tests: add Windows into the RNG path (#61)
This adds Windows to the SystemNumberGenerator condition as well, which
is needed to get the tests to build on Windows.
2021-01-22 09:28:25 +00:00
Saleem AbdulrasoolandCory Benfield 8f4bfa5bc1 scripts: update scripts for Windows support (#57)
Add support for Windows for vending BoringSSL.  This is required in
order to build SwiftCrypto for Windows.

Co-authored-by: Cory Benfield <lukasa@apple.com>
2020-12-02 15:51:18 +00:00
Cory Benfield 0effb70b52 Update BoringSSL to 9dae0ac4f0ae18ebed988d36bfb4c4e4023fc574. (#54) 2020-12-02 15:44:56 +00:00
Saleem AbdulrasoolandCory Benfield 6eee6ab1d9 CCryptoBoringSSL: add Windows generated assembly (#56)
This adds the generated assembly files for Windows.  Unfortunately, the
x64 generated assembly appears to be ELF-esque and SYSV ABI rather than
Win64.  Additionally, the ARM targets do not seem to generate valid
Windows ARM code either (quick perusal shows at least invalid SP
handling on ARMv7 NT and non-conforming prologues on AArch64).  Add x86
Windows assembly only for the time being.

Co-authored-by: Cory Benfield <lukasa@apple.com>
2020-12-02 15:43:03 +00:00
Saleem AbdulrasoolandCory Benfield 8b1daa33f6 build: allow building on Windows (#53)
This allows us to build on Windows, though not entirely.  The assembly
routines need to be generated for the Windows targets, but this is
required to get to that point.  With this set of changes, we are able to
get to the point where we can start linking the `crypto-shasum` target,
which exposes the missing symbols.

Co-authored-by: Cory Benfield <lukasa@apple.com>
2020-12-02 11:09:40 +00:00
Saleem Abdulrasool ef6f94da02 gitignore: ignore vim swapfiles (#55) 2020-12-01 21:41:40 +00:00
YOCKOW 9680b7251c Make memset_s consistent with Darwin. (#52)
Resolves [issue#51](https://github.com/apple/swift-crypto/issues/51).

In Swift 5.3, a warning is viewed on Linux because `memset_s` implemented in this module returns `Void`.
This commit let the function return the same type with Darwin.
2020-10-06 10:22:50 +01:00
Cory Benfield 3c632a678e Update BoringSSL to 67818bea6690a230e2f42e8a588e0f54949bbbf1 (#50) 2020-09-30 15:31:23 +01:00
Cory Benfield 7ba861aa8a We now use the main branch. (#49) 2020-09-24 18:03:00 +01:00
366 changed files with 59267 additions and 14131 deletions

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+1 -1
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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ about: If something isn't working as expected
### New Issue Checklist
- [ ] I'm using the latest version of Swift Crypto (master branch)
- [ ] I'm using the latest version of Swift Crypto (`main` branch)
- [ ] I read the [Contribution Guidelines](https://github.com/apple/swift-crypto/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md)
- [ ] I searched for [existing GitHub issues](https://github.com/apple/swift-crypto/issues)
+5 -1
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@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
.DS_Store
/.build
/out
/Packages
/*.xcodeproj
Package.pins
@@ -10,4 +11,7 @@ Package.resolved
.podspecs
DerivedData
.swiftpm
**/gyb.pyc
**/gyb.pyc
.*.sw[nop]
+1 -1
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# file options
--swiftversion 5.0
--swiftversion 5.2
--exclude .build
# format options
+46
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@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
##===----------------------------------------------------------------------===##
##
## This source file is part of the SwiftCrypto open source project
##
## Copyright (c) 2021 Apple Inc. and the SwiftCrypto project authors
## Licensed under Apache License v2.0
##
## See LICENSE.txt for license information
## See CONTRIBUTORS.md for the list of SwiftCrypto project authors
##
## SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
##
##===----------------------------------------------------------------------===##
cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.15.1)
project(SwiftCrypto
LANGUAGES ASM C Swift)
list(APPEND CMAKE_MODULE_PATH ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/cmake/modules)
include(SwiftSupport)
if(CMAKE_VERSION VERSION_LESS 3.16 AND CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME STREQUAL Windows)
set(CMAKE_ARCHIVE_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY ${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/bin)
set(CMAKE_LIBRARY_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY ${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/bin)
else()
set(CMAKE_ARCHIVE_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY ${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/lib)
set(CMAKE_LIBRARY_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY ${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/lib)
endif()
set(CMAKE_RUNTIME_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY ${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/bin)
set(CMAKE_Swift_MODULE_DIRECTORY ${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/swift)
option(BUILD_SHARED_LIBS "Build shared libraries by default" YES)
if(BUILD_SHARED_LIBS)
set(CMAKE_POSITION_INDEPENDENT_CODE YES)
endif()
if(NOT CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME STREQUAL Darwin)
find_package(dispatch CONFIG)
find_package(Foundation CONFIG)
endif()
add_subdirectory(Sources)
add_subdirectory(cmake/modules)
+16 -3
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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
// swift-tools-version:5.1
// swift-tools-version:5.2
//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
//
// This source file is part of the SwiftCrypto open source project
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
// Sources/CCryptoBoringSSL directory. The source repository is at
// https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl.
//
// BoringSSL Commit: 54858b63c1d886f6c8d903d4a4f594f1485de189
// BoringSSL Commit: 25773430c07075a368416c3646fa4b07daf4968a
import PackageDescription
@@ -40,17 +40,30 @@ let package = Package(
],
products: [
.library(name: "Crypto", targets: ["Crypto"]),
.library(name: "_CryptoExtras", targets: ["_CryptoExtras"]),
/* This target is used only for symbol mangling. It's added and removed automatically because it emits build warnings. MANGLE_START
.library(name: "CCryptoBoringSSL", type: .static, targets: ["CCryptoBoringSSL"]),
MANGLE_END */
],
dependencies: [],
targets: [
.target(name: "CCryptoBoringSSL"),
.target(
name: "CCryptoBoringSSL",
cSettings: [
/*
* This define is required on Windows, but because we need older
* versions of SPM, we cannot conditionally define this on Windows
* only. Unconditionally define it instead.
*/
.define("WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN"),
]
),
.target(name: "CCryptoBoringSSLShims", dependencies: ["CCryptoBoringSSL"]),
.target(name: "Crypto", dependencies: ["CCryptoBoringSSL", "CCryptoBoringSSLShims"], swiftSettings: swiftSettings),
.target(name: "_CryptoExtras", dependencies: ["CCryptoBoringSSL", "CCryptoBoringSSLShims", "Crypto"]),
.target(name: "crypto-shasum", dependencies: ["Crypto"]),
.testTarget(name: "CryptoTests", dependencies: ["Crypto"], swiftSettings: swiftSettings),
.testTarget(name: "_CryptoExtrasTests", dependencies: ["_CryptoExtras"]),
],
cxxLanguageStandard: .cxx11
)
+3 -3
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@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ If you have issues with CryptoKit, instead of Swift Crypto, please use [Feedback
#### `gyb`
Some of the files in this project are autogenerated (metaprogramming) using the Swift Utils tools called [gyb](https://github.com/apple/swift/blob/master/utils/gyb.py) (_"generate your boilerplate"_). `gyb` is included in [`./scripts/gyb`](scripts/gyb).
Some of the files in this project are autogenerated (metaprogramming) using the Swift Utils tools called [gyb](https://github.com/apple/swift/blob/main/utils/gyb.py) (_"generate your boilerplate"_). `gyb` is included in [`./scripts/gyb`](scripts/gyb).
`gyb` will generate some `Foobar.swift` Swift file from some `Foobar.swift.gyb` _template_ file. **You should not edit `Foobar.swift` directly**, since all manual edits in that generated file will be overwritten the next time `gyb` is run.
@@ -96,11 +96,11 @@ If you believe you have identified a vulnerability in Swift Crypto, please [repo
### Swift versions
Swift Crypto supports Swift 5.1 and later.
Swift Crypto supports Swift 5.2 and later. Swift Crypto supported Swift 5.1 until version 1.2.
### Compatibility
Swift Crypto follows [SemVer 2.0.0](https://semver.org/#semantic-versioning-200). Our public API is the same as that of CryptoKit (except where we lack an implementation entirely), as well as everything in the Server and Staging namespaces. We do not maintain a stable ABI, as Swift Crypto is a source-only distribution.
Swift Crypto follows [SemVer 2.0.0](https://semver.org/#semantic-versioning-200). Our public API is the same as that of CryptoKit (except where we lack an implementation entirely), as well as everything in the Server and Staging namespaces. Any symbol beginning with an underscore, and any product beginning with an underscore, is not subject to semantic versioning: these APIs may change without warning. We do not maintain a stable ABI, as Swift Crypto is a source-only distribution.
What this means for you is that you should depend on Swift Crypto with a version range that covers everything from the minimum Swift Crypto version you require up to the next major version.
In SwiftPM that can be easily done specifying for example `from: "1.0.0"` meaning that you support Swift Crypto in every version starting from 1.0.0 up to (excluding) 2.0.0.
+12
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@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
# Security
This document specifies the security process for Swift Crypto.
## Disclosures
To report a known or suspected vulnerability in Swift Crypto, [please report that vulnerability to Apple through the usual channel](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201220).
**Do not file a public issue.**
Fixes to Swift Crypto will be released simultaneously with any changes that need to be made in CryptoKit, to avoid the risk of having only partially fixed projects.
+393
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@@ -0,0 +1,393 @@
##===----------------------------------------------------------------------===##
##
## This source file is part of the SwiftCrypto open source project
##
## Copyright (c) 2021 Apple Inc. and the SwiftCrypto project authors
## Licensed under Apache License v2.0
##
## See LICENSE.txt for license information
## See CONTRIBUTORS.md for the list of SwiftCrypto project authors
##
## SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
##
##===----------------------------------------------------------------------===##
add_library(CCryptoBoringSSL STATIC
"crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_bool.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_dup.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_enum.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_gentm.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_i2d_fp.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_int.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_mbstr.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_object.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_octet.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_print.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_strex.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_time.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_type.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_utctm.c"
"crypto/asn1/a_utf8.c"
"crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c"
"crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c"
"crypto/asn1/asn_pack.c"
"crypto/asn1/f_enum.c"
"crypto/asn1/f_int.c"
"crypto/asn1/f_string.c"
"crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c"
"crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c"
"crypto/asn1/tasn_fre.c"
"crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c"
"crypto/asn1/tasn_typ.c"
"crypto/asn1/tasn_utl.c"
"crypto/asn1/time_support.c"
"crypto/base64/base64.c"
"crypto/bio/bio.c"
"crypto/bio/bio_mem.c"
"crypto/bio/connect.c"
"crypto/bio/fd.c"
"crypto/bio/file.c"
"crypto/bio/hexdump.c"
"crypto/bio/pair.c"
"crypto/bio/printf.c"
"crypto/bio/socket.c"
"crypto/bio/socket_helper.c"
"crypto/blake2/blake2.c"
"crypto/bn_extra/bn_asn1.c"
"crypto/bn_extra/convert.c"
"crypto/buf/buf.c"
"crypto/bytestring/asn1_compat.c"
"crypto/bytestring/ber.c"
"crypto/bytestring/cbb.c"
"crypto/bytestring/cbs.c"
"crypto/bytestring/unicode.c"
"crypto/chacha/chacha.c"
"crypto/cipher_extra/cipher_extra.c"
"crypto/cipher_extra/derive_key.c"
"crypto/cipher_extra/e_aesccm.c"
"crypto/cipher_extra/e_aesctrhmac.c"
"crypto/cipher_extra/e_aesgcmsiv.c"
"crypto/cipher_extra/e_chacha20poly1305.c"
"crypto/cipher_extra/e_null.c"
"crypto/cipher_extra/e_rc2.c"
"crypto/cipher_extra/e_rc4.c"
"crypto/cipher_extra/e_tls.c"
"crypto/cipher_extra/tls_cbc.c"
"crypto/cmac/cmac.c"
"crypto/conf/conf.c"
"crypto/cpu-aarch64-fuchsia.c"
"crypto/cpu-aarch64-linux.c"
"crypto/cpu-aarch64-win.c"
"crypto/cpu-arm-linux.c"
"crypto/cpu-arm.c"
"crypto/cpu-intel.c"
"crypto/cpu-ppc64le.c"
"crypto/crypto.c"
"crypto/curve25519/curve25519.c"
"crypto/curve25519/spake25519.c"
"crypto/dh_extra/dh_asn1.c"
"crypto/dh_extra/params.c"
"crypto/digest_extra/digest_extra.c"
"crypto/dsa/dsa.c"
"crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c"
"crypto/ec_extra/ec_asn1.c"
"crypto/ec_extra/ec_derive.c"
"crypto/ec_extra/hash_to_curve.c"
"crypto/ecdh_extra/ecdh_extra.c"
"crypto/ecdsa_extra/ecdsa_asn1.c"
"crypto/engine/engine.c"
"crypto/err/err.c"
"crypto/err/err_data.c"
"crypto/evp/digestsign.c"
"crypto/evp/evp.c"
"crypto/evp/evp_asn1.c"
"crypto/evp/evp_ctx.c"
"crypto/evp/p_dsa_asn1.c"
"crypto/evp/p_ec.c"
"crypto/evp/p_ec_asn1.c"
"crypto/evp/p_ed25519.c"
"crypto/evp/p_ed25519_asn1.c"
"crypto/evp/p_rsa.c"
"crypto/evp/p_rsa_asn1.c"
"crypto/evp/p_x25519.c"
"crypto/evp/p_x25519_asn1.c"
"crypto/evp/pbkdf.c"
"crypto/evp/print.c"
"crypto/evp/scrypt.c"
"crypto/evp/sign.c"
"crypto/ex_data.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/aes/aes.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/aes/aes_nohw.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/aes/key_wrap.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/aes/mode_wrappers.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/add.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/bn.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/bytes.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/cmp.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/ctx.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/div.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/div_extra.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/exponentiation.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/gcd.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/gcd_extra.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/generic.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/jacobi.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/montgomery.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/montgomery_inv.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/mul.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/prime.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/random.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/rsaz_exp.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/shift.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/bn/sqrt.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/aead.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/cipher.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/e_aes.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/e_des.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/des/des.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/dh/check.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/dh/dh.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/digest/digest.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/digest/digests.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/ec.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/ec_key.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/ec_montgomery.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/felem.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/oct.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/p224-64.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/p256-x86_64.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/p256.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/scalar.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/simple.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/simple_mul.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/util.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ec/wnaf.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ecdh/ecdh.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/ecdsa/ecdsa.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/fips_shared_support.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/hmac/hmac.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/md4/md4.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/md5/md5.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/modes/cbc.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/modes/cfb.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/modes/ctr.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/modes/gcm.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/modes/gcm_nohw.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/modes/ofb.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/modes/polyval.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/rand/ctrdrbg.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/rand/fork_detect.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/rand/rand.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/rand/urandom.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/rsa/blinding.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/rsa/padding.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/rsa/rsa.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/rsa/rsa_impl.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/self_check/fips.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/self_check/self_check.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/sha/sha1-altivec.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/sha/sha1.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/sha/sha256.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/sha/sha512.c"
"crypto/fipsmodule/tls/kdf.c"
"crypto/hkdf/hkdf.c"
"crypto/hpke/hpke.c"
"crypto/hrss/hrss.c"
"crypto/lhash/lhash.c"
"crypto/mem.c"
"crypto/obj/obj.c"
"crypto/obj/obj_xref.c"
"crypto/pem/pem_all.c"
"crypto/pem/pem_info.c"
"crypto/pem/pem_lib.c"
"crypto/pem/pem_oth.c"
"crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c"
"crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c"
"crypto/pem/pem_x509.c"
"crypto/pem/pem_xaux.c"
"crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7.c"
"crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7_x509.c"
"crypto/pkcs8/p5_pbev2.c"
"crypto/pkcs8/pkcs8.c"
"crypto/pkcs8/pkcs8_x509.c"
"crypto/poly1305/poly1305.c"
"crypto/poly1305/poly1305_arm.c"
"crypto/poly1305/poly1305_vec.c"
"crypto/pool/pool.c"
"crypto/rand_extra/deterministic.c"
"crypto/rand_extra/forkunsafe.c"
"crypto/rand_extra/fuchsia.c"
"crypto/rand_extra/passive.c"
"crypto/rand_extra/rand_extra.c"
"crypto/rand_extra/windows.c"
"crypto/rc4/rc4.c"
"crypto/refcount_c11.c"
"crypto/refcount_lock.c"
"crypto/rsa_extra/rsa_asn1.c"
"crypto/rsa_extra/rsa_print.c"
"crypto/siphash/siphash.c"
"crypto/stack/stack.c"
"crypto/thread.c"
"crypto/thread_none.c"
"crypto/thread_pthread.c"
"crypto/thread_win.c"
"crypto/trust_token/pmbtoken.c"
"crypto/trust_token/trust_token.c"
"crypto/trust_token/voprf.c"
"crypto/x509/a_digest.c"
"crypto/x509/a_sign.c"
"crypto/x509/a_verify.c"
"crypto/x509/algorithm.c"
"crypto/x509/asn1_gen.c"
"crypto/x509/by_dir.c"
"crypto/x509/by_file.c"
"crypto/x509/i2d_pr.c"
"crypto/x509/name_print.c"
"crypto/x509/rsa_pss.c"
"crypto/x509/t_crl.c"
"crypto/x509/t_req.c"
"crypto/x509/t_x509.c"
"crypto/x509/t_x509a.c"
"crypto/x509/x509.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_att.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_d2.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_def.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_ext.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_lu.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_obj.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_req.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_set.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_trs.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_txt.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_v3.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c"
"crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c"
"crypto/x509/x509cset.c"
"crypto/x509/x509name.c"
"crypto/x509/x509rset.c"
"crypto/x509/x509spki.c"
"crypto/x509/x_algor.c"
"crypto/x509/x_all.c"
"crypto/x509/x_attrib.c"
"crypto/x509/x_crl.c"
"crypto/x509/x_exten.c"
"crypto/x509/x_info.c"
"crypto/x509/x_name.c"
"crypto/x509/x_pkey.c"
"crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c"
"crypto/x509/x_req.c"
"crypto/x509/x_sig.c"
"crypto/x509/x_spki.c"
"crypto/x509/x_val.c"
"crypto/x509/x_x509.c"
"crypto/x509/x_x509a.c"
"crypto/x509v3/pcy_cache.c"
"crypto/x509v3/pcy_data.c"
"crypto/x509v3/pcy_lib.c"
"crypto/x509v3/pcy_map.c"
"crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c"
"crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_akey.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_akeya.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_bcons.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_bitst.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_conf.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_crld.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_enum.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_extku.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_ia5.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_info.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_int.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_lib.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_ocsp.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_pcons.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_pmaps.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_prn.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_skey.c"
"crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c")
if(CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME STREQUAL Darwin AND CMAKE_SYSTEM_PROCESSOR MATCHES "amd64|x86_64")
target_sources(CCryptoBoringSSL PRIVATE
crypto/chacha/chacha-x86_64.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/cipher_extra/aes128gcmsiv-x86_64.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/cipher_extra/chacha20_poly1305_x86_64.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/aesni-gcm-x86_64.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/aesni-x86_64.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/ghash-ssse3-x86_64.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/ghash-x86_64.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/md5-x86_64.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/p256-x86_64-asm.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/p256_beeu-x86_64-asm.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/rdrand-x86_64.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/rsaz-avx2.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha1-x86_64.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha256-x86_64.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha512-x86_64.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/vpaes-x86_64.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/x86_64-mont.mac.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/x86_64-mont5.mac.x86_64.S)
elseif(CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME MATCHES "Linux|Android" AND CMAKE_SYSTEM_PROCESSOR MATCHES "amd64|x86_64")
target_sources(CCryptoBoringSSL PRIVATE
crypto/chacha/chacha-x86_64.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/cipher_extra/aes128gcmsiv-x86_64.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/cipher_extra/chacha20_poly1305_x86_64.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/aesni-gcm-x86_64.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/aesni-x86_64.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/ghash-ssse3-x86_64.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/ghash-x86_64.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/md5-x86_64.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/p256-x86_64-asm.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/p256_beeu-x86_64-asm.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/rdrand-x86_64.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/rsaz-avx2.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha1-x86_64.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha256-x86_64.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha512-x86_64.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/vpaes-x86_64.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/x86_64-mont.linux.x86_64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/x86_64-mont5.linux.x86_64.S)
elseif(CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME STREQUAL Darwin AND CMAKE_SYSTEM_PROCESSOR MATCHES "arm64|aarch64")
target_sources(CCryptoBoringSSL PRIVATE
crypto/chacha/chacha-armv8.ios.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/aesv8-armx64.ios.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/armv8-mont.ios.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/ghash-neon-armv8.ios.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/ghashv8-armx64.ios.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha1-armv8.ios.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha256-armv8.ios.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha512-armv8.ios.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/vpaes-armv8.ios.aarch64.S)
elseif(CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME MATCHES "Linux|Android" AND CMAKE_SYSTEM_PROCESSOR MATCHES "arm64|aarch64")
target_sources(CCryptoBoringSSL PRIVATE
crypto/chacha/chacha-armv8.linux.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/aesv8-armx64.linux.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/armv8-mont.linux.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/ghash-neon-armv8.linux.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/ghashv8-armx64.linux.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha1-armv8.linux.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha256-armv8.linux.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/sha512-armv8.linux.aarch64.S
crypto/fipsmodule/vpaes-armv8.linux.aarch64.S)
endif()
target_include_directories(CCryptoBoringSSL PUBLIC
include)
target_compile_definitions(CCryptoBoringSSL PRIVATE
$<$<PLATFORM_ID:Windows>:WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN>)
set_target_properties(CCryptoBoringSSL PROPERTIES
INTERFACE_INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES "${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/include;${CMAKE_Swift_MODULE_DIRECTORY}")
set_property(GLOBAL APPEND PROPERTY SWIFT_CRYPTO_EXPORTS CCryptoBoringSSL)
+57 -52
View File
@@ -65,64 +65,69 @@
#include "../internal.h"
int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(ASN1_BIT_STRING *x, unsigned char *d, int len)
int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(ASN1_BIT_STRING *x, const unsigned char *d, int len)
{
return M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(x, d, len);
return ASN1_STRING_set(x, d, len);
}
static int asn1_bit_string_length(const ASN1_BIT_STRING *str,
uint8_t *out_padding_bits) {
int len = str->length;
if (str->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT) {
// If the string is already empty, it cannot have padding bits.
*out_padding_bits = len == 0 ? 0 : str->flags & 0x07;
return len;
}
// TODO(davidben): If we move this logic to |ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit|, can
// we remove this representation?
while (len > 0 && str->data[len - 1] == 0) {
len--;
}
uint8_t padding_bits = 0;
if (len > 0) {
uint8_t last = str->data[len - 1];
assert(last != 0);
for (; padding_bits < 7; padding_bits++) {
if (last & (1 << padding_bits)) {
break;
}
}
}
*out_padding_bits = padding_bits;
return len;
}
int ASN1_BIT_STRING_num_bytes(const ASN1_BIT_STRING *str, size_t *out) {
uint8_t padding_bits;
int len = asn1_bit_string_length(str, &padding_bits);
if (padding_bits != 0) {
return 0;
}
*out = len;
return 1;
}
int i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING(const ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, unsigned char **pp)
{
int ret, j, bits, len;
unsigned char *p, *d;
if (a == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (a == NULL)
return (0);
len = a->length;
uint8_t bits;
int len = asn1_bit_string_length(a, &bits);
int ret = 1 + len;
if (pp == NULL) {
return ret;
}
uint8_t *p = *pp;
*(p++) = bits;
OPENSSL_memcpy(p, a->data, len);
if (len > 0) {
if (a->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT) {
bits = (int)a->flags & 0x07;
} else {
for (; len > 0; len--) {
if (a->data[len - 1])
break;
}
j = a->data[len - 1];
if (j & 0x01)
bits = 0;
else if (j & 0x02)
bits = 1;
else if (j & 0x04)
bits = 2;
else if (j & 0x08)
bits = 3;
else if (j & 0x10)
bits = 4;
else if (j & 0x20)
bits = 5;
else if (j & 0x40)
bits = 6;
else if (j & 0x80)
bits = 7;
else
bits = 0; /* should not happen */
}
} else
bits = 0;
ret = 1 + len;
if (pp == NULL)
return (ret);
p = *pp;
*(p++) = (unsigned char)bits;
d = a->data;
OPENSSL_memcpy(p, d, len);
p[len - 1] &= (0xff << bits);
}
p += len;
if (len > 0)
p[-1] &= (0xff << bits);
*pp = p;
return (ret);
}
@@ -146,7 +151,7 @@ ASN1_BIT_STRING *c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING **a,
}
if ((a == NULL) || ((*a) == NULL)) {
if ((ret = M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
if ((ret = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
return (NULL);
} else
ret = (*a);
@@ -188,7 +193,7 @@ ASN1_BIT_STRING *c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING **a,
return (ret);
err:
if ((ret != NULL) && ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret)))
M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ret);
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ret);
return (NULL);
}
@@ -251,7 +256,7 @@ int ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(const ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, int n)
* 'len' is the length of 'flags'.
*/
int ASN1_BIT_STRING_check(const ASN1_BIT_STRING *a,
unsigned char *flags, int flags_len)
const unsigned char *flags, int flags_len)
{
int i, ok;
/* Check if there is one bit set at all. */
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ int i2d_ASN1_BOOLEAN(int a, unsigned char **pp)
}
ASN1_put_object(&p, 0, 1, V_ASN1_BOOLEAN, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
*p = (unsigned char)a;
*p = a ? 0xff : 0x00;
/*
* If a new buffer was allocated, just return it back.
@@ -78,7 +78,6 @@ void *ASN1_item_d2i_bio(const ASN1_ITEM *it, BIO *in, void *x)
return ret;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
void *ASN1_item_d2i_fp(const ASN1_ITEM *it, FILE *in, void *x)
{
BIO *b = BIO_new_fp(in, BIO_NOCLOSE);
@@ -90,4 +89,3 @@ void *ASN1_item_d2i_fp(const ASN1_ITEM *it, FILE *in, void *x)
BIO_free(b);
return ret;
}
#endif
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ ASN1_ENUMERATED *BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai)
int len, j;
if (ai == NULL)
ret = M_ASN1_ENUMERATED_new();
ret = ASN1_ENUMERATED_new();
else
ret = ai;
if (ret == NULL) {
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ ASN1_ENUMERATED *BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai)
return (ret);
err:
if (ret != ai)
M_ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(ret);
ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(ret);
return (NULL);
}
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_err.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include "asn1_locl.h"
#include "internal.h"
int asn1_generalizedtime_to_tm(struct tm *tm, const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *d)
{
@@ -237,6 +237,11 @@ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *s,
goto err;
}
if (ts->tm_year < 0 - 1900 || ts->tm_year > 9999 - 1900) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TIME_VALUE);
goto err;
}
p = (char *)tmps->data;
if ((p == NULL) || ((size_t)tmps->length < len)) {
p = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+5 -5
View File
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
ASN1_INTEGER *ASN1_INTEGER_dup(const ASN1_INTEGER *x)
{
return M_ASN1_INTEGER_dup(x);
return ASN1_STRING_dup(x);
}
int ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(const ASN1_INTEGER *x, const ASN1_INTEGER *y)
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ ASN1_INTEGER *c2i_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER **a, const unsigned char **pp,
}
if ((a == NULL) || ((*a) == NULL)) {
if ((ret = M_ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL)
if ((ret = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL)
return (NULL);
ret->type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
} else
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ ASN1_INTEGER *c2i_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER **a, const unsigned char **pp,
err:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, i);
if ((ret != NULL) && ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret)))
M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(ret);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(ret);
return (NULL);
}
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ ASN1_INTEGER *BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_INTEGER *ai)
int len, j;
if (ai == NULL)
ret = M_ASN1_INTEGER_new();
ret = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
else
ret = ai;
if (ret == NULL) {
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ ASN1_INTEGER *BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_INTEGER *ai)
return (ret);
err:
if (ret != ai)
M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(ret);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(ret);
return (NULL);
}
+16 -23
View File
@@ -63,11 +63,9 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_err.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include "asn1_locl.h"
#include "internal.h"
#include "../bytestring/internal.h"
static int is_printable(uint32_t value);
/*
* These functions take a string in UTF8, ASCII or multibyte form and a mask
* of permissible ASN1 string types. It then works out the minimal type
@@ -153,7 +151,7 @@ int ASN1_mbstring_ncopy(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in, int len,
}
/* Update which output formats are still possible. */
if ((mask & B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING) && !is_printable(c)) {
if ((mask & B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING) && !asn1_is_printable(c)) {
mask &= ~B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING;
}
if ((mask & B_ASN1_IA5STRING) && (c > 127)) {
@@ -208,11 +206,14 @@ int ASN1_mbstring_ncopy(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in, int len,
encode_func = cbb_add_utf32_be;
size_estimate = 4 * nchar;
outform = MBSTRING_UNIV;
} else {
} else if (mask & B_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
str_type = V_ASN1_UTF8STRING;
outform = MBSTRING_UTF8;
encode_func = cbb_add_utf8;
size_estimate = utf8_len;
} else {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_CHARACTERS);
return -1;
}
if (!out)
@@ -282,24 +283,16 @@ int ASN1_mbstring_ncopy(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in, int len,
return -1;
}
/* Return 1 if the character is permitted in a PrintableString */
static int is_printable(uint32_t value)
int asn1_is_printable(uint32_t value)
{
int ch;
if (value > 0x7f)
if (value > 0x7f) {
return 0;
ch = (int)value;
/*
* Note: we can't use 'isalnum' because certain accented characters may
* count as alphanumeric in some environments.
*/
if ((ch >= 'a') && (ch <= 'z'))
return 1;
if ((ch >= 'A') && (ch <= 'Z'))
return 1;
if ((ch >= '0') && (ch <= '9'))
return 1;
if ((ch == ' ') || strchr("'()+,-./:=?", ch))
return 1;
return 0;
}
/* Note we cannot use |isalnum| because it is locale-dependent. */
return ('a' <= value && value <= 'z') || //
('A' <= value && value <= 'Z') || //
('0' <= value && value <= '9') || //
value == ' ' || value == '\'' || value == '(' || value == ')' ||
value == '+' || value == ',' || value == '-' || value == '.' ||
value == '/' || value == ':' || value == '=' || value == '?';
}
+13 -17
View File
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_obj.h>
#include "../internal.h"
#include "internal.h"
int i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(const ASN1_OBJECT *a, unsigned char **pp)
@@ -180,16 +181,13 @@ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
}
}
/*
* only the ASN1_OBJECTs from the 'table' will have values for ->sn or
* ->ln
*/
if ((a == NULL) || ((*a) == NULL) ||
!((*a)->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC)) {
if ((ret = ASN1_OBJECT_new()) == NULL)
return (NULL);
} else
} else {
ret = (*a);
}
p = *pp;
/* detach data from object */
@@ -208,12 +206,17 @@ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
ret->flags |= ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(data, p, length);
/* If there are dynamic strings, free them here, and clear the flag */
if ((ret->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS) != 0) {
OPENSSL_free((char *)ret->sn);
OPENSSL_free((char *)ret->ln);
ret->flags &= ~ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS;
}
/* reattach data to object, after which it remains const */
ret->data = data;
ret->length = length;
ret->sn = NULL;
ret->ln = NULL;
/* ret->flags=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC; we know it is dynamic */
p += length;
if (a != NULL)
@@ -250,19 +253,12 @@ void ASN1_OBJECT_free(ASN1_OBJECT *a)
if (a == NULL)
return;
if (a->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS) {
#ifndef CONST_STRICT /* disable purely for compile-time strict
* const checking. Doing this on a "real"
* compile will cause memory leaks */
if (a->sn != NULL)
OPENSSL_free((void *)a->sn);
if (a->ln != NULL)
OPENSSL_free((void *)a->ln);
#endif
OPENSSL_free((void *)a->sn);
OPENSSL_free((void *)a->ln);
a->sn = a->ln = NULL;
}
if (a->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA) {
if (a->data != NULL)
OPENSSL_free((void *)a->data);
OPENSSL_free((void *)a->data);
a->data = NULL;
a->length = 0;
}
@@ -270,7 +266,7 @@ void ASN1_OBJECT_free(ASN1_OBJECT *a)
OPENSSL_free(a);
}
ASN1_OBJECT *ASN1_OBJECT_create(int nid, unsigned char *data, int len,
ASN1_OBJECT *ASN1_OBJECT_create(int nid, const unsigned char *data, int len,
const char *sn, const char *ln)
{
ASN1_OBJECT o;
@@ -61,17 +61,17 @@
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *x)
{
return M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(x);
return ASN1_STRING_dup(x);
}
int ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a,
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *b)
{
return M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(a, b);
return ASN1_STRING_cmp(a, b);
}
int ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *x, const unsigned char *d,
int len)
{
return M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(x, d, len);
return ASN1_STRING_set(x, d, len);
}
+20 -30
View File
@@ -56,38 +56,28 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_asn1.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_err.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "internal.h"
int ASN1_PRINTABLE_type(const unsigned char *s, int len)
{
int c;
int ia5 = 0;
int t61 = 0;
if (len <= 0)
len = -1;
if (s == NULL)
return (V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING);
while ((*s) && (len-- != 0)) {
c = *(s++);
if (!(((c >= 'a') && (c <= 'z')) ||
((c >= 'A') && (c <= 'Z')) ||
(c == ' ') ||
((c >= '0') && (c <= '9')) ||
(c == ' ') || (c == '\'') ||
(c == '(') || (c == ')') ||
(c == '+') || (c == ',') ||
(c == '-') || (c == '.') ||
(c == '/') || (c == ':') || (c == '=') || (c == '?')))
ia5 = 1;
if (c & 0x80)
t61 = 1;
if (len < 0) {
len = strlen((const char *)s);
}
if (t61)
return (V_ASN1_T61STRING);
if (ia5)
return (V_ASN1_IA5STRING);
return (V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING);
int printable = 1;
for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {
unsigned char c = s[i];
if (c & 0x80) {
/* No need to continue iterating. */
return V_ASN1_T61STRING;
}
if (!asn1_is_printable(c)) {
printable = 0;
}
}
return printable ? V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING : V_ASN1_IA5STRING;
}
@@ -54,23 +54,27 @@
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_x509.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_asn1.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_asn1.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_bio.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_obj.h>
#include "charmap.h"
#include "../asn1/asn1_locl.h"
#include "internal.h"
/*
* ASN1_STRING_print_ex() and X509_NAME_print_ex(). Enhanced string and name
* printing routines handling multibyte characters, RFC2253 and a host of
* other options.
