23 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Si Beaumont 1fa43495bc Merge commit from fork
* Enforce the maxMemory limit passed to KDF.Scrypt

* Reject out-of-range scrypt parameters instead of trapping

* Reject a maxMemory that no derivation could satisfy
2026-11-19 14:45:16 +00:00
Peter KrassayandSi Beaumont 6ff0a3b147 Make _RSA.Encryption keys Sendable (#495)
Add `Sendable` conformance to `_RSA.Encryption.PublicKey` and
`_RSA.Encryption.PrivateKey`.

### Motivation:

The `_RSA.Signing` keys became `Sendable` in #211, but the encryption
keys lack the same conformance.

Fixes #494.

### Modifications:

Declare both conformances and add `testKeysAreSendable` to check them at
compile time.

### Result:

RSA encryption keys can be passed across concurrency domains.

Co-authored-by: Si Beaumont <beaumont@apple.com>
2026-11-02 09:16:43 +00:00
Si Beaumont ab0beab369 Zero temporary buffers that hold key material and reduce more allocations (#493)
### Motivation:

AES-KeyWrap unwrap, ML-KEM decapsulation, PBKDF2, and scrypt each write
the key they return into a temporary buffer, copy it into a
`SymmetricKey`, and free the buffer without zeroing it. The
`SymmetricKey` stores its copy in `SecureBytes`, which zeroes the copy
before freeing it. Nothing zeroes the original.

AES-KeyWrap and ML-KEM can write the key directly into the
`SymmetricKey`, as X-Wing already does. That removes both the buffer and
the copy. PBKDF2 and scrypt can't, because they are in CryptoExtras and
`SymmetricKey(unsafeUninitializedCapacity:initializingWith:)` is
internal to Crypto. They keep their buffer and zero it after the copy.
Moving that buffer onto the stack made them twice as slow.

### Modifications:

- Add benchmarks for AES-KeyWrap, ML-KEM, PBKDF2, and scrypt
- Unwrap AES-KeyWrap keys straight into the `SymmetricKey`
- Decapsulate ML-KEM shared secrets straight into the `SymmetricKey`.
Regenerating `MLKEM_boring.swift` from its `.gyb` also drops five
`@available` attributes that were only ever in the generated file.
- Zero the PBKDF2 and scrypt derived key buffers

### Result:

- After the call returns, no temporary buffer still contains the key.
- `AES.KeyWrap.unwrap` makes 2 allocations instead of 3 and is about 6%
faster.
- `MLKEM768.PrivateKey.decapsulate` makes 2 allocations instead of 4.
- `KDF.Insecure.PBKDF2.deriveKey` and `KDF.Scrypt.deriveKey` make the
same number of allocations and take the same time as before.

### Benchmarks:

The tables come from `swift package benchmark --metric mallocCountTotal
--metric wallClock`.

```
aes-keywrap-unwrap (before)
╒══════════════════════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╕
│ Metric                   │        p0 │       p25 │       p50 │       p75 │       p90 │       p99 │      p100 │   Samples │
╞══════════════════════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╡
│ Malloc (total) *         │         3 │         3 │         3 │         3 │         3 │         3 │         3 │         5 │
├──────────────────────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┤
│ Time (wall clock) (ns) * │       597 │       601 │       614 │       621 │       630 │       630 │       630 │         5 │
╘══════════════════════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╛

aes-keywrap-unwrap (after)
╒══════════════════════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╕
│ Metric                   │        p0 │       p25 │       p50 │       p75 │       p90 │       p99 │      p100 │   Samples │
╞══════════════════════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╡
│ Malloc (total) *         │         2 │         2 │         2 │         2 │         2 │         2 │         2 │         5 │
├──────────────────────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┤
│ Time (wall clock) (ns) * │       563 │       564 │       578 │       578 │       581 │       581 │       581 │         5 │
╘══════════════════════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╛

mlkem768-decapsulate (before)
╒══════════════════════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╕
│ Metric                   │        p0 │       p25 │       p50 │       p75 │       p90 │       p99 │      p100 │   Samples │
╞══════════════════════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╡
│ Malloc (total) *         │         4 │         4 │         4 │         4 │         4 │         4 │         4 │        10 │
├──────────────────────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┤
│ Time (wall clock) (μs) * │        48 │        49 │        50 │        51 │        51 │        51 │        51 │        10 │
╘══════════════════════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╛

mlkem768-decapsulate (after)
╒══════════════════════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╤═══════════╕
│ Metric                   │        p0 │       p25 │       p50 │       p75 │       p90 │       p99 │      p100 │   Samples │
╞══════════════════════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╪═══════════╡
│ Malloc (total) *         │         2 │         2 │         2 │         2 │         2 │         2 │         2 │        10 │
├──────────────────────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┤
│ Time (wall clock) (μs) * │        46 │        48 │        49 │        51 │        51 │        51 │        51 │        10 │
╘══════════════════════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╧═══════════╛
```
2026-11-02 08:31:17 +00:00
Si Beaumont 57de8e7cb8 Zero the entire pointee in UnsafeMutablePointer.zeroize (#491)
### Motivation:

We have some helper functions to zero out memory after use. One of these
helper functions provides a `zeroize()` method on
`UnsafeMutablePointer`, which has a subtle bug. It zeros out
`MemoryLayout.size(ofValue: Pointee.self)` instead of
`MemoryLayout<Pointee>.size`, so only the first 8 bytes get zeroed. This
bug is duplicated in CryptoExtras too in a fileprivate helper.

### Modifications:

- Zero the entire pointee in UnsafeMutablePointer.zeroize
- Copy Zeroization helpers from Crypto to CryptoExtras (without the `#if
canImport(CryptoKit)` guard)

### Result:

All the memory that should be zeroed by this helper is actually zeroed.
2026-10-23 11:46:45 +00:00
Si Beaumont 6a032cf17d Remove pre-6.2 compiler checks (#492)
### Motivation:

Tending the garden. This repo only supports Swift 6.2+ these days, but
we have some code that conditionally compiles based on compiler versions
that are either always false or always true.

### Modifications:

- Remove any pre-6.2 compiler check.

### Result:

Removing dead code.
2026-10-23 10:58:54 +00:00
Si Beaumont c2cbadd726 Merge commit from fork 2026-10-20 10:55:16 +02:00
deadcaf3 deb49b961e Bound the cost of RSA prime factor recovery (#484)
### Motivation:

`extractPrimeFactors` squares `t` times per attempt, where `t` is the
number of trailing zero bits of `e * d - 1`. Nothing bounds `e`, `d` or
`n`, so the caller picks the cost. A 2.5 KB `d` takes about 45 s before
throwing.

### Modifications:

- Reject `e >= n`, `d >= n`, and moduli over 8192 bits before factoring
- Throw once `g^(e * d - 1) != 1`, since then the numbers cannot form a
key
- Add tests for oversized and inconsistent numbers
- Keep the #482 attempt-limit test reaching the limit now that `e >= n`
is rejected

### Result:

These inputs now throw immediately. No public API change.

Valid keys aren't affected: they always have `e < n` and `d < n`, and
BoringSSL already rejects moduli over 8192 bits.

The oversized-number test fails on `main` and passes with this change.
The RSA tests pass on macOS.

Fixes #483
2026-10-20 09:38:39 +01:00
deadcaf3 0f6f68df04 Bound prime factor recovery in RSA _createFromNumbers (#482)
### Motivation:

`_createFromNumbers(n:e:d:)` can hang forever on some inputs. `e = 1, d
= 1` is enough to trigger it

`extractPrimeFactors` is meant to stop after 100 tries, but the
`continue` for a trivial base (`y` is `1` or `n - 1`) skipped the
counter. If every base is trivial, the loop never ends

### Modifications:

- Use `for _ in 0..<100` so every try counts
- Throw early when `e * d == 1`
- Add tests for both failing inputs

### Result:

These inputs now throw instead of hanging. No public API change.

The new tests hang on `main` and pass with this change. The full suite
passes on macOS and Linux.

Valid keys arent affected. Each try works at least half the time, so 100
failed tries wont happen in practice.

Fixes a hang in `_createFromNumbers(n:e:d:)`.