*/
// These flags must be distinct from |ESC_FLAGS| and fit in a byte.
// Character is a valid PrintableString character
#define CHARTYPE_PRINTABLESTRING 0x10
// Character needs escaping if it is the first character
#define CHARTYPE_FIRST_ESC_2253 0x20
// Character needs escaping if it is the last character
#define CHARTYPE_LAST_ESC_2253 0x40
#define CHARTYPE_BS_ESC (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | CHARTYPE_FIRST_ESC_2253 | CHARTYPE_LAST_ESC_2253)
@@ -79,26 +83,12 @@
ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | \
ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB)
static int send_bio_chars(void *arg, const void *buf, int len)
static int maybe_write(BIO *out, const void *buf, int len)
{
if (!arg)
return 1;
if (BIO_write(arg, buf, len) != len)
return 0;
return 1;
/* If |out| is NULL, ignore the output but report the length. */
return out == NULL || BIO_write(out, buf, len) == len;
}
static int send_fp_chars(void *arg, const void *buf, int len)
{
if (!arg)
return 1;
if (fwrite(buf, 1, len, arg) != (unsigned int)len)
return 0;
return 1;
}
typedef int char_io (void *arg, const void *buf, int len);
/*
* This function handles display of strings, one character at a time. It is
* passed an unsigned long for each character because it could come from 2 or
@@ -108,20 +98,20 @@ typedef int char_io (void *arg, const void *buf, int len);
#define HEX_SIZE(type) (sizeof(type)*2)
static int do_esc_char(uint32_t c, unsigned char flags, char *do_quotes,
char_io *io_ch, void *arg)
BIO *out)
{
unsigned char chflgs, chtmp;
char tmphex[HEX_SIZE(uint32_t) + 3];
if (c > 0xffff) {
BIO_snprintf(tmphex, sizeof tmphex, "\\W%08" PRIX32, c);
if (!io_ch(arg, tmphex, 10))
if (!maybe_write(out, tmphex, 10))
return -1;
return 10;
}
if (c > 0xff) {
BIO_snprintf(tmphex, sizeof tmphex, "\\U%04" PRIX32, c);
if (!io_ch(arg, tmphex, 6))
if (!maybe_write(out, tmphex, 6))
return -1;
return 6;
}
@@ -135,19 +125,19 @@ static int do_esc_char(uint32_t c, unsigned char flags, char *do_quotes,
if (chflgs & ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE) {
if (do_quotes)
*do_quotes = 1;
if (!io_ch(arg, &chtmp, 1))
if (!maybe_write(out, &chtmp, 1))
return -1;
return 1;
}
if (!io_ch(arg, "\\", 1))
if (!maybe_write(out, "\\", 1))
return -1;
if (!io_ch(arg, &chtmp, 1))
if (!maybe_write(out, &chtmp, 1))
return -1;
return 2;
}
if (chflgs & (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB)) {
BIO_snprintf(tmphex, 11, "\\%02X", chtmp);
if (!io_ch(arg, tmphex, 3))
if (!maybe_write(out, tmphex, 3))
return -1;
return 3;
}
@@ -156,11 +146,11 @@ static int do_esc_char(uint32_t c, unsigned char flags, char *do_quotes,
* character itself: backslash.
*/
if (chtmp == '\\' && flags & ESC_FLAGS) {
if (!io_ch(arg, "\\\\", 2))
if (!maybe_write(out, "\\\\", 2))
return -1;
return 2;
}
if (!io_ch(arg, &chtmp, 1))
if (!maybe_write(out, &chtmp, 1))
return -1;
return 1;
}
@@ -175,8 +165,7 @@ static int do_esc_char(uint32_t c, unsigned char flags, char *do_quotes,
*/
static int do_buf(unsigned char *buf, int buflen,
int type, unsigned char flags, char *quotes, char_io *io_ch,
void *arg)
int type, unsigned char flags, char *quotes, BIO *out)
{
int i, outlen, len, charwidth;
unsigned char orflags, *p, *q;
@@ -208,6 +197,8 @@ static int do_buf(unsigned char *buf, int buflen,
orflags = CHARTYPE_FIRST_ESC_2253;
else
orflags = 0;
/* TODO(davidben): Replace this with |cbs_get_ucs2_be|, etc., to check
* for invalid codepoints. */
switch (charwidth) {
case 4:
c = ((uint32_t)*p++) << 24;
@@ -248,17 +239,14 @@ static int do_buf(unsigned char *buf, int buflen,
* otherwise each character will be > 0x7f and so the
* character will never be escaped on first and last.
*/
len =
do_esc_char(utfbuf[i], (unsigned char)(flags | orflags),
quotes, io_ch, arg);
len = do_esc_char(utfbuf[i], (unsigned char)(flags | orflags),
quotes, out);
if (len < 0)
return -1;
outlen += len;
}
} else {
len =
do_esc_char(c, (unsigned char)(flags | orflags), quotes,
io_ch, arg);
len = do_esc_char(c, (unsigned char)(flags | orflags), quotes, out);
if (len < 0)
return -1;
outlen += len;
@@ -269,19 +257,18 @@ static int do_buf(unsigned char *buf, int buflen,
/* This function hex dumps a buffer of characters */
static int do_hex_dump(char_io *io_ch, void *arg, unsigned char *buf,
int buflen)
static int do_hex_dump(BIO *out, unsigned char *buf, int buflen)
{
static const char hexdig[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
unsigned char *p, *q;
char hextmp[2];
if (arg) {
if (out) {
p = buf;
q = buf + buflen;
while (p != q) {
hextmp[0] = hexdig[*p >> 4];
hextmp[1] = hexdig[*p & 0xf];
if (!io_ch(arg, hextmp, 2))
if (!maybe_write(out, hextmp, 2))
return -1;
p++;
}
@@ -292,41 +279,55 @@ static int do_hex_dump(char_io *io_ch, void *arg, unsigned char *buf,
/*
* "dump" a string. This is done when the type is unknown, or the flags
* request it. We can either dump the content octets or the entire DER
* encoding. This uses the RFC2253 #01234 format.
* encoding. This uses the RFC 2253 #01234 format.
*/
static int do_dump(unsigned long lflags, char_io *io_ch, void *arg,
const ASN1_STRING *str)
static int do_dump(unsigned long lflags, BIO *out, const ASN1_STRING *str)
{
/*
* Placing the ASN1_STRING in a temp ASN1_TYPE allows the DER encoding to
* readily obtained
*/
ASN1_TYPE t;
unsigned char *der_buf, *p;
int outlen, der_len;
if (!io_ch(arg, "#", 1))
if (!maybe_write(out, "#", 1)) {
return -1;
}
/* If we don't dump DER encoding just dump content octets */
if (!(lflags & ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_DER)) {
outlen = do_hex_dump(io_ch, arg, str->data, str->length);
if (outlen < 0)
int outlen = do_hex_dump(out, str->data, str->length);
if (outlen < 0) {
return -1;
}
return outlen + 1;
}
/*
* Placing the ASN1_STRING in a temporary ASN1_TYPE allows the DER encoding
* to readily obtained.
*/
ASN1_TYPE t;
t.type = str->type;
t.value.ptr = (char *)str;
der_len = i2d_ASN1_TYPE(&t, NULL);
der_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(der_len);
if (!der_buf)
/* Negative INTEGER and ENUMERATED values are the only case where
* |ASN1_STRING| and |ASN1_TYPE| types do not match.
*
* TODO(davidben): There are also some type fields which, in |ASN1_TYPE|, do
* not correspond to |ASN1_STRING|. It is unclear whether those are allowed
* in |ASN1_STRING| at all, or what the space of allowed types is.
* |ASN1_item_ex_d2i| will never produce such a value so, for now, we say
* this is an invalid input. But this corner of the library in general
* should be more robust. */
if (t.type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) {
t.type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
} else if (t.type == V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED) {
t.type = V_ASN1_ENUMERATED;
}
t.value.asn1_string = (ASN1_STRING *)str;
unsigned char *der_buf = NULL;
int der_len = i2d_ASN1_TYPE(&t, &der_buf);
if (der_len < 0) {
return -1;
p = der_buf;
i2d_ASN1_TYPE(&t, &p);
outlen = do_hex_dump(io_ch, arg, der_buf, der_len);
}
int outlen = do_hex_dump(out, der_buf, der_len);
OPENSSL_free(der_buf);
if (outlen < 0)
if (outlen < 0) {
return -1;
}
return outlen + 1;
}
@@ -353,8 +354,7 @@ static const signed char tag2nbyte[] = {
* an error occurred.
*/
static int do_print_ex(char_io *io_ch, void *arg, unsigned long lflags,
const ASN1_STRING *str)
int ASN1_STRING_print_ex(BIO *out, const ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long lflags)
{
int outlen, len;
int type;
@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ static int do_print_ex(char_io *io_ch, void *arg, unsigned long lflags,
const char *tagname;
tagname = ASN1_tag2str(type);
outlen += strlen(tagname);
if (!io_ch(arg, tagname, outlen) || !io_ch(arg, ":", 1))
if (!maybe_write(out, tagname, outlen) || !maybe_write(out, ":", 1))
return -1;
outlen++;
}
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ static int do_print_ex(char_io *io_ch, void *arg, unsigned long lflags,
}
if (type == -1) {
len = do_dump(lflags, io_ch, arg, str);
len = do_dump(lflags, out, str);
if (len < 0)
return -1;
outlen += len;
@@ -415,219 +415,41 @@ static int do_print_ex(char_io *io_ch, void *arg, unsigned long lflags,
type |= BUF_TYPE_CONVUTF8;
}
len = do_buf(str->data, str->length, type, flags, &quotes, io_ch, NULL);
len = do_buf(str->data, str->length, type, flags, &quotes, NULL);
if (len < 0)
return -1;
outlen += len;
if (quotes)
outlen += 2;
if (!arg)
if (!out)
return outlen;
if (quotes && !io_ch(arg, "\"", 1))
if (quotes && !maybe_write(out, "\"", 1))
return -1;
if (do_buf(str->data, str->length, type, flags, NULL, io_ch, arg) < 0)
if (do_buf(str->data, str->length, type, flags, NULL, out) < 0)
return -1;
if (quotes && !io_ch(arg, "\"", 1))
if (quotes && !maybe_write(out, "\"", 1))
return -1;
return outlen;
}
/* Used for line indenting: print 'indent' spaces */
static int do_indent(char_io *io_ch, void *arg, int indent)
int ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, const ASN1_STRING *str,
unsigned long flags)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < indent; i++)
if (!io_ch(arg, " ", 1))
return 0;
return 1;
}
#define FN_WIDTH_LN 25
#define FN_WIDTH_SN 10
static int do_name_ex(char_io *io_ch, void *arg, X509_NAME *n,
int indent, unsigned long flags)
{
int i, prev = -1, orflags, cnt;
int fn_opt, fn_nid;
ASN1_OBJECT *fn;
ASN1_STRING *val;
X509_NAME_ENTRY *ent;
char objtmp[80];
const char *objbuf;
int outlen, len;
const char *sep_dn, *sep_mv, *sep_eq;
int sep_dn_len, sep_mv_len, sep_eq_len;
if (indent < 0)
indent = 0;
outlen = indent;
if (!do_indent(io_ch, arg, indent))
return -1;
switch (flags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) {
case XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE:
sep_dn = "\n";
sep_dn_len = 1;
sep_mv = " + ";
sep_mv_len = 3;
break;
case XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS:
sep_dn = ",";
sep_dn_len = 1;
sep_mv = "+";
sep_mv_len = 1;
indent = 0;
break;
case XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC:
sep_dn = ", ";
sep_dn_len = 2;
sep_mv = " + ";
sep_mv_len = 3;
indent = 0;
break;
case XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC:
sep_dn = "; ";
sep_dn_len = 2;
sep_mv = " + ";
sep_mv_len = 3;
indent = 0;
break;
default:
return -1;
}
if (flags & XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ) {
sep_eq = " = ";
sep_eq_len = 3;
} else {
sep_eq = "=";
sep_eq_len = 1;
}
fn_opt = flags & XN_FLAG_FN_MASK;
cnt = X509_NAME_entry_count(n);
for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
if (flags & XN_FLAG_DN_REV)
ent = X509_NAME_get_entry(n, cnt - i - 1);
else
ent = X509_NAME_get_entry(n, i);
if (prev != -1) {
if (prev == ent->set) {
if (!io_ch(arg, sep_mv, sep_mv_len))
return -1;
outlen += sep_mv_len;
} else {
if (!io_ch(arg, sep_dn, sep_dn_len))
return -1;
outlen += sep_dn_len;
if (!do_indent(io_ch, arg, indent))
return -1;
outlen += indent;
}
}
prev = ent->set;
fn = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(ent);
val = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ent);
fn_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(fn);
if (fn_opt != XN_FLAG_FN_NONE) {
int objlen, fld_len;
if ((fn_opt == XN_FLAG_FN_OID) || (fn_nid == NID_undef)) {
OBJ_obj2txt(objtmp, sizeof objtmp, fn, 1);
fld_len = 0; /* XXX: what should this be? */
objbuf = objtmp;
} else {
if (fn_opt == XN_FLAG_FN_SN) {
fld_len = FN_WIDTH_SN;
objbuf = OBJ_nid2sn(fn_nid);
} else if (fn_opt == XN_FLAG_FN_LN) {
fld_len = FN_WIDTH_LN;
objbuf = OBJ_nid2ln(fn_nid);
} else {
fld_len = 0; /* XXX: what should this be? */
objbuf = "";
}
}
objlen = strlen(objbuf);
if (!io_ch(arg, objbuf, objlen))
return -1;
if ((objlen < fld_len) && (flags & XN_FLAG_FN_ALIGN)) {
if (!do_indent(io_ch, arg, fld_len - objlen))
return -1;
outlen += fld_len - objlen;
}
if (!io_ch(arg, sep_eq, sep_eq_len))
return -1;
outlen += objlen + sep_eq_len;
}
/*
* If the field name is unknown then fix up the DER dump flag. We
* might want to limit this further so it will DER dump on anything
* other than a few 'standard' fields.
*/
if ((fn_nid == NID_undef) && (flags & XN_FLAG_DUMP_UNKNOWN_FIELDS))
orflags = ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_ALL;
else
orflags = 0;
len = do_print_ex(io_ch, arg, flags | orflags, val);
if (len < 0)
BIO *bio = NULL;
if (fp != NULL) {
/* If |fp| is NULL, this function returns the number of bytes without
* writing. */
bio = BIO_new_fp(fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
if (bio == NULL) {
return -1;
outlen += len;
}
}
return outlen;
int ret = ASN1_STRING_print_ex(bio, str, flags);
BIO_free(bio);
return ret;
}
/* Wrappers round the main functions */
int X509_NAME_print_ex(BIO *out, X509_NAME *nm, int indent,
unsigned long flags)
{
if (flags == XN_FLAG_COMPAT)
return X509_NAME_print(out, nm, indent);
return do_name_ex(send_bio_chars, out, nm, indent, flags);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
int X509_NAME_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, X509_NAME *nm, int indent,
unsigned long flags)
{
if (flags == XN_FLAG_COMPAT) {
BIO *btmp;
int ret;
btmp = BIO_new_fp(fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
if (!btmp)
return -1;
ret = X509_NAME_print(btmp, nm, indent);
BIO_free(btmp);
return ret;
}
return do_name_ex(send_fp_chars, fp, nm, indent, flags);
}
#endif
int ASN1_STRING_print_ex(BIO *out, const ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags)
{
return do_print_ex(send_bio_chars, out, flags, str);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
int ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, const ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags)
{
return do_print_ex(send_fp_chars, fp, flags, str);
}
#endif
/*
* Utility function: convert any string type to UTF8, returns number of bytes
* in output string or a negative error code
*/
int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, ASN1_STRING *in)
int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, const ASN1_STRING *in)
{
ASN1_STRING stmp, *str = &stmp;
int mbflag, type, ret;
@@ -643,11 +465,186 @@ int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, ASN1_STRING *in)
stmp.data = NULL;
stmp.length = 0;
stmp.flags = 0;
ret =
ASN1_mbstring_copy(&str, in->data, in->length, mbflag,
B_ASN1_UTF8STRING);
ret = ASN1_mbstring_copy(&str, in->data, in->length, mbflag,
B_ASN1_UTF8STRING);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
*out = stmp.data;
return stmp.length;
}
int ASN1_STRING_print(BIO *bp, const ASN1_STRING *v)
{
int i, n;
char buf[80];
const char *p;
if (v == NULL)
return (0);
n = 0;
p = (const char *)v->data;
for (i = 0; i < v->length; i++) {
if ((p[i] > '~') || ((p[i] < ' ') &&
(p[i] != '\n') && (p[i] != '\r')))
buf[n] = '.';
else
buf[n] = p[i];
n++;
if (n >= 80) {
if (BIO_write(bp, buf, n) <= 0)
return (0);
n = 0;
}
}
if (n > 0)
if (BIO_write(bp, buf, n) <= 0)
return (0);
return (1);
}
int ASN1_TIME_print(BIO *bp, const ASN1_TIME *tm)
{
if (tm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
return ASN1_UTCTIME_print(bp, tm);
if (tm->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, tm);
BIO_write(bp, "Bad time value", 14);
return (0);
}
static const char *const mon[12] = {
"Jan", "Feb", "Mar", "Apr", "May", "Jun",
"Jul", "Aug", "Sep", "Oct", "Nov", "Dec"
};
int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(BIO *bp, const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *tm)
{
char *v;
int gmt = 0;
int i;
int y = 0, M = 0, d = 0, h = 0, m = 0, s = 0;
char *f = NULL;
int f_len = 0;
i = tm->length;
v = (char *)tm->data;
if (i < 12)
goto err;
if (v[i - 1] == 'Z')
gmt = 1;
for (i = 0; i < 12; i++)
if ((v[i] > '9') || (v[i] < '0'))
goto err;
y = (v[0] - '0') * 1000 + (v[1] - '0') * 100 + (v[2] - '0') * 10 + (v[3] -
'0');
M = (v[4] - '0') * 10 + (v[5] - '0');
if ((M > 12) || (M < 1))
goto err;
d = (v[6] - '0') * 10 + (v[7] - '0');
h = (v[8] - '0') * 10 + (v[9] - '0');
m = (v[10] - '0') * 10 + (v[11] - '0');
if (tm->length >= 14 &&
(v[12] >= '0') && (v[12] <= '9') &&
(v[13] >= '0') && (v[13] <= '9')) {
s = (v[12] - '0') * 10 + (v[13] - '0');
/* Check for fractions of seconds. */
if (tm->length >= 15 && v[14] == '.') {
int l = tm->length;
f = &v[14]; /* The decimal point. */
f_len = 1;
while (14 + f_len < l && f[f_len] >= '0' && f[f_len] <= '9')
++f_len;
}
}
if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s %2d %02d:%02d:%02d%.*s %d%s",
mon[M - 1], d, h, m, s, f_len, f, y,
(gmt) ? " GMT" : "") <= 0)
return (0);
else
return (1);
err:
BIO_write(bp, "Bad time value", 14);
return (0);
}
// consume_two_digits is a helper function for ASN1_UTCTIME_print. If |*v|,
// assumed to be |*len| bytes long, has two leading digits, updates |*out| with
// their value, updates |v| and |len|, and returns one. Otherwise, returns
// zero.
static int consume_two_digits(int* out, const char **v, int *len) {
if (*len < 2|| !isdigit((*v)[0]) || !isdigit((*v)[1])) {
return 0;
}
*out = ((*v)[0] - '0') * 10 + ((*v)[1] - '0');
*len -= 2;
*v += 2;
return 1;
}
// consume_zulu_timezone is a helper function for ASN1_UTCTIME_print. If |*v|,
// assumed to be |*len| bytes long, starts with "Z" then it updates |*v| and
// |*len| and returns one. Otherwise returns zero.
static int consume_zulu_timezone(const char **v, int *len) {
if (*len == 0 || (*v)[0] != 'Z') {
return 0;
}
*len -= 1;
*v += 1;
return 1;
}
int ASN1_UTCTIME_print(BIO *bp, const ASN1_UTCTIME *tm) {
const char *v = (const char *)tm->data;
int len = tm->length;
int Y = 0, M = 0, D = 0, h = 0, m = 0, s = 0;
// YYMMDDhhmm are required to be present.
if (!consume_two_digits(&Y, &v, &len) ||
!consume_two_digits(&M, &v, &len) ||
!consume_two_digits(&D, &v, &len) ||
!consume_two_digits(&h, &v, &len) ||
!consume_two_digits(&m, &v, &len)) {
goto err;
}
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280, section 4.1.2.5.1, requires seconds
// to be present, but historically this code has forgiven its absence.
consume_two_digits(&s, &v, &len);
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280, section 4.1.2.5.1, specifies this
// interpretation of the year.
if (Y < 50) {
Y += 2000;
} else {
Y += 1900;
}
if (M > 12 || M == 0) {
goto err;
}
if (D > 31 || D == 0) {
goto err;
}
if (h > 23 || m > 59 || s > 60) {
goto err;
}
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280, section 4.1.2.5.1, requires the "Z"
// to be present, but historically this code has forgiven its absence.
const int is_gmt = consume_zulu_timezone(&v, &len);
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280, section 4.1.2.5.1, does not permit
// the specification of timezones using the +hhmm / -hhmm syntax, which is
// the only other thing that might legitimately be found at the end.
if (len) {
goto err;
}
return BIO_printf(bp, "%s %2d %02d:%02d:%02d %d%s", mon[M - 1], D, h, m, s, Y,
is_gmt ? " GMT" : "") > 0;
err:
BIO_write(bp, "Bad time value", 14);
return 0;
}
@@ -69,53 +69,17 @@ DEFINE_STACK_OF(ASN1_STRING_TABLE)
static STACK_OF(ASN1_STRING_TABLE) *stable = NULL;
static void st_free(ASN1_STRING_TABLE *tbl);
/*
* This is the global mask for the mbstring functions: this is use to mask
* out certain types (such as BMPString and UTF8String) because certain
* software (e.g. Netscape) has problems with them.
*/
static unsigned long global_mask = B_ASN1_UTF8STRING;
void ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask(unsigned long mask)
{
global_mask = mask;
}
unsigned long ASN1_STRING_get_default_mask(void)
{
return global_mask;
return B_ASN1_UTF8STRING;
}
/*
* This function sets the default to various "flavours" of configuration.
* based on an ASCII string. Currently this is: MASK:XXXX : a numerical mask
* value. nobmp : Don't use BMPStrings (just Printable, T61). pkix : PKIX
* recommendation in RFC2459. utf8only : only use UTF8Strings (RFC2459
* recommendation for 2004). default: the default value, Printable, T61, BMP.
*/
int ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(const char *p)
{
unsigned long mask;
char *end;
if (!strncmp(p, "MASK:", 5)) {
if (!p[5])
return 0;
mask = strtoul(p + 5, &end, 0);
if (*end)
return 0;
} else if (!strcmp(p, "nombstr"))
mask = ~((unsigned long)(B_ASN1_BMPSTRING | B_ASN1_UTF8STRING));
else if (!strcmp(p, "pkix"))
mask = ~((unsigned long)B_ASN1_T61STRING);
else if (!strcmp(p, "utf8only"))
mask = B_ASN1_UTF8STRING;
else if (!strcmp(p, "default"))
mask = 0xFFFFFFFFL;
else
return 0;
ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask(mask);
return 1;
}
@@ -139,13 +103,12 @@ ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID(ASN1_STRING **out,
if (tbl) {
mask = tbl->mask;
if (!(tbl->flags & STABLE_NO_MASK))
mask &= global_mask;
mask &= B_ASN1_UTF8STRING;
ret = ASN1_mbstring_ncopy(out, in, inlen, inform, mask,
tbl->minsize, tbl->maxsize);
} else
ret =
ASN1_mbstring_copy(out, in, inlen, inform,
DIRSTRING_TYPE & global_mask);
} else {
ret = ASN1_mbstring_copy(out, in, inlen, inform, B_ASN1_UTF8STRING);
}
if (ret <= 0)
return NULL;
return *out;
@@ -155,7 +118,7 @@ ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID(ASN1_STRING **out,
* Now the tables and helper functions for the string table:
*/
/* size limits: this stuff is taken straight from RFC3280 */
/* size limits: this stuff is taken straight from RFC 3280 */
#define ub_name 32768
#define ub_common_name 64
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_err.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include "asn1_locl.h"
#include "internal.h"
/*
* This is an implementation of the ASN1 Time structure which is: Time ::=
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ static int asn1_time_to_tm(struct tm *tm, const ASN1_TIME *t)
return 0;
}
int ASN1_TIME_diff(int *pday, int *psec,
int ASN1_TIME_diff(int *out_days, int *out_seconds,
const ASN1_TIME *from, const ASN1_TIME *to)
{
struct tm tm_from, tm_to;
@@ -208,5 +208,5 @@ int ASN1_TIME_diff(int *pday, int *psec,
return 0;
if (!asn1_time_to_tm(&tm_to, to))
return 0;
return OPENSSL_gmtime_diff(pday, psec, &tm_from, &tm_to);
return OPENSSL_gmtime_diff(out_days, out_seconds, &tm_from, &tm_to);
}
+22 -10
View File
@@ -61,20 +61,33 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_obj.h>
#include "internal.h"
int ASN1_TYPE_get(const ASN1_TYPE *a)
{
if ((a->value.ptr != NULL) || (a->type == V_ASN1_NULL))
return (a->type);
else
return (0);
if (a->type == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN || a->type == V_ASN1_NULL ||
a->value.ptr != NULL) {
return a->type;
}
return 0;
}
const void *asn1_type_value_as_pointer(const ASN1_TYPE *a)
{
if (a->type == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN) {
return a->value.boolean ? (void *)0xff : NULL;
}
if (a->type == V_ASN1_NULL) {
return NULL;
}
return a->value.ptr;
}
void ASN1_TYPE_set(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, void *value)
{
if (a->value.ptr != NULL) {
ASN1_TYPE **tmp_a = &a;
ASN1_primitive_free((ASN1_VALUE **)tmp_a, NULL);
}
ASN1_TYPE **tmp_a = &a;
ASN1_primitive_free((ASN1_VALUE **)tmp_a, NULL);
a->type = type;
if (type == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN)
a->value.boolean = value ? 0xff : 0;
@@ -142,8 +155,7 @@ int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b)
case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING:
case V_ASN1_OTHER:
default:
result = ASN1_STRING_cmp((ASN1_STRING *)a->value.ptr,
(ASN1_STRING *)b->value.ptr);
result = ASN1_STRING_cmp(a->value.asn1_string, b->value.asn1_string);
break;
}
+3 -42
View File
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_err.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include "asn1_locl.h"
#include "internal.h"
int asn1_utctime_to_tm(struct tm *tm, const ASN1_UTCTIME *d)
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t,
if (s == NULL) {
free_s = 1;
s = M_ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
s = ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
}
if (s == NULL)
goto err;
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t,
return (s);
err:
if (free_s && s)
M_ASN1_UTCTIME_free(s);
ASN1_UTCTIME_free(s);
return NULL;
}
@@ -262,42 +262,3 @@ int ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t(const ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t)
return -1;
return 0;
}
#if 0
time_t ASN1_UTCTIME_get(const ASN1_UTCTIME *s)
{
struct tm tm;
int offset;
OPENSSL_memset(&tm, '\0', sizeof tm);
# define g2(p) (((p)[0]-'0')*10+(p)[1]-'0')
tm.tm_year = g2(s->data);
if (tm.tm_year < 50)
tm.tm_year += 100;
tm.tm_mon = g2(s->data + 2) - 1;
tm.tm_mday = g2(s->data + 4);
tm.tm_hour = g2(s->data + 6);
tm.tm_min = g2(s->data + 8);
tm.tm_sec = g2(s->data + 10);
if (s->data[12] == 'Z')
offset = 0;
else {
offset = g2(s->data + 13) * 60 + g2(s->data + 15);
if (s->data[12] == '-')
offset = -offset;
}
# undef g2
return mktime(&tm) - offset * 60; /* FIXME: mktime assumes the current
* timezone instead of UTC, and unless
* we rewrite OpenSSL in Lisp we cannot
* locally change the timezone without
* possibly interfering with other
* parts of the program. timegm, which
* uses UTC, is non-standard. Also
* time_t is inappropriate for general
* UTC times because it may a 32 bit
* type. */
}
#endif
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_err.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include "asn1_locl.h"
#include "internal.h"
/* UTF8 utilities */
+16 -22
View File
@@ -251,6 +251,8 @@ void ASN1_put_object(unsigned char **pp, int constructed, int length, int tag,
int ASN1_put_eoc(unsigned char **pp)
{
/* This function is no longer used in the library, but some external code
* uses it. */
unsigned char *p = *pp;
*p++ = 0;
*p++ = 0;
@@ -311,9 +313,9 @@ int ASN1_STRING_copy(ASN1_STRING *dst, const ASN1_STRING *str)
{
if (str == NULL)
return 0;
dst->type = str->type;
if (!ASN1_STRING_set(dst, str->data, str->length))
return 0;
dst->type = str->type;
dst->flags = str->flags;
return 1;
}
@@ -368,8 +370,7 @@ int ASN1_STRING_set(ASN1_STRING *str, const void *_data, int len)
void ASN1_STRING_set0(ASN1_STRING *str, void *data, int len)
{
if (str->data)
OPENSSL_free(str->data);
OPENSSL_free(str->data);
str->data = data;
str->length = len;
}
@@ -395,13 +396,12 @@ ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_type_new(int type)
return (ret);
}
void ASN1_STRING_free(ASN1_STRING *a)
void ASN1_STRING_free(ASN1_STRING *str)
{
if (a == NULL)
if (str == NULL)
return;
if (a->data && !(a->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF))
OPENSSL_free(a->data);
OPENSSL_free(a);
OPENSSL_free(str->data);
OPENSSL_free(str);
}
int ASN1_STRING_cmp(const ASN1_STRING *a, const ASN1_STRING *b)
@@ -419,28 +419,22 @@ int ASN1_STRING_cmp(const ASN1_STRING *a, const ASN1_STRING *b)
return (i);
}
int ASN1_STRING_length(const ASN1_STRING *x)
int ASN1_STRING_length(const ASN1_STRING *str)
{
return M_ASN1_STRING_length(x);
return str->length;
}
void ASN1_STRING_length_set(ASN1_STRING *x, int len)
int ASN1_STRING_type(const ASN1_STRING *str)
{
M_ASN1_STRING_length_set(x, len);
return;
return str->type;
}
int ASN1_STRING_type(const ASN1_STRING *x)
unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_data(ASN1_STRING *str)
{
return M_ASN1_STRING_type(x);
return str->data;
}
unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_data(ASN1_STRING *x)
const unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_get0_data(const ASN1_STRING *str)
{
return M_ASN1_STRING_data(x);
}
const unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_get0_data(const ASN1_STRING *x)
{
return x->data;
return str->data;
}
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ const char *ASN1_tag2str(int tag)
};
if ((tag == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) || (tag == V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED))
tag &= ~0x100;
tag &= ~V_ASN1_NEG;
if (tag < 0 || tag > 30)
return "(unknown)";
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
/* asn1t.h */
/*
* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2006.
@@ -87,6 +86,26 @@ int OPENSSL_gmtime_diff(int *out_days, int *out_secs, const struct tm *from,
/* Internal ASN1 structures and functions: not for application use */
/* These are used internally in the ASN1_OBJECT to keep track of
* whether the names and data need to be free()ed */
#define ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC 0x01 /* internal use */
#define ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS 0x04 /* internal use */
#define ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA 0x08 /* internal use */
/* An asn1_object_st (aka |ASN1_OBJECT|) represents an ASN.1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER.