Fixes #481
2026-10-16 13:53:27 +00:00
Si Beaumont 1c80d3aff5 Require compressed encoding when deserializing OPRF elements (#479)
### Motivation:

`P384._VOPRF.BlindedElement(oprfRepresentation:)` accepts uncompressed
x9.63 encoded inputs, but RFC 9497 states
only inputs using compressed encoding should be accepted:

```
SerializeElement(A): Implemented using the compressed Elliptic-Curve-Point-to-Octet-String method...

DeserializeElement(buf): Implemented by attempting to deserialize a 49-byte array to a public key
                         using the compressed Octet-String-to-Elliptic-Curve-Point method...
```

### Modifications:

- Add input guard to only accept points using compressed representation.
- Extend the tests.

### Result:

- OPRF element deserialization accepts only the compressed encoding.
- Uncompressed encodings now throw
`CryptoKitError.incorrectParameterSize`.
2026-10-09 11:38:27 +00:00
Si Beaumont 25847ff705 Make ARC presentation verification cost independent of the nonce (#478)
### Motivation:

ARC presentation verification derives the tag using a loop that scales
with the client-provided nonce, but it has everything it needs to
recompute it with a scalar multiplication.

### Modifications:

- Add a failing test.
- Recompute `m1Tag` as `T - nonceScalar * self.tag`, the same way the
prover does.

### Result:

ARC presentation verification computation independent of magnitude of
nonce.
2026-10-09 11:17:31 +00:00
a9d1d5ab89 Merge the 5.x branch for the Swift Crypto 5.0 release (#470)
## Motivation

Xcode 27 is now available[^1] so it's time to merge in our 5.x branch to
main and release 5.0.

## Modifications

See "Release Notes" section below for overview of changes and links to
the PRs that landed on the 5.x branch during the beta period.

## Result

The main branch will be ready to tag a 5.0 release.

[^1]: https://developer.apple.com/download/all/?q=Xcode%2027

---

## Release Notes

Swift Crypto 5.0 aligns the cross-platform API surface with CryptoKit as
shipped in Xcode 27 (CryptoKit-383.2.1), and takes the opportunity to
streamline the package for both adopters and maintainers.

Most users will be able to depend on the 1.0.0, 2.0.0, 3.0.0, 4.0.0, or
5.0.0 series of releases.

To do so, please use the following dependency in your `Package.swift`:

```swift
.package(url: "https://github.com/apple/swift-crypto.git", "1.0.0" ..< "6.0.0"),
```

### Requires Swift 6.2

The package now declares 6.2 as the minimum Swift version in its package
manifest.

### New span-based API

CryptoKit's new non-allocating, span-based entry points are now
available cross-platform:

- `SymmetricKey` gains `bytes: RawSpan`, `init(copying: RawSpan)`,
`init(copyingWithZeroing: inout MutableRawSpan)`, and
`init(size:initializingWith:)` which initializes the key through an
`inout OutputRawSpan`.
- `HashFunction` gains `update(bytes: RawSpan)` and `hash(bytes:
RawSpan)`, and `Digest` gains `init?(copying: RawSpan)`.
- `HMAC` gains `authenticationCode(for: RawSpan, using:)`.
- `HKDF` gains `deriveKey(inputKeyMaterial:salt:info:output:)` writing
into an `inout OutputRawSpan`, along with span-based `extract` and
`expand`. The existing `DataProtocol` overload now has a fast path for
contiguous salt and info.
- `AES.GCM` and `ChaChaPoly` gain in-place
`seal(inPlace:using:nonce:authenticating:tag:)` and
`open(inPlace:using:nonce:authenticating:tag:)` over `MutableRawSpan`,
and their `Nonce` types gain `bytes: RawSpan` and `init(copying:
RawSpan)`.

### Single-use KEM keys

A new `KEMOneTimePrivateKey` protocol, refining `~Copyable` and
`Sendable`, provides a `consuming func decapsulate(_:)` so a
decapsulation key cannot be reused. Conforming types are
`MLKEM768.OneTimePrivateKey`, `MLKEM1024.OneTimePrivateKey`, and
`XWingMLKEM768X25519.OneTimePrivateKey`.

### Extensible enums

Historically Swift Crypto needed a new major version each time CryptoKit
added a case to a non-frozen enum, because Swift Crypto is not built
with library evolution. All public non-frozen enums are now marked
`@nonexhaustive` (SE-0487), which should remove that reason for future
major bumps. Adopters who do not switch over these enums should not need
to widen their version constraints again.

### Other changes

- Symbols that were previously marked `@_spi(...) public` have been made
internal; they were never intended to be available.
- `@available` annotations have been removed from `Crypto`; they are
unused in all supported compilation modes.
- Some internal reference types are now marked `final`
- Some unused code, e.g. `ECDSASignature.derBytes`, is removed.

### Build and packaging

- The `CCryptoBoringSSLShims` target is removed, along with all
`bindMemory(to:)` calls.
- The `.gyb` templates for nonces, digests, ECDH, ECDSA, MLDSA, and
MLKEM are removed and the generated Swift is checked in. The BoringSSL
backend templates for MLDSA and MLKEM remain.
- Conditional compilation is simplified to `#if canImport(CryptoKit)`;
branches that could never be taken are gone.
- Developing the BoringSSL backend on macOS is no longer supported. Use
the Dev Container configuration now shipped in the repository, or build
on the target platform.
- Warnings are silenced for vendored C sources: `-Wshorten-64-to-32` for
BoringSSL and `macro-redefined` for XKCP. CI builds with
`-warnings-as-errors`.

### Commits

The changes in this release were reviewed and merged to the 5.x branch
during the beta period:

- 0a26a9e3 [5.x] Align with CryptoKit APIs from Xcode 27 beta 1 (#442)
- 8ee9962f [5.x] Align with CryptoKit APIs from Xcode 27 beta 2 (#444)
- ce8db476 [5.x] Align with CryptoKit APIs from Xcode 27 beta 4 (#453)
- 15b0fb5b [5.x] Adopt CheckImplementationOnly and CI with
-warnings-as-errors (#454)
- b3746b14 [5.x] Remove bindMemory(to:) calls and the
CCryptoBoringSSLShims target (#455)
- 57782dc6 [5.x] Remove duplicate imports from gyb-generated MLDSA
backend code (#458)
- 2c45ca2f [5.x] Remove unused internal code path:
ECDSASignature.derBytes (#457)
- 33785f67 [5.x] Mark some class types as final (#456)
- 2e074efb [5.x] Remove native SwiftPM build-system workaround in CI
(#461)
- 20f90497 [5.x] Align with CryptoKit from Xcode 27 beta 6 (#462)

---------

Co-authored-by: Dmitry <45711841+darkdi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Cory Benfield <lukasa@apple.com>
2026-09-16 14:47:34 +01:00
Si BeaumontandCory Benfield da9d28d69e Enforce a 2048-bit minimum on RSA raw number initializers (#467)
### Motivation:

The RSA initializers that take raw numbers, e.g. `init(n:e:)` and
friends, do not enforce a minimum key size.

Our other public API has two lower bounds: the "safe" APIs, e.g.
`init(pemRepresentation:)`, which has a 2048-bit lower bound, and the
"unsafe" variants, e.g. `init(unsfafePEMRepresentation:)`, which has a
1024-bit minimum.

Given the raw number initializers do not state they are unsafe, they
should probably have a 2048-bit minimum too.

### Modifications:

- Add a 2048-bit minimum key length check to the raw number
initializers.
- Update the documentation to match the wording on the PEM and DER
initializers.
- Extend the tests.

### Result:

The RSA initializers that take raw numbers, e.g. `init(n:e:)` and
friends, now enforce a 2048-bit minimum key length.

Co-authored-by: Cory Benfield <lukasa@apple.com>
2026-09-01 18:48:04 +01:00
Si Beaumont f79a3ffbc0 Compute RSA key size from the modulus bit length (#466)
### Motivation:

The BoringSSL RSA backing computes `keySizeInBits` using `RSA_size(key)
* 8`, which is incorrect. `RSA_size` returns the number of bytes
required to represent the modulus, so is rounding up to the nearest
byte.

Because of this, the minimum key strength checks are slightly off. For
example, 1017-bit keys are accepted by initializers that document a 1024
minimum, and similar for the initializers guarding for a 2048-bit
minimum.

### Modifications:

- Compute `keySizeInBits` using `RSA_bits` instead of `RSA_size`, which
returns the modulus bit length.
- Add a `modulusByteCount` property, which does still use `RSA_size`,
and use it for the block-size checks.
- Document the byte-alignment requirement of
`_RSA.Encryption.init(pemRepresentation:)` and friends.
- Update and add more tests.