* Note: Mutating an |ASN1_OBJECT| is only permitted when initializing it. The
* library maintains a table of static |ASN1_OBJECT|s, which may be referenced
* by non-const |ASN1_OBJECT| pointers. Code which receives an |ASN1_OBJECT|
* pointer externally must assume it is immutable, even if the pointer is not
* const. */
struct asn1_object_st {
const char *sn, *ln;
int nid;
int length;
const unsigned char *data; /* data remains const after init */
int flags; /* Should we free this one */
};
int asn1_utctime_to_tm(struct tm *tm, const ASN1_UTCTIME *d);
int asn1_generalizedtime_to_tm(struct tm *tm, const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *d);
@@ -96,6 +115,45 @@ void asn1_item_combine_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
int UTF8_getc(const unsigned char *str, int len, uint32_t *val);
int UTF8_putc(unsigned char *str, int len, uint32_t value);
int ASN1_item_ex_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
void ASN1_item_ex_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
void ASN1_template_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt);
int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass, char opt,
ASN1_TLC *ctx);
int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass);
void ASN1_primitive_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
int asn1_get_choice_selector(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
int asn1_set_choice_selector(ASN1_VALUE **pval, int value, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
ASN1_VALUE **asn1_get_field_ptr(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt);
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *asn1_do_adb(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt,
int nullerr);
void asn1_refcount_set_one(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
int asn1_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
void asn1_enc_init(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
void asn1_enc_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
int asn1_enc_restore(int *len, unsigned char **out, ASN1_VALUE **pval,
const ASN1_ITEM *it);
int asn1_enc_save(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *in, int inlen,
const ASN1_ITEM *it);
/* asn1_type_value_as_pointer returns |a|'s value in pointer form. This is
* usually the value object but, for BOOLEAN values, is 0 or 0xff cast to
* a pointer. */
const void *asn1_type_value_as_pointer(const ASN1_TYPE *a);
/* asn1_is_printable returns one if |value| is a valid Unicode codepoint for an
* ASN.1 PrintableString, and zero otherwise. */
int asn1_is_printable(uint32_t value);
#if defined(__cplusplus)
} /* extern C */
+32 -83
View File
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include "../internal.h"
#include "internal.h"
/*
* Constructed types with a recursive definition (such as can be found in PKCS7)
@@ -95,6 +96,8 @@ static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
ASN1_TLC *ctx, int depth);
static int asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_ITEM *it,
@@ -166,19 +169,16 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx, int depth)
{
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, *errtt = NULL;
const ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS *cf;
const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb;
const unsigned char *p = NULL, *q;
unsigned char *wp = NULL; /* BIG FAT WARNING! BREAKS CONST WHERE USED */
unsigned char imphack = 0, oclass;
unsigned char oclass;
char seq_eoc, seq_nolen, cst, isopt;
long tmplen;
int i;
int otag;
int ret = 0;
ASN1_VALUE **pchptr, *ptmpval;
ASN1_VALUE **pchptr;
int combine = aclass & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
aclass &= ~ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
if (!pval)
@@ -223,6 +223,15 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING:
/*
* It never makes sense for multi-strings to have implicit tagging, so
* if tag != -1, then this looks like an error in the template.
*/
if (tag != -1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE);
goto err;
}
p = *in;
/* Just read in tag and class */
ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, &otag, &oclass, NULL, NULL,
@@ -255,67 +264,16 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
ef = it->funcs;
return ef->asn1_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
case ASN1_ITYPE_COMPAT:
/* we must resort to old style evil hackery */
cf = it->funcs;
/* If OPTIONAL see if it is there */
if (opt) {
int exptag;
p = *in;
if (tag == -1)
exptag = it->utype;
else
exptag = tag;
/*
* Don't care about anything other than presence of expected tag
*/
ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
&p, len, exptag, aclass, 1, ctx);
if (!ret) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (ret == -1)
return -1;
}
/*
* This is the old style evil hack IMPLICIT handling: since the
* underlying code is expecting a tag and class other than the one
* present we change the buffer temporarily then change it back
* afterwards. This doesn't and never did work for tags > 30. Yes
* this is *horrible* but it is only needed for old style d2i which
* will hopefully not be around for much longer. FIXME: should copy
* the buffer then modify it so the input buffer can be const: we
* should *always* copy because the old style d2i might modify the
* buffer.
*/
if (tag != -1) {
wp = *(unsigned char **)in;
imphack = *wp;
if (p == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
*wp = (unsigned char)((*p & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
| it->utype);
}
ptmpval = cf->asn1_d2i(pval, in, len);
if (tag != -1)
*wp = imphack;
if (ptmpval)
return 1;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
/*
* It never makes sense for CHOICE types to have implicit tagging, so if
* tag != -1, then this looks like an error in the template.
*/
if (tag != -1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE);
goto err;
}
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
@@ -370,10 +328,8 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
*in = p;
return 1;
case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
p = *in;
tmplen = len;
/* If no IMPLICIT tagging set to SEQUENCE, UNIVERSAL */
if (tag == -1) {
@@ -388,13 +344,8 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
goto err;
} else if (ret == -1)
return -1;
if (aux && (aux->flags & ASN1_AFLG_BROKEN)) {
len = tmplen - (p - *in);
seq_nolen = 1;
}
/* If indefinite we don't do a length check */
else
seq_nolen = seq_eoc;
seq_nolen = seq_eoc;
if (!cst) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED);
goto err;
@@ -649,7 +600,7 @@ static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
} else if (ret == -1)
return -1;
if (!*val)
*val = (ASN1_VALUE *)sk_new_null();
*val = (ASN1_VALUE *)sk_ASN1_VALUE_new_null();
else {
/*
* We've got a valid STACK: free up any items present
@@ -860,19 +811,19 @@ static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
/* Translate ASN1 content octets into a structure */
int asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
static int asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
ASN1_VALUE **opval = NULL;
ASN1_STRING *stmp;
ASN1_TYPE *typ = NULL;
int ret = 0;
const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf;
ASN1_INTEGER **tint;
pf = it->funcs;
if (pf && pf->prim_c2i)
return pf->prim_c2i(pval, cont, len, utype, free_cont, it);
/* Historically, |it->funcs| for primitive types contained an
* |ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS| table of callbacks. */
assert(it->funcs == NULL);
/* If ANY type clear type and set pointer to internal value */
if (it->utype == V_ASN1_ANY) {
if (!*pval) {
@@ -1055,15 +1006,13 @@ static int asn1_find_end(const unsigned char **in, long len, char inf)
* constructed type and 'inf' should be set if it is indefinite length.
*/
#ifndef ASN1_MAX_STRING_NEST
/*
* This determines how many levels of recursion are permitted in ASN1 string
* types. If it is not limited stack overflows can occur. If set to zero no
* recursion is allowed at all. Although zero should be adequate examples
* exist that require a value of 1. So 5 should be more than enough.
*/
# define ASN1_MAX_STRING_NEST 5
#endif
#define ASN1_MAX_STRING_NEST 5
static int asn1_collect(BUF_MEM *buf, const unsigned char **in, long len,
char inf, int tag, int aclass, int depth)
+59 -97
View File
@@ -63,10 +63,13 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include "../internal.h"
#include "internal.h"
static int asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass);
static int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype,
const ASN1_ITEM *it);
static int asn1_set_seq_out(STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sk, unsigned char **out,
int skcontlen, const ASN1_ITEM *item,
int do_sort, int iclass);
@@ -76,16 +79,9 @@ static int asn1_item_flags_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out,
const ASN1_ITEM *it, int flags);
/*
* Top level i2d equivalents: the 'ndef' variant instructs the encoder to use
* indefinite length constructed encoding, where appropriate
* Top level i2d equivalents
*/
int ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out,
const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
return asn1_item_flags_i2d(val, out, it, ASN1_TFLG_NDEF);
}
int ASN1_item_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
return asn1_item_flags_i2d(val, out, it, 0);
@@ -128,9 +124,7 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass)
{
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt = NULL;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
int i, seqcontlen, seqlen, ndef = 1;
const ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS *cf;
int i, seqcontlen, seqlen;
const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb = 0;
@@ -151,9 +145,25 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING:
/*
* It never makes sense for multi-strings to have implicit tagging, so
* if tag != -1, then this looks like an error in the template.
*/
if (tag != -1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE);
return -1;
}
return asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(pval, out, it, -1, aclass);
case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
/*
* It never makes sense for CHOICE types to have implicit tagging, so if
* tag != -1, then this looks like an error in the template.
*/
if (tag != -1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE);
return -1;
}
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_I2D_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
return 0;
i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it);
@@ -174,26 +184,6 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
ef = it->funcs;
return ef->asn1_ex_i2d(pval, out, it, tag, aclass);
case ASN1_ITYPE_COMPAT:
/* old style hackery... */
cf = it->funcs;
if (out)
p = *out;
i = cf->asn1_i2d(*pval, out);
/*
* Fixup for IMPLICIT tag: note this messes up for tags > 30, but so
* did the old code. Tags > 30 are very rare anyway.
*/
if (out && (tag != -1))
*p = aclass | tag | (*p & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED);
return i;
case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
/* Use indefinite length constructed if requested */
if (aclass & ASN1_TFLG_NDEF)
ndef = 2;
OPENSSL_FALLTHROUGH;
case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
i = asn1_enc_restore(&seqcontlen, out, pval, it);
/* An error occurred */
@@ -228,11 +218,11 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
seqcontlen += tmplen;
}
seqlen = ASN1_object_size(ndef, seqcontlen, tag);
seqlen = ASN1_object_size(/*constructed=*/1, seqcontlen, tag);
if (!out || seqlen == -1)
return seqlen;
/* Output SEQUENCE header */
ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, seqcontlen, tag, aclass);
ASN1_put_object(out, /*constructed=*/1, seqcontlen, tag, aclass);
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
@@ -243,8 +233,6 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
/* FIXME: check for errors in enhanced version */
asn1_template_ex_i2d(pseqval, out, seqtt, -1, aclass);
}
if (ndef == 2)
ASN1_put_eoc(out);
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_I2D_POST, pval, it, NULL))
return 0;
return seqlen;
@@ -259,7 +247,7 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
static int asn1_template_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, int tag, int iclass)
{
int i, ret, flags, ttag, tclass, ndef;
int i, ret, flags, ttag, tclass;
size_t j;
flags = tt->flags;
/*
@@ -295,12 +283,6 @@ static int asn1_template_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
* class and iclass is any flags passed to this function.
*/
/* if template and arguments require ndef, use it */
if ((flags & ASN1_TFLG_NDEF) && (iclass & ASN1_TFLG_NDEF))
ndef = 2;
else
ndef = 1;
if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SK_MASK) {
/* SET OF, SEQUENCE OF */
STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sk = (STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *)*pval;
@@ -313,11 +295,12 @@ static int asn1_template_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF) {
isset = 1;
/* 2 means we reorder */
if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF)
isset = 2;
} else
/* Historically, types with both bits set were mutated when
* serialized to apply the sort. We no longer support this. */
assert((flags & ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF) == 0);
} else {
isset = 0;
}
/*
* Work out inner tag value: if EXPLICIT or no tagging use underlying
@@ -345,12 +328,12 @@ static int asn1_template_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
return -1;
skcontlen += tmplen;
}
sklen = ASN1_object_size(ndef, skcontlen, sktag);
sklen = ASN1_object_size(/*constructed=*/1, skcontlen, sktag);
if (sklen == -1)
return -1;
/* If EXPLICIT need length of surrounding tag */
if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG)
ret = ASN1_object_size(ndef, sklen, ttag);
ret = ASN1_object_size(/*constructed=*/1, sklen, ttag);
else
ret = sklen;
@@ -360,18 +343,12 @@ static int asn1_template_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
/* Now encode this lot... */
/* EXPLICIT tag */
if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG)
ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, sklen, ttag, tclass);
ASN1_put_object(out, /*constructed=*/1, sklen, ttag, tclass);
/* SET or SEQUENCE and IMPLICIT tag */
ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, skcontlen, sktag, skaclass);
ASN1_put_object(out, /*constructed=*/1, skcontlen, sktag, skaclass);
/* And the stuff itself */
asn1_set_seq_out(sk, out, skcontlen, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
isset, iclass);
if (ndef == 2) {
ASN1_put_eoc(out);
if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG)
ASN1_put_eoc(out);
}
return ret;
}
@@ -382,13 +359,11 @@ static int asn1_template_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
if (!i)
return 0;
/* Find length of EXPLICIT tag */
ret = ASN1_object_size(ndef, i, ttag);
ret = ASN1_object_size(/*constructed=*/1, i, ttag);
if (out && ret != -1) {
/* Output tag and item */
ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, i, ttag, tclass);
ASN1_put_object(out, /*constructed=*/1, i, ttag, tclass);
ASN1_item_ex_i2d(pval, out, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), -1, iclass);
if (ndef == 2)
ASN1_put_eoc(out);
}
return ret;
}
@@ -404,7 +379,6 @@ static int asn1_template_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
typedef struct {
unsigned char *data;
int length;
ASN1_VALUE *field;
} DER_ENC;
static int der_cmp(const void *a, const void *b)
@@ -459,7 +433,6 @@ static int asn1_set_seq_out(STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sk, unsigned char **out,
skitem = sk_ASN1_VALUE_value(sk, i);
tder->data = p;
tder->length = ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&skitem, &p, item, -1, iclass);
tder->field = skitem;
}
/* Now sort them */
@@ -471,11 +444,6 @@ static int asn1_set_seq_out(STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sk, unsigned char **out,
p += tder->length;
}
*out = p;
/* If do_sort is 2 then reorder the STACK */
if (do_sort == 2) {
for (i = 0, tder = derlst; i < sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk); i++, tder++)
(void)sk_ASN1_VALUE_set(sk, i, tder->field);
}
OPENSSL_free(derlst);
OPENSSL_free(tmpdat);
return 1;
@@ -487,7 +455,6 @@ static int asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
int len;
int utype;
int usetag;
int ndef = 0;
utype = it->utype;
@@ -513,12 +480,6 @@ static int asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
if (len == -1)
return 0;
/* -2 return is special meaning use ndef */
if (len == -2) {
ndef = 2;
len = 0;
}
/* If not implicitly tagged get tag from underlying type */
if (tag == -1)
tag = utype;
@@ -526,23 +487,20 @@ static int asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
/* Output tag+length followed by content octets */
if (out) {
if (usetag)
ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, len, tag, aclass);
ASN1_put_object(out, /*constructed=*/0, len, tag, aclass);
asn1_ex_i2c(pval, *out, &utype, it);
if (ndef)
ASN1_put_eoc(out);
else
*out += len;
*out += len;
}
if (usetag)
return ASN1_object_size(ndef, len, tag);
return ASN1_object_size(/*constructed=*/0, len, tag);
return len;
}
/* Produce content octets from a structure */
int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cout, int *putype,
const ASN1_ITEM *it)
static int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cout, int *putype,
const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
ASN1_BOOLEAN *tbool = NULL;
ASN1_STRING *strtmp;
@@ -551,10 +509,10 @@ int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cout, int *putype,
const unsigned char *cont;
unsigned char c;
int len;
const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf;
pf = it->funcs;
if (pf && pf->prim_i2c)
return pf->prim_i2c(pval, cout, putype, it);
/* Historically, |it->funcs| for primitive types contained an
* |ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS| table of callbacks. */
assert(it->funcs == NULL);
/* Should type be omitted? */
if ((it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE)
@@ -567,6 +525,20 @@ int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cout, int *putype,
/* If MSTRING type set the underlying type */
strtmp = (ASN1_STRING *)*pval;
utype = strtmp->type;
/* Negative INTEGER and ENUMERATED values use |ASN1_STRING| type values
* that do not match their corresponding utype values. INTEGERs cannot
* participate in MSTRING types, but ENUMERATEDs can.
*
* TODO(davidben): Is this a bug? Although arguably one of the MSTRING
* types should contain more values, rather than less. See
* https://crbug.com/boringssl/412. But it is not possible to fit all
* possible ANY values into an |ASN1_STRING|, so matching the spec here
* is somewhat hopeless. */
if (utype == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) {
utype = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
} else if (utype == V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED) {
utype = V_ASN1_ENUMERATED;
}
*putype = utype;
} else if (it->utype == V_ASN1_ANY) {
/* If ANY set type and pointer to value */
@@ -605,7 +577,7 @@ int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cout, int *putype,
if (!*tbool && !it->size)
return -1;
}
c = (unsigned char)*tbool;
c = *tbool ? 0xff : 0x00;
cont = &c;
len = 1;
break;
@@ -642,16 +614,6 @@ int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cout, int *putype,
default:
/* All based on ASN1_STRING and handled the same */
strtmp = (ASN1_STRING *)*pval;
/* Special handling for NDEF */
if ((it->size == ASN1_TFLG_NDEF)
&& (strtmp->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) {
if (cout) {
strtmp->data = cout;
strtmp->length = 0;
}
/* Special return code */
return -2;
}
cont = strtmp->data;
len = strtmp->length;
@@ -56,10 +56,12 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_asn1.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_asn1t.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include "asn1_locl.h"
#include "internal.h"
/* Free up an ASN1 structure */
@@ -77,7 +79,6 @@ void asn1_item_combine_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int combine)
{
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt = NULL, *seqtt;
const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
const ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS *cf;
const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb;
int i;
@@ -124,19 +125,12 @@ void asn1_item_combine_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int combine)
}
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_COMPAT:
cf = it->funcs;
if (cf && cf->asn1_free)
cf->asn1_free(*pval);
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN:
ef = it->funcs;
if (ef && ef->asn1_ex_free)
ef->asn1_ex_free(pval, it);
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
if (!asn1_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(pval, it))
return;
@@ -190,20 +184,15 @@ void ASN1_template_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt)
void ASN1_primitive_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
int utype;
if (it) {
const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf;
pf = it->funcs;
if (pf && pf->prim_free) {
pf->prim_free(pval, it);
return;
}
}
/* Historically, |it->funcs| for primitive types contained an
* |ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS| table of calbacks. */
assert(it == NULL || it->funcs == NULL);
/* Special case: if 'it' is NULL free contents of ASN1_TYPE */
if (!it) {
ASN1_TYPE *typ = (ASN1_TYPE *)*pval;
utype = typ->type;
pval = &typ->value.asn1_value;
if (!*pval)
if (utype != V_ASN1_BOOLEAN && !*pval)
return;
} else if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING) {
utype = -1;
+12 -67
View File
@@ -63,14 +63,16 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_obj.h>
#include "asn1_locl.h"
#include "internal.h"
#include "../internal.h"
static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
int combine);
static void asn1_item_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
static int ASN1_template_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt);
static void asn1_template_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt);
static int ASN1_primitive_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
static void asn1_primitive_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
ASN1_VALUE *ASN1_item_new(const ASN1_ITEM *it)
@@ -92,7 +94,6 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
int combine)
{
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt = NULL;
const ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS *cf;
const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb;
@@ -103,11 +104,6 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
else
asn1_cb = 0;
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
if (it->sname)
CRYPTO_push_info(it->sname);
#endif
switch (it->itype) {
case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN:
@@ -118,15 +114,6 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
}
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_COMPAT:
cf = it->funcs;
if (cf && cf->asn1_new) {
*pval = cf->asn1_new();
if (!*pval)
goto memerr;
}
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE:
if (it->templates) {
if (!ASN1_template_new(pval, it->templates))
@@ -146,10 +133,6 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
if (!i)
goto auxerr;
if (i == 2) {
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
if (it->sname)
CRYPTO_pop_info();
#endif
return 1;
}
}
@@ -164,17 +147,12 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
goto auxerr2;
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
if (asn1_cb) {
i = asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE, pval, it, NULL);
if (!i)
goto auxerr;
if (i == 2) {
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
if (it->sname)
CRYPTO_pop_info();
#endif
return 1;
}
}
@@ -195,30 +173,18 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
goto auxerr2;
break;
}
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
if (it->sname)
CRYPTO_pop_info();
#endif
return 1;
memerr2:
asn1_item_combine_free(pval, it, combine);
memerr:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
if (it->sname)
CRYPTO_pop_info();
#endif
return 0;
auxerr2:
asn1_item_combine_free(pval, it, combine);
auxerr:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR);
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
if (it->sname)
CRYPTO_pop_info();
#endif
return 0;
}
@@ -248,16 +214,14 @@ static void asn1_item_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
asn1_primitive_clear(pval, it);
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_COMPAT:
case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
*pval = NULL;
break;
}
}
int ASN1_template_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt)
static int ASN1_template_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt)
{
const ASN1_ITEM *it = ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item);
int ret;
@@ -271,10 +235,6 @@ int ASN1_template_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt)
*pval = NULL;
return 1;
}
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
if (tt->field_name)
CRYPTO_push_info(tt->field_name);
#endif
/* If SET OF or SEQUENCE OF, its a STACK */
if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_SK_MASK) {
STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *skval;
@@ -291,10 +251,6 @@ int ASN1_template_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt)
/* Otherwise pass it back to the item routine */
ret = asn1_item_ex_combine_new(pval, it, tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE);
done:
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
if (it->sname)
CRYPTO_pop_info();
#endif
return ret;
}
@@ -312,20 +268,17 @@ static void asn1_template_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt)
* all the old functions.
*/
int ASN1_primitive_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
static int ASN1_primitive_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
ASN1_TYPE *typ;
ASN1_STRING *str;
int utype;
if (!it)
return 0;
if (it->funcs) {
const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf = it->funcs;
if (pf->prim_new)
return pf->prim_new(pval, it);
}
/* Historically, |it->funcs| for primitive types contained an
* |ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS| table of calbacks. */
assert(it->funcs == NULL);
if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING)
utype = -1;
@@ -354,10 +307,7 @@ int ASN1_primitive_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
break;
default:
str = ASN1_STRING_type_new(utype);
if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING && str)
str->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING;
*pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)str;
*pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)ASN1_STRING_type_new(utype);
break;
}
if (*pval)
@@ -368,14 +318,9 @@ int ASN1_primitive_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
static void asn1_primitive_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
int utype;
if (it && it->funcs) {
const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf = it->funcs;
if (pf->prim_clear)
pf->prim_clear(pval, it);
else
*pval = NULL;
return;
}
/* Historically, |it->funcs| for primitive types contained an
* |ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS| table of calbacks. */
assert(it == NULL || it->funcs == NULL);
if (!it || (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING))
utype = -1;
else
@@ -117,8 +117,6 @@ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE_ex(ASN1_FBOOLEAN, ASN1_BOOLEAN, 0)
/* Special, OCTET STRING with indefinite length constructed support */
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE_ex(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_NDEF, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ASN1_TFLG_NDEF)
ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY) =
ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY, ASN1_ANY)
ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY)
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_thread.h>
#include "../internal.h"
#include "internal.h"
/* Utility functions for manipulating fields and offsets */
@@ -91,8 +92,7 @@ int asn1_set_choice_selector(ASN1_VALUE **pval, int value,
static CRYPTO_refcount_t *asn1_get_references(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
const ASN1_ITEM *it) {
if (it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE &&
it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE) {
if (it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE) {
return NULL;
}
const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 201410L /* for gmtime_r */
#endif
#include "asn1_locl.h"
#include "internal.h"
#include <time.h>
@@ -262,6 +262,8 @@ int BIO_should_io_special(const BIO *bio) {
int BIO_get_retry_reason(const BIO *bio) { return bio->retry_reason; }
void BIO_set_retry_reason(BIO *bio, int reason) { bio->retry_reason = reason; }
void BIO_clear_flags(BIO *bio, int flags) {
bio->flags &= ~flags;
}
@@ -116,17 +116,11 @@ static int mem_new(BIO *bio) {
}
static int mem_free(BIO *bio) {
BUF_MEM *b;
if (bio == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (!bio->shutdown || !bio->init || bio->ptr == NULL) {
return 1;
}
b = (BUF_MEM *)bio->ptr;
BUF_MEM *b = (BUF_MEM *)bio->ptr;
if (bio->flags & BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY) {
b->data = NULL;
}
@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ static int conn_new(BIO *bio) {
bio->init = 0;
bio->num = -1;
bio->flags = 0;
bio->ptr = (char *)BIO_CONNECT_new();
bio->ptr = BIO_CONNECT_new();
return bio->ptr != NULL;
}
@@ -340,10 +340,6 @@ static void conn_close_socket(BIO *bio) {
}
static int conn_free(BIO *bio) {
if (bio == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (bio->shutdown) {
conn_close_socket(bio);
}
-4
View File
@@ -146,10 +146,6 @@ static int fd_new(BIO *bio) {
}
static int fd_free(BIO *bio) {
if (bio == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (bio->shutdown) {
if (bio->init) {
BORINGSSL_CLOSE(bio->num);
+1 -7
View File
@@ -126,13 +126,7 @@ BIO *BIO_new_fp(FILE *stream, int close_flag) {
return ret;
}
static int file_new(BIO *bio) { return 1; }
static int file_free(BIO *bio) {
if (bio == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (!bio->shutdown) {
return 1;
}
@@ -279,7 +273,7 @@ static const BIO_METHOD methods_filep = {
BIO_TYPE_FILE, "FILE pointer",
file_write, file_read,
NULL /* puts */, file_gets,
file_ctrl, file_new,
file_ctrl, NULL /* create */,
file_free, NULL /* callback_ctrl */,
};
+1 -6
View File
@@ -127,12 +127,7 @@ static void bio_destroy_pair(BIO *bio) {
}
static int bio_free(BIO *bio) {
struct bio_bio_st *b;
if (bio == NULL) {
return 0;
}
b = bio->ptr;
struct bio_bio_st *b = bio->ptr;
assert(b != NULL);
+3 -17
View File
@@ -81,19 +81,7 @@ static int closesocket(int sock) {
}
#endif
static int sock_new(BIO *bio) {
bio->init = 0;
bio->num = 0;
bio->ptr = NULL;
bio->flags = 0;
return 1;
}
static int sock_free(BIO *bio) {
if (bio == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (bio->shutdown) {
if (bio->init) {
closesocket(bio->num);
@@ -105,17 +93,15 @@ static int sock_free(BIO *bio) {
}
static int sock_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) {
int ret = 0;
if (out == NULL) {
return 0;
}
bio_clear_socket_error();
#if defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
ret = recv(b->num, out, outl, 0);
int ret = recv(b->num, out, outl, 0);
#else
ret = read(b->num, out, outl);
int ret = read(b->num, out, outl);
#endif
BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
if (ret <= 0) {
@@ -186,7 +172,7 @@ static const BIO_METHOD methods_sockp = {
BIO_TYPE_SOCKET, "socket",
sock_write, sock_read,
NULL /* puts */, NULL /* gets, */,
sock_ctrl, sock_new,
sock_ctrl, NULL /* create */,
sock_free, NULL /* callback_ctrl */,
};
@@ -55,7 +55,11 @@ int bio_ip_and_port_to_socket_and_addr(int *out_sock,
ret = getaddrinfo(hostname, port_str, &hint, &result);
if (ret != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SYS, 0);
#if defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
ERR_add_error_data(1, gai_strerrorA(ret));
#else
ERR_add_error_data(1, gai_strerror(ret));
#endif
return 0;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2021, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_blake2.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_type_check.h>
#include "../internal.h"
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7693#section-2.6
static const uint64_t kIV[8] = {
UINT64_C(0x6a09e667f3bcc908), UINT64_C(0xbb67ae8584caa73b),
UINT64_C(0x3c6ef372fe94f82b), UINT64_C(0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1),
UINT64_C(0x510e527fade682d1), UINT64_C(0x9b05688c2b3e6c1f),
UINT64_C(0x1f83d9abfb41bd6b), UINT64_C(0x5be0cd19137e2179),
};
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7693#section-2.7
static const uint8_t kSigma[10 * 16] = {
// clang-format off
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,
14, 10, 4, 8, 9, 15, 13, 6, 1, 12, 0, 2, 11, 7, 5, 3,
11, 8, 12, 0, 5, 2, 15, 13, 10, 14, 3, 6, 7, 1, 9, 4,
7, 9, 3, 1, 13, 12, 11, 14, 2, 6, 5, 10, 4, 0, 15, 8,
9, 0, 5, 7, 2, 4, 10, 15, 14, 1, 11, 12, 6, 8, 3, 13,
2, 12, 6, 10, 0, 11, 8, 3, 4, 13, 7, 5, 15, 14, 1, 9,
12, 5, 1, 15, 14, 13, 4, 10, 0, 7, 6, 3, 9, 2, 8, 11,
13, 11, 7, 14, 12, 1, 3, 9, 5, 0, 15, 4, 8, 6, 2, 10,
6, 15, 14, 9, 11, 3, 0, 8, 12, 2, 13, 7, 1, 4, 10, 5,
10, 2, 8, 4, 7, 6, 1, 5, 15, 11, 9, 14, 3, 12, 13, 0,
// clang-format on
};
#define RIGHT_ROTATE(v, n) (((v) >> (n)) | ((v) << (64 - (n))))
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7693#section-3.1
static void blake2b_mix(uint64_t v[16], int a, int b, int c, int d, uint64_t x,
uint64_t y) {
v[a] = v[a] + v[b] + x;
v[d] = RIGHT_ROTATE(v[d] ^ v[a], 32);
v[c] = v[c] + v[d];
v[b] = RIGHT_ROTATE(v[b] ^ v[c], 24);
v[a] = v[a] + v[b] + y;
v[d] = RIGHT_ROTATE(v[d] ^ v[a], 16);
v[c] = v[c] + v[d];
v[b] = RIGHT_ROTATE(v[b] ^ v[c], 63);
}
static void blake2b_transform(
BLAKE2B_CTX *b2b,
const uint64_t block_words[BLAKE2B_CBLOCK / sizeof(uint64_t)],
size_t num_bytes, int is_final_block) {
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7693#section-3.2
uint64_t v[16];
OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(v) == sizeof(b2b->h) + sizeof(kIV), "");
OPENSSL_memcpy(v, b2b->h, sizeof(b2b->h));
OPENSSL_memcpy(&v[8], kIV, sizeof(kIV));
b2b->t_low += num_bytes;
if (b2b->t_low < num_bytes) {
b2b->t_high++;
}
v[12] ^= b2b->t_low;
v[13] ^= b2b->t_high;
if (is_final_block) {
v[14] = ~v[14];
}
for (int round = 0; round < 12; round++) {
const uint8_t *const s = &kSigma[16 * (round % 10)];
blake2b_mix(v, 0, 4, 8, 12, block_words[s[0]], block_words[s[1]]);
blake2b_mix(v, 1, 5, 9, 13, block_words[s[2]], block_words[s[3]]);
blake2b_mix(v, 2, 6, 10, 14, block_words[s[4]], block_words[s[5]]);
blake2b_mix(v, 3, 7, 11, 15, block_words[s[6]], block_words[s[7]]);
blake2b_mix(v, 0, 5, 10, 15, block_words[s[8]], block_words[s[9]]);
blake2b_mix(v, 1, 6, 11, 12, block_words[s[10]], block_words[s[11]]);
blake2b_mix(v, 2, 7, 8, 13, block_words[s[12]], block_words[s[13]]);
blake2b_mix(v, 3, 4, 9, 14, block_words[s[14]], block_words[s[15]]);
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(b2b->h); i++) {
b2b->h[i] ^= v[i];
b2b->h[i] ^= v[i + 8];
}
}
void BLAKE2B256_Init(BLAKE2B_CTX *b2b) {
OPENSSL_memset(b2b, 0, sizeof(BLAKE2B_CTX));
OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(kIV) == sizeof(b2b->h), "");
OPENSSL_memcpy(&b2b->h, kIV, sizeof(kIV));
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7693#section-2.5
b2b->h[0] ^= 0x01010000 | BLAKE2B256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
}
void BLAKE2B256_Update(BLAKE2B_CTX *b2b, const void *in_data, size_t len) {
const uint8_t *data = (const uint8_t *)in_data;
size_t todo = sizeof(b2b->block.bytes) - b2b->block_used;
if (todo > len) {
todo = len;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(&b2b->block.bytes[b2b->block_used], data, todo);
b2b->block_used += todo;
data += todo;
len -= todo;
if (!len) {
return;
}
// More input remains therefore we must have filled |b2b->block|.
assert(b2b->block_used == BLAKE2B_CBLOCK);
blake2b_transform(b2b, b2b->block.words, BLAKE2B_CBLOCK,
/*is_final_block=*/0);
b2b->block_used = 0;
while (len > BLAKE2B_CBLOCK) {
uint64_t block_words[BLAKE2B_CBLOCK / sizeof(uint64_t)];
OPENSSL_memcpy(block_words, data, sizeof(block_words));
blake2b_transform(b2b, block_words, BLAKE2B_CBLOCK, /*is_final_block=*/0);
data += BLAKE2B_CBLOCK;
len -= BLAKE2B_CBLOCK;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(b2b->block.bytes, data, len);
b2b->block_used = len;
}
void BLAKE2B256_Final(uint8_t out[BLAKE2B256_DIGEST_LENGTH], BLAKE2B_CTX *b2b) {
OPENSSL_memset(&b2b->block.bytes[b2b->block_used], 0,
sizeof(b2b->block.bytes) - b2b->block_used);
blake2b_transform(b2b, b2b->block.words, b2b->block_used,
/*is_final_block=*/1);
OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(BLAKE2B256_DIGEST_LENGTH <= sizeof(b2b->h), "");
memcpy(out, b2b->h, BLAKE2B256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
}
void BLAKE2B256(const uint8_t *data, size_t len,
uint8_t out[BLAKE2B256_DIGEST_LENGTH]) {
BLAKE2B_CTX ctx;
BLAKE2B256_Init(&ctx);
BLAKE2B256_Update(&ctx, data, len);
BLAKE2B256_Final(out, &ctx);
}
@@ -20,25 +20,18 @@
int BN_parse_asn1_unsigned(CBS *cbs, BIGNUM *ret) {
CBS child;
int is_negative;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &child, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
CBS_len(&child) == 0) {
!CBS_is_valid_asn1_integer(&child, &is_negative)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_BAD_ENCODING);
return 0;
}
if (CBS_data(&child)[0] & 0x80) {
if (is_negative) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NEGATIVE_NUMBER);
return 0;
}
// INTEGERs must be minimal.
if (CBS_data(&child)[0] == 0x00 &&
CBS_len(&child) > 1 &&
!(CBS_data(&child)[1] & 0x80)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_BAD_ENCODING);
return 0;
}
return BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&child), CBS_len(&child), ret) != NULL;
}
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static int is_string_type(unsigned tag) {
// depending on whether an indefinite length element or constructed string was
// found. The value of |orig_in| is not changed. It returns one on success (i.e.