### Result:

- RSA `keySizeInBits` correctly reports the modulus bit length.
- The documented minimum key length requirements are now correctly
enforced, closing a 7-bit gap.
2026-09-01 18:12:06 +01:00
Dmitry 315a799ccc Match the documented parameter names to the signatures (#463) 2026-08-31 21:00:33 +00:00
Si Beaumont 47d3869a72 Merge commit from fork
* Fix double-free when RSA key init from bytes fails

Motivation:

When initializing an RSA public key from DER or PEM bytes throws an error,
we double-free of the `EVP_PKEY*`: first in the catch block, then in the
backing `deinit`. The first of these should be removed.

Modifications:

Remove the duplicative call to `EVP_PKEY_free`.

Result:

Fixed double-free of `EVP_PKEY*` when failing to initialize RSA public
key from bytes.

Testing:

Tests have been added that reliably fail under ASan:

```console
% swift --version
Swift version 6.3.2 (swift-6.3.2-RELEASE)
Target: aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu

% env ASAN_OPTIONS=detect_leaks=0 swift test -c release --sanitize=address \
  --filter test_invalidPEMPublicKeyThrowsWithoutDoubleFree \
  --filter test_invalidDERPublicKeyThrowsWithoutDoubleFree

Test Suite 'Selected tests' started at 2026-07-06 09:36:58.468
Test Suite 'TestRSASigning' started at 2026-07-06 09:36:58.469
Test Case 'TestRSASigning.test_invalidDERPublicKeyThrowsWithoutDoubleFree' started at 2026-07-06 09:36:58.469
Test Case 'TestRSASigning.test_invalidDERPublicKeyThrowsWithoutDoubleFree' passed (0.001 seconds)
Test Case 'TestRSASigning.test_invalidPEMPublicKeyThrowsWithoutDoubleFree' started at 2026-07-06 09:36:58.470
Test Case 'TestRSASigning.test_invalidPEMPublicKeyThrowsWithoutDoubleFree' passed (0.001 seconds)
Test Suite 'TestRSASigning' passed at 2026-07-06 09:36:58.471
         Executed 2 tests, with 0 failures (0 unexpected) in 0.002 (0.002) seconds
Test Suite 'Selected tests' passed at 2026-07-06 09:36:58.471
         Executed 2 tests, with 0 failures (0 unexpected) in 0.002 (0.002) seconds
◇ Test run started.
↳ Testing Library Version: 6.3.2 (70eff261d7f462c)
↳ Target Platform: aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu
✔ Test run with 0 tests in 0 suites passed after 0.001 seconds.
```

* Have only one designated init for BoringSSLRSAPublicKey.Backing
2026-07-16 13:29:36 +01:00
Si Beaumont c3d9fc8938 Back AES-CBC with BoringSSL and constant-time PKCS#7 unpadding (#448)
### Motivation:

Our AES-CBC padding check is a padding-oracle timing side channel.
Validation short-circuits on the first mismatching byte, so the time
taken leaks padding validity; an attacker with a decryption oracle could
recover plaintext without the key. The AES core is already
BoringSSL-backed, so the remaining fix is to move the CBC mode onto
BoringSSL and update padding removal to be constant-time.

Aside: padding removal cannot be delegated to BoringSSL, whose generic
unpad is itself a documented padding oracle absent authentication.

### Modifications:

- Replace the Swift CBC block loop in `AES._CBC` with BoringSSL's
`AES_cbc_encrypt`.
- Add padding on encrypt in Swift, since `AES_cbc_encrypt` does not pad.
- Replace `trimPadding` with `removingPKCS7PaddingConstantTime`
- Add regression tests rejecting over-long pad lengths.
- Add unpad tests for every valid length.
- Add unpad tests for every corruption position.

### Result:

AES-CBC is BoringSSL-backed and padding validation runs in constant
time, removing a timing side channel.
2026-07-16 12:28:36 +00:00
2d37b1192f Adopt FoundationEssentials instead of Foundation where available (#317)
Use `FoundationEssentials` if available.

<!-- Thanks for contributing to Swift Crypto! Before you submit your
issue, please make sure you followed our checklist and check the
appropriate boxes by putting an x in the [ ]: [x] -->

### Checklist
- [x] I've run tests to see all new and existing tests pass (macOS and
linux)
- [x] I've followed the code style of the rest of the project
- [x] I've read the [Contribution Guidelines](CONTRIBUTING.md)
- [x] I've updated the documentation if necessary

#### If you've made changes to `gyb` files
- [ ] I've run `.script/generate_boilerplate_files_with_gyb` and
included updated generated files in a commit of this pull request
```
bash .script/generate_boilerplate_files_with_gyb
bash: .script/generate_boilerplate_files_with_gyb: No such file or directory
```

### Motivation:

Would be great that packages that depend on `swift-crypto` can be built
without linking full `Foundation`.