// |*ber_found| was set) and zero on error.
static int cbs_find_ber(const CBS *orig_in, char *ber_found, unsigned depth) {
static int cbs_find_ber(const CBS *orig_in, int *ber_found, unsigned depth) {
CBS in;
if (depth > kMaxDepth) {
@@ -68,14 +68,11 @@ static int cbs_find_ber(const CBS *orig_in, char *ber_found, unsigned depth) {
unsigned tag;
size_t header_len;
if (!CBS_get_any_ber_asn1_element(&in, &contents, &tag, &header_len)) {
if (!CBS_get_any_ber_asn1_element(&in, &contents, &tag, &header_len,
ber_found)) {
return 0;
}
if (CBS_len(&contents) == header_len &&
header_len > 0 &&
CBS_data(&contents)[header_len-1] == 0x80) {
// Found an indefinite-length element.
*ber_found = 1;
if (*ber_found) {
return 1;
}
if (tag & CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) {
@@ -120,9 +117,11 @@ static int cbs_convert_ber(CBS *in, CBB *out, unsigned string_tag,
CBS contents;
unsigned tag, child_string_tag = string_tag;
size_t header_len;
int ber_found;
CBB *out_contents, out_contents_storage;
if (!CBS_get_any_ber_asn1_element(in, &contents, &tag, &header_len)) {
if (!CBS_get_any_ber_asn1_element(in, &contents, &tag, &header_len,
&ber_found)) {
return 0;
}
@@ -194,7 +193,7 @@ int CBS_asn1_ber_to_der(CBS *in, CBS *out, uint8_t **out_storage) {
// First, do a quick walk to find any indefinite-length elements. Most of the
// time we hope that there aren't any and thus we can quickly return.
char conversion_needed;
int conversion_needed;
if (!cbs_find_ber(in, &conversion_needed, 0)) {
return 0;
}
@@ -404,6 +404,15 @@ int CBB_add_bytes(CBB *cbb, const uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
return 1;
}
int CBB_add_zeros(CBB *cbb, size_t len) {
uint8_t *out;
if (!CBB_add_space(cbb, &out, len)) {
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, len);
return 1;
}
int CBB_add_space(CBB *cbb, uint8_t **out_data, size_t len) {
if (!CBB_flush(cbb) ||
!cbb_buffer_add(cbb->base, out_data, len)) {
@@ -216,6 +216,14 @@ int CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(CBS *cbs, CBS *out) {
return cbs_get_length_prefixed(cbs, out, 3);
}
int CBS_get_until_first(CBS *cbs, CBS *out, uint8_t c) {
const uint8_t *split = OPENSSL_memchr(CBS_data(cbs), c, CBS_len(cbs));
if (split == NULL) {
return 0;
}
return CBS_get_bytes(cbs, out, split - CBS_data(cbs));
}
// parse_base128_integer reads a big-endian base-128 integer from |cbs| and sets
// |*out| to the result. This is the encoding used in DER for both high tag
// number form and OID components.
@@ -254,8 +262,7 @@ static int parse_asn1_tag(CBS *cbs, unsigned *out) {
//
// If the number portion is 31 (0x1f, the largest value that fits in the
// allotted bits), then the tag is more than one byte long and the
// continuation bytes contain the tag number. This parser only supports tag
// numbers less than 31 (and thus single-byte tags).
// continuation bytes contain the tag number.
unsigned tag = ((unsigned)tag_byte & 0xe0) << CBS_ASN1_TAG_SHIFT;
unsigned tag_number = tag_byte & 0x1f;
if (tag_number == 0x1f) {
@@ -263,7 +270,7 @@ static int parse_asn1_tag(CBS *cbs, unsigned *out) {
if (!parse_base128_integer(cbs, &v) ||
// Check the tag number is within our supported bounds.
v > CBS_ASN1_TAG_NUMBER_MASK ||
// Small tag numbers should have used low tag number form.
// Small tag numbers should have used low tag number form, even in BER.
v < 0x1f) {
return 0;
}
@@ -277,13 +284,17 @@ static int parse_asn1_tag(CBS *cbs, unsigned *out) {
}
static int cbs_get_any_asn1_element(CBS *cbs, CBS *out, unsigned *out_tag,
size_t *out_header_len, int ber_ok) {
size_t *out_header_len, int *out_ber_found,
int ber_ok) {
CBS header = *cbs;
CBS throwaway;
if (out == NULL) {
out = &throwaway;
}
if (ber_ok) {
*out_ber_found = 0;
}
unsigned tag;
if (!parse_asn1_tag(&header, &tag)) {
@@ -321,27 +332,38 @@ static int cbs_get_any_asn1_element(CBS *cbs, CBS *out, unsigned *out_tag,
if (out_header_len != NULL) {
*out_header_len = header_len;
}
*out_ber_found = 1;
return CBS_get_bytes(cbs, out, header_len);
}
// ITU-T X.690 clause 8.1.3.5.c specifies that the value 0xff shall not be
// used as the first byte of the length. If this parser encounters that
// value, num_bytes will be parsed as 127, which will fail the check below.
// value, num_bytes will be parsed as 127, which will fail this check.
if (num_bytes == 0 || num_bytes > 4) {
return 0;
}
if (!cbs_get_u(&header, &len64, num_bytes)) {
return 0;
}
// ITU-T X.690 section 10.1 (DER length forms) requires encoding the length
// with the minimum number of octets.
// ITU-T X.690 section 10.1 (DER length forms) requires encoding the
// length with the minimum number of octets. BER could, technically, have
// 125 superfluous zero bytes. We do not attempt to handle that and still
// require that the length fit in a |uint32_t| for BER.
if (len64 < 128) {
// Length should have used short-form encoding.
return 0;
if (ber_ok) {
*out_ber_found = 1;
} else {
return 0;
}
}
if ((len64 >> ((num_bytes-1)*8)) == 0) {
if ((len64 >> ((num_bytes - 1) * 8)) == 0) {
// Length should have been at least one byte shorter.
return 0;
if (ber_ok) {
*out_ber_found = 1;
} else {
return 0;
}
}
len = len64;
if (len + header_len + num_bytes < len) {
@@ -374,13 +396,15 @@ int CBS_get_any_asn1(CBS *cbs, CBS *out, unsigned *out_tag) {
int CBS_get_any_asn1_element(CBS *cbs, CBS *out, unsigned *out_tag,
size_t *out_header_len) {
return cbs_get_any_asn1_element(cbs, out, out_tag, out_header_len,
0 /* DER only */);
NULL, 0 /* DER only */);
}
int CBS_get_any_ber_asn1_element(CBS *cbs, CBS *out, unsigned *out_tag,
size_t *out_header_len) {
return cbs_get_any_asn1_element(cbs, out, out_tag, out_header_len,
1 /* BER allowed */);
size_t *out_header_len, int *out_ber_found) {
int ber_found_temp;
return cbs_get_any_asn1_element(
cbs, out, out_tag, out_header_len,
out_ber_found ? out_ber_found : &ber_found_temp, 1 /* BER allowed */);
}
static int cbs_get_asn1(CBS *cbs, CBS *out, unsigned tag_value,
@@ -426,29 +450,14 @@ int CBS_peek_asn1_tag(const CBS *cbs, unsigned tag_value) {
int CBS_get_asn1_uint64(CBS *cbs, uint64_t *out) {
CBS bytes;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &bytes, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER)) {
if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &bytes, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
!CBS_is_unsigned_asn1_integer(&bytes)) {
return 0;
}
*out = 0;
const uint8_t *data = CBS_data(&bytes);
size_t len = CBS_len(&bytes);
if (len == 0) {
// An INTEGER is encoded with at least one octet.
return 0;
}
if ((data[0] & 0x80) != 0) {
// Negative number.
return 0;
}
if (data[0] == 0 && len > 1 && (data[1] & 0x80) == 0) {
// Extra leading zeros.
return 0;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if ((*out >> 56) != 0) {
// Too large to represent as a uint64_t.
@@ -462,31 +471,21 @@ int CBS_get_asn1_uint64(CBS *cbs, uint64_t *out) {
}
int CBS_get_asn1_int64(CBS *cbs, int64_t *out) {
int is_negative;
CBS bytes;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &bytes, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER)) {
if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &bytes, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
!CBS_is_valid_asn1_integer(&bytes, &is_negative)) {
return 0;
}
const uint8_t *data = CBS_data(&bytes);
const size_t len = CBS_len(&bytes);
if (len == 0 || len > sizeof(int64_t)) {
// An INTEGER is encoded with at least one octet.
if (len > sizeof(int64_t)) {
return 0;
}
if (len > 1) {
if (data[0] == 0 && (data[1] & 0x80) == 0) {
return 0; // Extra leading zeros.
}
if (data[0] == 0xff && (data[1] & 0x80) != 0) {
return 0; // Extra leading 0xff.
}
}
union {
int64_t i;
uint8_t bytes[sizeof(int64_t)];
} u;
const int is_negative = (data[0] & 0x80);
memset(u.bytes, is_negative ? 0xff : 0, sizeof(u.bytes)); // Sign-extend.
for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {
u.bytes[i] = data[len - i - 1];
@@ -635,6 +634,30 @@ int CBS_asn1_bitstring_has_bit(const CBS *cbs, unsigned bit) {
(CBS_data(cbs)[byte_num] & (1 << bit_num)) != 0;
}
int CBS_is_valid_asn1_integer(const CBS *cbs, int *out_is_negative) {
CBS copy = *cbs;
uint8_t first_byte, second_byte;
if (!CBS_get_u8(&copy, &first_byte)) {
return 0; // INTEGERs may not be empty.
}
if (out_is_negative != NULL) {
*out_is_negative = (first_byte & 0x80) != 0;
}
if (!CBS_get_u8(&copy, &second_byte)) {
return 1; // One byte INTEGERs are always minimal.
}
if ((first_byte == 0x00 && (second_byte & 0x80) == 0) ||
(first_byte == 0xff && (second_byte & 0x80) != 0)) {
return 0; // The value is minimal iff the first 9 bits are not all equal.
}
return 1;
}
int CBS_is_unsigned_asn1_integer(const CBS *cbs) {
int is_negative;
return CBS_is_valid_asn1_integer(cbs, &is_negative) && !is_negative;
}
static int add_decimal(CBB *out, uint64_t v) {
char buf[DECIMAL_SIZE(uint64_t) + 1];
BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%" PRIu64, v);
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_arm_arch.h>
.private_extern _OPENSSL_armcap_P
.section __TEXT,__const
@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ Lone:
.align 5
_ChaCha20_ctr32:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
cbz x2,Labort
#if __has_feature(hwaddress_sanitizer) && __clang_major__ >= 10
adrp x5,:pg_hi21_nc:_OPENSSL_armcap_P
@@ -48,6 +50,7 @@ _ChaCha20_ctr32:
b.ne ChaCha20_neon
Lshort:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-96]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -260,6 +263,7 @@ Loop:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
Labort:
ret
@@ -316,12 +320,14 @@ Loop_tail:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.align 5
ChaCha20_neon:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-96]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -702,6 +708,7 @@ Loop_neon:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
Ltail_neon:
@@ -811,11 +818,13 @@ Ldone_neon:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.align 5
ChaCha20_512_neon:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-96]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -1979,6 +1988,7 @@ Ldone_512_neon:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
#endif // !OPENSSL_NO_ASM
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_arm_arch.h>
.hidden OPENSSL_armcap_P
.section .rodata
@@ -36,6 +37,7 @@
.type ChaCha20_ctr32,%function
.align 5
ChaCha20_ctr32:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
cbz x2,.Labort
#if __has_feature(hwaddress_sanitizer) && __clang_major__ >= 10
adrp x5,:pg_hi21_nc:OPENSSL_armcap_P
@@ -49,6 +51,7 @@ ChaCha20_ctr32:
b.ne ChaCha20_neon
.Lshort:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-96]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -261,6 +264,7 @@ ChaCha20_ctr32:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
.Labort:
ret
@@ -317,12 +321,14 @@ ChaCha20_ctr32:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size ChaCha20_ctr32,.-ChaCha20_ctr32
.type ChaCha20_neon,%function
.align 5
ChaCha20_neon:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-96]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -703,6 +709,7 @@ ChaCha20_neon:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.Ltail_neon:
@@ -812,11 +819,13 @@ ChaCha20_neon:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size ChaCha20_neon,.-ChaCha20_neon
.type ChaCha20_512_neon,%function
.align 5
ChaCha20_512_neon:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-96]!
add x29,sp,#0
@@ -1980,6 +1989,7 @@ ChaCha20_512_neon:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size ChaCha20_512_neon,.-ChaCha20_512_neon
#endif
@@ -0,0 +1,979 @@
#define BORINGSSL_PREFIX CCryptoBoringSSL
#if defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
# This file is generated from a similarly-named Perl script in the BoringSSL
# source tree. Do not edit by hand.
#if defined(__i386__)
#if defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h>
#endif
.text
.globl _ChaCha20_ctr32
.hidden _ChaCha20_ctr32
.def _ChaCha20_ctr32; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_ChaCha20_ctr32:
.L_ChaCha20_ctr32_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
xorl %eax,%eax
cmpl 28(%esp),%eax
je .L000no_data
call .Lpic_point
.Lpic_point:
popl %eax
leal _OPENSSL_ia32cap_P,%ebp
testl $16777216,(%ebp)
jz .L001x86
testl $512,4(%ebp)
jz .L001x86
jmp .Lssse3_shortcut
.L001x86:
movl 32(%esp),%esi
movl 36(%esp),%edi
subl $132,%esp
movl (%esi),%eax
movl 4(%esi),%ebx
movl 8(%esi),%ecx
movl 12(%esi),%edx
movl %eax,80(%esp)
movl %ebx,84(%esp)
movl %ecx,88(%esp)
movl %edx,92(%esp)
movl 16(%esi),%eax
movl 20(%esi),%ebx
movl 24(%esi),%ecx
movl 28(%esi),%edx
movl %eax,96(%esp)
movl %ebx,100(%esp)
movl %ecx,104(%esp)
movl %edx,108(%esp)
movl (%edi),%eax
movl 4(%edi),%ebx
movl 8(%edi),%ecx
movl 12(%edi),%edx
subl $1,%eax
movl %eax,112(%esp)
movl %ebx,116(%esp)
movl %ecx,120(%esp)
movl %edx,124(%esp)
jmp .L002entry
.align 16
.L003outer_loop:
movl %ebx,156(%esp)
movl %eax,152(%esp)
movl %ecx,160(%esp)
.L002entry:
movl $1634760805,%eax
movl $857760878,4(%esp)
movl $2036477234,8(%esp)
movl $1797285236,12(%esp)
movl 84(%esp),%ebx
movl 88(%esp),%ebp
movl 104(%esp),%ecx
movl 108(%esp),%esi
movl 116(%esp),%edx
movl 120(%esp),%edi
movl %ebx,20(%esp)
movl %ebp,24(%esp)
movl %ecx,40(%esp)
movl %esi,44(%esp)
movl %edx,52(%esp)
movl %edi,56(%esp)
movl 92(%esp),%ebx
movl 124(%esp),%edi
movl 112(%esp),%edx
movl 80(%esp),%ebp
movl 96(%esp),%ecx
movl 100(%esp),%esi
addl $1,%edx
movl %ebx,28(%esp)
movl %edi,60(%esp)
movl %edx,112(%esp)
movl $10,%ebx
jmp .L004loop
.align 16
.L004loop:
addl %ebp,%eax
movl %ebx,128(%esp)
movl %ebp,%ebx
xorl %eax,%edx
roll $16,%edx
addl %edx,%ecx
xorl %ecx,%ebx
movl 52(%esp),%edi
roll $12,%ebx
movl 20(%esp),%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
xorl %eax,%edx
movl %eax,(%esp)
roll $8,%edx
movl 4(%esp),%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
movl %edx,48(%esp)
xorl %ecx,%ebx
addl %ebp,%eax
roll $7,%ebx
xorl %eax,%edi
movl %ecx,32(%esp)
roll $16,%edi
movl %ebx,16(%esp)
addl %edi,%esi
movl 40(%esp),%ecx
xorl %esi,%ebp
movl 56(%esp),%edx
roll $12,%ebp
movl 24(%esp),%ebx
addl %ebp,%eax
xorl %eax,%edi
movl %eax,4(%esp)
roll $8,%edi
movl 8(%esp),%eax
addl %edi,%esi
movl %edi,52(%esp)
xorl %esi,%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
roll $7,%ebp
xorl %eax,%edx
movl %esi,36(%esp)
roll $16,%edx
movl %ebp,20(%esp)
addl %edx,%ecx
movl 44(%esp),%esi
xorl %ecx,%ebx
movl 60(%esp),%edi
roll $12,%ebx
movl 28(%esp),%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
xorl %eax,%edx
movl %eax,8(%esp)
roll $8,%edx
movl 12(%esp),%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
movl %edx,56(%esp)
xorl %ecx,%ebx
addl %ebp,%eax
roll $7,%ebx
xorl %eax,%edi
roll $16,%edi
movl %ebx,24(%esp)
addl %edi,%esi
xorl %esi,%ebp
roll $12,%ebp
movl 20(%esp),%ebx
addl %ebp,%eax
xorl %eax,%edi
movl %eax,12(%esp)
roll $8,%edi
movl (%esp),%eax
addl %edi,%esi
movl %edi,%edx
xorl %esi,%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
roll $7,%ebp
xorl %eax,%edx
roll $16,%edx
movl %ebp,28(%esp)
addl %edx,%ecx
xorl %ecx,%ebx
movl 48(%esp),%edi
roll $12,%ebx
movl 24(%esp),%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
xorl %eax,%edx
movl %eax,(%esp)
roll $8,%edx
movl 4(%esp),%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
movl %edx,60(%esp)
xorl %ecx,%ebx
addl %ebp,%eax
roll $7,%ebx
xorl %eax,%edi
movl %ecx,40(%esp)
roll $16,%edi
movl %ebx,20(%esp)
addl %edi,%esi
movl 32(%esp),%ecx
xorl %esi,%ebp
movl 52(%esp),%edx
roll $12,%ebp
movl 28(%esp),%ebx
addl %ebp,%eax
xorl %eax,%edi
movl %eax,4(%esp)
roll $8,%edi
movl 8(%esp),%eax
addl %edi,%esi
movl %edi,48(%esp)
xorl %esi,%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
roll $7,%ebp
xorl %eax,%edx
movl %esi,44(%esp)
roll $16,%edx
movl %ebp,24(%esp)
addl %edx,%ecx
movl 36(%esp),%esi
xorl %ecx,%ebx
movl 56(%esp),%edi
roll $12,%ebx
movl 16(%esp),%ebp
addl %ebx,%eax
xorl %eax,%edx
movl %eax,8(%esp)
roll $8,%edx
movl 12(%esp),%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
movl %edx,52(%esp)
xorl %ecx,%ebx
addl %ebp,%eax
roll $7,%ebx
xorl %eax,%edi
roll $16,%edi
movl %ebx,28(%esp)
addl %edi,%esi
xorl %esi,%ebp
movl 48(%esp),%edx
roll $12,%ebp
movl 128(%esp),%ebx
addl %ebp,%eax
xorl %eax,%edi
movl %eax,12(%esp)
roll $8,%edi
movl (%esp),%eax
addl %edi,%esi
movl %edi,56(%esp)
xorl %esi,%ebp
roll $7,%ebp
decl %ebx
jnz .L004loop
movl 160(%esp),%ebx
addl $1634760805,%eax
addl 80(%esp),%ebp
addl 96(%esp),%ecx
addl 100(%esp),%esi
cmpl $64,%ebx
jb .L005tail
movl 156(%esp),%ebx
addl 112(%esp),%edx
addl 120(%esp),%edi
xorl (%ebx),%eax
xorl 16(%ebx),%ebp
movl %eax,(%esp)
movl 152(%esp),%eax
xorl 32(%ebx),%ecx
xorl 36(%ebx),%esi
xorl 48(%ebx),%edx
xorl 56(%ebx),%edi
movl %ebp,16(%eax)
movl %ecx,32(%eax)
movl %esi,36(%eax)
movl %edx,48(%eax)
movl %edi,56(%eax)
movl 4(%esp),%ebp
movl 8(%esp),%ecx
movl 12(%esp),%esi
movl 20(%esp),%edx
movl 24(%esp),%edi
addl $857760878,%ebp
addl $2036477234,%ecx
addl $1797285236,%esi
addl 84(%esp),%edx
addl 88(%esp),%edi
xorl 4(%ebx),%ebp
xorl 8(%ebx),%ecx
xorl 12(%ebx),%esi
xorl 20(%ebx),%edx
xorl 24(%ebx),%edi
movl %ebp,4(%eax)
movl %ecx,8(%eax)
movl %esi,12(%eax)
movl %edx,20(%eax)
movl %edi,24(%eax)
movl 28(%esp),%ebp
movl 40(%esp),%ecx
movl 44(%esp),%esi
movl 52(%esp),%edx
movl 60(%esp),%edi
addl 92(%esp),%ebp
addl 104(%esp),%ecx
addl 108(%esp),%esi
addl 116(%esp),%edx
addl 124(%esp),%edi
xorl 28(%ebx),%ebp
xorl 40(%ebx),%ecx
xorl 44(%ebx),%esi
xorl 52(%ebx),%edx
xorl 60(%ebx),%edi
leal 64(%ebx),%ebx
movl %ebp,28(%eax)
movl (%esp),%ebp
movl %ecx,40(%eax)
movl 160(%esp),%ecx
movl %esi,44(%eax)
movl %edx,52(%eax)
movl %edi,60(%eax)
movl %ebp,(%eax)
leal 64(%eax),%eax
subl $64,%ecx
jnz .L003outer_loop
jmp .L006done
.L005tail:
addl 112(%esp),%edx
addl 120(%esp),%edi
movl %eax,(%esp)
movl %ebp,16(%esp)
movl %ecx,32(%esp)
movl %esi,36(%esp)
movl %edx,48(%esp)
movl %edi,56(%esp)
movl 4(%esp),%ebp
movl 8(%esp),%ecx
movl 12(%esp),%esi
movl 20(%esp),%edx
movl 24(%esp),%edi
addl $857760878,%ebp
addl $2036477234,%ecx
addl $1797285236,%esi
addl 84(%esp),%edx
addl 88(%esp),%edi
movl %ebp,4(%esp)
movl %ecx,8(%esp)
movl %esi,12(%esp)
movl %edx,20(%esp)
movl %edi,24(%esp)
movl 28(%esp),%ebp
movl 40(%esp),%ecx
movl 44(%esp),%esi
movl 52(%esp),%edx
movl 60(%esp),%edi
addl 92(%esp),%ebp
addl 104(%esp),%ecx
addl 108(%esp),%esi
addl 116(%esp),%edx
addl 124(%esp),%edi
movl %ebp,28(%esp)
movl 156(%esp),%ebp
movl %ecx,40(%esp)
movl 152(%esp),%ecx
movl %esi,44(%esp)
xorl %esi,%esi
movl %edx,52(%esp)
movl %edi,60(%esp)
xorl %eax,%eax
xorl %edx,%edx
.L007tail_loop:
movb (%esi,%ebp,1),%al
movb (%esp,%esi,1),%dl
leal 1(%esi),%esi
xorb %dl,%al
movb %al,-1(%ecx,%esi,1)
decl %ebx
jnz .L007tail_loop
.L006done:
addl $132,%esp
.L000no_data:
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.globl _ChaCha20_ssse3
.hidden _ChaCha20_ssse3
.def _ChaCha20_ssse3; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_ChaCha20_ssse3:
.L_ChaCha20_ssse3_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
.Lssse3_shortcut:
movl 20(%esp),%edi
movl 24(%esp),%esi
movl 28(%esp),%ecx
movl 32(%esp),%edx
movl 36(%esp),%ebx
movl %esp,%ebp
subl $524,%esp
andl $-64,%esp
movl %ebp,512(%esp)
leal .Lssse3_data-.Lpic_point(%eax),%eax
movdqu (%ebx),%xmm3
cmpl $256,%ecx
jb .L0081x
movl %edx,516(%esp)
movl %ebx,520(%esp)
subl $256,%ecx
leal 384(%esp),%ebp
movdqu (%edx),%xmm7
pshufd $0,%xmm3,%xmm0
pshufd $85,%xmm3,%xmm1
pshufd $170,%xmm3,%xmm2
pshufd $255,%xmm3,%xmm3
paddd 48(%eax),%xmm0
pshufd $0,%xmm7,%xmm4
pshufd $85,%xmm7,%xmm5
psubd 64(%eax),%xmm0
pshufd $170,%xmm7,%xmm6
pshufd $255,%xmm7,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm0,64(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm1,80(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm2,96(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm3,112(%ebp)
movdqu 16(%edx),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm4,-64(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm5,-48(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm6,-32(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm7,-16(%ebp)
movdqa 32(%eax),%xmm7
leal 128(%esp),%ebx
pshufd $0,%xmm3,%xmm0
pshufd $85,%xmm3,%xmm1
pshufd $170,%xmm3,%xmm2
pshufd $255,%xmm3,%xmm3
pshufd $0,%xmm7,%xmm4
pshufd $85,%xmm7,%xmm5
pshufd $170,%xmm7,%xmm6
pshufd $255,%xmm7,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm0,(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm1,16(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm2,32(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm3,48(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm4,-128(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm5,-112(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm6,-96(%ebp)
movdqa %xmm7,-80(%ebp)
leal 128(%esi),%esi
leal 128(%edi),%edi
jmp .L009outer_loop
.align 16
.L009outer_loop:
movdqa -112(%ebp),%xmm1
movdqa -96(%ebp),%xmm2
movdqa -80(%ebp),%xmm3
movdqa -48(%ebp),%xmm5
movdqa -32(%ebp),%xmm6
movdqa -16(%ebp),%xmm7
movdqa %xmm1,-112(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm2,-96(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm3,-80(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm5,-48(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm6,-32(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm7,-16(%ebx)
movdqa 32(%ebp),%xmm2
movdqa 48(%ebp),%xmm3
movdqa 64(%ebp),%xmm4
movdqa 80(%ebp),%xmm5
movdqa 96(%ebp),%xmm6
movdqa 112(%ebp),%xmm7
paddd 64(%eax),%xmm4
movdqa %xmm2,32(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm3,48(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm4,64(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm5,80(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm6,96(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm7,112(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm4,64(%ebp)
movdqa -128(%ebp),%xmm0
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm6
movdqa -64(%ebp),%xmm3
movdqa (%ebp),%xmm4
movdqa 16(%ebp),%xmm5
movl $10,%edx
nop
.align 16
.L010loop:
paddd %xmm3,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm3,%xmm2
pxor %xmm0,%xmm6
pshufb (%eax),%xmm6
paddd %xmm6,%xmm4
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
movdqa -48(%ebx),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm1
pslld $12,%xmm2
psrld $20,%xmm1
por %xmm1,%xmm2
movdqa -112(%ebx),%xmm1
paddd %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa 80(%ebx),%xmm7
pxor %xmm0,%xmm6
movdqa %xmm0,-128(%ebx)
pshufb 16(%eax),%xmm6
paddd %xmm6,%xmm4
movdqa %xmm6,64(%ebx)
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
paddd %xmm3,%xmm1
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm0
pslld $7,%xmm2
psrld $25,%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm7
por %xmm0,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,(%ebx)
pshufb (%eax),%xmm7
movdqa %xmm2,-64(%ebx)
paddd %xmm7,%xmm5
movdqa 32(%ebx),%xmm4
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
movdqa -32(%ebx),%xmm2
movdqa %xmm3,%xmm0
pslld $12,%xmm3
psrld $20,%xmm0
por %xmm0,%xmm3
movdqa -96(%ebx),%xmm0
paddd %xmm3,%xmm1
movdqa 96(%ebx),%xmm6
pxor %xmm1,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm1,-112(%ebx)
pshufb 16(%eax),%xmm7
paddd %xmm7,%xmm5
movdqa %xmm7,80(%ebx)
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
paddd %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm3,%xmm1
pslld $7,%xmm3
psrld $25,%xmm1
pxor %xmm0,%xmm6
por %xmm1,%xmm3
movdqa %xmm5,16(%ebx)
pshufb (%eax),%xmm6
movdqa %xmm3,-48(%ebx)
paddd %xmm6,%xmm4
movdqa 48(%ebx),%xmm5
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
movdqa -16(%ebx),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm1
pslld $12,%xmm2
psrld $20,%xmm1
por %xmm1,%xmm2
movdqa -80(%ebx),%xmm1
paddd %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa 112(%ebx),%xmm7
pxor %xmm0,%xmm6
movdqa %xmm0,-96(%ebx)
pshufb 16(%eax),%xmm6
paddd %xmm6,%xmm4
movdqa %xmm6,96(%ebx)
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
paddd %xmm3,%xmm1
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm0
pslld $7,%xmm2
psrld $25,%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm7
por %xmm0,%xmm2
pshufb (%eax),%xmm7
movdqa %xmm2,-32(%ebx)
paddd %xmm7,%xmm5
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
movdqa -48(%ebx),%xmm2
movdqa %xmm3,%xmm0
pslld $12,%xmm3
psrld $20,%xmm0
por %xmm0,%xmm3
movdqa -128(%ebx),%xmm0
paddd %xmm3,%xmm1
pxor %xmm1,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm1,-80(%ebx)
pshufb 16(%eax),%xmm7
paddd %xmm7,%xmm5
movdqa %xmm7,%xmm6
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
paddd %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm3,%xmm1
pslld $7,%xmm3
psrld $25,%xmm1
pxor %xmm0,%xmm6
por %xmm1,%xmm3
pshufb (%eax),%xmm6
movdqa %xmm3,-16(%ebx)
paddd %xmm6,%xmm4
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
movdqa -32(%ebx),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm1
pslld $12,%xmm2
psrld $20,%xmm1
por %xmm1,%xmm2
movdqa -112(%ebx),%xmm1
paddd %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa 64(%ebx),%xmm7
pxor %xmm0,%xmm6
movdqa %xmm0,-128(%ebx)
pshufb 16(%eax),%xmm6
paddd %xmm6,%xmm4
movdqa %xmm6,112(%ebx)
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
paddd %xmm3,%xmm1
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm0
pslld $7,%xmm2
psrld $25,%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm7
por %xmm0,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm4,32(%ebx)
pshufb (%eax),%xmm7
movdqa %xmm2,-48(%ebx)
paddd %xmm7,%xmm5
movdqa (%ebx),%xmm4
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
movdqa -16(%ebx),%xmm2
movdqa %xmm3,%xmm0
pslld $12,%xmm3
psrld $20,%xmm0
por %xmm0,%xmm3
movdqa -96(%ebx),%xmm0
paddd %xmm3,%xmm1
movdqa 80(%ebx),%xmm6
pxor %xmm1,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm1,-112(%ebx)
pshufb 16(%eax),%xmm7
paddd %xmm7,%xmm5
movdqa %xmm7,64(%ebx)
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
paddd %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm3,%xmm1
pslld $7,%xmm3
psrld $25,%xmm1
pxor %xmm0,%xmm6
por %xmm1,%xmm3
movdqa %xmm5,48(%ebx)
pshufb (%eax),%xmm6
movdqa %xmm3,-32(%ebx)
paddd %xmm6,%xmm4
movdqa 16(%ebx),%xmm5
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
movdqa -64(%ebx),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm1
pslld $12,%xmm2
psrld $20,%xmm1
por %xmm1,%xmm2
movdqa -80(%ebx),%xmm1
paddd %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa 96(%ebx),%xmm7
pxor %xmm0,%xmm6
movdqa %xmm0,-96(%ebx)
pshufb 16(%eax),%xmm6
paddd %xmm6,%xmm4
movdqa %xmm6,80(%ebx)
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
paddd %xmm3,%xmm1
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm0
pslld $7,%xmm2
psrld $25,%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm7
por %xmm0,%xmm2
pshufb (%eax),%xmm7
movdqa %xmm2,-16(%ebx)
paddd %xmm7,%xmm5
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
movdqa %xmm3,%xmm0
pslld $12,%xmm3
psrld $20,%xmm0
por %xmm0,%xmm3
movdqa -128(%ebx),%xmm0
paddd %xmm3,%xmm1
movdqa 64(%ebx),%xmm6
pxor %xmm1,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm1,-80(%ebx)
pshufb 16(%eax),%xmm7
paddd %xmm7,%xmm5
movdqa %xmm7,96(%ebx)
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
movdqa %xmm3,%xmm1
pslld $7,%xmm3
psrld $25,%xmm1
por %xmm1,%xmm3
decl %edx
jnz .L010loop
movdqa %xmm3,-64(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm4,(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm5,16(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm6,64(%ebx)
movdqa %xmm7,96(%ebx)
movdqa -112(%ebx),%xmm1
movdqa -96(%ebx),%xmm2
movdqa -80(%ebx),%xmm3
paddd -128(%ebp),%xmm0
paddd -112(%ebp),%xmm1
paddd -96(%ebp),%xmm2
paddd -80(%ebp),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm6
punpckldq %xmm1,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm7
punpckldq %xmm3,%xmm2
punpckhdq %xmm1,%xmm6
punpckhdq %xmm3,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
punpcklqdq %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm3
punpcklqdq %xmm7,%xmm6
punpckhqdq %xmm2,%xmm1
punpckhqdq %xmm7,%xmm3
movdqu -128(%esi),%xmm4
movdqu -64(%esi),%xmm5
movdqu (%esi),%xmm2
movdqu 64(%esi),%xmm7
leal 16(%esi),%esi
pxor %xmm0,%xmm4
movdqa -64(%ebx),%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm5
movdqa -48(%ebx),%xmm1
pxor %xmm2,%xmm6
movdqa -32(%ebx),%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm7
movdqa -16(%ebx),%xmm3
movdqu %xmm4,-128(%edi)
movdqu %xmm5,-64(%edi)
movdqu %xmm6,(%edi)
movdqu %xmm7,64(%edi)
leal 16(%edi),%edi
paddd -64(%ebp),%xmm0
paddd -48(%ebp),%xmm1
paddd -32(%ebp),%xmm2
paddd -16(%ebp),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm6
punpckldq %xmm1,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm7
punpckldq %xmm3,%xmm2
punpckhdq %xmm1,%xmm6
punpckhdq %xmm3,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
punpcklqdq %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm3
punpcklqdq %xmm7,%xmm6
punpckhqdq %xmm2,%xmm1
punpckhqdq %xmm7,%xmm3
movdqu -128(%esi),%xmm4
movdqu -64(%esi),%xmm5
movdqu (%esi),%xmm2
movdqu 64(%esi),%xmm7
leal 16(%esi),%esi
pxor %xmm0,%xmm4
movdqa (%ebx),%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm5
movdqa 16(%ebx),%xmm1
pxor %xmm2,%xmm6
movdqa 32(%ebx),%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm7
movdqa 48(%ebx),%xmm3
movdqu %xmm4,-128(%edi)
movdqu %xmm5,-64(%edi)
movdqu %xmm6,(%edi)
movdqu %xmm7,64(%edi)
leal 16(%edi),%edi
paddd (%ebp),%xmm0
paddd 16(%ebp),%xmm1
paddd 32(%ebp),%xmm2
paddd 48(%ebp),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm6
punpckldq %xmm1,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm7
punpckldq %xmm3,%xmm2
punpckhdq %xmm1,%xmm6
punpckhdq %xmm3,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
punpcklqdq %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm3
punpcklqdq %xmm7,%xmm6
punpckhqdq %xmm2,%xmm1
punpckhqdq %xmm7,%xmm3
movdqu -128(%esi),%xmm4
movdqu -64(%esi),%xmm5
movdqu (%esi),%xmm2
movdqu 64(%esi),%xmm7
leal 16(%esi),%esi
pxor %xmm0,%xmm4
movdqa 64(%ebx),%xmm0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm5
movdqa 80(%ebx),%xmm1
pxor %xmm2,%xmm6
movdqa 96(%ebx),%xmm2
pxor %xmm3,%xmm7
movdqa 112(%ebx),%xmm3
movdqu %xmm4,-128(%edi)
movdqu %xmm5,-64(%edi)
movdqu %xmm6,(%edi)
movdqu %xmm7,64(%edi)
leal 16(%edi),%edi
paddd 64(%ebp),%xmm0
paddd 80(%ebp),%xmm1
paddd 96(%ebp),%xmm2
paddd 112(%ebp),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm6
punpckldq %xmm1,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm7
punpckldq %xmm3,%xmm2
punpckhdq %xmm1,%xmm6
punpckhdq %xmm3,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
punpcklqdq %xmm2,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm6,%xmm3
punpcklqdq %xmm7,%xmm6
punpckhqdq %xmm2,%xmm1
punpckhqdq %xmm7,%xmm3
movdqu -128(%esi),%xmm4
movdqu -64(%esi),%xmm5
movdqu (%esi),%xmm2
movdqu 64(%esi),%xmm7
leal 208(%esi),%esi
pxor %xmm0,%xmm4
pxor %xmm1,%xmm5
pxor %xmm2,%xmm6
pxor %xmm3,%xmm7
movdqu %xmm4,-128(%edi)
movdqu %xmm5,-64(%edi)
movdqu %xmm6,(%edi)
movdqu %xmm7,64(%edi)
leal 208(%edi),%edi
subl $256,%ecx
jnc .L009outer_loop
addl $256,%ecx
jz .L011done
movl 520(%esp),%ebx
leal -128(%esi),%esi
movl 516(%esp),%edx
leal -128(%edi),%edi
movd 64(%ebp),%xmm2
movdqu (%ebx),%xmm3
paddd 96(%eax),%xmm2
pand 112(%eax),%xmm3
por %xmm2,%xmm3
.L0081x:
movdqa 32(%eax),%xmm0
movdqu (%edx),%xmm1
movdqu 16(%edx),%xmm2
movdqa (%eax),%xmm6
movdqa 16(%eax),%xmm7
movl %ebp,48(%esp)
movdqa %xmm0,(%esp)
movdqa %xmm1,16(%esp)
movdqa %xmm2,32(%esp)
movdqa %xmm3,48(%esp)
movl $10,%edx
jmp .L012loop1x
.align 16
.L013outer1x:
movdqa 80(%eax),%xmm3
movdqa (%esp),%xmm0
movdqa 16(%esp),%xmm1
movdqa 32(%esp),%xmm2
paddd 48(%esp),%xmm3
movl $10,%edx
movdqa %xmm3,48(%esp)
jmp .L012loop1x
.align 16
.L012loop1x:
paddd %xmm1,%xmm0
pxor %xmm0,%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,222
paddd %xmm3,%xmm2
pxor %xmm2,%xmm1
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm4
psrld $20,%xmm1
pslld $12,%xmm4
por %xmm4,%xmm1
paddd %xmm1,%xmm0
pxor %xmm0,%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,223
paddd %xmm3,%xmm2
pxor %xmm2,%xmm1
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm4
psrld $25,%xmm1
pslld $7,%xmm4
por %xmm4,%xmm1
pshufd $78,%xmm2,%xmm2
pshufd $57,%xmm1,%xmm1
pshufd $147,%xmm3,%xmm3
nop
paddd %xmm1,%xmm0
pxor %xmm0,%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,222
paddd %xmm3,%xmm2
pxor %xmm2,%xmm1
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm4
psrld $20,%xmm1
pslld $12,%xmm4
por %xmm4,%xmm1
paddd %xmm1,%xmm0
pxor %xmm0,%xmm3
.byte 102,15,56,0,223
paddd %xmm3,%xmm2
pxor %xmm2,%xmm1
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm4
psrld $25,%xmm1
pslld $7,%xmm4
por %xmm4,%xmm1
pshufd $78,%xmm2,%xmm2
pshufd $147,%xmm1,%xmm1
pshufd $57,%xmm3,%xmm3
decl %edx
jnz .L012loop1x
paddd (%esp),%xmm0
paddd 16(%esp),%xmm1
paddd 32(%esp),%xmm2
paddd 48(%esp),%xmm3
cmpl $64,%ecx
jb .L014tail
movdqu (%esi),%xmm4
movdqu 16(%esi),%xmm5
pxor %xmm4,%xmm0
movdqu 32(%esi),%xmm4
pxor %xmm5,%xmm1
movdqu 48(%esi),%xmm5
pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
pxor %xmm5,%xmm3
leal 64(%esi),%esi
movdqu %xmm0,(%edi)
movdqu %xmm1,16(%edi)
movdqu %xmm2,32(%edi)
movdqu %xmm3,48(%edi)
leal 64(%edi),%edi
subl $64,%ecx
jnz .L013outer1x
jmp .L011done
.L014tail:
movdqa %xmm0,(%esp)
movdqa %xmm1,16(%esp)
movdqa %xmm2,32(%esp)
movdqa %xmm3,48(%esp)
xorl %eax,%eax
xorl %edx,%edx
xorl %ebp,%ebp
.L015tail_loop:
movb (%esp,%ebp,1),%al
movb (%esi,%ebp,1),%dl
leal 1(%ebp),%ebp
xorb %dl,%al
movb %al,-1(%edi,%ebp,1)
decl %ecx
jnz .L015tail_loop
.L011done:
movl 512(%esp),%esp
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.align 64
.Lssse3_data:
.byte 2,3,0,1,6,7,4,5,10,11,8,9,14,15,12,13
.byte 3,0,1,2,7,4,5,6,11,8,9,10,15,12,13,14
.long 1634760805,857760878,2036477234,1797285236
.long 0,1,2,3
.long 4,4,4,4
.long 1,0,0,0
.long 4,0,0,0
.long 0,-1,-1,-1
.align 64
.byte 67,104,97,67,104,97,50,48,32,102,111,114,32,120,56,54
.byte 44,32,67,82,89,80,84,79,71,65,77,83,32,98,121,32
.byte 60,97,112,112,114,111,64,111,112,101,110,115,115,108,46,111
.byte 114,103,62,0
#endif
#endif // defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__ELF__)
.section .note.GNU-stack,"",%progbits
#endif
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
@@ -89,6 +89,10 @@ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_get_cipherbynid(int nid) {
}
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_get_cipherbyname(const char *name) {
if (name == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (OPENSSL_strcasecmp(name, "rc4") == 0) {
return EVP_rc4();
} else if (OPENSSL_strcasecmp(name, "des-cbc") == 0) {
@@ -18,18 +18,15 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_chacha.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_cipher.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_cpu.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_err.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_poly1305.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_type_check.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "../chacha/internal.h"
#include "../fipsmodule/cipher/internal.h"
#include "../internal.h"
#include "../chacha/internal.h"
#define POLY1305_TAG_LEN 16
struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx {
uint8_t key[32];
@@ -44,78 +41,6 @@ OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
"AEAD state has insufficient alignment");
#endif
// For convenience (the x86_64 calling convention allows only six parameters in
// registers), the final parameter for the assembly functions is both an input
// and output parameter.