### Modifications:

This patch simply replaces `import Foundation` with a conditional
`import FoundationEssentials`.

In some files this also required to explicitly import the C standard
lib.

Maybe we could follow the same approach as in
https://github.com/swiftlang/swift-tools-support-core/blob/main/Sources/TSCLibc/libc.swift
and add an internal module that abstracts this import dance in a single
place.

### Result:

After this change the package should only depend on
`FoundationEssentials`.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Cory Benfield <lukasa@apple.com>
2026-04-17 15:06:53 +00:00
Andreas BauerandCory Benfield c5b1d7f0cb Add support for SHA-512/256 (#432)
Add SHA-512/256 digest implementation via BoringSSL

### Checklist
- [x] I've run tests to see all new and existing tests pass
- [x] I've followed the code style of the rest of the project
- [x] I've read the [Contribution Guidelines](CONTRIBUTING.md)
- [x] I've updated the documentation if necessary

#### If you've made changes to `gyb` files
- [N/A] I've run `.script/generate_boilerplate_files_with_gyb` and
included updated generated files in a commit of this pull request

### Motivation:

Neither CryptoKit nor swift-crypto currently explore the SHA-512/256
hashing function. SHA-512/256 provides the same 256-bit security level
as SHA-256 but can be significantly faster on 64-bit platforms because
it uses the SHA-512 internal structure, which operates on 64-bit words.

### Modifications:

We modified CryptoExtras to include support using the BoringSSL
implementation.

### Result:

Swift ecosystem supports SHA-512/256.

---------

Co-authored-by: Cory Benfield <lukasa@apple.com>
2026-04-17 14:02:55 +00:00
Francesco Paolo Severino a5a71cfcbc Add support for encrypted PEM keys via BoringSSL (#428)
Add support for creating RSA private keys from encrypted PEM files.

### Checklist
- [X] I've run tests to see all new and existing tests pass
- [X] I've followed the code style of the rest of the project
- [X] I've read the [Contribution Guidelines](CONTRIBUTING.md)
- [X] I've updated the documentation if necessary

#### If you've made changes to `gyb` files
- [ ] I've run `./scripts/generate_boilerplate_files_with_gyb.sh` and
included updated generated files in a commit of this pull request

### Motivation:

Resolves #264

### Modifications:

Adds an initializer to `_RSA.Signing.PrivateKey` that takes the
encrypted PEM representation and the encryption password and calls the
high-level BoringSSL function to parse the encrypted key format.

Tests were copied from #318 by @ptoffy.

### Result:

RSA private keys can be created from encrypted PEM files.
2026-02-23 13:29:41 +00:00
Mike SchragandMike Schrag 6f70fa9eab Add RSA PKCSv1.5 padding support for legacy compat (#425)
Add RSA PKCSv1.5 padding support for legacy compat

### Checklist
- [X] I've run tests to see all new and existing tests pass
- [X] I've followed the code style of the rest of the project
- [X] I've read the [Contribution Guidelines](CONTRIBUTING.md)
- [X] I've updated the documentation if necessary

#### If you've made changes to `gyb` files
- [n/a] I've run `./scripts/generate_boilerplate_files_with_gyb.sh` and
included updated generated files in a commit of this pull request

### Motivation:
I have a scenario that requires me to be able to encrypt and decrypt
values that use RSA PKCSv1.5 padding. This is known to be a weak
algorithm, so we explicitly want to discourage its use, but there are
scenarios where you need the algorithm for legacy compatibility, so we
want to provide the capability, even if we strongly discourage its use.

### Modifications:
Added a new enum + constant + passthrough to allow users to specify RSA
PKCSv1.5. From the internal review, we thought it would be best to
explicitly name the constants in a way that discouraged use without very
intentional needs, hence the "weak" and "insecure" references in all of
the naming.

### Result:
You can now specify PKCSv1.5 padding for use in encryption and
decryption. This is only adding constants, and the enums are not public,
so there should not be any impact on compatibility (source or binary).