union open_data {
struct {
alignas(16) uint8_t key[32];
uint32_t counter;
uint8_t nonce[12];
} in;
struct {
uint8_t tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN];
} out;
};
union seal_data {
struct {
alignas(16) uint8_t key[32];
uint32_t counter;
uint8_t nonce[12];
const uint8_t *extra_ciphertext;
size_t extra_ciphertext_len;
} in;
struct {
uint8_t tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN];
} out;
};
#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && \
!defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
static int asm_capable(void) {
const int sse41_capable = (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << 19)) != 0;
return sse41_capable;
}
OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(union open_data) == 48, "wrong open_data size");
OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(union seal_data) == 48 + 8 + 8,
"wrong seal_data size");
// chacha20_poly1305_open is defined in chacha20_poly1305_x86_64.pl. It decrypts
// |plaintext_len| bytes from |ciphertext| and writes them to |out_plaintext|.
// Additional input parameters are passed in |aead_data->in|. On exit, it will
// write calculated tag value to |aead_data->out.tag|, which the caller must
// check.
extern void chacha20_poly1305_open(uint8_t *out_plaintext,
const uint8_t *ciphertext,
size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
size_t ad_len, union open_data *aead_data);
// chacha20_poly1305_open is defined in chacha20_poly1305_x86_64.pl. It encrypts
// |plaintext_len| bytes from |plaintext| and writes them to |out_ciphertext|.
// Additional input parameters are passed in |aead_data->in|. The calculated tag
// value is over the computed ciphertext concatenated with |extra_ciphertext|
// and written to |aead_data->out.tag|.
extern void chacha20_poly1305_seal(uint8_t *out_ciphertext,
const uint8_t *plaintext,
size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
size_t ad_len, union seal_data *aead_data);
#else
static int asm_capable(void) { return 0; }
static void chacha20_poly1305_open(uint8_t *out_plaintext,
const uint8_t *ciphertext,
size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
size_t ad_len, union open_data *aead_data) {}
static void chacha20_poly1305_seal(uint8_t *out_ciphertext,
const uint8_t *plaintext,
size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
size_t ad_len, union seal_data *aead_data) {}
#endif
static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
size_t key_len, size_t tag_len) {
struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx =
@@ -238,8 +163,8 @@ static int chacha20_poly1305_seal_scatter(
}
}
union seal_data data;
if (asm_capable()) {
union chacha20_poly1305_seal_data data;
if (chacha20_poly1305_asm_capable()) {
OPENSSL_memcpy(data.in.key, key, 32);
data.in.counter = 0;
OPENSSL_memcpy(data.in.nonce, nonce, 12);
@@ -321,8 +246,8 @@ static int chacha20_poly1305_open_gather(
return 0;
}
union open_data data;
if (asm_capable()) {
union chacha20_poly1305_open_data data;
if (chacha20_poly1305_asm_capable()) {
OPENSSL_memcpy(data.in.key, key, 32);
data.in.counter = 0;
OPENSSL_memcpy(data.in.nonce, nonce, 12);
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ static int aead_tls_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
EVP_tls_cbc_record_digest_supported(tls_ctx->hmac_ctx.md)) {
if (!EVP_tls_cbc_digest_record(tls_ctx->hmac_ctx.md, mac, &mac_len,
ad_fixed, out, data_plus_mac_len, total,
ad_fixed, out, data_len, total,
tls_ctx->mac_key, tls_ctx->mac_key_len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return 0;
@@ -406,14 +406,6 @@ static int aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init(
EVP_sha1(), 1);
}
static int aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len,
size_t tag_len,
enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_aes_128_cbc(),
EVP_sha256(), 0);
}
static int aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
size_t key_len, size_t tag_len,
enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
@@ -428,22 +420,6 @@ static int aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init(
EVP_sha1(), 1);
}
static int aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len,
size_t tag_len,
enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_aes_256_cbc(),
EVP_sha256(), 0);
}
static int aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len,
size_t tag_len,
enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_aes_256_cbc(),
EVP_sha384(), 0);
}
static int aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len,
size_t tag_len,
@@ -513,23 +489,6 @@ static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv = {
aead_tls_tag_len,
};
static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls = {
SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 16, // key len (SHA256 + AES128)
16, // nonce len (IV)
16 + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, // overhead (padding + SHA256)
SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, // max tag length
0, // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in
NULL, // init
aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls_init,
aead_tls_cleanup,
aead_tls_open,
aead_tls_seal_scatter,
NULL, // open_gather
NULL, // get_iv
aead_tls_tag_len,
};
static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls = {
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32, // key len (SHA1 + AES256)
16, // nonce len (IV)
@@ -564,40 +523,6 @@ static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv = {
aead_tls_tag_len,
};
static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls = {
SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32, // key len (SHA256 + AES256)
16, // nonce len (IV)
16 + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, // overhead (padding + SHA256)
SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, // max tag length
0, // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in
NULL, // init
aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls_init,
aead_tls_cleanup,
aead_tls_open,
aead_tls_seal_scatter,
NULL, // open_gather
NULL, // get_iv
aead_tls_tag_len,
};
static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls = {
SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32, // key len (SHA384 + AES256)
16, // nonce len (IV)
16 + SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, // overhead (padding + SHA384)
SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, // max tag length
0, // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in
NULL, // init
aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls_init,
aead_tls_cleanup,
aead_tls_open,
aead_tls_seal_scatter,
NULL, // open_gather
NULL, // get_iv
aead_tls_tag_len,
};
static const EVP_AEAD aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls = {
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 24, // key len (SHA1 + 3DES)
8, // nonce len (IV)
@@ -657,10 +582,6 @@ const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv(void) {
return &aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv;
}
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls(void) {
return &aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls;
}
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls(void) {
return &aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls;
}
@@ -669,14 +590,6 @@ const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv(void) {
return &aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv;
}
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls(void) {
return &aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls;
}
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls(void) {
return &aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls;
}
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls(void) {
return &aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls;
}
@@ -57,7 +57,11 @@
#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_CIPHER_EXTRA_INTERNAL_H
#define OPENSSL_HEADER_CIPHER_EXTRA_INTERNAL_H
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_base.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_cpu.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_type_check.h>
#include "../internal.h"
@@ -95,6 +99,17 @@ void EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac(uint8_t *out, size_t md_size, const uint8_t *in,
// which EVP_tls_cbc_digest_record supports.
int EVP_tls_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD *md);
// EVP_sha1_final_with_secret_suffix computes the result of hashing |len| bytes
// from |in| to |ctx| and writes the resulting hash to |out|. |len| is treated
// as secret and must be at most |max_len|, which is treated as public. |in|
// must point to a buffer of at least |max_len| bytes. It returns one on success
// and zero if inputs are too long.
//
// This function is exported for unit tests.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_sha1_final_with_secret_suffix(
SHA_CTX *ctx, uint8_t out[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], const uint8_t *in, size_t len,
size_t max_len);
// EVP_tls_cbc_digest_record computes the MAC of a decrypted, padded TLS
// record.
//
@@ -104,8 +119,8 @@ int EVP_tls_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD *md);
// md_out_size: the number of output bytes is written here.
// header: the 13-byte, TLS record header.
// data: the record data itself
// data_plus_mac_size: the secret, reported length of the data and MAC
// once the padding has been removed.
// data_size: the secret, reported length of the data once the padding and MAC
// have been removed.
// data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size: the public length of the whole
// record, including padding.
//
@@ -115,11 +130,94 @@ int EVP_tls_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD *md);
// padding too. )
int EVP_tls_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t *md_out,
size_t *md_out_size, const uint8_t header[13],
const uint8_t *data, size_t data_plus_mac_size,
const uint8_t *data, size_t data_size,
size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
const uint8_t *mac_secret,
unsigned mac_secret_length);
#define POLY1305_TAG_LEN 16
// For convenience (the x86_64 calling convention allows only six parameters in
// registers), the final parameter for the assembly functions is both an input
// and output parameter.
union chacha20_poly1305_open_data {
struct {
alignas(16) uint8_t key[32];
uint32_t counter;
uint8_t nonce[12];
} in;
struct {
uint8_t tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN];
} out;
};
union chacha20_poly1305_seal_data {
struct {
alignas(16) uint8_t key[32];
uint32_t counter;
uint8_t nonce[12];
const uint8_t *extra_ciphertext;
size_t extra_ciphertext_len;
} in;
struct {
uint8_t tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN];
} out;
};
#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(union chacha20_poly1305_open_data) == 48,
"wrong chacha20_poly1305_open_data size");
OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(union chacha20_poly1305_seal_data) == 48 + 8 + 8,
"wrong chacha20_poly1305_seal_data size");
OPENSSL_INLINE int chacha20_poly1305_asm_capable(void) {
const int sse41_capable = (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << 19)) != 0;
return sse41_capable;
}
// chacha20_poly1305_open is defined in chacha20_poly1305_x86_64.pl. It decrypts
// |plaintext_len| bytes from |ciphertext| and writes them to |out_plaintext|.
// Additional input parameters are passed in |aead_data->in|. On exit, it will
// write calculated tag value to |aead_data->out.tag|, which the caller must
// check.
extern void chacha20_poly1305_open(uint8_t *out_plaintext,
const uint8_t *ciphertext,
size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
size_t ad_len,
union chacha20_poly1305_open_data *data);
// chacha20_poly1305_open is defined in chacha20_poly1305_x86_64.pl. It encrypts
// |plaintext_len| bytes from |plaintext| and writes them to |out_ciphertext|.
// Additional input parameters are passed in |aead_data->in|. The calculated tag
// value is over the computed ciphertext concatenated with |extra_ciphertext|
// and written to |aead_data->out.tag|.
extern void chacha20_poly1305_seal(uint8_t *out_ciphertext,
const uint8_t *plaintext,
size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
size_t ad_len,
union chacha20_poly1305_seal_data *data);
#else
OPENSSL_INLINE int chacha20_poly1305_asm_capable(void) { return 0; }
OPENSSL_INLINE void chacha20_poly1305_open(uint8_t *out_plaintext,
const uint8_t *ciphertext,
size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
size_t ad_len,
union chacha20_poly1305_open_data *data) {
abort();
}
OPENSSL_INLINE void chacha20_poly1305_seal(uint8_t *out_ciphertext,
const uint8_t *plaintext,
size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
size_t ad_len,
union chacha20_poly1305_seal_data *data) {
abort();
}
#endif
#if defined(__cplusplus)
} // extern C
@@ -62,15 +62,6 @@
#include "../fipsmodule/cipher/internal.h"
// MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES is the maximum number of bytes in the hash's length
// field. (SHA-384/512 have 128-bit length.)
#define MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES 16
// MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE is the maximum hash block size that we'll support.
// Currently SHA-384/512 has a 128-byte block size and that's the largest
// supported by TLS.)
#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128
int EVP_tls_cbc_remove_padding(crypto_word_t *out_padding_ok, size_t *out_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
size_t block_size, size_t mac_size) {
@@ -183,134 +174,110 @@ void EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac(uint8_t *out, size_t md_size, const uint8_t *in,
OPENSSL_memcpy(out, rotated_mac, md_size);
}
// u32toBE serialises an unsigned, 32-bit number (n) as four bytes at (p) in
// big-endian order. The value of p is advanced by four.
#define u32toBE(n, p) \
do { \
*((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 24); \
*((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 16); \
*((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 8); \
*((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n)); \
} while (0)
// u64toBE serialises an unsigned, 64-bit number (n) as eight bytes at (p) in
// big-endian order. The value of p is advanced by eight.
#define u64toBE(n, p) \
do { \
*((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 56); \
*((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 48); \
*((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 40); \
*((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 32); \
*((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 24); \
*((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 16); \
*((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 8); \
*((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n)); \
} while (0)
typedef union {
SHA_CTX sha1;
SHA256_CTX sha256;
SHA512_CTX sha512;
} HASH_CTX;
static void tls1_sha1_transform(HASH_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *block) {
SHA1_Transform(&ctx->sha1, block);
}
static void tls1_sha256_transform(HASH_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *block) {
SHA256_Transform(&ctx->sha256, block);
}
static void tls1_sha512_transform(HASH_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *block) {
SHA512_Transform(&ctx->sha512, block);
}
// These functions serialize the state of a hash and thus perform the standard
// "final" operation without adding the padding and length that such a function
// typically does.
static void tls1_sha1_final_raw(HASH_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *md_out) {
SHA_CTX *sha1 = &ctx->sha1;
u32toBE(sha1->h[0], md_out);
u32toBE(sha1->h[1], md_out);
u32toBE(sha1->h[2], md_out);
u32toBE(sha1->h[3], md_out);
u32toBE(sha1->h[4], md_out);
}
static void tls1_sha256_final_raw(HASH_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *md_out) {
SHA256_CTX *sha256 = &ctx->sha256;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
u32toBE(sha256->h[i], md_out);
int EVP_sha1_final_with_secret_suffix(SHA_CTX *ctx,
uint8_t out[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH],
const uint8_t *in, size_t len,
size_t max_len) {
// Bound the input length so |total_bits| below fits in four bytes. This is
// redundant with TLS record size limits. This also ensures |input_idx| below
// does not overflow.
size_t max_len_bits = max_len << 3;
if (ctx->Nh != 0 ||
(max_len_bits >> 3) != max_len || // Overflow
ctx->Nl + max_len_bits < max_len_bits ||
ctx->Nl + max_len_bits > UINT32_MAX) {
return 0;
}
}
static void tls1_sha512_final_raw(HASH_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *md_out) {
SHA512_CTX *sha512 = &ctx->sha512;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
u64toBE(sha512->h[i], md_out);
// We need to hash the following into |ctx|:
//
// - ctx->data[:ctx->num]
// - in[:len]
// - A 0x80 byte
// - However many zero bytes are needed to pad up to a block.
// - Eight bytes of length.
size_t num_blocks = (ctx->num + len + 1 + 8 + SHA_CBLOCK - 1) >> 6;
size_t last_block = num_blocks - 1;
size_t max_blocks = (ctx->num + max_len + 1 + 8 + SHA_CBLOCK - 1) >> 6;
// The bounds above imply |total_bits| fits in four bytes.
size_t total_bits = ctx->Nl + (len << 3);
uint8_t length_bytes[4];
length_bytes[0] = (uint8_t)(total_bits >> 24);
length_bytes[1] = (uint8_t)(total_bits >> 16);
length_bytes[2] = (uint8_t)(total_bits >> 8);
length_bytes[3] = (uint8_t)total_bits;
// We now construct and process each expected block in constant-time.
uint8_t block[SHA_CBLOCK] = {0};
uint32_t result[5] = {0};
// input_idx is the index into |in| corresponding to the current block.
// However, we allow this index to overflow beyond |max_len|, to simplify the
// 0x80 byte.
size_t input_idx = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < max_blocks; i++) {
// Fill |block| with data from the partial block in |ctx| and |in|. We copy
// as if we were hashing up to |max_len| and then zero the excess later.
size_t block_start = 0;
if (i == 0) {
OPENSSL_memcpy(block, ctx->data, ctx->num);
block_start = ctx->num;
}
if (input_idx < max_len) {
size_t to_copy = SHA_CBLOCK - block_start;
if (to_copy > max_len - input_idx) {
to_copy = max_len - input_idx;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(block + block_start, in + input_idx, to_copy);
}
// Zero any bytes beyond |len| and add the 0x80 byte.
for (size_t j = block_start; j < SHA_CBLOCK; j++) {
// input[idx] corresponds to block[j].
size_t idx = input_idx + j - block_start;
// The barriers on |len| are not strictly necessary. However, without
// them, GCC compiles this code by incorporating |len| into the loop
// counter and subtracting it out later. This is still constant-time, but
// it frustrates attempts to validate this.
uint8_t is_in_bounds = constant_time_lt_8(idx, value_barrier_w(len));
uint8_t is_padding_byte = constant_time_eq_8(idx, value_barrier_w(len));
block[j] &= is_in_bounds;
block[j] |= 0x80 & is_padding_byte;
}
input_idx += SHA_CBLOCK - block_start;
// Fill in the length if this is the last block.
crypto_word_t is_last_block = constant_time_eq_w(i, last_block);
for (size_t j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
block[SHA_CBLOCK - 4 + j] |= is_last_block & length_bytes[j];
}
// Process the block and save the hash state if it is the final value.
SHA1_Transform(ctx, block);
for (size_t j = 0; j < 5; j++) {
result[j] |= is_last_block & ctx->h[j];
}
}
// Write the output.
for (size_t i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
CRYPTO_store_u32_be(out + 4 * i, result[i]);
}
return 1;
}
int EVP_tls_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD *md) {
switch (EVP_MD_type(md)) {
case NID_sha1:
case NID_sha256:
case NID_sha384:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
return EVP_MD_type(md) == NID_sha1;
}
int EVP_tls_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t *md_out,
size_t *md_out_size, const uint8_t header[13],
const uint8_t *data, size_t data_plus_mac_size,
const uint8_t *data, size_t data_size,
size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
const uint8_t *mac_secret,
unsigned mac_secret_length) {
HASH_CTX md_state;
void (*md_final_raw)(HASH_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *md_out);
void (*md_transform)(HASH_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *block);
unsigned md_size, md_block_size = 64, md_block_shift = 6;
// md_length_size is the number of bytes in the length field that terminates
// the hash.
unsigned md_length_size = 8;
// Bound the acceptable input so we can forget about many possible overflows
// later in this function. This is redundant with the record size limits in
// TLS.
if (data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size >= 1024 * 1024) {
assert(0);
return 0;
}
switch (EVP_MD_type(md)) {
case NID_sha1:
SHA1_Init(&md_state.sha1);
md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw;
md_transform = tls1_sha1_transform;
md_size = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
break;
case NID_sha256:
SHA256_Init(&md_state.sha256);
md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
md_transform = tls1_sha256_transform;
md_size = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
break;
case NID_sha384:
SHA384_Init(&md_state.sha512);
md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
md_transform = tls1_sha512_transform;
md_size = SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH;
md_block_size = 128;
md_block_shift = 7;
md_length_size = 16;
break;
default:
if (EVP_MD_type(md) != NID_sha1) {
// EVP_tls_cbc_record_digest_supported should have been called first to
// check that the hash function is supported.
assert(0);
@@ -318,175 +285,54 @@ int EVP_tls_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t *md_out,
return 0;
}
assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES);
assert(md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
assert(md_block_size == (1u << md_block_shift));
assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
static const size_t kHeaderLength = 13;
// kVarianceBlocks is the number of blocks of the hash that we have to
// calculate in constant time because they could be altered by the
// padding value.
//
// TLSv1 has MACs up to 48 bytes long (SHA-384) and the padding is not
// required to be minimal. Therefore we say that the final |kVarianceBlocks|
// blocks can vary based on the padding and on the hash used. This value
// must be derived from public information.
const size_t kVarianceBlocks =
( 255 + 1 + // maximum padding bytes + padding length
md_size + // length of hash's output
md_block_size - 1 // ceiling
) / md_block_size
+ 1; // the 0x80 marker and the encoded message length could or not
// require an extra block; since the exact value depends on the
// message length; thus, one extra block is always added to run
// in constant time.
// From now on we're dealing with the MAC, which conceptually has 13
// bytes of `header' before the start of the data.
size_t len = data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + kHeaderLength;
// max_mac_bytes contains the maximum bytes of bytes in the MAC, including
// |header|, assuming that there's no padding.
size_t max_mac_bytes = len - md_size - 1;
// num_blocks is the maximum number of hash blocks.
size_t num_blocks =
(max_mac_bytes + 1 + md_length_size + md_block_size - 1) / md_block_size;
// In order to calculate the MAC in constant time we have to handle
// the final blocks specially because the padding value could cause the
// end to appear somewhere in the final |kVarianceBlocks| blocks and we
// can't leak where. However, |num_starting_blocks| worth of data can
// be hashed right away because no padding value can affect whether
// they are plaintext.
size_t num_starting_blocks = 0;
// k is the starting byte offset into the conceptual header||data where
// we start processing.
size_t k = 0;
// mac_end_offset is the index just past the end of the data to be MACed.
size_t mac_end_offset = data_plus_mac_size + kHeaderLength - md_size;
// c is the index of the 0x80 byte in the final hash block that contains
// application data.
size_t c = mac_end_offset & (md_block_size - 1);
// index_a is the hash block number that contains the 0x80 terminating value.
size_t index_a = mac_end_offset >> md_block_shift;
// index_b is the hash block number that contains the 64-bit hash length, in
// bits.
size_t index_b = (mac_end_offset + md_length_size) >> md_block_shift;
if (num_blocks > kVarianceBlocks) {
num_starting_blocks = num_blocks - kVarianceBlocks;
k = md_block_size * num_starting_blocks;
if (mac_secret_length > SHA_CBLOCK) {
// HMAC pads small keys with zeros and hashes large keys down. This function
// should never reach the large key case.
assert(0);
return 0;
}
// bits is the hash-length in bits. It includes the additional hash
// block for the masked HMAC key.
size_t bits = 8 * mac_end_offset; // at most 18 bits to represent
// Compute the initial HMAC block.
bits += 8 * md_block_size;
// hmac_pad is the masked HMAC key.
uint8_t hmac_pad[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
OPENSSL_memset(hmac_pad, 0, md_block_size);
assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad));
uint8_t hmac_pad[SHA_CBLOCK];
OPENSSL_memset(hmac_pad, 0, sizeof(hmac_pad));
OPENSSL_memcpy(hmac_pad, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
for (size_t i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < SHA_CBLOCK; i++) {
hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36;
}
md_transform(&md_state, hmac_pad);
SHA_CTX ctx;
SHA1_Init(&ctx);
SHA1_Update(&ctx, hmac_pad, SHA_CBLOCK);
SHA1_Update(&ctx, header, 13);
// The length check means |bits| fits in four bytes.
uint8_t length_bytes[MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES];
OPENSSL_memset(length_bytes, 0, md_length_size - 4);
length_bytes[md_length_size - 4] = (uint8_t)(bits >> 24);
length_bytes[md_length_size - 3] = (uint8_t)(bits >> 16);
length_bytes[md_length_size - 2] = (uint8_t)(bits >> 8);
length_bytes[md_length_size - 1] = (uint8_t)bits;
if (k > 0) {
// k is a multiple of md_block_size.
uint8_t first_block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
OPENSSL_memcpy(first_block, header, 13);
OPENSSL_memcpy(first_block + 13, data, md_block_size - 13);
md_transform(&md_state, first_block);
for (size_t i = 1; i < k / md_block_size; i++) {
md_transform(&md_state, data + md_block_size * i - 13);
}
// There are at most 256 bytes of padding, so we can compute the public
// minimum length for |data_size|.
size_t min_data_size = 0;
if (data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size > SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 256) {
min_data_size = data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 256;
}
uint8_t mac_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
OPENSSL_memset(mac_out, 0, sizeof(mac_out));
// Hash the public minimum length directly. This reduces the number of blocks
// that must be computed in constant-time.
SHA1_Update(&ctx, data, min_data_size);
// We now process the final hash blocks. For each block, we construct
// it in constant time. If the |i==index_a| then we'll include the 0x80
// bytes and zero pad etc. For each block we selectively copy it, in
// constant time, to |mac_out|.
for (size_t i = num_starting_blocks;
i <= num_starting_blocks + kVarianceBlocks; i++) {
uint8_t block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
uint8_t is_block_a = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_a);
uint8_t is_block_b = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_b);
for (size_t j = 0; j < md_block_size; j++) {
uint8_t b = 0;
if (k < kHeaderLength) {
b = header[k];
} else if (k < data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + kHeaderLength) {
b = data[k - kHeaderLength];
}
k++;
uint8_t is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c);
uint8_t is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c + 1);
// If this is the block containing the end of the
// application data, and we are at the offset for the
// 0x80 value, then overwrite b with 0x80.
b = constant_time_select_8(is_past_c, 0x80, b);
// If this the the block containing the end of the
// application data and we're past the 0x80 value then
// just write zero.
b = b & ~is_past_cp1;
// If this is index_b (the final block), but not
// index_a (the end of the data), then the 64-bit
// length didn't fit into index_a and we're having to
// add an extra block of zeros.
b &= ~is_block_b | is_block_a;
// The final bytes of one of the blocks contains the
// length.
if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size) {
// If this is index_b, write a length byte.
b = constant_time_select_8(
is_block_b, length_bytes[j - (md_block_size - md_length_size)], b);
}
block[j] = b;
}
md_transform(&md_state, block);
md_final_raw(&md_state, block);
// If this is index_b, copy the hash value to |mac_out|.
for (size_t j = 0; j < md_size; j++) {
mac_out[j] |= block[j] & is_block_b;
}
}
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL /* engine */)) {
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
// Hash the remaining data without leaking |data_size|.
uint8_t mac_out[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
if (!EVP_sha1_final_with_secret_suffix(
&ctx, mac_out, data + min_data_size, data_size - min_data_size,
data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size - min_data_size)) {
return 0;
}
// Complete the HMAC in the standard manner.
for (size_t i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++) {
SHA1_Init(&ctx);
for (size_t i = 0; i < SHA_CBLOCK; i++) {
hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a;
}
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size);
unsigned md_out_size_u;
EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u);
*md_out_size = md_out_size_u;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
SHA1_Update(&ctx, hmac_pad, SHA_CBLOCK);
SHA1_Update(&ctx, mac_out, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
SHA1_Final(md_out, &ctx);
*md_out_size = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
return 1;
}
+14 -3
View File
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
#include "conf_def.h"
#include "internal.h"
#include "../internal.h"
#include "../lhash/internal.h"
DEFINE_LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE)
@@ -76,12 +77,16 @@ struct conf_st {
LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *data;
};
static const char kDefaultSectionName[] = "default";
// The maximum length we can grow a value to after variable expansion. 64k
// should be more than enough for all reasonable uses.
#define MAX_CONF_VALUE_LENGTH 65536
static uint32_t conf_value_hash(const CONF_VALUE *v) {
return (lh_strhash(v->section) << 2) ^ lh_strhash(v->name);
const uint32_t section_hash = v->section ? OPENSSL_strhash(v->section) : 0;
const uint32_t name_hash = v->name ? OPENSSL_strhash(v->name) : 0;
return (section_hash << 2) ^ name_hash;
}
static int conf_value_cmp(const CONF_VALUE *a, const CONF_VALUE *b) {
@@ -155,12 +160,14 @@ static void value_free(CONF_VALUE *value) {
OPENSSL_free(value);
}
static void value_free_arg(CONF_VALUE *value, void *arg) { value_free(value); }
void NCONF_free(CONF *conf) {
if (conf == NULL || conf->data == NULL) {
return;
}
lh_CONF_VALUE_doall(conf->data, value_free);
lh_CONF_VALUE_doall_arg(conf->data, value_free_arg, NULL);
lh_CONF_VALUE_free(conf->data);
OPENSSL_free(conf);
}
@@ -390,6 +397,10 @@ const char *NCONF_get_string(const CONF *conf, const char *section,
const char *name) {
CONF_VALUE template, *value;
if (section == NULL) {
section = kDefaultSectionName;
}
OPENSSL_memset(&template, 0, sizeof(template));
template.section = (char *) section;
template.name = (char *) name;
@@ -538,7 +549,7 @@ static int def_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *in, long *out_error_line) {
goto err;
}
section = OPENSSL_strdup("default");
section = OPENSSL_strdup(kDefaultSectionName);
if (section == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CONF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2018, Google Inc.
* Copyright (c) 2020, Arm Ltd.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_cpu.h>
#if defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64) && defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS) && \
!defined(OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP)
#include <windows.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_arm_arch.h>
#include "internal.h"
extern uint32_t OPENSSL_armcap_P;
void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) {
// We do not need to check for the presence of NEON, as Armv8-A always has it
OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV7_NEON;
if (IsProcessorFeaturePresent(PF_ARM_V8_CRYPTO_INSTRUCTIONS_AVAILABLE)) {
// These are all covered by one call in Windows
OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_AES;
OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_PMULL;
OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA1;
OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA256;
}
}
#endif
@@ -175,7 +175,13 @@ void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) {
hwcap = crypto_get_arm_hwcap_from_cpuinfo(&cpuinfo);
}
// Clear NEON support if known broken.
// Clear NEON support if known broken. Note, if NEON is available statically,
// the non-NEON code is dropped and this workaround is a no-op.
//
// TODO(davidben): The Android NDK now builds with NEON statically available
// by default. Cronet still has some consumers that support NEON-less devices
// (b/150371744). Get metrics on whether they still see this CPU and, if not,
// remove this check entirely.
g_has_broken_neon = crypto_cpuinfo_has_broken_neon(&cpuinfo);
if (g_has_broken_neon) {
hwcap &= ~HWCAP_NEON;
@@ -186,7 +192,10 @@ void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) {
OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV7_NEON;
// Some ARMv8 Android devices don't expose AT_HWCAP2. Fall back to
// /proc/cpuinfo. See https://crbug.com/596156.
// /proc/cpuinfo. See https://crbug.com/boringssl/46. As of February 2021,
// this is now rare (see Chrome's Net.NeedsHWCAP2Workaround metric), but AES
// and PMULL extensions are very useful, so we still carry the workaround
// for now.
unsigned long hwcap2 = 0;
if (getauxval != NULL) {
hwcap2 = getauxval(AT_HWCAP2);
+3 -3
View File
@@ -22,15 +22,15 @@
extern uint32_t OPENSSL_armcap_P;
char CRYPTO_is_NEON_capable_at_runtime(void) {
int CRYPTO_is_NEON_capable_at_runtime(void) {
return (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV7_NEON) != 0;
}
int CRYPTO_is_ARMv8_AES_capable(void) {
int CRYPTO_is_ARMv8_AES_capable_at_runtime(void) {
return (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV8_AES) != 0;
}
int CRYPTO_is_ARMv8_PMULL_capable(void) {
int CRYPTO_is_ARMv8_PMULL_capable_at_runtime(void) {
return (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV8_PMULL) != 0;
}
@@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ static void table_select(ge_precomp *t, int pos, signed char b) {
//
// Preconditions:
// a[31] <= 127
void x25519_ge_scalarmult_base(ge_p3 *h, const uint8_t *a) {
void x25519_ge_scalarmult_base(ge_p3 *h, const uint8_t a[32]) {
signed char e[64];
signed char carry;
ge_p1p1 r;
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ typedef struct {
} ge_cached;
void x25519_ge_tobytes(uint8_t s[32], const ge_p2 *h);
int x25519_ge_frombytes_vartime(ge_p3 *h, const uint8_t *s);
int x25519_ge_frombytes_vartime(ge_p3 *h, const uint8_t s[32]);
void x25519_ge_p3_to_cached(ge_cached *r, const ge_p3 *p);
void x25519_ge_p1p1_to_p2(ge_p2 *r, const ge_p1p1 *p);
void x25519_ge_p1p1_to_p3(ge_p3 *r, const ge_p1p1 *p);
@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_dh.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_bn.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_err.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include "../fipsmodule/bn/internal.h"
@@ -91,3 +93,180 @@ BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_1536(BIGNUM *ret) {
return ret;
}
int DH_generate_parameters_ex(DH *dh, int prime_bits, int generator,
BN_GENCB *cb) {
// We generate DH parameters as follows
// find a prime q which is prime_bits/2 bits long.
// p=(2*q)+1 or (p-1)/2 = q
// For this case, g is a generator if
// g^((p-1)/q) mod p != 1 for values of q which are the factors of p-1.
// Since the factors of p-1 are q and 2, we just need to check
// g^2 mod p != 1 and g^q mod p != 1.
//
// Having said all that,
// there is another special case method for the generators 2, 3 and 5.
// for 2, p mod 24 == 11
// for 3, p mod 12 == 5 <<<<< does not work for safe primes.
// for 5, p mod 10 == 3 or 7
//
// Thanks to Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com> for the pointers about the
// special generators and for answering some of my questions.
//
// I've implemented the second simple method :-).
// Since DH should be using a safe prime (both p and q are prime),
// this generator function can take a very very long time to run.
// Actually there is no reason to insist that 'generator' be a generator.
// It's just as OK (and in some sense better) to use a generator of the
// order-q subgroup.
BIGNUM *t1, *t2;
int g, ok = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL) {
goto err;
}
// Make sure |dh| has the necessary elements
if (dh->p == NULL) {
dh->p = BN_new();
if (dh->p == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
if (dh->g == NULL) {
dh->g = BN_new();
if (dh->g == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
if (generator <= 1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR);
goto err;
}
if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_2) {
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 24)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 11)) {
goto err;
}
g = 2;
} else if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_5) {
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 10)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 3)) {
goto err;
}
// BN_set_word(t3,7); just have to miss
// out on these ones :-(
g = 5;
} else {
// in the general case, don't worry if 'generator' is a
// generator or not: since we are using safe primes,
// it will generate either an order-q or an order-2q group,
// which both is OK
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 2)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 1)) {
goto err;
}
g = generator;
}
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(dh->p, prime_bits, 1, t1, t2, cb)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(dh->g, g)) {
goto err;
}
ok = 1;
err:
if (!ok) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
}
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
return ok;
}
static int int_dh_bn_cpy(BIGNUM **dst, const BIGNUM *src) {
BIGNUM *a = NULL;
if (src) {
a = BN_dup(src);
if (!a) {
return 0;
}
}
BN_free(*dst);
*dst = a;
return 1;
}
static int int_dh_param_copy(DH *to, const DH *from, int is_x942) {
if (is_x942 == -1) {
is_x942 = !!from->q;
}
if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->p, from->p) ||
!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->g, from->g)) {
return 0;
}
if (!is_x942) {
return 1;
}
if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->q, from->q) ||
!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->j, from->j)) {
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(to->seed);
to->seed = NULL;
to->seedlen = 0;
if (from->seed) {
to->seed = OPENSSL_memdup(from->seed, from->seedlen);
if (!to->seed) {
return 0;
}
to->seedlen = from->seedlen;
}
return 1;
}
DH *DHparams_dup(const DH *dh) {
DH *ret = DH_new();
if (!ret) {
return NULL;
}
if (!int_dh_param_copy(ret, dh, -1)) {
DH_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
@@ -58,11 +58,14 @@
#include <string.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_asn1.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_blake2.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_bytestring.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_obj.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_nid.h>
#include "../asn1/internal.h"
#include "../internal.h"
#include "../fipsmodule/digest/internal.h"
struct nid_to_digest {
@@ -80,6 +83,7 @@ static const struct nid_to_digest nid_to_digest_mapping[] = {
{NID_sha256, EVP_sha256, SN_sha256, LN_sha256},
{NID_sha384, EVP_sha384, SN_sha384, LN_sha384},
{NID_sha512, EVP_sha512, SN_sha512, LN_sha512},
{NID_sha512_256, EVP_sha512_256, SN_sha512_256, LN_sha512_256},
{NID_md5_sha1, EVP_md5_sha1, SN_md5_sha1, LN_md5_sha1},
// As a remnant of signing |EVP_MD|s, OpenSSL returned the corresponding
// hash function when given a signature OID. To avoid unintended lax parsing
@@ -150,13 +154,14 @@ static const EVP_MD *cbs_to_md(const CBS *cbs) {
}
const EVP_MD *EVP_get_digestbyobj(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj) {
// Handle objects with no corresponding OID.
// Handle objects with no corresponding OID. Note we don't use |OBJ_obj2nid|
// here to avoid pulling in the OID table.
if (obj->nid != NID_undef) {
return EVP_get_digestbynid(obj->nid);
}
CBS cbs;
CBS_init(&cbs, obj->data, obj->length);
CBS_init(&cbs, OBJ_get0_data(obj), OBJ_length(obj));
return cbs_to_md(&cbs);
}
@@ -238,3 +243,26 @@ const EVP_MD *EVP_get_digestbyname(const char *name) {
return NULL;
}
static void blake2b256_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { BLAKE2B256_Init(ctx->md_data); }
static void blake2b256_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t len) {
BLAKE2B256_Update(ctx->md_data, data, len);
}
static void blake2b256_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *md) {
BLAKE2B256_Final(md, ctx->md_data);
}
static const EVP_MD evp_md_blake2b256 = {
NID_undef,
BLAKE2B256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
0,
blake2b256_init,
blake2b256_update,
blake2b256_final,
BLAKE2B_CBLOCK,
sizeof(BLAKE2B_CTX),
};
const EVP_MD *EVP_blake2b256(void) { return &evp_md_blake2b256; }
+9 -43
View File
@@ -72,12 +72,11 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_sha.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_thread.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "../fipsmodule/bn/internal.h"
#include "../internal.h"
#define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
// Primality test according to FIPS PUB 186[-1], Appendix 2.1: 50 rounds of
// Miller-Rabin.
#define DSS_prime_checks 50
@@ -568,23 +567,7 @@ static int mod_mul_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
}
DSA_SIG *DSA_do_sign(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, const DSA *dsa) {
if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
return NULL;
}
// Reject invalid parameters. In particular, the algorithm will infinite loop
// if |g| is zero.
if (BN_is_zero(dsa->p) || BN_is_zero(dsa->q) || BN_is_zero(dsa->g)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS);
return NULL;
}
// We only support DSA keys that are a multiple of 8 bits. (This is a weaker
// check than the one in |DSA_do_check_signature|, which only allows 160-,
// 224-, and 256-bit keys.
if (BN_num_bits(dsa->q) % 8 != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
if (!dsa_check_parameters(dsa)) {
return NULL;
}
@@ -678,35 +661,17 @@ int DSA_do_verify(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, DSA_SIG *sig,
int DSA_do_check_signature(int *out_valid, const uint8_t *digest,
size_t digest_len, DSA_SIG *sig, const DSA *dsa) {
BN_CTX *ctx;
BIGNUM u1, u2, t1;
int ret = 0;
unsigned i;
*out_valid = 0;
if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
i = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
// FIPS 186-3 allows only different sizes for q.
if (i != 160 && i != 224 && i != 256) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
return 0;
}
if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
if (!dsa_check_parameters(dsa)) {
return 0;
}
int ret = 0;
BIGNUM u1, u2, t1;
BN_init(&u1);
BN_init(&u2);
BN_init(&t1);
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
@@ -729,11 +694,12 @@ int DSA_do_check_signature(int *out_valid, const uint8_t *digest,
}
// save M in u1
if (digest_len > (i >> 3)) {
unsigned q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
if (digest_len > (q_bits >> 3)) {
// if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the
// BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see
// fips 186-3, 4.2
digest_len = (i >> 3);
digest_len = (q_bits >> 3);
}
if (BN_bin2bn(digest, digest_len, &u1) == NULL) {
+55 -4
View File
@@ -61,9 +61,45 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_err.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "../bytestring/internal.h"
#define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
// This function is in dsa_asn1.c rather than dsa.c because it is reachable from
// |EVP_PKEY| parsers. This makes it easier for the static linker to drop most
// of the DSA implementation.
int dsa_check_parameters(const DSA *dsa) {
if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
// Reject invalid parameters. In particular, signing will infinite loop if |g|
// is zero.
if (BN_is_zero(dsa->p) || BN_is_zero(dsa->q) || BN_is_zero(dsa->g)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
// FIPS 186-4 allows only three different sizes for q.
unsigned q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
if (q_bits != 160 && q_bits != 224 && q_bits != 256) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
return 0;
}
// Bound |dsa->p| to avoid a DoS vector. Note this limit is much larger than
// the one in FIPS 186-4, which only allows L = 1024, 2048, and 3072.
if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int parse_integer(CBS *cbs, BIGNUM **out) {
assert(*out == NULL);
*out = BN_new();
@@ -124,10 +160,16 @@ DSA *DSA_parse_public_key(CBS *cbs) {
!parse_integer(&child, &ret->g) ||
CBS_len(&child) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR);
DSA_free(ret);
return NULL;
goto err;
}
if (!dsa_check_parameters(ret)) {
goto err;
}
return ret;
err:
DSA_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
int DSA_marshal_public_key(CBB *cbb, const DSA *dsa) {
@@ -156,10 +198,16 @@ DSA *DSA_parse_parameters(CBS *cbs) {
!parse_integer(&child, &ret->g) ||
CBS_len(&child) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR);
DSA_free(ret);
return NULL;
goto err;
}
if (!dsa_check_parameters(ret)) {
goto err;
}
return ret;
err:
DSA_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
int DSA_marshal_parameters(CBB *cbb, const DSA *dsa) {
@@ -203,6 +251,9 @@ DSA *DSA_parse_private_key(CBS *cbs) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!dsa_check_parameters(ret)) {
goto err;
}
return ret;
err:
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2017, Google Inc.
/* Copyright (c) 2020, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
@@ -12,18 +12,23 @@
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_crypto.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_DSA_INTERNAL_H
#define OPENSSL_HEADER_DSA_INTERNAL_H
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_dsa.h>
// This file exists in order to give the fipsmodule target, in non-FIPS mode,
// something to compile.
int FIPS_mode(void) {
#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS) && !defined(OPENSSL_ASAN)
return 1;
#else
return 0;
#if defined(__cplusplus)
extern "C" {
#endif
}
int FIPS_mode_set(int on) { return on == FIPS_mode(); }
// dsa_check_parameters checks that |dsa|'s group is within DoS bounds. It
// returns one on success and zero on error.
int dsa_check_parameters(const DSA *dsa);
#if defined(__cplusplus)
} // extern C
#endif
#endif // OPENSSL_HEADER_DSA_INTERNAL_H
@@ -241,21 +241,6 @@ int EC_KEY_marshal_private_key(CBB *cbb, const EC_KEY *key,
return 1;
}
// is_unsigned_integer returns one if |cbs| is a valid unsigned DER INTEGER and
// zero otherwise.
static int is_unsigned_integer(const CBS *cbs) {
if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t byte = CBS_data(cbs)[0];
if ((byte & 0x80) ||
(byte == 0 && CBS_len(cbs) > 1 && (CBS_data(cbs)[1] & 0x80) == 0)) {
// Negative or not minimally-encoded.
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
// kPrimeFieldOID is the encoding of 1.2.840.10045.1.1.
static const uint8_t kPrimeField[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x01, 0x01};
@@ -276,7 +261,7 @@ static int parse_explicit_prime_curve(CBS *in, CBS *out_prime, CBS *out_a,
OPENSSL_memcmp(CBS_data(&field_type), kPrimeField, sizeof(kPrimeField)) !=
0 ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&field_id, out_prime, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
!is_unsigned_integer(out_prime) ||
!CBS_is_unsigned_asn1_integer(out_prime) ||
CBS_len(&field_id) != 0 ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&params, &curve, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&curve, out_a, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
@@ -286,7 +271,7 @@ static int parse_explicit_prime_curve(CBS *in, CBS *out_prime, CBS *out_a,
CBS_len(&curve) != 0 ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&params, &base, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&params, out_order, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
!is_unsigned_integer(out_order) ||
!CBS_is_unsigned_asn1_integer(out_order) ||
!CBS_get_optional_asn1(&params, &cofactor, &has_cofactor,
CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
CBS_len(&params) != 0) {
+87 -80
View File
@@ -368,84 +368,6 @@ void ERR_clear_system_error(void) {
errno = 0;
}
char *ERR_error_string(uint32_t packed_error, char *ret) {
static char buf[ERR_ERROR_STRING_BUF_LEN];
if (ret == NULL) {
// TODO(fork): remove this.
ret = buf;
}
#if !defined(NDEBUG)
// This is aimed to help catch callers who don't provide
// |ERR_ERROR_STRING_BUF_LEN| bytes of space.
OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, ERR_ERROR_STRING_BUF_LEN);
#endif
return ERR_error_string_n(packed_error, ret, ERR_ERROR_STRING_BUF_LEN);
}
char *ERR_error_string_n(uint32_t packed_error, char *buf, size_t len) {
char lib_buf[64], reason_buf[64];
const char *lib_str, *reason_str;
unsigned lib, reason;
if (len == 0) {
return NULL;
}
lib = ERR_GET_LIB(packed_error);
reason = ERR_GET_REASON(packed_error);
lib_str = ERR_lib_error_string(packed_error);
reason_str = ERR_reason_error_string(packed_error);
if (lib_str == NULL) {
BIO_snprintf(lib_buf, sizeof(lib_buf), "lib(%u)", lib);
lib_str = lib_buf;
}
if (reason_str == NULL) {
BIO_snprintf(reason_buf, sizeof(reason_buf), "reason(%u)", reason);
reason_str = reason_buf;
}
BIO_snprintf(buf, len, "error:%08" PRIx32 ":%s:OPENSSL_internal:%s",
packed_error, lib_str, reason_str);
if (strlen(buf) == len - 1) {
// output may be truncated; make sure we always have 5 colon-separated
// fields, i.e. 4 colons.
static const unsigned num_colons = 4;
unsigned i;
char *s = buf;
if (len <= num_colons) {
// In this situation it's not possible to ensure that the correct number
// of colons are included in the output.
return buf;
}
for (i = 0; i < num_colons; i++) {
char *colon = strchr(s, ':');
char *last_pos = &buf[len - 1] - num_colons + i;
if (colon == NULL || colon > last_pos) {
// set colon |i| at last possible position (buf[len-1] is the
// terminating 0). If we're setting this colon, then all whole of the
// rest of the string must be colons in order to have the correct
// number.
OPENSSL_memset(last_pos, ':', num_colons - i);
break;
}
s = colon + 1;
}
}
return buf;
}
// err_string_cmp is a compare function for searching error values with
// |bsearch| in |err_string_lookup|.
static int err_string_cmp(const void *a, const void *b) {
@@ -530,7 +452,7 @@ static const char *const kLibraryNames[ERR_NUM_LIBS] = {
"User defined functions", // ERR_LIB_USER
};
const char *ERR_lib_error_string(uint32_t packed_error) {
static const char *err_lib_error_string(uint32_t packed_error) {
const uint32_t lib = ERR_GET_LIB(packed_error);
if (lib >= ERR_NUM_LIBS) {
@@ -539,11 +461,16 @@ const char *ERR_lib_error_string(uint32_t packed_error) {
return kLibraryNames[lib];
}
const char *ERR_lib_error_string(uint32_t packed_error) {
const char *ret = err_lib_error_string(packed_error);
return ret == NULL ? "unknown library" : ret;
}
const char *ERR_func_error_string(uint32_t packed_error) {
return "OPENSSL_internal";
}
const char *ERR_reason_error_string(uint32_t packed_error) {
static const char *err_reason_error_string(uint32_t packed_error) {
const uint32_t lib = ERR_GET_LIB(packed_error);
const uint32_t reason = ERR_GET_REASON(packed_error);
@@ -579,6 +506,86 @@ const char *ERR_reason_error_string(uint32_t packed_error) {
kOpenSSLReasonValuesLen, kOpenSSLReasonStringData);
}
const char *ERR_reason_error_string(uint32_t packed_error) {
const char *ret = err_reason_error_string(packed_error);
return ret == NULL ? "unknown error" : ret;
}
char *ERR_error_string(uint32_t packed_error, char *ret) {
static char buf[ERR_ERROR_STRING_BUF_LEN];
if (ret == NULL) {
// TODO(fork): remove this.
ret = buf;
}
#if !defined(NDEBUG)
// This is aimed to help catch callers who don't provide
// |ERR_ERROR_STRING_BUF_LEN| bytes of space.
OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, ERR_ERROR_STRING_BUF_LEN);
#endif
return ERR_error_string_n(packed_error, ret, ERR_ERROR_STRING_BUF_LEN);
}
char *ERR_error_string_n(uint32_t packed_error, char *buf, size_t len) {
if (len == 0) {
return NULL;
}
unsigned lib = ERR_GET_LIB(packed_error);
unsigned reason = ERR_GET_REASON(packed_error);
const char *lib_str = err_lib_error_string(packed_error);
const char *reason_str = err_reason_error_string(packed_error);
char lib_buf[64], reason_buf[64];
if (lib_str == NULL) {
BIO_snprintf(lib_buf, sizeof(lib_buf), "lib(%u)", lib);
lib_str = lib_buf;
}
if (reason_str == NULL) {
BIO_snprintf(reason_buf, sizeof(reason_buf), "reason(%u)", reason);
reason_str = reason_buf;
}
BIO_snprintf(buf, len, "error:%08" PRIx32 ":%s:OPENSSL_internal:%s",
packed_error, lib_str, reason_str);
if (strlen(buf) == len - 1) {
// output may be truncated; make sure we always have 5 colon-separated
// fields, i.e. 4 colons.
static const unsigned num_colons = 4;
unsigned i;
char *s = buf;
if (len <= num_colons) {
// In this situation it's not possible to ensure that the correct number
// of colons are included in the output.
return buf;
}
for (i = 0; i < num_colons; i++) {
char *colon = strchr(s, ':');
char *last_pos = &buf[len - 1] - num_colons + i;
if (colon == NULL || colon > last_pos) {
// set colon |i| at last possible position (buf[len-1] is the
// terminating 0). If we're setting this colon, then all whole of the
// rest of the string must be colons in order to have the correct
// number.
OPENSSL_memset(last_pos, ':', num_colons - i);
break;
}
s = colon + 1;
}
}
return buf;
}
void ERR_print_errors_cb(ERR_print_errors_callback_t callback, void *ctx) {
char buf[ERR_ERROR_STRING_BUF_LEN];
char buf2[1024];
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
+13
View File
@@ -76,6 +76,10 @@
// TODO(davidben): Fix Node to not touch the error queue itself and remove this.
OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(EVP, NOT_XOF_OR_INVALID_LENGTH)
// The HPKE module uses the EVP error namespace, but it lives in another
// directory.
OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(EVP, EMPTY_PSK)
EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new(void) {
EVP_PKEY *ret;
@@ -425,6 +429,15 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **out_md) {
0, (void *)out_md);
}
void *EVP_PKEY_get0(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
// Node references, but never calls this function, so for now we return NULL.
// If other projects require complete support, call |EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA|, etc.,
// rather than reading |pkey->pkey.ptr| directly. This avoids problems if our
// internal representation does not match the type the caller expects from
// OpenSSL.
return NULL;
}
void OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(void) {}
void OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_conf(void) {}
@@ -407,6 +407,10 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY **out, const uint8_t **inp, long len) {
}
int i2d_PUBKEY(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, uint8_t **outp) {
if (pkey == NULL) {
return 0;
}
CBB cbb;
if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 128) ||
!EVP_marshal_public_key(&cbb, pkey)) {
@@ -440,6 +444,10 @@ RSA *d2i_RSA_PUBKEY(RSA **out, const uint8_t **inp, long len) {
}
int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY(const RSA *rsa, uint8_t **outp) {
if (rsa == NULL) {
return 0;
}
int ret = -1;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (pkey == NULL ||
@@ -478,6 +486,10 @@ DSA *d2i_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA **out, const uint8_t **inp, long len) {
}
int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY(const DSA *dsa, uint8_t **outp) {
if (dsa == NULL) {
return 0;
}
int ret = -1;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (pkey == NULL ||
@@ -516,6 +528,10 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_EC_PUBKEY(EC_KEY **out, const uint8_t **inp, long len) {
}
int i2d_EC_PUBKEY(const EC_KEY *ec_key, uint8_t **outp) {
if (ec_key == NULL) {
return 0;
}
int ret = -1;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (pkey == NULL ||
@@ -141,9 +141,13 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *out, CBS *params, CBS *key) {
goto err;
}
// Decode the key.
// Decode the key. To avoid DoS attacks when importing private keys, we bound
// |dsa->priv_key| against |dsa->q|, which itself bound by
// |DSA_parse_parameters|. (We cannot call |BN_num_bits| on |dsa->priv_key|.
// That would leak a secret bit width.)
if (!BN_parse_asn1_unsigned(key, dsa->priv_key) ||
CBS_len(key) != 0) {
CBS_len(key) != 0 ||
BN_cmp(dsa->priv_key, dsa->q) >= 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
@@ -250,6 +250,7 @@ Ldec_key_abort:
#endif
.align 5
_aes_hw_encrypt:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ldr r3,[r2,#240]
vld1.32 {q0},[r2]!
vld1.8 {q2},[r0]
@@ -282,6 +283,7 @@ Loop_enc:
#endif
.align 5
_aes_hw_decrypt:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ldr r3,[r2,#240]
vld1.32 {q0},[r2]!
vld1.8 {q2},[r0]
@@ -630,20 +632,34 @@ _aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
add r7,r3,#32
mov r6,r5
movlo r12,#0
@ ARM Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72 cores running in 32-bit mode are
@ affected by silicon errata #1742098 [0] and #1655431 [1],
@ respectively, where the second instruction of an aese/aesmc
@ instruction pair may execute twice if an interrupt is taken right
@ after the first instruction consumes an input register of which a
@ single 32-bit lane has been updated the last time it was modified.
@
@ This function uses a counter in one 32-bit lane. The
@ could write to q1 and q10 directly, but that trips this bugs.
@ We write to q6 and copy to the final register as a workaround.
@
@ [0] ARM-EPM-049219 v23 Cortex-A57 MPCore Software Developers Errata Notice
@ [1] ARM-EPM-012079 v11.0 Cortex-A72 MPCore Software Developers Errata Notice
#ifndef __ARMEB__
rev r8, r8
#endif
vorr q1,q0,q0
add r10, r8, #1
vorr q10,q0,q0
add r8, r8, #2
vorr q6,q0,q0
rev r10, r10
vmov.32 d3[1],r10
vmov.32 d13[1],r10
add r8, r8, #2
vorr q1,q6,q6
bls Lctr32_tail
rev r12, r8
vmov.32 d13[1],r12
sub r2,r2,#3 @ bias
vmov.32 d21[1],r12
vorr q10,q6,q6
b Loop3x_ctr32
.align 4
@@ -670,11 +686,11 @@ Loop3x_ctr32:
.byte 0x20,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q1,q8
.byte 0x82,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q5,q1
vld1.8 {q2},[r0]!
vorr q0,q6,q6
add r9,r8,#1
.byte 0x20,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q10,q8
.byte 0xa4,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesmc q10,q10
vld1.8 {q3},[r0]!
vorr q1,q6,q6
rev r9,r9
.byte 0x22,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q4,q9
.byte 0x88,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q4,q4
.byte 0x22,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q5,q9
@@ -683,8 +699,6 @@ Loop3x_ctr32:
mov r7,r3
.byte 0x22,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q10,q9
.byte 0xa4,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesmc q9,q10
vorr q10,q6,q6
add r9,r8,#1
.byte 0x28,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q4,q12
.byte 0x88,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q4,q4
.byte 0x28,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q5,q12
@@ -699,21 +713,26 @@ Loop3x_ctr32:
.byte 0x88,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q4,q4
.byte 0x2a,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q5,q13
.byte 0x8a,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q5,q5
@ Note the logic to update q0, q1, and q1 is written to work
@ around a bug in ARM Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72 cores running in
@ 32-bit mode. See the comment above.
veor q11,q11,q7
rev r9,r9
vmov.32 d13[1], r9
.byte 0x2a,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q9,q13
.byte 0xa2,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesmc q9,q9
vmov.32 d1[1], r9
vorr q0,q6,q6
rev r10,r10
.byte 0x2c,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q4,q14
.byte 0x88,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q4,q4
vmov.32 d13[1], r10
rev r12,r8
.byte 0x2c,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q5,q14
.byte 0x8a,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q5,q5
vmov.32 d3[1], r10
rev r12,r8
vorr q1,q6,q6
vmov.32 d13[1], r12
.byte 0x2c,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q9,q14
.byte 0xa2,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesmc q9,q9
vmov.32 d21[1], r12
vorr q10,q6,q6
subs r2,r2,#3
.byte 0x2e,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q4,q15
.byte 0x2e,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q5,q15
@@ -245,6 +245,7 @@ aes_hw_set_decrypt_key:
.type aes_hw_encrypt,%function
.align 5
aes_hw_encrypt:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ldr r3,[r2,#240]
vld1.32 {q0},[r2]!
vld1.8 {q2},[r0]
@@ -275,6 +276,7 @@ aes_hw_encrypt:
.type aes_hw_decrypt,%function
.align 5
aes_hw_decrypt:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ldr r3,[r2,#240]
vld1.32 {q0},[r2]!
vld1.8 {q2},[r0]
@@ -619,20 +621,34 @@ aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
add r7,r3,#32
mov r6,r5
movlo r12,#0
@ ARM Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72 cores running in 32-bit mode are
@ affected by silicon errata #1742098 [0] and #1655431 [1],
@ respectively, where the second instruction of an aese/aesmc
@ instruction pair may execute twice if an interrupt is taken right
@ after the first instruction consumes an input register of which a
@ single 32-bit lane has been updated the last time it was modified.
@
@ This function uses a counter in one 32-bit lane. The
@ could write to q1 and q10 directly, but that trips this bugs.
@ We write to q6 and copy to the final register as a workaround.