Co-authored-by: Mike Schrag <schrag@apple.com>
2025-11-19 20:31:42 +00:00
Mike SchragandMike Schrag e8ed8867ec Incorrect maximum encryption size for RSA OAEP (#423)
Incorrect maximum encryption size for RSA OAEP

### Checklist
- [X] I've run tests to see all new and existing tests pass
- [X] I've followed the code style of the rest of the project
- [X] I've read the [Contribution Guidelines](CONTRIBUTING.md)
- [X] I've updated the documentation if necessary

#### If you've made changes to `gyb` files
- [n/a] I've run `./scripts/generate_boilerplate_files_with_gyb.sh` and
included updated generated files in a commit of this pull request

### Motivation:
The `maximumEncryptSize` function is hardcoded to use 42 as the hash
offset, but the RFC actually says it's "2*hLen-2" so 42 is only valid
for SHA1. SHA256 should be 62 (2*32-2). This adds a hash length onto the
Digest enum, which can then be used in the length calculation.

In writing the tests for this, I also stumbled on the unsafe PEM
representation for RSA Public Keys don't allow 1024-bit keys as
documented, so this also fixes that.

### Modifications:
* Added a `hashBitLength` to the RSA Digest which is then used in the
`maximumEncryptSize` to properly compute the maximum length
* Corrected the minimum key size for RSA unsafe PEM public keys to 1024
from 2048

### Result:
* The `maximumEncryptSize` function will return the expected value for
RSA OAEP SHA256 keys. I don't believe anything calls this internally, so
this would be for external consumers.
* Unsafe construction of RSA public keys now allow 1024 bit keys. It was
documented as supporting them, but the check was still 2048 (probably
copy-paste error from the safe variant). This only expands the potential
uses, so it shouldn't introduce any new failures.

Co-authored-by: Mike Schrag <schrag@apple.com>
2025-10-29 10:58:46 +00:00
Paul Toffoloni 87a9e066d9 Add PEM/DER APIs for Curve25519 (#419)
Add PEM/DER APIs for Curve25519

### Checklist
- [x] I've run tests to see all new and existing tests pass
- [x] I've followed the code style of the rest of the project
- [x] I've read the [Contribution Guidelines](CONTRIBUTING.md)
- [x] I've updated the documentation if necessary

#### If you've made changes to `gyb` files
- [ ] I've run `./scripts/generate_boilerplate_files_with_gyb.sh` and
included updated generated files in a commit of this pull request

### Motivation:

Closes #82 
Creating Ed25519/X25519 keys using PEM/DER and also generating their
PEM/DER representations can be handy

### Modifications:

Added 
- `init(pemRepresentation:)` and the `pemRepresentation` computed
property
- `init(derRepresentation:)` and the `derRepresentation` computed
property

to `Curve25519.{Signing,KeyAgreement}.{Private,Public}Key`

### Result:

Curve25519 can now be created with and can produce PEM/DER
representations
2025-10-23 12:35:45 +01:00
+6 431013afaf Update to WWDC25 release (#417)
This change updates Crypto to WWDC25 equivalent code.

Each of these changes were individually merged to the WWDC25 branch.
This includes:

- #359
- #363
- #365
- #367
- #368
- #397
- #403
- #410
- #407
- #401
- #415

---------

Co-authored-by: YourMJK <37852512+YourMJK@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Si Beaumont <beaumont@apple.com>
Co-authored-by: Rick Newton-Rogers <rnro@apple.com>
Co-authored-by: Raphael <josephnoir@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Evan Wilde <ewilde@apple.com>
Co-authored-by: Tim Condon <0xTim@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Gus Cairo <gus.cairo@apple.com>
Co-authored-by: George Barnett <gbarnett@apple.com>
Co-authored-by: Fabrice de Gans <Steelskin@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Wojciech Nagrodzki <278594+wnagrodzki@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Jesse L. Zamora <xtremekforever@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: aryan-25 <aryan_shah@apple.com>
Co-authored-by: Gwynne Raskind <gwynne@vapor.codes>
Co-authored-by: 3405691582 <dsk@google.com>
Co-authored-by: Paul Toffoloni <69189821+ptoffy@users.noreply.github.com>
2025-09-26 11:55:11 +01:00