@
@ [0] ARM-EPM-049219 v23 Cortex-A57 MPCore Software Developers Errata Notice
@ [1] ARM-EPM-012079 v11.0 Cortex-A72 MPCore Software Developers Errata Notice
#ifndef __ARMEB__
rev r8, r8
#endif
vorr q1,q0,q0
add r10, r8, #1
vorr q10,q0,q0
add r8, r8, #2
vorr q6,q0,q0
rev r10, r10
vmov.32 d3[1],r10
vmov.32 d13[1],r10
add r8, r8, #2
vorr q1,q6,q6
bls .Lctr32_tail
rev r12, r8
vmov.32 d13[1],r12
sub r2,r2,#3 @ bias
vmov.32 d21[1],r12
vorr q10,q6,q6
b .Loop3x_ctr32
.align 4
@@ -659,11 +675,11 @@ aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
.byte 0x20,0x23,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q1,q8
.byte 0x82,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q5,q1
vld1.8 {q2},[r0]!
vorr q0,q6,q6
add r9,r8,#1
.byte 0x20,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q10,q8
.byte 0xa4,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesmc q10,q10
vld1.8 {q3},[r0]!
vorr q1,q6,q6
rev r9,r9
.byte 0x22,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q4,q9
.byte 0x88,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q4,q4
.byte 0x22,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q5,q9
@@ -672,8 +688,6 @@ aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
mov r7,r3
.byte 0x22,0x43,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q10,q9
.byte 0xa4,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesmc q9,q10
vorr q10,q6,q6
add r9,r8,#1
.byte 0x28,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q4,q12
.byte 0x88,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q4,q4
.byte 0x28,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q5,q12
@@ -688,21 +702,26 @@ aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
.byte 0x88,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q4,q4
.byte 0x2a,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q5,q13
.byte 0x8a,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q5,q5
@ Note the logic to update q0, q1, and q1 is written to work
@ around a bug in ARM Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72 cores running in
@ 32-bit mode. See the comment above.
veor q11,q11,q7
rev r9,r9
vmov.32 d13[1], r9
.byte 0x2a,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q9,q13
.byte 0xa2,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesmc q9,q9
vmov.32 d1[1], r9
vorr q0,q6,q6
rev r10,r10
.byte 0x2c,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q4,q14
.byte 0x88,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q4,q4
vmov.32 d13[1], r10
rev r12,r8
.byte 0x2c,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q5,q14
.byte 0x8a,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aesmc q5,q5
vmov.32 d3[1], r10
rev r12,r8
vorr q1,q6,q6
vmov.32 d13[1], r12
.byte 0x2c,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aese q9,q14
.byte 0xa2,0x23,0xf0,0xf3 @ aesmc q9,q9
vmov.32 d21[1], r12
vorr q10,q6,q6
subs r2,r2,#3
.byte 0x2e,0x83,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q4,q15
.byte 0x2e,0xa3,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese q5,q15
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ Lrcon:
.align 5
_aes_hw_set_encrypt_key:
Lenc_key:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
mov x3,#-1
@@ -202,6 +204,7 @@ Lenc_key_abort:
.align 5
_aes_hw_set_decrypt_key:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
bl Lenc_key
@@ -235,6 +238,7 @@ Loop_imc:
eor x0,x0,x0 // return value
Ldec_key_abort:
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.globl _aes_hw_encrypt
@@ -242,6 +246,7 @@ Ldec_key_abort:
.align 5
_aes_hw_encrypt:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ldr w3,[x2,#240]
ld1 {v0.4s},[x2],#16
ld1 {v2.16b},[x0]
@@ -272,6 +277,7 @@ Loop_enc:
.align 5
_aes_hw_decrypt:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ldr w3,[x2,#240]
ld1 {v0.4s},[x2],#16
ld1 {v2.16b},[x0]
@@ -302,6 +308,8 @@ Loop_dec:
.align 5
_aes_hw_cbc_encrypt:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
subs x2,x2,#16
@@ -593,6 +601,8 @@ Lcbc_abort:
.align 5
_aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
ldr w5,[x3,#240]
@@ -612,20 +622,34 @@ _aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
add x7,x3,#32
mov w6,w5
csel x12,xzr,x12,lo
// ARM Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72 cores running in 32-bit mode are
// affected by silicon errata #1742098 [0] and #1655431 [1],
// respectively, where the second instruction of an aese/aesmc
// instruction pair may execute twice if an interrupt is taken right
// after the first instruction consumes an input register of which a
// single 32-bit lane has been updated the last time it was modified.
//
// This function uses a counter in one 32-bit lane. The vmov lines
// could write to v1.16b and v18.16b directly, but that trips this bugs.
// We write to v6.16b and copy to the final register as a workaround.
//
// [0] ARM-EPM-049219 v23 Cortex-A57 MPCore Software Developers Errata Notice
// [1] ARM-EPM-012079 v11.0 Cortex-A72 MPCore Software Developers Errata Notice
#ifndef __ARMEB__
rev w8, w8
#endif
orr v1.16b,v0.16b,v0.16b
add w10, w8, #1
orr v18.16b,v0.16b,v0.16b
add w8, w8, #2
orr v6.16b,v0.16b,v0.16b
rev w10, w10
mov v1.s[3],w10
mov v6.s[3],w10
add w8, w8, #2
orr v1.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
b.ls Lctr32_tail
rev w12, w8
mov v6.s[3],w12
sub x2,x2,#3 // bias
mov v18.s[3],w12
orr v18.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
b Loop3x_ctr32
.align 4
@@ -652,11 +676,11 @@ Loop3x_ctr32:
aese v1.16b,v16.16b
aesmc v5.16b,v1.16b
ld1 {v2.16b},[x0],#16
orr v0.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
add w9,w8,#1
aese v18.16b,v16.16b
aesmc v18.16b,v18.16b
ld1 {v3.16b},[x0],#16
orr v1.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
rev w9,w9
aese v4.16b,v17.16b
aesmc v4.16b,v4.16b
aese v5.16b,v17.16b
@@ -665,8 +689,6 @@ Loop3x_ctr32:
mov x7,x3
aese v18.16b,v17.16b
aesmc v17.16b,v18.16b
orr v18.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
add w9,w8,#1
aese v4.16b,v20.16b
aesmc v4.16b,v4.16b
aese v5.16b,v20.16b
@@ -681,21 +703,26 @@ Loop3x_ctr32:
aesmc v4.16b,v4.16b
aese v5.16b,v21.16b
aesmc v5.16b,v5.16b
// Note the logic to update v0.16b, v1.16b, and v1.16b is written to work
// around a bug in ARM Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72 cores running in
// 32-bit mode. See the comment above.
eor v19.16b,v19.16b,v7.16b
rev w9,w9
mov v6.s[3], w9
aese v17.16b,v21.16b
aesmc v17.16b,v17.16b
mov v0.s[3], w9
orr v0.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
rev w10,w10
aese v4.16b,v22.16b
aesmc v4.16b,v4.16b
mov v6.s[3], w10
rev w12,w8
aese v5.16b,v22.16b
aesmc v5.16b,v5.16b
mov v1.s[3], w10
rev w12,w8
orr v1.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
mov v6.s[3], w12
aese v17.16b,v22.16b
aesmc v17.16b,v17.16b
mov v18.s[3], w12
orr v18.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
subs x2,x2,#3
aese v4.16b,v23.16b
aese v5.16b,v23.16b
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@
.align 5
aes_hw_set_encrypt_key:
.Lenc_key:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
mov x3,#-1
@@ -203,6 +205,7 @@ aes_hw_set_encrypt_key:
.type aes_hw_set_decrypt_key,%function
.align 5
aes_hw_set_decrypt_key:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
bl .Lenc_key
@@ -236,6 +239,7 @@ aes_hw_set_decrypt_key:
eor x0,x0,x0 // return value
.Ldec_key_abort:
ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size aes_hw_set_decrypt_key,.-aes_hw_set_decrypt_key
.globl aes_hw_encrypt
@@ -243,6 +247,7 @@ aes_hw_set_decrypt_key:
.type aes_hw_encrypt,%function
.align 5
aes_hw_encrypt:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ldr w3,[x2,#240]
ld1 {v0.4s},[x2],#16
ld1 {v2.16b},[x0]
@@ -273,6 +278,7 @@ aes_hw_encrypt:
.type aes_hw_decrypt,%function
.align 5
aes_hw_decrypt:
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
ldr w3,[x2,#240]
ld1 {v0.4s},[x2],#16
ld1 {v2.16b},[x0]
@@ -303,6 +309,8 @@ aes_hw_decrypt:
.type aes_hw_cbc_encrypt,%function
.align 5
aes_hw_cbc_encrypt:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
subs x2,x2,#16
@@ -594,6 +602,8 @@ aes_hw_cbc_encrypt:
.type aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,%function
.align 5
aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
// Armv8.3-A PAuth: even though x30 is pushed to stack it is not popped later.
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
ldr w5,[x3,#240]
@@ -613,20 +623,34 @@ aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
add x7,x3,#32
mov w6,w5
csel x12,xzr,x12,lo
// ARM Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72 cores running in 32-bit mode are
// affected by silicon errata #1742098 [0] and #1655431 [1],
// respectively, where the second instruction of an aese/aesmc
// instruction pair may execute twice if an interrupt is taken right
// after the first instruction consumes an input register of which a
// single 32-bit lane has been updated the last time it was modified.
//
// This function uses a counter in one 32-bit lane. The vmov lines
// could write to v1.16b and v18.16b directly, but that trips this bugs.
// We write to v6.16b and copy to the final register as a workaround.
//
// [0] ARM-EPM-049219 v23 Cortex-A57 MPCore Software Developers Errata Notice
// [1] ARM-EPM-012079 v11.0 Cortex-A72 MPCore Software Developers Errata Notice
#ifndef __ARMEB__
rev w8, w8
#endif
orr v1.16b,v0.16b,v0.16b
add w10, w8, #1
orr v18.16b,v0.16b,v0.16b
add w8, w8, #2
orr v6.16b,v0.16b,v0.16b
rev w10, w10
mov v1.s[3],w10
mov v6.s[3],w10
add w8, w8, #2
orr v1.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
b.ls .Lctr32_tail
rev w12, w8
mov v6.s[3],w12
sub x2,x2,#3 // bias
mov v18.s[3],w12
orr v18.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
b .Loop3x_ctr32
.align 4
@@ -653,11 +677,11 @@ aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
aese v1.16b,v16.16b
aesmc v5.16b,v1.16b
ld1 {v2.16b},[x0],#16
orr v0.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
add w9,w8,#1
aese v18.16b,v16.16b
aesmc v18.16b,v18.16b
ld1 {v3.16b},[x0],#16
orr v1.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
rev w9,w9
aese v4.16b,v17.16b
aesmc v4.16b,v4.16b
aese v5.16b,v17.16b
@@ -666,8 +690,6 @@ aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
mov x7,x3
aese v18.16b,v17.16b
aesmc v17.16b,v18.16b
orr v18.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
add w9,w8,#1
aese v4.16b,v20.16b
aesmc v4.16b,v4.16b
aese v5.16b,v20.16b
@@ -682,21 +704,26 @@ aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
aesmc v4.16b,v4.16b
aese v5.16b,v21.16b
aesmc v5.16b,v5.16b
// Note the logic to update v0.16b, v1.16b, and v1.16b is written to work
// around a bug in ARM Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72 cores running in
// 32-bit mode. See the comment above.
eor v19.16b,v19.16b,v7.16b
rev w9,w9
mov v6.s[3], w9
aese v17.16b,v21.16b
aesmc v17.16b,v17.16b
mov v0.s[3], w9
orr v0.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
rev w10,w10
aese v4.16b,v22.16b
aesmc v4.16b,v4.16b
mov v6.s[3], w10
rev w12,w8
aese v5.16b,v22.16b
aesmc v5.16b,v5.16b
mov v1.s[3], w10
rev w12,w8
orr v1.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
mov v6.s[3], w12
aese v17.16b,v22.16b
aesmc v17.16b,v17.16b
mov v18.s[3], w12
orr v18.16b,v6.16b,v6.16b
subs x2,x2,#3
aese v4.16b,v23.16b
aese v5.16b,v23.16b
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
#if defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h>
#endif
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_arm_arch.h>
.text
.globl _bn_mul_mont
@@ -21,6 +23,7 @@
.align 5
_bn_mul_mont:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
tst x5,#7
b.eq __bn_sqr8x_mont
tst x5,#3
@@ -218,11 +221,14 @@ Lcond_copy:
mov x0,#1
ldp x23,x24,[x29,#48]
ldr x29,[sp],#64
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.align 5
__bn_sqr8x_mont:
// Not adding AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER here because __bn_sqr8x_mont is jumped to
// only from bn_mul_mont which has already signed the return address.
cmp x1,x2
b.ne __bn_mul4x_mont
Lsqr8x_mont:
@@ -976,11 +982,16 @@ Lsqr8x_done:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldr x29,[sp],#128
// x30 is popped earlier
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.align 5
__bn_mul4x_mont:
// Not adding AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER here because __bn_mul4x_mont is jumped to
// only from bn_mul_mont or __bn_mul8x_mont which have already signed the
// return address.
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-128]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp x19,x20,[sp,#16]
@@ -1414,6 +1425,8 @@ Lmul4x_done:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldr x29,[sp],#128
// x30 is popped earlier
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.byte 77,111,110,116,103,111,109,101,114,121,32,77,117,108,116,105,112,108,105,99,97,116,105,111,110,32,102,111,114,32,65,82,77,118,56,44,32,67,82,89,80,84,79,71,65,77,83,32,98,121,32,60,97,112,112,114,111,64,111,112,101,110,115,115,108,46,111,114,103,62,0
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
#if defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h>
#endif
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_arm_arch.h>
.text
.globl bn_mul_mont
@@ -22,6 +24,7 @@
.type bn_mul_mont,%function
.align 5
bn_mul_mont:
AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER
tst x5,#7
b.eq __bn_sqr8x_mont
tst x5,#3
@@ -219,11 +222,14 @@ bn_mul_mont:
mov x0,#1
ldp x23,x24,[x29,#48]
ldr x29,[sp],#64
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size bn_mul_mont,.-bn_mul_mont
.type __bn_sqr8x_mont,%function
.align 5
__bn_sqr8x_mont:
// Not adding AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER here because __bn_sqr8x_mont is jumped to
// only from bn_mul_mont which has already signed the return address.
cmp x1,x2
b.ne __bn_mul4x_mont
.Lsqr8x_mont:
@@ -977,11 +983,16 @@ __bn_sqr8x_mont:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldr x29,[sp],#128
// x30 is popped earlier
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size __bn_sqr8x_mont,.-__bn_sqr8x_mont
.type __bn_mul4x_mont,%function
.align 5
__bn_mul4x_mont:
// Not adding AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER here because __bn_mul4x_mont is jumped to
// only from bn_mul_mont or __bn_mul8x_mont which have already signed the
// return address.
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-128]!
add x29,sp,#0
stp x19,x20,[sp,#16]
@@ -1415,6 +1426,8 @@ __bn_mul4x_mont:
ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64]
ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80]
ldr x29,[sp],#128
// x30 is popped earlier
AARCH64_VALIDATE_LINK_REGISTER
ret
.size __bn_mul4x_mont,.-__bn_mul4x_mont
.byte 77,111,110,116,103,111,109,101,114,121,32,77,117,108,116,105,112,108,105,99,97,116,105,111,110,32,102,111,114,32,65,82,77,118,56,44,32,67,82,89,80,84,79,71,65,77,83,32,98,121,32,60,97,112,112,114,111,64,111,112,101,110,115,115,108,46,111,114,103,62,0
@@ -0,0 +1,852 @@
#define BORINGSSL_PREFIX CCryptoBoringSSL
#if defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
# This file is generated from a similarly-named Perl script in the BoringSSL
# source tree. Do not edit by hand.
#if defined(__i386__)
#if defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX)
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h>
#endif
.text
.globl _bn_mul_add_words
.hidden _bn_mul_add_words
.def _bn_mul_add_words; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_bn_mul_add_words:
.L_bn_mul_add_words_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
xorl %esi,%esi
movl 20(%esp),%edi
movl 28(%esp),%ecx
movl 24(%esp),%ebx
andl $4294967288,%ecx
movl 32(%esp),%ebp
pushl %ecx
jz .L000maw_finish
.align 16
.L001maw_loop:
# Round 0
movl (%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl (%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 4
movl 4(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 4(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,4(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 8
movl 8(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 8(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,8(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 12
movl 12(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 12(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,12(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 16
movl 16(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 16(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,16(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 20
movl 20(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 20(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,20(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 24
movl 24(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 24(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,24(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 28
movl 28(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 28(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,28(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
subl $8,%ecx
leal 32(%ebx),%ebx
leal 32(%edi),%edi
jnz .L001maw_loop
.L000maw_finish:
movl 32(%esp),%ecx
andl $7,%ecx
jnz .L002maw_finish2
jmp .L003maw_end
.L002maw_finish2:
# Tail Round 0
movl (%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl (%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
decl %ecx
movl %eax,(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
jz .L003maw_end
# Tail Round 1
movl 4(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 4(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
decl %ecx
movl %eax,4(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
jz .L003maw_end
# Tail Round 2
movl 8(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 8(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
decl %ecx
movl %eax,8(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
jz .L003maw_end
# Tail Round 3
movl 12(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 12(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
decl %ecx
movl %eax,12(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
jz .L003maw_end
# Tail Round 4
movl 16(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 16(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
decl %ecx
movl %eax,16(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
jz .L003maw_end
# Tail Round 5
movl 20(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 20(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
decl %ecx
movl %eax,20(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
jz .L003maw_end
# Tail Round 6
movl 24(%ebx),%eax
mull %ebp
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
addl 24(%edi),%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,24(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
.L003maw_end:
movl %esi,%eax
popl %ecx
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.globl _bn_mul_words
.hidden _bn_mul_words
.def _bn_mul_words; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_bn_mul_words:
.L_bn_mul_words_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
xorl %esi,%esi
movl 20(%esp),%edi
movl 24(%esp),%ebx
movl 28(%esp),%ebp
movl 32(%esp),%ecx
andl $4294967288,%ebp
jz .L004mw_finish
.L005mw_loop:
# Round 0
movl (%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 4
movl 4(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,4(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 8
movl 8(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,8(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 12
movl 12(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,12(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 16
movl 16(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,16(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 20
movl 20(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,20(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 24
movl 24(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,24(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
# Round 28
movl 28(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,28(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
addl $32,%ebx
addl $32,%edi
subl $8,%ebp
jz .L004mw_finish
jmp .L005mw_loop
.L004mw_finish:
movl 28(%esp),%ebp
andl $7,%ebp
jnz .L006mw_finish2
jmp .L007mw_end
.L006mw_finish2:
# Tail Round 0
movl (%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
decl %ebp
jz .L007mw_end
# Tail Round 1
movl 4(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,4(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
decl %ebp
jz .L007mw_end
# Tail Round 2
movl 8(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,8(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
decl %ebp
jz .L007mw_end
# Tail Round 3
movl 12(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,12(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
decl %ebp
jz .L007mw_end
# Tail Round 4
movl 16(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,16(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
decl %ebp
jz .L007mw_end
# Tail Round 5
movl 20(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,20(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
decl %ebp
jz .L007mw_end
# Tail Round 6
movl 24(%ebx),%eax
mull %ecx
addl %esi,%eax
adcl $0,%edx
movl %eax,24(%edi)
movl %edx,%esi
.L007mw_end:
movl %esi,%eax
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.globl _bn_sqr_words
.hidden _bn_sqr_words
.def _bn_sqr_words; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_bn_sqr_words:
.L_bn_sqr_words_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
movl 20(%esp),%esi
movl 24(%esp),%edi
movl 28(%esp),%ebx
andl $4294967288,%ebx
jz .L008sw_finish
.L009sw_loop:
# Round 0
movl (%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,(%esi)
movl %edx,4(%esi)
# Round 4
movl 4(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,8(%esi)
movl %edx,12(%esi)
# Round 8
movl 8(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,16(%esi)
movl %edx,20(%esi)
# Round 12
movl 12(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,24(%esi)
movl %edx,28(%esi)
# Round 16
movl 16(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,32(%esi)
movl %edx,36(%esi)
# Round 20
movl 20(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,40(%esi)
movl %edx,44(%esi)
# Round 24
movl 24(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,48(%esi)
movl %edx,52(%esi)
# Round 28
movl 28(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,56(%esi)
movl %edx,60(%esi)
addl $32,%edi
addl $64,%esi
subl $8,%ebx
jnz .L009sw_loop
.L008sw_finish:
movl 28(%esp),%ebx
andl $7,%ebx
jz .L010sw_end
# Tail Round 0
movl (%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,(%esi)
decl %ebx
movl %edx,4(%esi)
jz .L010sw_end
# Tail Round 1
movl 4(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,8(%esi)
decl %ebx
movl %edx,12(%esi)
jz .L010sw_end
# Tail Round 2
movl 8(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,16(%esi)
decl %ebx
movl %edx,20(%esi)
jz .L010sw_end
# Tail Round 3
movl 12(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,24(%esi)
decl %ebx
movl %edx,28(%esi)
jz .L010sw_end
# Tail Round 4
movl 16(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,32(%esi)
decl %ebx
movl %edx,36(%esi)
jz .L010sw_end
# Tail Round 5
movl 20(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,40(%esi)
decl %ebx
movl %edx,44(%esi)
jz .L010sw_end
# Tail Round 6
movl 24(%edi),%eax
mull %eax
movl %eax,48(%esi)
movl %edx,52(%esi)
.L010sw_end:
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.globl _bn_div_words
.hidden _bn_div_words
.def _bn_div_words; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_bn_div_words:
.L_bn_div_words_begin:
movl 4(%esp),%edx
movl 8(%esp),%eax
movl 12(%esp),%ecx
divl %ecx
ret
.globl _bn_add_words
.hidden _bn_add_words
.def _bn_add_words; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_bn_add_words:
.L_bn_add_words_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
movl 20(%esp),%ebx
movl 24(%esp),%esi
movl 28(%esp),%edi
movl 32(%esp),%ebp
xorl %eax,%eax
andl $4294967288,%ebp
jz .L011aw_finish
.L012aw_loop:
# Round 0
movl (%esi),%ecx
movl (%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,(%ebx)
# Round 1
movl 4(%esi),%ecx
movl 4(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,4(%ebx)
# Round 2
movl 8(%esi),%ecx
movl 8(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,8(%ebx)
# Round 3
movl 12(%esi),%ecx
movl 12(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,12(%ebx)
# Round 4
movl 16(%esi),%ecx
movl 16(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,16(%ebx)
# Round 5
movl 20(%esi),%ecx
movl 20(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,20(%ebx)
# Round 6
movl 24(%esi),%ecx
movl 24(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,24(%ebx)
# Round 7
movl 28(%esi),%ecx
movl 28(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,28(%ebx)
addl $32,%esi
addl $32,%edi
addl $32,%ebx
subl $8,%ebp
jnz .L012aw_loop
.L011aw_finish:
movl 32(%esp),%ebp
andl $7,%ebp
jz .L013aw_end
# Tail Round 0
movl (%esi),%ecx
movl (%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,(%ebx)
jz .L013aw_end
# Tail Round 1
movl 4(%esi),%ecx
movl 4(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,4(%ebx)
jz .L013aw_end
# Tail Round 2
movl 8(%esi),%ecx
movl 8(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,8(%ebx)
jz .L013aw_end
# Tail Round 3
movl 12(%esi),%ecx
movl 12(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,12(%ebx)
jz .L013aw_end
# Tail Round 4
movl 16(%esi),%ecx
movl 16(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,16(%ebx)
jz .L013aw_end
# Tail Round 5
movl 20(%esi),%ecx
movl 20(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,20(%ebx)
jz .L013aw_end
# Tail Round 6
movl 24(%esi),%ecx
movl 24(%edi),%edx
addl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
addl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,24(%ebx)
.L013aw_end:
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
.globl _bn_sub_words
.hidden _bn_sub_words
.def _bn_sub_words; .scl 2; .type 32; .endef
.align 16
_bn_sub_words:
.L_bn_sub_words_begin:
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %esi
pushl %edi
movl 20(%esp),%ebx
movl 24(%esp),%esi
movl 28(%esp),%edi
movl 32(%esp),%ebp
xorl %eax,%eax
andl $4294967288,%ebp
jz .L014aw_finish
.L015aw_loop:
# Round 0
movl (%esi),%ecx
movl (%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,(%ebx)
# Round 1
movl 4(%esi),%ecx
movl 4(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,4(%ebx)
# Round 2
movl 8(%esi),%ecx
movl 8(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,8(%ebx)
# Round 3
movl 12(%esi),%ecx
movl 12(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,12(%ebx)
# Round 4
movl 16(%esi),%ecx
movl 16(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,16(%ebx)
# Round 5
movl 20(%esi),%ecx
movl 20(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,20(%ebx)
# Round 6
movl 24(%esi),%ecx
movl 24(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,24(%ebx)
# Round 7
movl 28(%esi),%ecx
movl 28(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,28(%ebx)
addl $32,%esi
addl $32,%edi
addl $32,%ebx
subl $8,%ebp
jnz .L015aw_loop
.L014aw_finish:
movl 32(%esp),%ebp
andl $7,%ebp
jz .L016aw_end
# Tail Round 0
movl (%esi),%ecx
movl (%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,(%ebx)
jz .L016aw_end
# Tail Round 1
movl 4(%esi),%ecx
movl 4(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,4(%ebx)
jz .L016aw_end
# Tail Round 2
movl 8(%esi),%ecx
movl 8(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,8(%ebx)
jz .L016aw_end
# Tail Round 3
movl 12(%esi),%ecx
movl 12(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,12(%ebx)
jz .L016aw_end
# Tail Round 4
movl 16(%esi),%ecx
movl 16(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,16(%ebx)
jz .L016aw_end
# Tail Round 5
movl 20(%esi),%ecx
movl 20(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
decl %ebp
movl %ecx,20(%ebx)
jz .L016aw_end
# Tail Round 6
movl 24(%esi),%ecx
movl 24(%edi),%edx
subl %eax,%ecx
movl $0,%eax
adcl %eax,%eax
subl %edx,%ecx
adcl $0,%eax
movl %ecx,24(%ebx)
.L016aw_end:
popl %edi
popl %esi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
ret
#endif
#endif // defined(__i386__) && defined(_WIN32)
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__ELF__)
.section .note.GNU-stack,"",%progbits
#endif
@@ -101,26 +101,7 @@ void BN_free(BIGNUM *bn) {
}
void BN_clear_free(BIGNUM *bn) {
char should_free;
if (bn == NULL) {
return;
}
if (bn->d != NULL) {
if ((bn->flags & BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA) == 0) {
OPENSSL_free(bn->d);
} else {
OPENSSL_cleanse(bn->d, bn->dmax * sizeof(bn->d[0]));
}
}
should_free = (bn->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED) != 0;
if (should_free) {
OPENSSL_free(bn);
} else {
OPENSSL_cleanse(bn, sizeof(BIGNUM));
}
BN_free(bn);
}
BIGNUM *BN_dup(const BIGNUM *src) {
@@ -302,6 +283,18 @@ int bn_set_words(BIGNUM *bn, const BN_ULONG *words, size_t num) {
return 1;
}
void bn_set_static_words(BIGNUM *bn, const BN_ULONG *words, size_t num) {
if ((bn->flags & BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA) == 0) {
OPENSSL_free(bn->d);
}
bn->d = (BN_ULONG *)words;
bn->width = num;
bn->dmax = num;
bn->neg = 0;
bn->flags |= BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA;
}
int bn_fits_in_words(const BIGNUM *bn, size_t num) {
// All words beyond |num| must be zero.
BN_ULONG mask = 0;
@@ -64,10 +64,10 @@
#include "internal.h"
#if !defined(BN_CAN_DIVIDE_ULLONG) && !defined(BN_CAN_USE_INLINE_ASM)
// bn_div_words divides a double-width |h|,|l| by |d| and returns the result,
// which must fit in a |BN_ULONG|.
static BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d) {
OPENSSL_UNUSED static BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l,
BN_ULONG d) {
BN_ULONG dh, dl, q, ret = 0, th, tl, t;
int i, count = 2;
@@ -135,7 +135,6 @@ static BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d) {
ret |= q;
return ret;
}
#endif // !defined(BN_CAN_DIVIDE_ULLONG) && !defined(BN_CAN_USE_INLINE_ASM)
static inline void bn_div_rem_words(BN_ULONG *quotient_out, BN_ULONG *rem_out,
BN_ULONG n0, BN_ULONG n1, BN_ULONG d0) {
@@ -286,8 +285,10 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *quotient, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *numerator,
// pointer to the 'top' of snum
wnump = &(snum->d[num_n - 1]);
// Setup to 'res'
res->neg = (numerator->neg ^ divisor->neg);
// Setup |res|. |numerator| and |res| may alias, so we save |numerator->neg|
// for later.
const int numerator_neg = numerator->neg;
res->neg = (numerator_neg ^ divisor->neg);
if (!bn_wexpand(res, loop + 1)) {
goto err;
}
@@ -380,14 +381,11 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *quotient, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *numerator,
bn_set_minimal_width(snum);
if (rem != NULL) {
// Keep a copy of the neg flag in numerator because if |rem| == |numerator|
// |BN_rshift| will overwrite it.
int neg = numerator->neg;
if (!BN_rshift(rem, snum, norm_shift)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_is_zero(rem)) {
rem->neg = neg;
rem->neg = numerator_neg;
}
}
@@ -458,7 +456,7 @@ void bn_mod_add_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
int bn_div_consttime(BIGNUM *quotient, BIGNUM *remainder,
const BIGNUM *numerator, const BIGNUM *divisor,
BN_CTX *ctx) {
unsigned divisor_min_bits, BN_CTX *ctx) {
if (BN_is_negative(numerator) || BN_is_negative(divisor)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NEGATIVE_NUMBER);
return 0;
@@ -498,8 +496,26 @@ int bn_div_consttime(BIGNUM *quotient, BIGNUM *remainder,
r->neg = 0;
// Incorporate |numerator| into |r|, one bit at a time, reducing after each
// step. At the start of each loop iteration, |r| < |divisor|
for (int i = numerator->width - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
// step. We maintain the invariant that |0 <= r < divisor| and
// |q * divisor + r = n| where |n| is the portion of |numerator| incorporated
// so far.
//
// First, we short-circuit the loop: if we know |divisor| has at least
// |divisor_min_bits| bits, the top |divisor_min_bits - 1| can be incorporated
// without reductions. This significantly speeds up |RSA_check_key|. For
// simplicity, we round down to a whole number of words.
assert(divisor_min_bits <= BN_num_bits(divisor));
int initial_words = 0;
if (divisor_min_bits > 0) {
initial_words = (divisor_min_bits - 1) / BN_BITS2;
if (initial_words > numerator->width) {
initial_words = numerator->width;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(r->d, numerator->d + numerator->width - initial_words,
initial_words * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
}
for (int i = numerator->width - initial_words - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
for (int bit = BN_BITS2 - 1; bit >= 0; bit--) {
// Incorporate the next bit of the numerator, by computing
// r = 2*r or 2*r + 1. Note the result fits in one more word. We store the
@@ -157,10 +157,11 @@ int bn_lcm_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) {
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
unsigned shift;
BIGNUM *gcd = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
int ret = gcd != NULL &&
int ret = gcd != NULL && //
bn_mul_consttime(r, a, b, ctx) &&
bn_gcd_consttime(gcd, &shift, a, b, ctx) &&
bn_div_consttime(r, NULL, r, gcd, ctx) &&
// |gcd| has a secret bit width.
bn_div_consttime(r, NULL, r, gcd, /*divisor_min_bits=*/0, ctx) &&
bn_rshift_secret_shift(r, r, shift, ctx);
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return ret;
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@
#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_BN_INTERNAL_H
#define OPENSSL_HEADER_BN_INTERNAL_H
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_base.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_bn.h>
#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && defined(_MSC_VER)
OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(push, 3))
@@ -241,6 +241,14 @@ void bn_select_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG mask, const BN_ULONG *a,
// least significant word first.
int bn_set_words(BIGNUM *bn, const BN_ULONG *words, size_t num);
// bn_set_static_words acts like |bn_set_words|, but doesn't copy the data. A
// flag is set on |bn| so that |BN_free| won't attempt to free the data.
//
// The |STATIC_BIGNUM| macro is probably a better solution for this outside of
// the FIPS module. Inside of the FIPS module that macro generates rel.ro data,
// which doesn't work with FIPS requirements.
void bn_set_static_words(BIGNUM *bn, const BN_ULONG *words, size_t num);
// bn_fits_in_words returns one if |bn| may be represented in |num| words, plus
// a sign bit, and zero otherwise.
int bn_fits_in_words(const BIGNUM *bn, size_t num);
@@ -289,7 +297,7 @@ void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG r[8], const BN_ULONG a[4], const BN_ULONG b[4]);
void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG r[16], const BN_ULONG a[8], const BN_ULONG b[8]);
// bn_sqr_comba8 sets |r| to |a|^2.
void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG r[16], const BN_ULONG a[4]);
void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG r[16], const BN_ULONG a[8]);
// bn_sqr_comba4 sets |r| to |a|^2.
void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG r[8], const BN_ULONG a[4]);
@@ -544,12 +552,15 @@ int bn_sqr_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx);
// bn_div_consttime behaves like |BN_div|, but it rejects negative inputs and
// treats both inputs, including their magnitudes, as secret. It is, as a
// result, much slower than |BN_div| and should only be used for rare operations
// where Montgomery reduction is not available.
// where Montgomery reduction is not available. |divisor_min_bits| is a
// public lower bound for |BN_num_bits(divisor)|. When |divisor|'s bit width is
// public, this can speed up the operation.
//
// Note that |quotient->width| will be set pessimally to |numerator->width|.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_div_consttime(BIGNUM *quotient, BIGNUM *remainder,
const BIGNUM *numerator,
const BIGNUM *divisor, BN_CTX *ctx);
const BIGNUM *divisor,
unsigned divisor_min_bits, BN_CTX *ctx);
// bn_is_relatively_prime checks whether GCD(|x|, |y|) is one. On success, it
// returns one and sets |*out_relatively_prime| to one if the GCD was one and
@@ -115,10 +115,6 @@
#include "../../internal.h"
// The quick sieve algorithm approach to weeding out primes is Philip
// Zimmermann's, as implemented in PGP. I have had a read of his comments and
// implemented my own version.
// kPrimes contains the first 1024 primes.
static const uint16_t kPrimes[] = {
2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37,
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_cipher.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_err.h>
@@ -224,7 +225,6 @@ int EVP_CipherInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
ctx->buf_len = 0;
ctx->final_used = 0;
ctx->block_mask = ctx->cipher->block_size - 1;
return 1;
}
@@ -238,16 +238,31 @@ int EVP_DecryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
return EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, impl, key, iv, 0);
}
// block_remainder returns the number of bytes to remove from |len| to get a
// multiple of |ctx|'s block size.
static int block_remainder(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int len) {
// |block_size| must be a power of two.
assert(ctx->cipher->block_size != 0);
assert((ctx->cipher->block_size & (ctx->cipher->block_size - 1)) == 0);
return len & (ctx->cipher->block_size - 1);
}
int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, int *out_len,
const uint8_t *in, int in_len) {
int i, j, bl;
// Ciphers that use blocks may write up to |bl| extra bytes. Ensure the output
// does not overflow |*out_len|.
int bl = ctx->cipher->block_size;
if (bl > 1 && in_len > INT_MAX - bl) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
return 0;
}
if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {
i = ctx->cipher->cipher(ctx, out, in, in_len);
if (i < 0) {
int ret = ctx->cipher->cipher(ctx, out, in, in_len);
if (ret < 0) {
return 0;
} else {
*out_len = i;
*out_len = ret;
}
return 1;
}
@@ -257,7 +272,7 @@ int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, int *out_len,
return in_len == 0;
}
if (ctx->buf_len == 0 && (in_len & ctx->block_mask) == 0) {
if (ctx->buf_len == 0 && block_remainder(ctx, in_len) == 0) {
if (ctx->cipher->cipher(ctx, out, in, in_len)) {
*out_len = in_len;
return 1;
@@ -267,8 +282,7 @@ int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, int *out_len,
}
}
i = ctx->buf_len;
bl = ctx->cipher->block_size;
int i = ctx->buf_len;
assert(bl <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf));
if (i != 0) {
if (bl - i > in_len) {
@@ -277,7 +291,7 @@ int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, int *out_len,
*out_len = 0;
return 1;
} else {
j = bl - i;
int j = bl - i;
OPENSSL_memcpy(&ctx->buf[i], in, j);
if (!ctx->cipher->cipher(ctx, out, ctx->buf, bl)) {
return 0;
@@ -291,7 +305,7 @@ int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, int *out_len,
*out_len = 0;
}
i = in_len & ctx->block_mask;
i = block_remainder(ctx, in_len);
in_len -= i;
if (in_len > 0) {
if (!ctx->cipher->cipher(ctx, out, in, in_len)) {
@@ -353,8 +367,13 @@ int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, int *out_len) {
int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, int *out_len,
const uint8_t *in, int in_len) {
int fix_len;
unsigned int b;
// Ciphers that use blocks may write up to |bl| extra bytes. Ensure the output
// does not overflow |*out_len|.
unsigned int b = ctx->cipher->block_size;
if (b > 1 && in_len > INT_MAX - (int)b) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
return 0;
}
if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {
int r = ctx->cipher->cipher(ctx, out, in, in_len);
@@ -376,15 +395,12 @@ int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, int *out_len,
return EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, out_len, in, in_len);
}
b = ctx->cipher->block_size;
assert(b <= sizeof(ctx->final));
int fix_len = 0;
if (ctx->final_used) {
OPENSSL_memcpy(out, ctx->final, b);
out += b;
fix_len = 1;
} else {
fix_len = 0;
}
if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, out_len, in, in_len)) {
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@
OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(push))
OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(disable: 4702)) // Unreachable code.
#define AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH 12
#if defined(BSAES)
static void vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks_with_bsaes(const uint8_t *in,
uint8_t *out, size_t blocks,
@@ -139,10 +141,22 @@ typedef struct {
static int aes_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
const uint8_t *iv, int enc) {
int ret, mode;
int ret;
EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *)ctx->cipher_data;
const int mode = ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_MODE_MASK;
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) {
switch (ctx->key_len) {
case 16:
boringssl_fips_inc_counter(fips_counter_evp_aes_128_ctr);
break;
case 32:
boringssl_fips_inc_counter(fips_counter_evp_aes_256_ctr);
break;
}
}
mode = ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_MODE_MASK;
if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) && !enc) {
if (hwaes_capable()) {
ret = aes_hw_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks);
@@ -351,6 +365,17 @@ static int aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
if (!iv && !key) {
return 1;
}
switch (ctx->key_len) {
case 16:
boringssl_fips_inc_counter(fips_counter_evp_aes_128_gcm);
break;
case 32:
boringssl_fips_inc_counter(fips_counter_evp_aes_256_gcm);
break;
}
if (key) {
OPENSSL_memset(&gctx->gcm, 0, sizeof(gctx->gcm));
gctx->ctr = aes_ctr_set_key(&gctx->ks.ks, &gctx->gcm.gcm_key, NULL, key,
@@ -630,7 +655,7 @@ DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_128_gcm_generic) {
out->nid = NID_aes_128_gcm;
out->block_size = 1;
out->key_len = 16;
out->iv_len = 12;
out->iv_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) + EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING;
out->flags = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY |
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT |
@@ -698,7 +723,7 @@ DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_192_gcm_generic) {
out->nid = NID_aes_192_gcm;
out->block_size = 1;
out->key_len = 24;
out->iv_len = 12;
out->iv_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) + EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING;
out->flags = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY |
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT |
@@ -766,7 +791,7 @@ DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_256_gcm_generic) {
out->nid = NID_aes_256_gcm;
out->block_size = 1;
out->key_len = 32;
out->iv_len = 12;
out->iv_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) + EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING;
out->flags = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY |
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT |
@@ -931,21 +956,19 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
static void aead_aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {}
static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len,
size_t max_out_tag_len,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *extra_in,
size_t extra_in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *) &ctx->state;
if (extra_in_len + ctx->tag_len < ctx->tag_len) {
static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_impl(
const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx,
uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *extra_in, size_t extra_in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len,
size_t tag_len) {
if (extra_in_len + tag_len < tag_len) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
if (max_out_tag_len < extra_in_len + ctx->tag_len) {
if (max_out_tag_len < extra_in_len + tag_len) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
@@ -989,18 +1012,35 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
}
}
CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, out_tag + extra_in_len, ctx->tag_len);
*out_tag_len = ctx->tag_len + extra_in_len;
CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, out_tag + extra_in_len, tag_len);
*out_tag_len = tag_len + extra_in_len;
return 1;
}
static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *) &ctx->state;
static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len,
size_t max_out_tag_len,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *extra_in,
size_t extra_in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx =
(const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
return aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_impl(
gcm_ctx, out, out_tag, out_tag_len, max_out_tag_len, nonce, nonce_len, in,
in_len, extra_in, extra_in_len, ad, ad_len, ctx->tag_len);
}
static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_impl(const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx,
uint8_t *out,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *in_tag,
size_t in_tag_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len,
size_t tag_len) {
uint8_t tag[EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN];
if (nonce_len == 0) {
@@ -1008,7 +1048,7 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
return 0;
}
if (in_tag_len != ctx->tag_len) {
if (in_tag_len != tag_len) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return 0;
}
@@ -1035,8 +1075,8 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
}
}
CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, tag, ctx->tag_len);
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in_tag, ctx->tag_len) != 0) {
CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, tag, tag_len);
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in_tag, tag_len) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return 0;
}
@@ -1044,11 +1084,22 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
return 1;
}
static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
return aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_impl(gcm_ctx, out, nonce, nonce_len, in,
in_len, in_tag, in_tag_len, ad, ad_len,
ctx->tag_len);
}
DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
out->key_len = 16;
out->nonce_len = 12;
out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1063,7 +1114,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_192_gcm) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
out->key_len = 24;
out->nonce_len = 12;
out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1078,7 +1129,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
out->key_len = 32;
out->nonce_len = 12;
out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1089,6 +1140,116 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm) {
out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather;
}
static int aead_aes_gcm_init_randnonce(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
size_t key_len,
size_t requested_tag_len) {
if (requested_tag_len != EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH) {
if (requested_tag_len < AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
requested_tag_len -= AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
}
if (!aead_aes_gcm_init(ctx, key, key_len, requested_tag_len)) {
return 0;
}
ctx->tag_len += AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
return 1;
}
static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_randnonce(
const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len,
const uint8_t *external_nonce, size_t external_nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *extra_in, size_t extra_in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
if (external_nonce_len != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
uint8_t nonce[AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH];
if (max_out_tag_len < sizeof(nonce)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
RAND_bytes(nonce, sizeof(nonce));
const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx =
(const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
if (!aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_impl(gcm_ctx, out, out_tag, out_tag_len,
max_out_tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH,
nonce, sizeof(nonce), in, in_len,
extra_in, extra_in_len, ad, ad_len,
ctx->tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH)) {
return 0;
}
assert(*out_tag_len + sizeof(nonce) <= max_out_tag_len);
memcpy(out_tag + *out_tag_len, nonce, sizeof(nonce));
*out_tag_len += sizeof(nonce);
return 1;
}
static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_randnonce(
const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
const uint8_t *external_nonce, size_t external_nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
if (external_nonce_len != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
if (in_tag_len < AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return 0;
}
const uint8_t *nonce = in_tag + in_tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx =
(const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
return aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_impl(
gcm_ctx, out, nonce, AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH, in, in_len, in_tag,
in_tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH, ad, ad_len,
ctx->tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH);
}
DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_randnonce) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
out->key_len = 16;
out->nonce_len = 0;
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
out->init = aead_aes_gcm_init_randnonce;
out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup;
out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_randnonce;
out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_randnonce;
}
DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_randnonce) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
out->key_len = 32;
out->nonce_len = 0;
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
out->init = aead_aes_gcm_init_randnonce;
out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup;
out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_randnonce;
out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_randnonce;
}
struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx {
struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx gcm_ctx;
uint64_t min_next_nonce;
@@ -1128,7 +1289,7 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_tls12_seal_scatter(
struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx *gcm_ctx =
(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx *) &ctx->state;
if (nonce_len != 12) {
if (nonce_len != AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
@@ -1155,7 +1316,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_tls12) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
out->key_len = 16;
out->nonce_len = 12;
out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1170,7 +1331,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_tls12) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
out->key_len = 32;
out->nonce_len = 12;
out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1223,7 +1384,7 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_tls13_seal_scatter(
struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx *gcm_ctx =
(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx *) &ctx->state;
if (nonce_len != 12) {
if (nonce_len != AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
@@ -1261,7 +1422,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_tls13) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
out->key_len = 16;
out->nonce_len = 12;
out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1276,7 +1437,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_tls13) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
out->key_len = 32;
out->nonce_len = 12;
out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
@@ -60,17 +60,16 @@
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_bn.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_err.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_ex_data.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_digest.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_mem.h>
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_thread.h>
#include "../internal.h"
#include "../../internal.h"
#include "../bn/internal.h"
#define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT;
DH *DH_new(void) {
DH *dh = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DH));
if (dh == NULL) {
@@ -83,7 +82,6 @@ DH *DH_new(void) {
CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&dh->method_mont_p_lock);
dh->references = 1;
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&dh->ex_data);
return dh;
}
@@ -97,8 +95,6 @@ void DH_free(DH *dh) {
return;
}
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, dh, &dh->ex_data);
BN_MONT_CTX_free(dh->method_mont_p);
BN_clear_free(dh->p);
BN_clear_free(dh->g);
@@ -189,120 +185,6 @@ int DH_set_length(DH *dh, unsigned priv_length) {
return 1;
}
int DH_generate_parameters_ex(DH *dh, int prime_bits, int generator, BN_GENCB *cb) {
// We generate DH parameters as follows
// find a prime q which is prime_bits/2 bits long.
// p=(2*q)+1 or (p-1)/2 = q
// For this case, g is a generator if
// g^((p-1)/q) mod p != 1 for values of q which are the factors of p-1.
// Since the factors of p-1 are q and 2, we just need to check
// g^2 mod p != 1 and g^q mod p != 1.
//
// Having said all that,
// there is another special case method for the generators 2, 3 and 5.
// for 2, p mod 24 == 11
// for 3, p mod 12 == 5 <<<<< does not work for safe primes.
// for 5, p mod 10 == 3 or 7
//
// Thanks to Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com> for the pointers about the
// special generators and for answering some of my questions.
//
// I've implemented the second simple method :-).
// Since DH should be using a safe prime (both p and q are prime),
// this generator function can take a very very long time to run.
// Actually there is no reason to insist that 'generator' be a generator.
// It's just as OK (and in some sense better) to use a generator of the
// order-q subgroup.
BIGNUM *t1, *t2;
int g, ok = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL) {
goto err;
}
// Make sure |dh| has the necessary elements
if (dh->p == NULL) {
dh->p = BN_new();
if (dh->p == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
if (dh->g == NULL) {
dh->g = BN_new();
if (dh->g == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
if (generator <= 1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR);
goto err;
}
if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_2) {
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 24)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 11)) {
goto err;
}
g = 2;
} else if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_5) {
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 10)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 3)) {
goto err;
}
// BN_set_word(t3,7); just have to miss
// out on these ones :-(
g = 5;
} else {
// in the general case, don't worry if 'generator' is a
// generator or not: since we are using safe primes,
// it will generate either an order-q or an order-2q group,
// which both is OK
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 2)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 1)) {
goto err;
}
g = generator;
}
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(dh->p, prime_bits, 1, t1, t2, cb)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(dh->g, g)) {
goto err;
}
ok = 1;
err:
if (!ok) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
}
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
return ok;
}
int DH_generate_key(DH *dh) {
int ok = 0;
int generate_new_key = 0;
@@ -390,56 +272,127 @@ err:
return ok;
}
int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *out, const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) {
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *shared_key;
int ret = -1;
int check_result;
static int dh_compute_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *out_shared_key,
const BIGNUM *peers_key, BN_CTX *ctx) {
if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
goto err;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
shared_key = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (shared_key == NULL) {
goto err;
return 0;
}
if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE);
goto err;
return 0;
}
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, &dh->method_mont_p_lock,
int check_result;
if (!DH_check_pub_key(dh, peers_key, &check_result) || check_result) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY);
return 0;
}
int ret = 0;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
BIGNUM *p_minus_1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (!p_minus_1 ||
!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, &dh->method_mont_p_lock,
dh->p, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
if (!DH_check_pub_key(dh, peers_key, &check_result) || check_result) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY);
goto err;
}
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(shared_key, peers_key, dh->priv_key, dh->p,
ctx, dh->method_mont_p)) {
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(out_shared_key, peers_key, dh->priv_key, dh->p,
ctx, dh->method_mont_p) ||
!BN_copy(p_minus_1, dh->p) ||
!BN_sub_word(p_minus_1, 1)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret = BN_bn2bin(shared_key, out);
err:
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
// This performs the check required by SP 800-56Ar3 section 5.7.1.1 step two.
if (BN_cmp_word(out_shared_key, 1) <= 0 ||
BN_cmp(out_shared_key, p_minus_1) == 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY);
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return ret;
}
int DH_compute_key_padded(unsigned char *out, const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) {
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
return -1;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
int dh_size = DH_size(dh);
int ret = -1;
BIGNUM *shared_key = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (shared_key &&
dh_compute_key(dh, shared_key, peers_key, ctx) &&
BN_bn2bin_padded(out, dh_size, shared_key)) {
ret = dh_size;
}
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *out, const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) {
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
return -1;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
int ret = -1;
BIGNUM *shared_key = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (shared_key && dh_compute_key(dh, shared_key, peers_key, ctx)) {
ret = BN_bn2bin(shared_key, out);
}
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
int DH_compute_key_hashed(DH *dh, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
size_t max_out_len, const BIGNUM *peers_key,
const EVP_MD *digest) {
*out_len = (size_t)-1;
const size_t digest_len = EVP_MD_size(digest);
if (digest_len > max_out_len) {
return 0;
}
int ret = 0;
const size_t dh_len = DH_size(dh);
uint8_t *shared_bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(dh_len);
unsigned out_len_unsigned;
if (!shared_bytes ||
// SP 800-56A is ambiguous about whether the output should be padded prior
// to revision three. But revision three, section C.1, awkwardly specifies
// padding to the length of p.
//
// Also, padded output avoids side-channels, so is always strongly
// advisable.
DH_compute_key_padded(shared_bytes, peers_key, dh) != (int)dh_len ||
!EVP_Digest(shared_bytes, dh_len, out, &out_len_unsigned, digest, NULL) ||
out_len_unsigned != digest_len) {
goto err;
}
*out_len = digest_len;
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(shared_bytes);
return ret;
}
@@ -452,82 +405,52 @@ int DH_up_ref(DH *dh) {
return 1;
}
static int int_dh_bn_cpy(BIGNUM **dst, const BIGNUM *src) {
BIGNUM *a = NULL;
DH *DH_get_rfc7919_2048(void) {
// This is the prime from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7919#appendix-A.1,
// which is specifically approved for FIPS in appendix D of SP 800-56Ar3.
static const BN_ULONG kFFDHE2048Data[] = {
TOBN(0xffffffff, 0xffffffff), TOBN(0x886b4238, 0x61285c97),
TOBN(0xc6f34a26, 0xc1b2effa), TOBN(0xc58ef183, 0x7d1683b2),
TOBN(0x3bb5fcbc, 0x2ec22005), TOBN(0xc3fe3b1b, 0x4c6fad73),
TOBN(0x8e4f1232, 0xeef28183), TOBN(0x9172fe9c, 0xe98583ff),
TOBN(0xc03404cd, 0x28342f61), TOBN(0x9e02fce1, 0xcdf7e2ec),
TOBN(0x0b07a7c8, 0xee0a6d70), TOBN(0xae56ede7, 0x6372bb19),
TOBN(0x1d4f42a3, 0xde394df4), TOBN(0xb96adab7, 0x60d7f468),
TOBN(0xd108a94b, 0xb2c8e3fb), TOBN(0xbc0ab182, 0xb324fb61),
TOBN(0x30acca4f, 0x483a797a), TOBN(0x1df158a1, 0x36ade735),
TOBN(0xe2a689da, 0xf3efe872), TOBN(0x984f0c70, 0xe0e68b77),
TOBN(0xb557135e, 0x7f57c935), TOBN(0x85636555, 0x3ded1af3),
TOBN(0x2433f51f, 0x5f066ed0), TOBN(0xd3df1ed5, 0xd5fd6561),
TOBN(0xf681b202, 0xaec4617a), TOBN(0x7d2fe363, 0x630c75d8),
TOBN(0xcc939dce, 0x249b3ef9), TOBN(0xa9e13641, 0x146433fb),
TOBN(0xd8b9c583, 0xce2d3695), TOBN(0xafdc5620, 0x273d3cf1),
TOBN(0xadf85458, 0xa2bb4a9a), TOBN(0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
};
if (src) {
a = BN_dup(src);
if (!a) {
return 0;
}
BIGNUM *const ffdhe2048_p = BN_new();
BIGNUM *const ffdhe2048_q = BN_new();
BIGNUM *const ffdhe2048_g = BN_new();
DH *const dh = DH_new();
if (!ffdhe2048_p || !ffdhe2048_q || !ffdhe2048_g || !dh) {
goto err;
}
BN_free(*dst);
*dst = a;
return 1;
}
bn_set_static_words(ffdhe2048_p, kFFDHE2048Data,
OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kFFDHE2048Data));
static int int_dh_param_copy(DH *to, const DH *from, int is_x942) {
if (is_x942 == -1) {
is_x942 = !!from->q;
}
if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->p, from->p) ||
!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->g, from->g)) {
return 0;
if (!BN_rshift1(ffdhe2048_q, ffdhe2048_p) ||
!BN_set_word(ffdhe2048_g, 2) ||
!DH_set0_pqg(dh, ffdhe2048_p, ffdhe2048_q, ffdhe2048_g)) {
goto err;
}
if (!is_x942) {
return 1;
}
return dh;
if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->q, from->q) ||
!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->j, from->j)) {
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(to->seed);
to->seed = NULL;
to->seedlen = 0;
if (from->seed) {
to->seed = OPENSSL_memdup(from->seed, from->seedlen);
if (!to->seed) {
return 0;
}
to->seedlen = from->seedlen;
}
return 1;
}
DH *DHparams_dup(const DH *dh) {
DH *ret = DH_new();
if (!ret) {
err:
BN_free(ffdhe2048_p);
BN_free(ffdhe2048_q);
BN_free(ffdhe2048_g);
DH_free(dh);
return NULL;
}
if (!int_dh_param_copy(ret, dh, -1)) {
DH_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
int DH_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
int index;
if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
free_func)) {
return -1;
}
return index;
}
int DH_set_ex_data(DH *d, int idx, void *arg) {
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx, arg);
}
void *DH_get_ex_data(DH *d, int idx) {
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx);
}
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@
int EVP_MD_type(const EVP_MD *md) { return md->type; }
int EVP_MD_nid(const EVP_MD *md) { return EVP_MD_type(md); }
uint32_t EVP_MD_flags(const EVP_MD *md) { return md->flags; }
size_t EVP_MD_size(const EVP_MD *md) { return md->md_size; }
@@ -122,6 +124,8 @@ int EVP_DigestFinalXOF(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t len) {
uint32_t EVP_MD_meth_get_flags(const EVP_MD *md) { return EVP_MD_flags(md); }
void EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int flags) {}
int EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in) {
// |in->digest| may be NULL if this is a signing |EVP_MD_CTX| for, e.g.,
// Ed25519 which does not hash with |EVP_MD_CTX|.
@@ -175,6 +179,13 @@ int EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in) {
return 1;
}
void EVP_MD_CTX_move(EVP_MD_CTX *out, EVP_MD_CTX *in) {
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(out);
// While not guaranteed, |EVP_MD_CTX| is currently safe to move with |memcpy|.
OPENSSL_memcpy(out, in, sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX));
EVP_MD_CTX_init(in);
}
int EVP_MD_CTX_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in) {
EVP_MD_CTX_init(out);
return EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(out, in);
@@ -247,13 +247,21 @@ static void sha512_256_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) {
CHECK(SHA512_256_Init(ctx->md_data));
}
static void sha512_256_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) {
CHECK(SHA512_256_Update(ctx->md_data, data, count));
}
static void sha512_256_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *md) {
CHECK(SHA512_256_Final(md, ctx->md_data));
}
DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_MD, EVP_sha512_256) {
out->type = NID_sha512_256;
out->md_size = SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
out->flags = 0;
out->init = sha512_256_init;
out->update = sha512_update;
out->final = sha512_final;
out->update = sha512_256_update;
out->final = sha512_256_final;
out->block_size = 128;
out->ctx_size = sizeof(SHA512_CTX);
}
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ==================================================================== */
#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_DIGEST_MD32_COMMON_H
#define OPENSSL_HEADER_DIGEST_MD32_COMMON_H
#include <CCryptoBoringSSL_base.h>
#include <assert.h>
@@ -59,22 +62,15 @@ extern "C" {
// This is a generic 32-bit "collector" for message digest algorithms. It
// collects input character stream into chunks of 32-bit values and invokes the
// block function that performs the actual hash calculations. To make use of
// this mechanism, the following macros must be defined before including
// md32_common.h.
// block function that performs the actual hash calculations.
//
// One of |DATA_ORDER_IS_BIG_ENDIAN| or |DATA_ORDER_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN| must be
// defined to specify the byte order of the input stream.
//
// |HASH_CBLOCK| must be defined as the integer block size, in bytes.
//
// |HASH_CTX| must be defined as the name of the context structure, which must
// have at least the following members:
// To make use of this mechanism, the hash context should be defined with the
// following parameters.
//
// typedef struct <name>_state_st {
// uint32_t h[<chaining length> / sizeof(uint32_t)];
// uint32_t Nl, Nh;
// uint8_t data[HASH_CBLOCK];
// uint8_t data[<block size>];
// unsigned num;
// ...
// } <NAME>_CTX;
@@ -83,186 +79,117 @@ extern "C" {
// any truncation (e.g. 64 for SHA-224 and SHA-256, 128 for SHA-384 and
// SHA-512).
//
// |HASH_UPDATE| must be defined as the name of the "Update" function to
// generate.
//
// |HASH_TRANSFORM| must be defined as the the name of the "Transform"
// function to generate.
//
// |HASH_FINAL| must be defined as the name of "Final" function to generate.
//
// |HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER| must be defined as the name of the "Block" function.
// That function must be implemented manually. It must be capable of operating
// on *unaligned* input data in its original (data) byte order. It must have
// this signature:
//
// void HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER(uint32_t *state, const uint8_t *data,
// size_t num);
//
// It must update the hash state |state| with |num| blocks of data from |data|,
// where each block is |HASH_CBLOCK| bytes; i.e. |data| points to a array of
// |HASH_CBLOCK * num| bytes. |state| points to the |h| member of a |HASH_CTX|,
// and so will have |<chaining length> / sizeof(uint32_t)| elements.
//
// |HASH_MAKE_STRING(c, s)| must be defined as a block statement that converts
// the hash state |c->h| into the output byte order, storing the result in |s|.
// |h| is the hash state and is updated by a function of type
// |crypto_md32_block_func|. |data| is the partial unprocessed block and has
// |num| bytes. |Nl| and |Nh| maintain the number of bits processed so far.
#if !defined(DATA_ORDER_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) && !defined(DATA_ORDER_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
#error "DATA_ORDER must be defined!"
#endif
#ifndef HASH_CBLOCK
#error "HASH_CBLOCK must be defined!"
#endif
#ifndef HASH_CTX
#error "HASH_CTX must be defined!"
#endif
#ifndef HASH_UPDATE
#error "HASH_UPDATE must be defined!"
#endif
#ifndef HASH_TRANSFORM
#error "HASH_TRANSFORM must be defined!"
#endif
#ifndef HASH_FINAL
#error "HASH_FINAL must be defined!"
#endif
#ifndef HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER
#error "HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER must be defined!"
#endif
#ifndef HASH_MAKE_STRING
#error "HASH_MAKE_STRING must be defined!"
#endif
#if defined(DATA_ORDER_IS_BIG_ENDIAN)
#define HOST_c2l(c, l) \
do { \
(l) = (((uint32_t)(*((c)++))) << 24); \
(l) |= (((uint32_t)(*((c)++))) << 16); \
(l) |= (((uint32_t)(*((c)++))) << 8); \
(l) |= (((uint32_t)(*((c)++)))); \
} while (0)
#define HOST_l2c(l, c) \
do { \
*((c)++) = (uint8_t)(((l) >> 24) & 0xff); \
*((c)++) = (uint8_t)(((l) >> 16) & 0xff); \
*((c)++) = (uint8_t)(((l) >> 8) & 0xff); \
*((c)++) = (uint8_t)(((l)) & 0xff); \
} while (0)
#elif defined(DATA_ORDER_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
#define HOST_c2l(c, l) \
do { \
(l) = (((uint32_t)(*((c)++)))); \
(l) |= (((uint32_t)(*((c)++))) << 8); \
(l) |= (((uint32_t)(*((c)++))) << 16); \
(l) |= (((uint32_t)(*((c)++))) << 24); \
} while (0)
#define HOST_l2c(l, c) \
do { \
*((c)++) = (uint8_t)(((l)) & 0xff); \
*((c)++) = (uint8_t)(((l) >> 8) & 0xff); \
*((c)++) = (uint8_t)(((l) >> 16) & 0xff); \
*((c)++) = (uint8_t)(((l) >> 24) & 0xff); \
} while (0)
#endif // DATA_ORDER
int HASH_UPDATE(HASH_CTX *c, const void *data_, size_t len) {
const uint8_t *data = data_;
// A crypto_md32_block_func should incorporate |num_blocks| of input from |data|
// into |state|. It is assumed the caller has sized |state| and |data| for the
// hash function.
typedef void (*crypto_md32_block_func)(uint32_t *state, const uint8_t *data,
size_t num_blocks);
// crypto_md32_update adds |len| bytes from |in| to the digest. |data| must be a
// buffer of length |block_size| with the first |*num| bytes containing a
// partial block. This function combines the partial block with |in| and
// incorporates any complete blocks into the digest state |h|. It then updates
// |data| and |*num| with the new partial block and updates |*Nh| and |*Nl| with
// the data consumed.
static inline void crypto_md32_update(crypto_md32_block_func block_func,
uint32_t *h, uint8_t *data,
size_t block_size, unsigned *num,
uint32_t *Nh, uint32_t *Nl,
const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
if (len == 0) {
return 1;
return;
}
uint32_t l = c->Nl + (((uint32_t)len) << 3);
if (l < c->Nl) {
uint32_t l = *Nl + (((uint32_t)len) << 3);
if (l < *Nl) {
// Handle carries.
c->Nh++;
(*Nh)++;
}
c->Nh += (uint32_t)(len >> 29);
c->Nl = l;
*Nh += (uint32_t)(len >> 29);
*Nl = l;
size_t n = c->num;
size_t n = *num;
if (n != 0) {
if (len >= HASH_CBLOCK || len + n >= HASH_CBLOCK) {
OPENSSL_memcpy(c->data + n, data, HASH_CBLOCK - n);
HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER(c->h, c->data, 1);
n = HASH_CBLOCK - n;
data += n;
if (len >= block_size || len + n >= block_size) {
OPENSSL_memcpy(data + n, in, block_size - n);
block_func(h, data, 1);
n = block_size - n;
in += n;
len -= n;
c->num = 0;
// Keep |c->data| zeroed when unused.
OPENSSL_memset(c->data, 0, HASH_CBLOCK);
*num = 0;
// Keep |data| zeroed when unused.
OPENSSL_memset(data, 0, block_size);
} else {
OPENSSL_memcpy(c->data + n, data, len);
c->num += (unsigned)len;
return 1;
OPENSSL_memcpy(data + n, in, len);
*num += (unsigned)len;
return;
}
}
n = len / HASH_CBLOCK;
n = len / block_size;
if (n > 0) {
HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER(c->h, data, n);
n *= HASH_CBLOCK;
data += n;
block_func(h, in, n);
n *= block_size;
in += n;
len -= n;
}
if (len != 0) {
c->num = (unsigned)len;
OPENSSL_memcpy(c->data, data, len);
*num = (unsigned)len;
OPENSSL_memcpy(data, in, len);
}
return 1;
}
void HASH_TRANSFORM(HASH_CTX *c, const uint8_t data[HASH_CBLOCK]) {
HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER(c->h, data, 1);
}
int HASH_FINAL(uint8_t out[HASH_DIGEST_LENGTH], HASH_CTX *c) {
// |c->data| always has room for at least one byte. A full block would have
// crypto_md32_final incorporates the partial block and trailing length into the
// digest state |h|. The trailing length is encoded in little-endian if
// |is_big_endian| is zero and big-endian otherwise. |data| must be a buffer of
// length |block_size| with the first |*num| bytes containing a partial block.
// |Nh| and |Nl| contain the total number of bits processed. On return, this
// function clears the partial block in |data| and
// |*num|.
//
// This function does not serialize |h| into a final digest. This is the
// responsibility of the caller.
static inline void crypto_md32_final(crypto_md32_block_func block_func,
uint32_t *h, uint8_t *data,
size_t block_size, unsigned *num,
uint32_t Nh, uint32_t Nl,
int is_big_endian) {
// |data| always has room for at least one byte. A full block would have
// been consumed.
size_t n = c->num;
assert(n < HASH_CBLOCK);
c->data[n] = 0x80;
size_t n = *num;
assert(n < block_size);
data[n] = 0x80;
n++;
// Fill the block with zeros if there isn't room for a 64-bit length.
if (n > (HASH_CBLOCK - 8)) {
OPENSSL_memset(c->data + n, 0, HASH_CBLOCK - n);
if (n > block_size - 8) {
OPENSSL_memset(data + n, 0, block_size - n);
n = 0;
HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER(c->h, c->data, 1);
block_func(h, data, 1);
}
OPENSSL_memset(c->data + n, 0, HASH_CBLOCK - 8 - n);
OPENSSL_memset(data + n, 0, block_size - 8 - n);
// Append a 64-bit length to the block and process it.
uint8_t *p = c->data + HASH_CBLOCK - 8;
#if defined(DATA_ORDER_IS_BIG_ENDIAN)
HOST_l2c(c->Nh, p);
HOST_l2c(c->Nl, p);
#elif defined(DATA_ORDER_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
HOST_l2c(c->Nl, p);
HOST_l2c(c->Nh, p);
#endif
assert(p == c->data + HASH_CBLOCK);
HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER(c->h, c->data, 1);
c->num = 0;
OPENSSL_memset(c->data, 0, HASH_CBLOCK);
HASH_MAKE_STRING(c, out);
return 1;
if (is_big_endian) {
CRYPTO_store_u32_be(data + block_size - 8, Nh);
CRYPTO_store_u32_be(data + block_size - 4, Nl);
} else {
CRYPTO_store_u32_le(data + block_size - 8, Nl);
CRYPTO_store_u32_le(data + block_size - 4, Nh);
}
block_func(h, data, 1);
*num = 0;
OPENSSL_memset(data, 0, block_size);
}
#if defined(__cplusplus)
} // extern C
#endif
#endif // OPENSSL_HEADER_DIGEST_MD32_COMMON_H
@@ -797,6 +797,12 @@ int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
return 1;
}
int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group,
const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y,
BN_CTX *ctx) {
return EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx);
}
void ec_affine_to_jacobian(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *out,
const EC_AFFINE *p) {
out->X = p->X;
@@ -879,6 +885,12 @@ int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
return 1;
}
int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y,
BN_CTX *ctx) {
return EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx);
}
int EC_POINT_add(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx) {
if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group, r->group, NULL) != 0 ||
@@ -1220,6 +1232,10 @@ void ec_set_to_safe_point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *out) {
void EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(EC_GROUP *group, int flag) {}
int EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(const EC_GROUP *group) {
return OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE;
}
const EC_METHOD *EC_GROUP_method_of(const EC_GROUP *group) {
// This function exists purely to give callers a way to call
// |EC_METHOD_get_field_type|. cryptography.io crashes if |EC_GROUP_method_of|
@@ -171,7 +171,6 @@ void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *r) {
EC_GROUP_free(r->group);
EC_POINT_free(r->pub_key);
ec_wrapped_scalar_free(r->priv_key);
BN_free(r->fixed_k);
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(g_ec_ex_data_class_bss_get(), r, &r->ex_data);
@@ -440,7 +439,15 @@ int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *key) {
}
int EC_KEY_generate_key_fips(EC_KEY *eckey) {
return EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey) && EC_KEY_check_fips(eckey);
if (EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey) && EC_KEY_check_fips(eckey)) {
return 1;
}
EC_POINT_free(eckey->pub_key);
ec_wrapped_scalar_free(eckey->priv_key);
eckey->pub_key = NULL;
eckey->priv_key = NULL;
return 0;
}
int EC_KEY_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
@@ -729,10 +729,6 @@ struct ec_key_st {
EC_POINT *pub_key;
EC_WRAPPED_SCALAR *priv_key;
// fixed_k may contain a specific value of 'k', to be used in ECDSA signing.
// This is only for the FIPS power-on tests.
BIGNUM *fixed_k;
unsigned int enc_flag;
point_conversion_form_t conv_form;
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